NEWTON, CHRISTOPHER LYNN v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0363-24
PD-0364-24

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

CHRISTOPHER LYNN NEWTON, Appellee

ON APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
NAVARRO COUNTY

WALKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK, P.J.,
and RICHARDSON, YEARY, NEWELL, MCCLURE, FINLEY, and PARKER, JJ., joined.
KEEL, J., concurred.

OPINION

Appellee Christopher Lynn Newton was arrested without a warrant after an officer

investigated the scene of a one-vehicle collision where the vehicle had already left, followed

tire marks from the scene to a damaged truck which was parked outside of a house, and asked

the occupant of the house, Appellee, to come outside, where the officer then observed signs
2

that Appellee was intoxicated. State v. Newton, 689 S.W.3d 397, 400–01 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2024). The trial court ruled that the warrantless arrest was

unlawful because Appellee was at his home which was not a suspicious place, id. at 405, and

there were no exigent circumstances. Id. at 403; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Ann. art.

14.03(a)(1) (“Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant . . . persons found in suspicious

places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty

of some felony, violation of Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code, breach of the peace, or offense

under Section 49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against

the laws[.]”) (emphasis added).

The State did not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances

were not present, and on the State’s appeal Appellee argued that the State had therefore failed

to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the warrantless arrest was lawful under

article 14.03(a)(1). Newton, 689 S.W.3d at 403. After reviewing this Court’s opinions in

which this Court signaled that exigent circumstances may be required, the court of appeals

nevertheless concluded that exigent circumstances were not required by the statute, found

that the State’s issue was reviewable, and proceeded to address the merits of the warrantless

arrest. Id. at 403–05 (discussing Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);

State v. McGuire, 689 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); and Gallups v. State, 151 S.W.3d

196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

We granted Appellee’s petition for discretionary review, which specifically alleges
3

that:

The court of appeals erred in overturning the grant of Mr. Newton’s motion to
suppress by failing to follow existing authority, creating a split among the
courts of appeal, and misapplying both precedent and cannons [sic] of statutory
construction.

Appellee’s issue is a narrow one, and he argues in his brief that the court of appeals

was bound by our opinions in Gallups, Swain, and McGuire, in which we employed language

that suggested that exigent circumstances were a requirement to support a warrantless arrest

under article 14.03(a)(1). Accordingly, Appellee contends that the court of appeals erred by

adhering to the text of article 14.03(a)(1) instead of this Court’s opinions. To the extent that

Gallups, Swain, and McGuire could be read as prescribing an exigent circumstances

requirement to article 14.03(a)(1) arrests, Appellee is arguably correct that the court of

appeals was bound to follow those opinions, regardless of the court of appeals’s opinion of

whether those opinions were wrongly decided.1

But the court of appeals was also correct, getting to the same conclusion we have just

reached in Armstrong v. State, — S.W.3d —, No. PD-0409-22, 2025 WL 1517410 (Tex.

1
See State v. Jackson, 75 S.W.3d 653, 657–58 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, pet. ref’d) (court
of appeals was bound by decision of this Court, although it believed that we had based our decision
upon an erroneous view of a split United States Supreme Court decision, and “respectfully
suggest[ing] that [this] court reexamine its position[.]”); Ware v. State, 62 S.W.3d 344, 350 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (where “Appellant urges us [the court of appeals] to overrule
Malik . . . We [the court of appeals] cannot overrule the court of criminal appeals.”); Wiley v. State,
112 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (Although agreeing with appellant
that cases from this Court “seem[ed] incongruent, . . . also agree[ing] with the State that as an
intermediate appellate court” the court of appeals was “bound to follow the pronouncements of the
court of criminal appeals.”).
4

Crim. App. May 28, 2025). In Armstrong, we explicitly held that article 14.03(a)(1) does not

have an exigency requirement.2 As a result, even if Appellee is correct that the court of

appeals erred at the time of its opinion, there is nothing to be gained by vacating the court of

appeals’s opinion and remanding the matter back to that court to reconsider the matter under

the proper standard. The court of appeals already applied the correct reading of the statute

in front of it.3 The issue as to whether Appellee’s house was a suspicious place under article

14.03(a)(1) is not before us, and we therefore express no opinion as to whether the court of

appeals or the trial court were correct with regard to whether Appellee was found in a

suspicious place.

We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand the case to the trial

court for further proceedings.

Delivered: July 30, 2025
Publish

2
Armstrong, 2025 WL 1517410, at *1 (“the central issue in this case is whether an exigency
requirement exists for warrantless arrests. We conclude that it does not.”); at *6 (“we conclude that
neither the plain text of Article 14.03 nor our caselaw imposes an exigency requirement.”); at *7
(“The issue before this Court is limited to whether Article 14.03(a)(1) includes an exigency
requirement. Our conclusion is a definitive no.”).
3
In an analogous situation, in Harrell, this Court declined to remand to the court of appeals
where it applied an incorrect legal standard in its original opinion, but this Court thereafter issued
a holding in a different case that had the effect of vindicating the court of appeals’s original opinion.
Harrell v. State, 980 S.W.2d 661, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). “In [that] situation, this Court
would normally . . . remand in light of [new case law]. However, a remand [was] unnecessary in
[that] case, since the Court of Appeals [had] already” applied the proper legal standard. Id. at 661.
“There [was] no issue left for the Court of Appeals to resolve.” Id. “The Court of Appeals’
conclusion in its original opinion [was] now correct under [the new case law].” Id. at 661–62.