COCKRELL, RAY LEE v. the State of Texas

In the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas
════════════
No. PD-0760-24
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RAY LEE COCKRELL, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS

═══════════════════════════════════════
On State’s Petition for Discretionary Review
From the Sixth Court of Appeals
Bowie County
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YEARY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK,
P.J., and KEEL, MCCLURE, and PARKER, JJ., joined. MCCLURE, J., filed a
concurring opinion in which KEEL, J., joined. RICHARDSON, J., concurred
in the result. FINLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which NEWELL and
WALKER, JJ., joined.

Appellant was convicted of injury to a child by omission after his
dogs attacked a young child. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04. But the court of
appeals reversed that conviction—holding that the State failed to show
COCKRELL – 2

that Appellant had a statutory duty to protect the child. The issue before
this Court, now, is whether Section 822.042(a) of the Texas Health and
Safety Code can serve as the source of a “statutory duty to act” for
purposes of satisfying the elements of injury to a child by omission. TEX.
PENAL CODE § 22.04; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 822.042(a). We
conclude that Section 822.042(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code
can serve as the statutory duty for purposes of injury to a child by
omission. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Appellant lived outside the city limits of Texarkana on some
property he owned. He also owned numerous pit bulls that he kept on
that same property. Curiously, while he lived in a make-shift tent on the
property, his dogs resided inside a trailer that he also kept there.
The property was enclosed by a fence. But the fence was
insufficient to contain the dogs. So, on several occasions in 2021 and
2022, the dogs escaped the property—attacking both people and animals
alike.
After one instance, when the dogs attacked a neighbor’s horse, a
deputy from the Bowie County Sheriff’s Office (BSCO) issued Appellant
a written “DOGS DANGEROUS TO ANIMALS DOG OWNER’S
NOTIFICATION.” The notice referenced Chapter 822 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code. During this interaction, Appellant
acknowledged that his dogs were dangerous. 1 This occurred on July 13,

At trial, the deputy testified that Appellant made this
1

acknowledgement. The notification also served to put Appellant on notice that
he had dangerous dogs.
COCKRELL – 3

2021.
Even after that incident, Appellant’s dogs continued their
attacks. Just one month later, in August of 2021, the dogs attacked a
woman who had been driving a scooter past Appellant’s property. That
same day, they again attacked the neighbor’s horse. Then, in May of
2022, they attacked a girl as she walked past Appellant’s home—biting
her and stripping her of her clothing.
A few weeks later, Appellant’s dogs entered a different neighbor’s
yard and killed that neighbor’s dog. In August of 2022, the dogs again
entered that same neighbor’s yard. This time, the neighbor contacted
BCSO. When officers arrived, the dogs charged at the officers—forcing
the officers to shoot at the dogs, which caused the dogs to retreat back
to Appellant’s property.
On September 5, 2022, the dogs attacked N.S., and that event
served as the factual basis for the indictment in this case. N.S., who was
just ten years old at the time of trial, had gone for a swim with his
cousins and older sister at a nearby pond. While N.S. was walking home
to his grandparents’ house, Appellant’s dogs surrounded and attacked
him. His sister attempted to fend off the dogs by beating them with a
stick. Meanwhile, one of the cousins called his father for help.
The father arrived in his truck and helped N.S.’s sister to fend off
the dogs before driving all of the children home. Ultimately, an
ambulance arrived and transported N.S. to the hospital, where N.S.
underwent surgery to repair injuries caused by Appellant’s dogs.
According to the surgeon, N.S. suffered “serious” injuries from multiple
dog bites.
COCKRELL – 4

B. The Trial
Appellant was indicted for committing an offense defined by
Section 22.04(a) of the Penal Code. 2 The indictment alleged that
Appellant “intentionally or knowingly by omission, cause[d] serious
bodily injury to [N.S.]” when he had a duty to act pursuant to Texas
Health and Safety Code Section 822.042(a) and/or Section 822.042(b).
The indictment also specified that Appellant failed to restrain or enclose
his dangerous dogs. Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of
injury to a child by omission, a first-degree felony, and sentenced to
confinement for thirty-five years. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.32(a) (“An
individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the first degree shall be
punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years.”).
C. The Appeal
Appellant argued on appeal “that the State neither alleged nor
proved the statutory elements of the offense.” 3 Cockrell v. State, No. 06-
23-00230-CR, 2024 WL 3709879, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 8,
2024) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court of appeals

2 Section 22.04(a) provides: “A person commits an offense if he
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes to a child, elderly
individual, or disabled individual: (1) serious bodily injury; (2) serious mental
deficiency, impairment, or injury; or (3) bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE §
22.04(a).

3 In a companion case, Appellant challenged his separate conviction for

the offense of attack by dog causing serious bodily injury. TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 833.005(b). He argued there was jury charge error, and the
court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. Cockrell v. State, No. 06-
23-00229-CR, 2024 WL 3708996 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 8, 2024) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
COCKRELL – 5

agreed. Id. It explained that an omission, under Section 22.04(a) of the
Penal Code, is an offense only if “(1) the actor has a legal or statutory
duty to act; or (2) the actor has assumed care, custody, or control of a
child.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(b)).
It highlighted the State’s concession that every court opinion addressing
an injury to a child case so far has looked to the Texas Family Code to
supply the “statutory duty[,]” and it suggested that importing a duty
from a statute outside of the Family Code would allow such things as
traffic violations to impose first-degree felony liability for injury to a
child. Id. at *3.
The court of appeals also determined that the State’s
interpretation—that any outside statute could supply a duty—was
unsupported by any court precedent. Id. Because Section 822.042 itself
does not expressly (1) provide that omissions under that section are an
offense or (2) contain a statutory duty specifically directed to the child,
the court of appeals determined that Appellant had no statutory duty to
act to protect N.S. Id. Accordingly, it decided that the State did not
allege or prove the necessary elements to support the conviction. Id. It
reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered a judgment of
acquittal. Id.
In dissent, Justice Rambin argued that the plain language of
Section 22.04(b)(1) does not limit what duties may be imported. Id. at *4
(Rambin, J., dissenting). He argued that, in the context of injury to a
child by reckless act, liability has previously been upheld by a court of
appeals even when an actor does not know the child. Id. at *5–6 (citing
Durkovitz v. State, 771 S.W.2d 12, 13–14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989,
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no pet.)). He explained that he would modify the conviction to reckless
injury to a child by omission, a second-degree felony—which carries a
maximum sentence of twenty years—and remand the case to the trial
court to re-assess punishment. Id. at *7.
The State sought discretionary review, but we granted review on
our own motion to address the following question: “Can the duty of an
owner of dangerous dogs to restrain or securely enclose them, TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 822.042(a), be imported to serve as a statutory
duty for purposes of injury to a child by omission?” 4
II. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. The Penal Offense at Issue
As relevant in this case, Section 22.04(a) of our Penal Code
establishes that a person “commits an offense if he . . . intentionally [or]
knowingly . . . by omission, causes to a child . . . serious bodily injury[.]”
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(a)(1) (emphasis added). An “omission” is
elsewhere defined as a “failure to act.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(34).
Section 6.01(c) of the Penal Code further provides that “[a] person who
omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as
defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or
otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.” TEX. PENAL
CODE § 6.01(c) (emphasis added). And Section 1.07 defines “law” in
pertinent part as “a statute of this state[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE §

4 We also granted a second ground for review that, in essence, asked: If

the importation of the dangerous-dog duty in Section 822.042(a) is improper
for injury to a child by omission, should the case be remanded for the lower
court to address the Appellant’s act of letting his dogs roam freely as a basis
for liability. Because we hold that the importation of the statutory duty from
in Section 822.042(a) is permissible, we do not reach that issue.
COCKRELL – 7

1.07(a)(30).
The statute at issue in this case—under which Appellant was
prosecuted—explains in relevant part that an intentional or knowing
“omission that causes [serious bodily injury] is conduct constituting an
offense . . . if: (1) the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act[.]” TEX.
PENAL CODE § 22.04(b) (emphasis added). As a result, the State was
required to prove in this case, among other things, that Appellant had a
legal or statutory duty to act. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(b)(1). We have
also described the offense at issue here as “a result-oriented offense.”
Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing
Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). This
means that proving a violation of the statute requires evidence that the
accused possessed a mental state that relates to “the result of that
conduct[,]” rather than simply to the conduct itself (or in this case, the
lack of conduct). Id. (emphasis added). In this context, the State’s burden
was to show that Appellant had a statutory duty to act, he failed to act,
and in failing to act, he either: (1) intended serious bodily injury to be
caused, or (2) knew serious bodily injury would be caused, but he still
failed to act. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04.
B. The Statutory Duty at Issue
Our Texas Health and Safety Code provides that, once an
individual learns that he owns a dangerous dog, certain duties are
imposed upon him. Section 822.042(a) specifically provides that:
Not later than the 30th day after a person learns
that the person is the owner of a dangerous dog, the person
shall: (1) register the dangerous dog with the animal
control authority for the area in which the dog is kept;
(2) restrain the dangerous dog at all times on a leash in the
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immediate control of a person or in a secure enclosure;
(3) obtain liability insurance coverage or show financial
responsibility in an amount of at least $100,000 to cover
damages resulting from an attack by the dangerous dog
causing bodily injury to a person and provide proof of the
required liability insurance coverage or financial
responsibility to the animal control authority for the area
in which the dog is kept; and (4) comply with an applicable
municipal or county regulation, requirement, or restriction
on dangerous dogs.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 822.042(a). Essentially, Subsection (a)
requires a person who learns that he owns a dangerous dog to (1)
register the dog; (2) restrain the dog on a leash or in a secure enclosure;
(3) obtain liability insurance or show financial responsibility; and (4)
comply with any local regulation, requirement, or restriction on
dangerous dogs. Id. And Subsection (b) requires “[t]he owner of a
dangerous dog who does not comply with Subsection (a) [to] deliver the
dog to the animal control authority not later than the 30th day after the
owner learns that the dog is a dangerous dog.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 822.042(b) (emphasis added). But section 822.042 does not itself
provide that an omission to perform one of these requirements is an
offense. So, the question in this case has become whether Section
822.042 nevertheless supplies “a [legal or statutory] duty to perform the
act.” Compare TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.01(c) (“duty to perform the act”),
with TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(b)(1) (“legal or statutory duty to act”).
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
This case requires us to construe—determine the meaning of—
several different statutes. Statutory construction involves deciding pure
questions of law. Ramos v. State, 303 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App.
COCKRELL – 9

2009). And so, we engage in statutory construction de novo—on a non-
deferential basis. Id.
When construing statutes, we begin with the language of the
statute itself. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). Generally, when “the plain language is clear and unambiguous,
our analysis ends[.]” Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d 511, 520–21 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). The Court has said that we will only depart from such a
plain reading of the text when the plain language “leads to absurd
results[.]” State v. Cuarenta, 707 S.W.3d 424, 427–28 (Tex. Crim. App.
2025). And absurd results, we have said, are those results “that the
Legislature could not possibly have intended[.]” Boykin v. State, 818
S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). But this exception has been
described as a “narrow” one because we assume the Legislature does not
act in absurd ways. Id.
Mere disagreement with a policy decision does not equate to an
absurd result. Getts v. State, 155 S.W.3d 153, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(quoting Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004)) (“It
is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and
to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.”). Indeed,
we may not “construe [a] statute in a manner that substitutes what we
believe is right or fair for what the [L]egislature has written.” Ex parte
Kibler, 664 S.W.3d 220, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Simply put, we do
not disturb policy decisions of the Legislature. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A Statutory Duty
The Texas Code Construction Act provides that the word shall
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“imposes a duty.” 5 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016(2). It explains that,
“unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily
requires a different construction or unless a different construction is
expressly provided by statute[,]” shall should be construed to impose a
duty. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016. Indeed, this Court has also said that
the word shall generally indicates a mandatory duty. In re Guerrero, 710
S.W.3d 798, 804(Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (citing Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d
355, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
As relevant here, Section 822.042(a) explicitly utilizes the word
shall immediately preceding the list of requirements imposed on a
person who learns they are the owner of a dangerous dog; no statute
dictates a different construction; and the context in which the word
appears does not require a different construction. Indeed, the title of
Section 822.042 also reads: “Requirements for Owners of Dangerous
Dogs.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 822.042 (emphasis added). And a
requirement is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[s]omething that
must be done because of a law or rule; something legally imposed, called
for, or demanded; an imperative command.” Requirement, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). It follows, then, that section 822.042
imposes a requirement, which is just another way of describing a duty
to act. Moreover, nothing within the text requires that Section 822.042
not be read to impose a mandatory duty.
Appellant argues, contrary to what seems to be the general rule
(i.e., that the word shall imposes a mandatory duty), that Subsection (a)

5 The Code Construction Act applies to the Health and Safety Code. See

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.002.
COCKRELL – 11

of Section 822.042 (requiring an owner to, among other things, restrain
a known dangerous dog by leash or enclosure) merely provides a
conditional or alternative duty. To support his argument, he suggests
that Subsection (b) of Section 822.042 permits the owner of a dangerous
dog to simply deliver the dog to animal control rather than to comply
with Subsection (a). In essence, Appellant argues that one could choose
under the law either to comply with Subsection (a) or Subsection (b), but
one need not comply with both. This, he contends, strips Subsection (a)
of any true, mandatory duty to restrain.
But, contrary to Applicant’s suggestion, Subsections (a) and (b) do
not impose alternative duties. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 822.042.
Subsection (a) utilizes mandatory language, indicating a mandatory—
not an alternative—duty. Id. Subsection (b)’s requirement to deliver the
dog to animal control does not in any way negate Subsection (a)’s
requirement to, among other things, restrain one’s dog. Id. Instead, it
imposes an additional, mandatory requirement for an owner who “does
not comply” with the duty imposed in Subsection (a). Id. (“The owner of
a dangerous dog who does not comply with Subsection (a) shall . . . .”).
In other words, Subsection (b) is the section that functions as a kind of
conditional duty that is triggered by the failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements set forth in Subsection (a). 6 Id.
To clarify, Subsection (a) still imposes a mandatory duty.

6 A conditional duty is “[a] duty that is conditioned on the occurrence of

an event other than the lapse of time.” Conditional Duty, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Comply means “to do what is required[.]” Comply,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added).
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Compliance with Subsection (a) is not optional. Subsection (b) merely
provides a fail-safe in the event that an owner of a dangerous dog fails
to comply with Subsection (a).
Appellant argues that the State alleged in the indictment that he
failed to restrain or enclose the dogs, but he contends the State did not
allege that he failed to turn them over to animal control. In this
argument, he points again to what he suggests is the conditional nature
of Subsection (a)’s requirements. He contends that because of the
conditional nature of Subsection (a), the State was required to allege in
its indictment, and the Court was required to include in its jury charge,
both of the requirements found in Subsections (a) and (b). 7 But this is
really an argument that concerns the adequacy of the pleadings and
propriety of the charge—not whether Section 822.042(a) imposes
mandatory duties. 8

7 It might be true that, upon compliance with the requirements of
Subsection (b), a hypothetical person may be relieved of the mandatory duties
imposed by Subsection (a). But there is no sense in which Subsection (b)
operates like an exception to the applicability of the requirements imposed by
Subsection (a), so that, if not pleaded and proved, the evidence would be
insufficient to sustain the judgment for that reason. Cf. TEX. PENAL CODE §
2.02(a) (“An exception to an offense in this code is so labeled by the phrase: ‘It
is an exception to the application of . . .’”). In any event, that question is not
before us, and we do not finally decide the answer to that question today.

8 Even assuming for the sake of argument that we agreed that
Subsection (b)’s requirement had to be included in the pleadings and charge,
with respect to the sufficiency claim that Appellant made in the lower court, a
jury could certainly have found in this case that he failed to deliver his dogs
within thirty days after learning that he owned a dangerous dog. The dogs
attacked a person in August of 2021, and May of 2022, before finally attacking
N.S. in September of 2022. So, even though Appellant’s jury was not tasked
with deciding whether he failed to deliver his dogs to the animal control
authority within the required timeframe, a rational jury could have decided
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We conclude that Section 822.042(a) plainly imposes a mandatory
duty to act.
B. Importing the Duty
Having confirmed that Section 822.042(a) imposes a mandatory
duty to act, we must now decide whether that duty can be imported to
the Penal Code to satisfy the statutory duty element contained in
Section 22.04(b)(1). Section 6.01 of the Penal Code contemplates, at least
with respect to omissions, that outside duties may be imported into
Penal Code offenses. It plainly states that an omission constitutes an
offense if a law provides a duty to perform an act. TEX. PENAL CODE §
6.01(c). According to the Penal Code, law includes a “statute of this
state[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(30). Because the Penal Code broadly
defines law to include statutes of this state, it follows that Section
822.042(a)—a statute of this state—can supply a duty to act sufficient
to satisfy the statutory duty element in Penal Code Section 22.04(b)(1).
Cf. Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (allowing
the importation of an extra-Penal-Code defense to a Penal Code
offense). 9

that the evidence was sufficient to show that he failed to comply with
Subsection (b). See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(“[S]ufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the
offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.”). As
for any potential inadequacy of the pleadings, that issue is not presently before
this Court on discretionary review.

9 The State suggests that the “Effect of Code” provision in the Penal

Code, which states that “provisions of Titles 1, 2, and 3 [of the Penal Code]
apply to offenses defined by other laws, unless the statute defining the offense
provides otherwise[,]” might provide a basis for importing the duty. TEX.
PENAL CODE § 1.03(b) (footnote omitted). But, as the Court has said before,
“[t]he point of § 1.03(b) was to specify when a Penal Code provision would apply
COCKRELL – 14

After all, the plain language of the statute at issue here does not
impose a limitation. It simply requires that “the actor has a legal or
statutory duty to act[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE 22.04(b)(1). And, in other
contexts, this Court has previously suggested that it could look outside
a penal statute to find a duty to act. State v. Guevara, 137 S.W.3d 55,
56–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Billingslea v. State, 780 S.W.2d
271, 273–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)) (“This duty to act could be contained
within the same statute that proscribes the offense . . . . Or the duty to
act could be found in a different statute[.]”). As discussed above, the
relevant provisions of Texas’ dangerous dog law impose a statutory duty
to act, and 22.04(b)(1) does not plainly limit what statutory duties from
outside the Penal Code can form the basis for liability under the statute.
Accordingly, we conclude that the provisions of 822.042(a) can serve as
the statutory duty to act for purposes of Section 22.04(b). 10

to an offense not contained in the Penal Code, not to specify how other laws
outside the Penal Code, such as those creating defenses, would apply to Penal
Code offenses.” Chase, 448 S.W.3d at 14 (footnotes omitted).

10 Appellant argues that this interpretation renders Section 22.04
unconstitutionally vague—both facially and as applied. Specifically, he alleges
that the Penal Code’s definition of law, which now includes common law, is too
expansive. But, as Appellant conceded at oral argument, this claim was raised
neither at trial nor on appeal. Consequently, it is not properly preserved. See
Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (rejecting an
unconstitutional-as-applied challenge when the appellant did not object at trial
that the statute was vague as applied to his conduct). Nevertheless, as
Appellant acknowledges, he was indicted pursuant to a statutory duty, not a
common law duty, so the concern that undergirds Appellant’s vagueness
challenge is not applicable on the facts of his case. See United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (citing United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 36 (1963)) (“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes
which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light
of the facts of the case at hand.”).
COCKRELL – 15

C. No Absurdity
The court of appeals expressed concern that a plain interpretation
of this statute might allow for the importation of duties embedded in, for
example, the Texas Transportation Code, and it suggested that such an
interpretation is unsupported by “caselaw.” Cockrell, 2024 WL 3709879,
at *3. Thus, without explicitly saying so, the court of appeals implicitly
hinted that an interpretation not previously adopted in a court opinion
is absurd. But the absurdity doctrine, itself, only applies if the
Legislature could not possibly have intended the result. Cuarenta, 707
S.W.3d at 427–28 (“If the language of the statute is plain, we follow that
language unless it leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not
have possibly intended.”). And we are not persuaded that the
Legislature “could not possibly have intended” that individuals who
cause serious bodily injury, even by omission, to vulnerable groups of
people—like children—are subject to greater criminal liability. See
Schlittler v. State, 488 S.W.3d 306, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing
Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)) (noting “a
compelling governmental interest in the protection of children”). That
decision is within the purview of the Legislature, and we are bound not
to encroach upon its policy decisions. 11

11 Both in the court of appeals and at oral argument, there was concern

regarding the propriety of subjecting individuals to a potential term of ninety-
nine years’ imprisonment for violating what might be considered a broad
statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.32(a) (setting the maximum punishment
for a first-degree felony at ninety-nine years). In particular, a concern was
expressed about whether the construction of Section 22.04 called for by the
State today might potentially subject individuals to heightened criminal
COCKRELL – 16

D. Duty Need Not Be Owed to a Particular Person
Additionally, the court of appeals concluded, and Appellant now
echoes, that the imported statutory duty must be to the child. But again,
that is not how the statute reads. 12 Very easily, the Legislature could
have written that “the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act [to/for
the child.]” Indeed, it explicitly references “a child” in Penal Code
Section 22.04(b)(2)—showing that it knows how to add clarifying
language regarding a particular child. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(b)(2);
see Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n,
518 S.W.3d 318, 329 (Tex. 2017) (citing R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex.
Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 628 (Tex.
2011)) (“When the Legislature uses a word or phrase in one part of a
statute but excludes it from another, the term should not be implied
where it has been excluded.”). So, its decision not to utilize that language

liability for commonplace conduct. But the Legislature itself addressed these
concerns.
A limiting principle is inherently embedded within Section 22.04’s mens
rea requirement. Critically, the offense at issue here is a “result-oriented
offense[,]” which requires “a mental state that relates not to the specific
conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750 (citing
Alvarado, 704 S.W.2d at 39). So, a mere omission, even when one has a duty
to act, does not automatically subject an individual to liability. Instead, “[t]he
State must prove that a defendant caused a child’s serious bodily injury with
the requisite criminal intent.” Id. (citing Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 490–
92 (Tex. Crim. App.1994)).

12 The dissent conducts an overview of the legislative history
surrounding the injury to a child act, but at no point does it argue that the
language of the statute is not plain. And this failure is fatal because, as this
Court has said, “the plain language of a statute, not the legislative history
behind it, dictates our interpretation of that statute.” State v. Johnson, 939
S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
COCKRELL – 17

in Section 22.04(b)(1) of the same law should be construed as purposeful.
For us to unilaterally add it amounts to an act of judicial amendment of
the statute to suit our own policy concerns. We cannot do that. Instead,
“if [the Legislature] enacted into law something different from what it
intended, it should amend the statute to conform [it] to its [true]
intent.” 13 Cuarenta, 707 S.W.3d at 428 (citing Getts, 155 S.W.3d at 158).
Also, the cases the court of appeals relied on to suggest that the
duty must be to the child are distinguishable. 14 For instance, the court
of appeals discussed Billingslea v. State for the proposition that the
statutory duty must be to a particular individual. Cockrell, 2024 WL
3709879, at *1 (citing Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 276). But Billingslea
analyzed a pre-amendment version of Section 22.04 that is strikingly
different from the version that exists today. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at
271–72. There, the Appellant was charged with injury to an elderly
person by omission under Section 22.04, but the State did not allege a
statutory duty to act. Id. at 271. At one point, the Court suggested that

13 The dissent suggests that this reading might “spark the Legislature

to correct us[.]” Dissenting Opinion at 15. But because we are simply applying
the plain language that the Legislature enacted, the Legislature would be
correcting itself. See Cuarenta, 707 S.W.3d at 428 (citing Getts, 155 S.W.3d at
158). Our job, particularly when the language of a statute is plain, is to enforce
the words of the statute, not estimate what the Legislature might have
intended through those words. Getts, 155 S.W.3d at 158.

14 For example, the court of appeals cited Hawkins v. State. Cockrell,

2024 WL 3709879, at *3 (citing Hawkins v. State, 891 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994). But Hawkins involved the construction of Section
22.04(b)(2)—which addresses “care, custody, or control of a child,” not statutory
duties. Hawkins 891 S.W.2d at 258. Accordingly, any passing suggestion that
Section 22.04(b)(1) required an outside duty to the child was nothing more than
dicta.
COCKRELL – 18

there must be a statutory duty “to care for an elderly person.” Id. at 276.
However, even assuming that were true, it is not controlling given that
the Court decided the case pursuant to the pre-amendment version of
the statute. Id. at 271–72.
At the time that Billingslea was decided, Section 22.04 did not
address what sort of omission would count as conduct constituting an
offense, as it does today. Id. at 271–72. So, the Court was not addressing
statutory language—like that present in the statute applicable here—
that explicitly provides that an omission is an offense if “the actor has a
legal or statutory duty to act[.]” 15 TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(b)(1). As a
result, an application of Billingslea’s supposed requirement that the
duty must go to a particular individual is questionable at best—it stems
from the pre-amendment version of the statute.
Furthermore, in Guevara, this Court suggested that Billingslea
does not require that the duty be owed to any particular individual. See
State v. Guevara, 137 S.W.3d at 56–57. The Court explained there that
“[w]e concluded that we would have to look outside the ‘injury to a child
or elderly individual’ statute to find a duty to act.” Id. at 57 (citing
Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 274). Indeed, the State failed to establish the
omission offense in Billingslea precisely “because it could not show that
the defendant had a duty to act.” Id. (citing Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at
276). So, contrary to the court of appeals decision, Guevara did not read

15 The court of appeals’ reliance on Florio v. State, Cockrell, 2024 WL

3709879, at *3 (citing Florio v. State, 784 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990)), shares the same flaw. See Florio 784 S.W.2d at 417 (analyzing the
previous version of Section 22.04).
COCKRELL – 19

Billingslea to require a duty to a particular person or child—it simply
read it to require a duty to act, period.
As recently as 2022, this Court described Billingslea in precisely
that way. See Cyr v. State, 665 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)
(quoting Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 274) (“[A]n omission is punished only
when there is ‘a corresponding duty to act.’”). Properly read, Billingslea
simply highlights that, “in order for there to be an omission [that will
satisfy Section 22.04(b)(1)], there must be a corresponding duty to act.”
Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 274. And current Section 22.04(b)(1), which
existed when Billingslea was decided, but was not addressed there, does
not dictate that the duty to act must be owed to any particular person.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Section 822.042(a) of the Health and
Safety Code constitutes a “statutory duty to act” for purposes of Section
22.04(b)(1) of the Penal Code. The case is remanded to the court of
appeals to reconduct its sufficiency of the evidence analysis and, if
necessary, to address any other points of error raised on appeal.

DELIVERED: August 20, 2025
PUBLISH