Preston Hollow Capital v. Truist Bank

FILED IN
BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS
BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK
ENTERED
2/2/2026

2026 Tex. Bus. 5

PRESTON HOLLOW CAPITAL, §
LLC; and PHCC LLC, Plaintiffs §
§
v. § Cause No. 25–BC01B–0030
§
TRUIST BANK FORMERLY §
KNOWN AS BRANCH BANK & §
TRUST, Defendant §
═══════════════════════════════════════
OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES
═══════════════════════════════════════

Syllabus 1

This opinion addresses Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 33’s definition
of “responsible third party” and the meaning of “the harm for which recovery
of damages is sought,” as used therein.

Opinion

[¶ 1] Based on defendant’s live pleadings, the parties’ submissions,

their oral arguments, and the applicable law, the court issued its January 7,

2026, Order granting Truist’s Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible

1
This syllabus is for the reader’s convenience; it is not part of the court’s opinion; and it is not
legal authority.
Third Parties conditioned on Truist filing an amended pleading that alleges

how Bouldin and Senior Care have separately contributed to Preston Hollow’s

injury or injuries in accordance with notice pleading standards.2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The court takes these facts from the parties’ pleadings:

[¶ 3] Senior Care Living VI, LLC was created to develop and operate a

senior living center called Inspired Living at Sugar Land. 3 Senior Care

financed the project with bond financing. 4

[¶ 4] BB&T was the initial trustee under (i) the Master Indenture

between BB&T and Senior Care and (ii) the Bond Indenture between BB&T

and the conduit bond issuer, Woodloch Healthcare Facilities Development

Corporation. 5 These documents are collectively the “Bond Documents.”

Defendant Truist is BB&T’s successor. 6

2
Unless otherwise noted, defined terms have the meanings proscribed to them in the
parties’ briefing.
3
Plaintiff’s Original Petition (POP) ¶ 9(a). Preston Hollow filed a First Amended Petition
on January 15, 2026. This opinion addresses the pleading that was live when Truist filed
its motion and the court issued its January 7, 2026, order. (i.e., the POP).
4
See POP ¶s 1, 10(a)–(c).
5
POP ¶ 11(b).
6
POP ¶ 11(a). Other than this paragraph, the court uses “Truist” to refer to both BB&T
and Defendant Truist.

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 1
[¶ 5] Although Woodloch issued the bonds pursuant to the Bond

Indenture,7 Senior Care was the ultimate bond Obligor.8

[¶ 6] Woodloch loaned the bond proceeds to Senior Care under a loan

secured by most of Senior Care’s assets. 9 Woodloch also assigned its rights

and interests under the Bond Documents and loan proceeds to Truist. 10

[¶ 7] To protect the gross revenue collateral pledge, Senior Care and

Truist executed Account Control Agreements (ACA) whereby Truist held all

ACA-created bank accounts into which Senior Care was to deposit its gross

receipts and gross revenue. 11

[¶ 8] Pursuant to its rights, Preston Hollow controlled the bond funds

during construction of the senior living center.12

[¶ 9] The project was substantially completed by late 2017, and Senior

Care started leasing by early 2018.13

7
POP ¶ 11(b).
8
POP ¶ 12(a).
9
POP ¶ 12(c).
10
POP ¶ 12(d).
11
POP ¶s 12(e)–(f).
12
POP ¶s 16–17.
13
POP ¶ 18.

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 2
[¶ 10] Beginning in 2019, Preston Hollow learned of multiple alleged

Senior Care defaults 14 and directed Truist to send default notices to Senior

Care. 15

[¶ 11] On March 18, 2019, Preston Hollow issued a Letter of Direction

to Truist. Through that Letter, Preston Hollow instructed Truist to not act

under the loan or Bond Documents unless Preston Hollow expressly directed

Truist to do so and in return Preston Hollow would indemnify Truist.16

[¶ 12] On March 25, 2019, Preston Hollow issued a Directions to

Trustee and Indemnification Letter (D&I Letter) to Truist that similarly

instructed Truist to not act unless directed and included an indemnification

provision. 17

[¶ 13] Truist alleges it acted consistently with both letters’

directives. 18

14
POP ¶s 19–21.
15
POP ¶ 22.
16
Defendant’s Answer and Counterclaims (DAAC) ¶s 25–28.
17
DAAC ¶ 29–33.
18
DAAC ¶ 34.

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 3
[¶ 14] When Senior Care allegedly refused to cure its defaults, Preston

Hollow directed Truist to accelerate the bonds and loan, which Truist did on

May 31, 2019. 19

[¶ 15] In June 2019, Preston Hollow sued Senior Care and Bouldin. 20

[¶ 16] On July 12, 2019, Truist appointed two successor trustees, and

resigned five days later.21

[¶ 17] Upon Truist’s resignation, Preston Hollow asked Truist if Senior

Care had deposited its gross revenues into the Blocked Accounts as the Bond

Documents and ACA required. 22 Truist disclosed that Senior Care never did

so.23 Preston Hollow alleges that it later learned that Truist’s representative

approved Senior Care’s deviation from the Bond Documents’ and ACA’s strict

requirements.24

[¶ 18] In the present case, Preston Hollow alleges breaches of fiduciary

duty, trust, and contract by Truist as the Bond Documents’ trustee.25

19
POP ¶ 23.
20
DAAC ¶ 36.
21
POP ¶ 25.
22
POP ¶ 27.
23
POP ¶ 28.
24
POP ¶ 29.
25
See generally POP § VII (Causes of Action and Remedies).

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 4
[¶ 19] Truist asserts that at least part of Preston Hollow’s harm derives

from Senior Care and Bouldin’s breaches, justifying designating each a

responsible third party.26 Specifically, Truist points to Preston Hollow’s

allegations that Senior Care and Bouldin (i) failed to pay the Project’s general

contractor; (ii) failed to pay property taxes; (iii) failed to deposit gross

revenues into the required accounts; and (iv) improperly transferred funds to

another Bouldin-related project, all of which Preston Hollow alleges Truist

failed to detect or mitigate. 27 Ultimately, Preston Hollow alleges that Truist

“failed to discharge its duties as trustee,” allowing Senior Care and Bouldin to

violate their duties under the Bond Documents and causing “irretrievable

deterioration of the trust estate.”28

26
See generally Truist’s Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Parties (Motion).
27
Truist’s Reply in support of Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Parties
(Reply) at 11 (citing POP ¶s 20, 21, 29–32, and 33).
28
POP ¶ 1; see also id. ¶ 47 (Preston Hollow further alleges that “Bouldin and Senior Care
have thus far made no payments on their bond obligations” and that Truist’s actions “have
hampered and worsened the situation for Preston Hollow.”).

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 5
II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

[¶ 20] A court shall grant leave to designate a person as a responsible

third party unless another party objects on or before the fifteenth day after the

date the motion is served. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(f).

[¶ 21] The court shall grant leave over an objection unless the objecting

party establishes that the defendant failed to “plead sufficient facts

concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading

requirement of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,” even after being granted leave

to replead. Id., § 33.004(g).

[¶ 22] Texas procedural rules require “notice pleading.” In re Lipsky,

460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 45 & 47). Notice

pleadings are satisfied if they provide fair notice of the claim and the relief

sought such that the opposing party can prepare a defense. Id.

B. Rules of Statutory Construction

[¶ 23] A court’s primary purpose in statutory construction is to

implement the Legislature’s intent by giving effect to every word, clause, and

sentence. Sunstate Equip. Co. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 685, 689–90 (Tex. 2020)

(citation omitted). Indeed, statutory text is the “first and foremost” indication

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 6
of legislative intent. Greater Hous. P’Ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex.

2015). Thus, courts apply the words’ common, ordinary meaning unless (i)

the text supplies a different meaning or (ii) the common meaning produces

absurd results. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838

(Tex. 2018).

[¶ 24] Further, courts derive statutory meaning from the entire statute.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(2); Janvey v. Gold Channel, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560,

572 (Tex. 2016). So, courts “presume the Legislature chose statutory

language deliberately and purposefully,” Crosstex Energy Servs. L.P., v. Pro

Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. 2014), and that it likewise excluded

language deliberately and purposefully, Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618

S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).

C. Responsible Third Parties

1. The Issue and Short Answer

[¶ 25] A responsible third party is:

any person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to
causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is
sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or
unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity
that violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination
of these.

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 7
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).

[¶ 26] The parties critically disagree over what is the relevant “harm”

here.

[¶ 27] Preston Hollow posits that the only “harm” it seeks recovery for

relevant to this motion is Truist’s deprivation of its fiduciary and trustee

duties.

[¶ 28] In contrast, Truist defines the harm as the “irretrievable

deterioration of the trust estate” alleged by Preston Hollow. 29

[¶ 29] Accordingly, Preston Hollow defines “harm” in § 33.011(6) to

essentially mean the responsible third party must have participated in the

sued-for breach, whereas Truist would have the court conclude that the third

party must have only contributed to the alleged injury.

[¶ 30] Because the court concludes that “harm” as used in § 33.011(6)

has a meaning more akin to the legal concept of “injury” than the concept of

“breach,” and because a responsible third party need only contribute to any

single harm among multiple alleged harms plead by the claimant, the court

29
Reply at 6 (citing POP ¶ 1).

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 8
granted the motion conditioned upon Truist satisfying the notice pleading

standard in its new pleadings.30

2. Defining “Responsible Third Party”

[¶ 31] Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 33 does not define

“harm” and “damages.” So, this court applies statutory construction

principles to ascertain their applicable meanings.

a. Chapter 33’s 2003 Amendments

[¶ 32] Before 2003, a responsible third party was:

any person to whom all of the following apply: (i) the court in
which the action was filed could exercise jurisdiction over the
person; (ii) the person could have been, but was not, sued by the
claimant; and (iii) the person is or may be liable to the plaintiff
for all or a part of the damages claimed against the named
defendant or defendants.

Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 136, § 1, 1995 TEX. GEN. LAWS 971,

973 (amended 2003).

[¶ 33] But the 2003 amendment expanded the class of persons who

could be designated as responsible third parties by (i) dropping the

requirements that (a) the court could exercise jurisdiction over the person and

This opinion does not address Truist’s January 21, 2026, Amended Motion for Leave to
30

Designate Responsible Third Parties (Amended Motion).

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 9
(b) that the person could have been sued by the claimant and (ii) no longer

requiring the third party to be potentially liable for all or part of the damages

claimed, rather now they must “have caused or contributed to causing in any

way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 33.011(6).

[¶ 34] While the current statute still requires the designated third party

to have caused or contributed to the harm via some “conduct or activity that

violates an applicable legal standard,” id. (emphasis added), it is no longer the

case that they must be liable to the plaintiff for the damages claimed, which

would require satisfying all the essential elements of a cause of action. See

LIABILITY, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“The quality, state, or

condition of being legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to

another or to society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment.”);

cf. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Texas, Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794,

798 (Tex. 2004) (“A movant who conclusively negates at least one essential

element of a cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.”).

[¶ 35] Accordingly, by requiring that the person (i) could have been

sued by the claimant and (ii) may have been liable to the plaintiff for all or a

part of the damages claimed against the named defendant, the previous statute

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 10
required a showing that the alleged responsible third party violated the same

legal standard as the named defendant, whereas the current statute requires

only that they violated some legal standard and that violation contributed in

some way to the claimed harm.

b. The Meaning of “Harm”

[¶ 36] First, the court concludes that throughout Chapter 33, the

Legislature appears to have intended “harm” to be somewhat synonymous

with “injury” and “damage.” City Nat’l Bank of Sulphur Springs v. Smith,

2016 WL 2586607, at *7 (Tex. App. 6th Dist. May 4, 2016, pet. denied)

(citing § 33.011(6)); see § 33.004(l) (“[A] party may move to strike the

designation of a responsible third party on the ground that there is no evidence

that the designated person is responsible for any portion of the claimant’s

alleged injury or damage.” (emphasis added)); § 33.011(1) (a claimant

includes a party seeking “recovery of damages for injury to another person,

damage to property of another person, death of another person, or other harm

to another person.” (emphasis added)); § 33.011(4) (percentage of

responsibility is the percentage attributed by the trier of fact to each person

“with respect to causing or contributing to cause in any way ... the personal

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 11
injury, property damage, death, or other harm for which recovery of damages

is sought.” (emphasis added)).

[¶ 37] The court further concludes that the terms “harm” and

“damages” presumably have different meanings given the Legislature used

both terms in the same sentence in its 2003 amendment responsible third

party definition. See Bank of Sulphur Springs, 2016 WL 2586607, at *6–7;

see also First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. 2008)

(proper statutory construction “gives effect to every word”); GOV. CODE.

§ 311.021(2) (it is presumed that the entire statute is intended to be effective).

[¶ 38] To ascertain the Legislature’s intended meanings for the terms,

the Bank of Sulphur Springs court looked to dictionary definitions of “harm,”

“injury,” and “damages” and concluded that “harm” is often equated to

“injury” and damages are equated to “compensation.” 2016 WL 2586607, at

*7.

[¶ 39] “Harm” means “injury, loss, damage; material or tangible

detriment.” HARM, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). That

Dictionary further notes the similarity between “harm” and “injury” and that

“[s]ome authorities distinguish harm from injury, holding that while harm

denotes any personal loss or detriment, injury involves an actionable invasion

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 12
of a legally protected interest.” INJURY, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (citing

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7 cmt. a (1965)).

[¶ 40] Additionally, “damages” means “compensation imposed by law

for loss or injury.” DAMAGES, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006); see also DAMAGES, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(12th ed. 2024) (“Money claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as

compensation for loss or injury.”).

[¶ 41] Both “harm” and “damages” focus on the results or effects of a

defendant’s alleged breach; whereas breach itself focuses on the actions taken

by the defendant in violation of a legal duty, giving rise to the injury. See

BREACH, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“A violation or

infraction of a law, obligation, or agreement, esp. of an official duty or a legal

obligation, whether by neglect, refusal, resistance, or inaction.”); see, e.g.,

Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex. App.—5th Dist. 2006, pet. denied)

(“The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim are: (1) a fiduciary

relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant must have

breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant’s breach must

result in injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant.” (emphasis added)).

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 13
[¶ 42] As noted at ¶s 34–35, while the pre-2003 law required

defendants to allege that the responsible third party was liable to the claimant,

including that they breached the same legal standard expected of defendant,

the new law focuses only on whether the third party in any way contributed to

the ultimate harm or injury through some unlawful act. See In re Mod. Senior

Living, LLC, 2022 WL 2187396, at *4 (Tex. App.—5th Dist. June 17, 2022,

orig. proceeding) (Speaking of § 33.011(6): “The standard is contribution to

the harm; breach of the same duty is not required.”)

[¶ 43] Accordingly, there is no rule that a non-fiduciary cannot

contribute to the harm caused by the breach of a fiduciary’s duties as Preston

Hollow essentially argues31—the defendant and third party’s breaches of their

legal standards may be different if there is a shared harm. See In re Smith, 366

S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—5th Dist. 2012, orig. proceeding) (in negligent

investigation claim against her former attorneys, “the fact that [third party] is

not an attorney would not necessarily mean she could not have tortiously

contributed to cause the harm for which [plaintiff] is suing”); Bank of Sulphur

Springs, 2016 WL 2586607, at *8 (discussing In re Smith).

See Opp. at 2 (arguing “it was Truist, not Senior Care or Bouldin, that owed Preston
31

Hollow [] fiduciary duties”).

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 14
c. Preston Hollow’s Arguments

[¶ 44] Preston Hollow cites legal malpractice cases to argue otherwise.

But those cases support the court’s conclusions.

[¶ 45] For starters in Bank of Sulphur Springs, Smith sued his former

attorney for missing the deadline to sue Smith’s bank for malicious

prosecution. 2016 WL 2586607, at *1. The attorney named the time-barred

bank as a Chapter 33 responsible third party. After clarifying the difference

between “harm” and “damages” in the statute, the court concluded that while

Smith’s damages would be based on what amount Smith would have collected

had he recovered the judgment against the bank, the lost cause of action was

his alleged harm or injury. Id. at *7.

[¶ 46] So, to establish the bank as a responsible third party, “Smith

must have both alleged and proven that the Bank contributed to causing Smith

to lose his cause of action against the Bank, e.g., by somehow contributing to

missing the statute of limitations.” Id. at *8. In other words, “[a]lthough it

was necessary for Smith to put on evidence of the damages he sustained … to

establish the lost cause of action’s true value, he was not suing for malicious

prosecution damages. Rather, the damage he sought was the value of that lost

cause of action.” Id. at *9. Because there was no evidence the bank

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 15
contributed to the loss of Smith’s cause of action, it was not a responsible third

party. Id. at *8.

[¶ 47] Next, DLA Piper LLP (US) v. Linegar, 539 S.W.3d 512 (Tex.

App.—11th 2017, pet. denied) is similar. There, Linegar sued DLA Piper for

malpractice for failing to timely perfect a security interest, resulting in Linegar

receiving less than what he would have been owed on a promissory note. Id.

at 515–17. The law firm sought to designate (i) a party that the firm alleged

violated its duties in loaning the money in the first place and (ii) Linegar’s

agent, which the firm alleged settled on behalf of Linger for too little,

increasing the amount of damages the law firm owed. As the court pointed

out, claimant’s suit was “not a suit on the note.” Id. at 517. Therefore, the

“harm for which damages were sought in this case related to the failure to

timely perfect the security interest in the note” not the harm of receiving less

on the note than what claimant otherwise should have. Id.

[¶ 48] In both Bank of Sulphur Springs and DLA Piper, the legal

malpractice suits were based on claims that arose out of, but logically distinct

from, the initial harm the claimant suffered. In both cases there was an initial

harm (malicious prosecution in Smith and note default in Linegar) that would

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 16
be relevant to calculating damages in the malpractice suits, but the harms were

distinct.

[¶ 49] Contrary to Preston Hollow’s argument, neither opinion

categorically holds that the disputed third-party designees could never have

contributed to the relevant harms. See Bank of Sulphur Springs, 2016 WL

2586607, at *8 (“With no pleadings and no evidence that the Bank

contributed to causing [the loss of Smith’s cause of action], the Bank was not,

by definition, a responsible third party.”); DLA Piper, 539 S.W.3d at 517

(“DLA Piper did not assert at trial and does not assert on appeal that Zaychan

or Key Ovation contributed to the untimely filing of the UCC-1 financing

statement.”). Accordingly, it was not relevant to the courts’ analysis that the

third parties were not attorneys because the responsible third parties need not

violate the same legal standard or duty as the defendant. See ¶s 34–35.

[¶ 50] Finally, Preston Hollow relies on Stabilis Fund II, LLC v.

Compass Bank, 2018 WL 4772411 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2018) to argue that “[a]

borrower’s contractual nonperformance … simply does not cause a trustee’s

breach of its own independent obligations.” 32 In Stabilis, a buyer alleged it

32
Opp. at 4.

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 17
was fraudulently induced into purchasing a loan because the seller concealed

a loan modification agreement. The seller sought to designate the initial

borrowers on the underlying loan as responsible third parties because they

failed to maintain the collateral for the loan and failed to pay amounts due on

the loan. The initial borrowers agreed to the concealed modification

agreement but had no role in the alleged fraudulent concealment itself.

[¶ 51] First, the court denied the designation because the borrowers’

failures to maintain the collateral or pay amounts due on the loan were not

negligent or otherwise violate an applicable legal standard and therefore did

not meet the statutory definition of a “responsible third party.” Id. at *3–*4;

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6). In other words, the court appears to have

assumed that because Chapter 33 primarily applies to tort causes of action—

see § 33.002(a)(1)—a responsible third party cannot contribute to the harm by

breaching a contract. Second, with respect to the fraudulent inducement and

concealment claims, the court held that none of the borrowers’ complained-of

acts were reasonably connected to any of the seller’s alleged fraudulent acts.

[¶ 52] Likewise, Preston Hollow asserts that Senior Care’s and

Bouldin’s alleged defaults concern their contractual obligations (nonpayment,

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 18
tax issues, and diversion of funds) and thereby did not cause or contribute to

Truist’s own alleged misconduct (breach of fiduciary and breach of trust).33

[¶ 53] The court disagrees with Stabilis to the extent it concluded that

Chapter 33 applies to only jointly committed torts and that a potentially

responsible third party cannot contribute to the harm for which recovery is

sought by breaching a contract alone. See 2018 WL 4772411, at *3–*4.

However, “[a] duty is a legally enforceable obligation to conform to a

particular standard of conduct and can be assumed by contract or imposed by

law.” In re Luminant Gen. Co. LLC, 711 S.W.3d 13, 21 (Tex. App.—1st Dist.

2023, orig. proceeding) (citation omitted). Thus, violating an “applicable

legal standard” as used in § 33.011(6) may include violation of the standards

established by contract. See Eisenstadt v. Tel. Elecs. Corp., 2008 WL

4452999, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2008) (allowing designation of

responsible third party where said party contributed to the claimed harm in

part by breaching its contract).

33
Opp. at 5.

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 19
[¶ 54] Accordingly, the court concludes that Truist’s motion connects

Senior Care’s and Bouldin’s alleged acts to Preston Hollow’s alleged harms,

discussed further below.

d. Preston Hollow’s Injury

[¶ 55] The parties dispute the “harm” for which Preston Hollow is

suing for. Preston Hollow describes the harm as the loss of the fiduciary and

trustee duties Truist owed to Preston Hollow, which Senior Care and Bouldin

are not alleged to have contributed to because they were not

fiduciaries/trustees.34 Truist describes the harm more broadly as

“irretrievable deterioration of the trust estate.”35

[¶ 56] To begin, claimants may seek compensation (damages) for a

variety of harms in a single lawsuit. Nothing in Chapter 33 requires that the

designated person caused or contributed to every harm for which the claimant

seeks redress. Rather, § 33.003(a) instructs the factfinder to determine the

percentage of responsibility “as to each cause of action asserted.” A “cause

of action” is a “group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for

suing,” CAUSE OF ACTION, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), and

34
Opp. at 3.
35
Motion at 11 (citing POP ¶ 1).

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 20
“thus [is] similar to a ʻclaim,’” and distinct from the overall “action” or

lawsuit itself. See Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 564 (Tex.

2014). Accordingly, if the individual contributed to at least one pled harm,

they may be designated under the statute.

[¶ 57] Here, the court agrees that at least one harm for which Preston

Hollow sues is “irretrievable deterioration of the trust estate,” 36 which Senior

Care and Bouldin at least plausibly contributed to through their alleged

unlawful actions.

[¶ 58] Second, Truist’s motion connects Senior Care’s and Bouldin’s

alleged acts to Preston Hollow’s tort claims against Truist. For example,

Preston Hollow’s allegations concerning Truist’s failure to monitor Senior

Care and wrongful approval of Senior Care’s failure to deposit gross receipts

in the proper accounts necessarily relies upon acts by Senior Care. 37 Similarly,

Preston Hollow’s claim that Truist impermissibly advised Bouldin on asset

protection strategies also required underlying acts by Bouldin.38 So, through

the nature of the acts themselves, Preston Hollow implicitly alleged that

36
POP ¶ 1.
37
Motion at 21–22.
38
Motion at 22.

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 21
Senior Care and Bouldin contributed to the claimed harms by violating some

legal standard.

[¶ 59] Accordingly, taking Truist’s allegations as true, Senior Care and

Bouldin plausibly “caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for

which recovery of damages is sought” from Truist. § 33.011(6).

III. CONCLUSION

[¶ 60] In reaching these conclusions, the court (i) assumes the truth of

Truist’s factual allegations in its live pleadings and motion and (ii) makes no

factual determinations or suggestions regarding whether Senior Care’s or

Bouldin’s alleged misconduct occurred or the extent to which they could be

responsible to Preston Hollow.

It is so ORDERED.

BILL WHITEHILL
Judge of the Texas Business Court,
First Division

SIGNED: February 2, 2026

OPINION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF THIRD PARTIES, Page 22