Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion: KP-0517

February 12, 2026

The Honorable Phil Sorrells
Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney
401 West Belknap
Fort Worth, Texas 76196

Opinion No. KP-0517

Re: Investigatory obligation following “the death of a prisoner in county jail” under
Government Code § 511.021(a) (RQ-0590-KP)

Dear Mr. Sorrells:

Your request pertains to the construction of subsection 511.021(a) of the Government
Code, which requires an independent investigation by an outside law enforcement agency “on the
death of a prisoner in a county jail.” 1 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 511.021(a). While you indicate that there
is no question that subsection 511.021(a) requires an independent investigation when a prisoner
dies inside a county jail facility, you explain that a disagreement exists over whether an
independent investigation is likewise required when a prisoner dies outside the county jail facility.
See Request Letter at 3–4 (referencing in-hospital deaths). You thus ask whether the investigatory
requirements under subsection 511.021(a) are limited to prisoner deaths occurring within the
county jail facility or whether the requirements extend to deaths of prisoners who are in custody
but outside the jail facility. Id. at 5.

The Sandra Bland Act and accompanying regulations

To provide context to your inquiry, we begin with a brief overview of the relevant statutory
and regulatory framework. The Eighty-fifth Legislature passed, and Governor Abbott signed into
law, the Sandra Bland Act. See generally Act of May 22, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 950, § 1.01,
2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 3801, 3801. The Act added section 511.021 to Chapter 511 of the
Government Code, which governs the Commission on Jail Standards—a state agency tasked with,
inter alia, establishing “reasonable minimum standards for the construction and operation of
[county and privately operated municipal] jails” across the State. Id. § 3.07 at 3807; TEX. COMM’N
ON JAIL STANDARDS, COMPACT WITH TEXAS, https://www.tcjs.state.tx.us/compact-with-texas (last
visited July 31, 2025).

1
Letter from Hon. Phil Sorrells, Tarrant Cnty. Crim. Dist. Att’y, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. at 3
(Mar. 21, 2025), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request-files/request/2025/RQ0590KP.pdf
(“Request Letter”).
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Subsection 511.021(a) concerns the investigation of prisoner deaths occurring in county
jails and provides, in pertinent part, that “[o]n the death of a prisoner in a county jail, the
[C]ommission shall appoint a law enforcement agency, other than the local law enforcement
agency that operates the county jail, to investigate the death as soon as possible.” TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 511.021(a); 2 see also id. § 511.001(1) (“‘Commission’ means the Commission on Jail
Standards.”). Subsection 511.021(c) further directs that “[t]he [C]ommission shall adopt any rules
necessary relating to the appointment of a law enforcement agency under [s]ubsection (a),
including rules relating to cooperation between law enforcement agencies and to procedures for
handling evidence.” Id. § 511.021(c).

The Commission submitted a brief in response to your request in which it asserts that it
promulgated title 37 of the Texas Administrative Code, subsection 269.1(5) (“the Rule”), pursuant
to its rulemaking authority in Texas Government Code subsections 511.021(c), 511.009(a)(2), and
511.009(a)(19). 3 In contrast to the language in subsection 511.021(a), however, the Rule provides
that the Commission “shall be notified of all deaths of inmates while in the custody of
sheriff/operator within 24 hours of the death.” 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 269.1(5)(A) (emphasis
added). The Rule further states both that the Commission “shall appoint a law enforcement agency,
other than the local law enforcement agency that operates the county jail, to investigate the death”
and that a report shall be submitted to the Commission following the investigation. Id.
§ 269.1(5)(B)–(C). With this background in mind, we first turn to the language of subsection
511.021(a).

Subsection 511.021(a) requires the appointment of an independent law enforcement
agency to investigate prisoner deaths that occur within a county jail facility

The language in subsection 511.021(a) makes clear that the Commission “shall appoint”
an independent law enforcement agency to conduct an investigation “[o]n the death of a prisoner
in a county jail.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 511.021(a). Accordingly, to determine precisely when the
requirements in subsection 511.021(a) apply, we must ascertain the meaning of the phrase
“prisoner in a county jail.”

The polestar of statutory construction is to “ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s
intent.” Bexar Appraisal Dist. v. Johnson, 691 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. 2024) (citations omitted).
We generally “look to and rely on the plain meaning of [the] statute’s words as expressing

2
The death of a county prisoner triggers an additional investigatory and reporting requirement under Article
49A.151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires county sheriffs to notify the Attorney General of “the
death of a person under the care, custody, or control of or residing in the institution” and to “prepare and submit to the
office of the attorney general a report containing all facts relevant to the person’s death.” Act of May 15, 2025, 89th
Leg., R.S., ch. 202, § 1.01, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 391, 411–12 (to be codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
49A.151(b)). This legislation, which goes into effect in April 2027, will replace Article 49.18, which, inter alia,
requires the sheriff to notify the Attorney General by report “[i]f a person dies while in the custody of a peace officer
or as a result of a peace officer’s use of force or if a person incarcerated in a jail, correctional facility, or state juvenile
facility dies.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.18(b). We do not offer an opinion as to whether the requirements in
these provisions extend to prisoner deaths occurring outside of a prison or who may conduct the related investigation.
3
See Brief from Brandon S. Wood, Exec. Dir. Tex. Comm’n on Jail Standards, to Op. Comm. at 2 (rec’d
Apr. 25, 2025) (“Commission Brief”) (on file with the Op. Comm.).
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legislative intent,” Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d
318, 325 (Tex. 2017), “typically look[ing] first to [a term’s] dictionary definition[]” to determine
its plain meaning, Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n,
511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017). Nevertheless, whenever “a statute uses a term with a particular
meaning or assigns a particular meaning to a term, we are bound by the statutory usage.” TGS-
NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). That is not to say that we
should “consider the meaning of the term to be defined in total isolation from its common usage.”
In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. 2014). Rather, we “construe the words and
phrases chosen by the Legislature in [the] context” of the statute as a whole. Aleman v. Tex. Med.
Bd., 573 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2019).

We begin by examining the phrase “prisoner in a county jail.” The phrase starts with the
word “prisoner,” which section 511.001 defines as “a person confined in a county jail.” TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 511.001(7). While the statute does not define “confined,” the term ordinarily means
“[b]ounded, limited, restricted, restrained, shut up, enclosed, imprisoned, etc.” THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 709 (2d ed. 1989). Following “prisoner” is the phrase “in a county jail.” The
term “in” typically means “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of,” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 885 (5th ed. 2016), and the statute defines “county jail”
as “a facility operated by or for a county for the confinement of persons accused or convicted of
an offense,” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 511.001(3).

Rules of grammar and common usage also inform our understanding of the statutory text.
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011(a). Relevant here, “in a county jail” is a prepositional phrase. A
prepositional phrase generally is understood to modify the “nearest reasonable referent.” ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 152 (2012);
see also Transformative Learning Sys. v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 572 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2018, no pet.) (“A subsequent prepositional phrase is generally assumed to modify the
nearest antecedent unless such a construction is unreasonable.”). The nearest referent in subsection
511.021(a) is “prisoner.” Critically, however, because “prisoner” means “a person confined in a
county jail,” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 511.001(7), reading “in a county jail” as modifying “prisoner”
would cause the provision at issue to effectively read as “on the death of a person confined in a
county jail in a county jail,” creating a possible redundancy.

We presume that the Legislature’s choice of words is intentional, and “we endeavor to
afford meaning to all of a statute’s language so none is rendered surplusage.” In re Tex. Educ.
Agency, 619 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). Given this discrepancy in the
statutory language, it is not clear that the Legislature intended for “in a county jail” to modify
“prisoner” in subsection 511.021(a). Accordingly, we must look to contextual clues to discern the
statute’s meaning. See Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 726 (Tex. 2024) (stating that
courts “rel[y] on statutory context when construing statutes”).

We first examine other sections within Chapter 511, as we must “look to the statutory
scheme as a whole in order to establish the meaning” of the provision at issue here. See Ochsner
v. Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tex. 2016); accord SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 167 (“The text
must be construed as a whole.”). Chapter 511 references “prisoner in a county jail” or “prisoner in
the county jail” in four subsections in addition to subsection 511.021(a). See TEX. GOV’T CODE
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§§ 511.0101(a)(4), .012(b), .020(a), .0098(a). To be sure, each of these provisions might at first
blush appear to suffer from the same redundancy issue as the language in subsection 511.021(a).
But a closer examination of the statutory language reveals that “in a county jail” must serve a
different purpose when included in a specific statutory provision than it serves in the general
statutory definition of “prisoner” in section 511.001.

Subsection 511.0098(a), for example, directs the Commission to adopt procedures related
to the provision of mental health services to a “prisoner in a county jail under a contract with the
county.” Id. § 511.0098(a). The phrase “in a county jail” is modified by the phrase “under a
contract with the county,” which plainly highlights the nature of a particular county jail in which
the prisoner is confined. The Legislature’s inclusion of “in a county jail” therefore specifies the
prisoner’s location.

Similarly, other provisions—like those in subsections 511.0101(a)(4), 511.012(b), and
511.020(a)—use the phrase “prisoner in the county jail.” Id. §§ 511.0101(a)(4), .012(b), .020(a)
(emphasis added). While these provisions do not contain qualifying language like in subsection
511.0098(a), their context nevertheless indicates that “in the county jail” also invokes the
prisoner’s location. Indeed, subsection 511.020(a) requires the sheriff of each county jail to report
to the Commission regarding the occurrence of any enumerated “incidents involving a prisoner in
the county jail,” id. § 511.020(a); subsection 511.0101(a)(4) directs the county to submit a monthly
report to the Commission regarding, inter alia, “the total cost to the county during the preceding
month of housing prisoners . . . calculated based on the average daily cost of housing
a prisoner in the county jail,” id. § 511.0101(a)(4); and subsection 511.012(b) permits the
Commission to “prohibit confinement of prisoners in the county jail” if the county commissioners
or sheriff do not comply with Commission rules and procedures or state law within a specified
time period, id. § 511.012(b). Each of these provisions concern specific matters that relate to
prisoners in a certain county jail facility—again revealing that the Legislature included the phrase
“in the county jail” to focus on a particular county jail location.

Nevertheless, while the language in the above provisions reflects that the phrase “in a
county jail” or “in the county jail” signifies a prisoner’s geographic location, the same cannot be
said for “in a county jail” in the statutory definition of “prisoner.” Indeed, if “prisoner” means a
person physically confined in a county jail, then the language in the above provisions specifying a
prisoner’s location in the county jail would constitute surplusage. This construction would also
create practical problems in the application of other provisions in Chapter 511 that reference
prisoners because conditioning one’s status as a prisoner on his location in a county jail would
cause a person to cease being a “prisoner” once he leaves the county jail. Subsection
511.0105(b)(4), for example, requires each county jail to file with the Commission a report
documenting the restraint of a pregnant prisoner, and that report must include, inter alia, “whether
the prisoner was restrained while being transported to a local hospital.” Id. § 511.0105(b)(4). If
the definition of “prisoner” is geographically limited to the county jail facility, then a prisoner who
is transported to a hospital can no longer be a prisoner for purposes of the statute, rendering
subsection 511.0105(b)(4) inoperable. This cuts against the presumption that the Legislature
“intend[s] to create a cohesive statutory framework that gives effect to every provision.” Miracle
Auto., Inc. v. Geico Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 696 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, no
The Honorable Phil Sorrells - Page 5

pet.); accord SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 174 (“If possible, every word and every provision is to
be given effect . . . .”).

Reading the definitional phrase “in a county jail” as a general status of imprisonment, on
the other hand, ameliorates this problem. It is well settled that “the Legislature intends an entire
statute to be effective,” Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001), and “[t]he
provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not
contradictory,” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 180. Interpreting “in a county jail” within the
definition of “prisoner” as a conceptual status of imprisonment, while construing “in a county jail”
in subsection 511.021(a) as imposing a locational condition on a “prisoner,” brings harmony to the
two provisions: Confinement in a county jail generally governs a prisoner’s status—regardless of
his or her immediate location—and subsection 511.021(a) requires an independent investigation
into prisoner deaths only when occurring in one of those county jails.

This construction is likewise supported by the Legislature’s demonstrated capacity to
predicate investigations on deaths in custody rather than those literally occurring in a county jail.
Chapter 501 of the Government Code requires reporting “[i]f an inmate dies while in the custody
of the department,” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 501.055(a) (emphasis added), and the Legislature defined
“inmate in the custody of the department” as “a convicted felon who: (1) is confined in a secure
correctional facility operated by or under contract with the department; or (2) has been admitted
for treatment into a hospital while remaining in the custody of the department,” id. § 501.055(e).
Had the Legislature intended a similarly broad construction of subsection 511.021(a), of course, it
would have used similarly broad language. We must presume “different meanings were intended”
where “the [L]egislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in
another.” Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d 555, 564 (Tex. 2016) (quoting DeWitt v. Harris
Cnty., 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1995)).

The title of section 511.021 further underscores its geographical focus: “Independent
Investigation of Death Occurring in County Jail.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 511.021 (emphasis added).
Though not independently dispositive, “[t]he title and headings are permissible indicators of
meaning.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 221; accord TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.023(7) (“In
construing a statute, . . . a court may consider among other matters the[] . . . title (caption),
preamble, and emergency provision.”); see also, e.g., Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d
132, 138 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (considering a rule’s title to aid in interpreting the rule). The
title of section 511.021 thus serves to confirm what is otherwise made clear by statutory context:
The phrase “in a county jail” speaks to a prisoner’s location, and the independent investigation
requirement in subsection 511.021(a) is triggered only when a prisoner dies in a county jail
facility. 4

4
Given our conclusion, the scenarios to which you refer in your Request Letter—i.e., a prisoner who dies
while being treated in the hospital for cancer and a prisoner who dies from a heart attack while on work release—
would not require the Commission to appoint an outside law enforcement agency to investigate the death under the
statute, as neither death occurred in a county jail. See Request Letter at 3–4. Moreover, nothing in subsection
511.021(a) suggests that a prisoner’s cause of death has bearing on the investigation requirement.
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This construction of subsection 511.021(c) does not mean that the Commission’s rule
is facially invalid

It is important to note that the foregoing does not mean the Commission’s Rule—requiring
an independent investigation into all deaths that occur in custody, 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 269.1(5)—is necessarily invalid. In fact, the Commission agrees that the requirements of
subsection 511.021(a) are limited to prisoner deaths occurring inside of a county jail but suggests
that provision is merely a “baseline requirement” related to investigations into county jail deaths.
Commission Brief at 5. The Commission therefore suggests that the “true” issue before us is its
“authority to promulgate” the Rule rather than “the scope of [s]ection 511.021.” Id. at 1. While
this is not the question we were asked, of course, the point merits general comment on agency
rulemaking in order to highlight the limited scope of this opinion.

State agencies, like the Commission, have “only those powers that the Texas Legislature
has expressly conferred upon [them] and those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to
carry out [their] statutory duties.” Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d at 33. It follows that the
Commission’s exercise of rulemaking authority must be “in harmony with the general objectives
of the act involved” as discerned from the “plain text of the statutes that grant or limit the agency’s
authority.” Id. (citations omitted). But there is no such harmony if a rule: “(1) contravenes specific
statutory language; (2) runs counter to the general objectives of the statute; or (3) imposes
additional burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the relevant
statutory provisions.” Id.

Notably, the Commission did not rely on subsection 511.021(c) during notice-and-
comment rulemaking; it instead invoked two other provisions of the Government Code:
(1) subsection 511.0085(a)(8), 42 Tex. Reg. 6630, 6631 (2017), which directs the Commission to
“develop a comprehensive set of risk factors to use in assessing the overall risk level” of jails
within its jurisdiction—including “the number and nature of inmate deaths at the jail” and “the
results of the investigations of those deaths,” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 511.0085(a)(8); and (2)
subsection 511.0085(b)(2), 42 Tex. Reg. 6630, 6631 (2017), which requires the Commission to
“regularly monitor[] the overall risk level of each jail,” Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch.
1215, § 8, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 3882, 3886 (amended 2021) (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 511.0085(c)(2)). These provisions therefore constitute the Commission’s “restatement of . . .
[authority] under which the rule [was] adopted” and certified as “a valid exercise of the agency’s
legal authority.” 5 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.033(a)(2)–(3).

Neither does the limited scope of subsection 511.021(c) cut against the authority invoked
during notice-and-comment rulemaking. This subsection plainly imposes a regulatory floor—
mandating independent-investigation rules for deaths that occur inside county jails, supra pp. 2–
5—within the Commission’s general obligation to “adopt reasonable rules and procedures
establishing minimum standards for the . . . operation of county jails,” TEX. GOV’T CODE

5
This obviates the need to consider whether the Commission can rely on authority that was not articulated
during notice-and-comment rulemaking process. Cf. Commission Brief at 2.
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§ 511.009(a)(1), as well as “for the custody, care, and treatment of prisoners,” id. § 511.009(a)(2). 6
As such, there can be no claim that subsection 511.021(c) constitutes the Commission’s only
authority to promulgate death-adjacent investigation rules. Our interpretation of subsection
511.021(c) therefore has no bearing on whether the Rule, which was adopted under different
authorities, is facially valid. That question is beyond the scope of your request, and we decline to
sua sponte expand the scope of this opinion.

6
Subsection 511.009 was recently amended but is identical in relevant part. See Act of May 20, 2025, 89th
Leg., R.S., ch. 299, § 3, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 762, 763–64 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 511.009(a)).
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S U M M A R Y

The phrase “death of a prisoner in a county jail” in
Government Code subsection 511.021(a) requires appointment of
an independent law enforcement agency to investigate a prisoner
death that occurred in the county jail itself. However, this does not
mean the Commission lacks statutory authority to promulgate a rule
requiring independent investigation of prisoner deaths while in
custody.

Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff

D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JOSHUA C. FIVESON
Chair, Opinion Committee

ALLISON FREED
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee