In RE BRIANNA DAILEY v. the State of Texas

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0382
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In re Brianna Dailey,
Relator

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
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JUSTICE YOUNG, concurring in the denial of the petition for writ
of mandamus.

This petition for writ of mandamus arises from a forcible-entry-
and-detainer action brought by the Housing Authority of the City of
Bastrop against Brianna Dailey. Dailey, relator in this Court, contends
that the trial court—a justice court in Bastrop County—abused its
discretion by disqualifying her counsel. She seeks mandamus relief to
correct the alleged error. A claim such as Dailey’s would not evade this
Court’s review if properly presented, but an original proceeding in this
Court is not a proper way to present the claim because we lack jurisdiction
to issue a writ of mandamus directed to a justice court unless it is necessary
to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction. I therefore concur in the denial of
Dailey’s petition for a writ of mandamus. I write separately to explain
why and to set out what I regard as the proper procedure for challenging
rulings such as the one to which Dailey objects.
I begin with the premise that this Court’s primary function is

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appellate. Article V, § 3(a) of the Texas Constitution, however, provides
that “[t]he Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as
may be specified, except as against the Governor of the State.” In turn,
the statute describing this Court’s general mandamus jurisdiction
simultaneously announces some proper respondents (“a statutory
county court judge, a statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a
court of appeals or justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state
government”) and excludes some potential respondents (“the governor,
the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of criminal appeals”).
Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(a). The only constitutionally impermissible
respondent is the governor. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a). But given the
enumeration in the current statute, and that the enumeration does not
include justice courts (although they are not expressly disclaimed by
statute, either), the sounder approach has been to regard this Court’s
mandamus jurisdiction as not reaching such courts unless it is necessary
to enforce our own jurisdiction. See Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950,
952 (Tex. 1969) (“[E]xcept to enforce its own jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has only such original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus ‘as
may be specified’ by the Legislature.”). The same principle is true of the
courts of appeals whose jurisdiction is also subject to the Constitution
(which does not mention their mandamus jurisdiction) and to statutory
restrictions. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 6; Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221.
This Court’s and the courts of appeals’ lack of mandamus
jurisdiction over a justice court’s rulings does not render a justice court’s
interlocutory orders unreviewable in either court, however. As Dailey did

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here, parties can seek mandamus relief in the appropriate county court.
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 25.0004(a) (“A statutory county court or its judge
may issue writs of injunction, mandamus, . . . and all writs necessary for
the enforcement of the jurisdiction of the court.”). “[C]ounty courts have
authority to issue writs of mandamus and injunction in matters within
their jurisdiction, and such power is not limited to instances ‘only when
necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.’ ” Repka v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 186
S.W.2d 977, 980 (Tex. 1945). Review does not stop there. Any party
unsatisfied with a county court’s decision can perfect an appeal to the
appropriate court of appeals and, if necessary, petition this Court for
review. See Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 795 n.1
(Tex. 1991) (“An original proceeding for writ of mandamus initiated in the
trial court is a civil action subject to trial and appeal on substantive law
issues and the rules of procedure as any other civil suit.”).
This pathway is more opaque than most others in our civil-justice
system. But it should not obscure the underlying point that this Court’s
inability to accept jurisdiction over original proceedings challenging
actions in justice courts does not foreclose review of such actions. To the
contrary, the pathway that Anderson describes should make it easier, not
harder, to correct errors. Coming directly to this Court, however, is not a
proper way to do so. Accordingly, with these observations and without
expressing any view as to the underlying merits of relator’s claims, I
concur in the denial of the petition for writ of mandamus.

Evan A. Young
Justice
OPINION FILED: July 5, 2024

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