In RE THE STATE OF TEXAS v. the State of Texas

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0325
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In re The State of Texas,
Relator

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
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JUSTICE BLACKLOCK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Harris County intends to use federal funds to “provide
no-strings-attached $500 monthly cash payments to 1,928 Harris
County residents for 18 months.” 1 Recipients would be chosen by lottery
from among applicants with income below 200% of the federal poverty
line who live in certain zip codes, among other criteria. Harris County
has identified roughly 55,000 eligible applicants, which means the
likelihood of any particular entrant succeeding in the lottery is roughly
3.5%.
The State of Texas contends this arrangement is unconstitutional
in multiple ways, including that it violates the Texas Constitution’s bar
on “gratuitous payments to individuals.” Tex. Mun. League

1 Frequently Asked Questions, UPLIFT HARRIS,
https://uplift.harriscountytx.gov/FAQs (as of May 22, 2024). A screenshot of
this statement appears in the record, but the website has since been altered.
Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d
377, 383 (Tex. 2002); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52(a). The State sued the
County, seeking an injunction blocking implementation of the proposed
program, which the County calls “Uplift Harris.” The State immediately
sought a temporary injunction, which the district court denied. The
State appealed the denial of the temporary injunction and asked the
court of appeals for a Rule 29.3 order staying payments under the Uplift
Harris program while its temporary-injunction appeal proceeds. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3 (authorizing “temporary orders necessary to
preserve the parties’ rights”). The court of appeals denied that request,
and the State sought mandamus relief in this Court.
The State’s mandamus petition asks this Court to require the
court of appeals to issue a Rule 29.3 order staying all Uplift Harris
payments while the State’s temporary-injunction appeal proceeds.
Together with its mandamus petition, the State filed a motion for
temporary relief pursuant to Rule 52.10, seeking an immediate stay of
Uplift-Harris payments. See id. 52.10(b) (authorizing an appellate
court to “grant any just relief pending the court’s action on the
[mandamus] petition”). We administratively stayed 2 the payments,
without regard to the merits, pending our consideration of the State’s

2 “Administrative stays do not typically reflect the court’s consideration

of the merits of the stay application. Rather, they ‘freeze legal proceedings
until the court can rule on a party’s request for expedited relief.’” United States
v. Texas, 144 S. Ct. 797, 798 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring in denial of
applications to vacate stay) (quoting Rachel Bayefsky, Administrative Stays:
Power and Procedure, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1941, 1942 (2022)).

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motion for temporary relief. See id. That motion, which Harris County
opposes, is now before this Court. For the following reasons, the motion
is granted, and all payments under the Uplift Harris program are
prohibited pending further order of this Court.
The State’s appeal of the denial of a temporary injunction remains
pending in the court of appeals, which we expect will proceed
expeditiously to a decision. That decision can, if desired, be appealed to
this Court. The State’s mandamus petition will remain pending in this
Court while its appeal proceeds below.
***
In a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court or a court of
appeals, “[t]he relator may file a motion to stay any underlying
proceeding or for any other temporary relief pending the court’s action
on the petition.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(a). Whether in response to such
a motion by the relator, in response to a motion by any other party, or
“on its own initiative,” the court may “grant any just relief pending the
court’s action on the petition.” Id. 52.10(b). Absent a contrary order,
relief ordered under Rule 52.10 remains in effect “until the case is finally
decided.” Id.
In an appeal—as opposed to a mandamus proceeding—the closest
analogue to Rule 52.10 is Rule 29.3, which authorizes a court of appeals
to “make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties’ rights
until disposition of the appeal.” Id. 29.3. When a court of appeals grants
or denies a motion for temporary relief under Rule 29.3, the rules
provide no direct mechanism for immediate appeal of that ruling to this
Court. As we have recognized in past cases, however, a party may seek
mandamus relief in this Court challenging a court of appeals’ decision

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on Rule 29.3 temporary relief. See, e.g., In re State, No. 21-0873, 2021
WL 4785741 (Tex. Oct. 14, 2021). In so doing, the party may request
immediate temporary relief under Rule 52.10. Id. In this way, when
time is of the essence, a party may ask this Court to intervene to
determine the parties’ rights during the pendency of the underlying
appeal.
When considering such a request in the past, we have described
our exercise of authority under Rule 52.10 as a way to “preserve the
status quo” while the appeal proceeds. Id. at *1. While “preservation of
the status quo” has long been a valid consideration when courts are
asked to issue temporary relief, the terminology is not without its
drawbacks. Identifying the status quo is not always a straightforward
undertaking, after all. In this case, for instance, Harris County claims
the status quo is its previously unchallenged freedom to implement the
Uplift Harris program as it sees fit. From that perspective, the State’s
motion seeks to alter the status quo. On the other hand, the State claims
the status quo is that the funds have not yet been disbursed. If that is
right, then the State’s motion seeks to preserve the status quo. Such
debates about how to define the status quo can descend quickly into
lawyerly word-play, offering little help to a court tasked with providing
“just relief.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b).
Rather than describe the purpose of relief under Rule 52.10 as
“preservation of the status quo,” we find Rule 29.3’s analogous
formulation more helpful. An appellate court asked to decide whether
to stay a lower court’s ruling pending appeal or to stay a party’s actions
while an appeal proceeds should seek “to preserve the parties’ rights

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until disposition of the appeal.” Id. 29.3. The equitable authority we
exercise today, under Rule 52.10, serves the same purpose—
preservation of the parties’ rights while the appeal proceeds. A stay
pending appeal is, of course, a kind of injunction, so the familiar
considerations governing injunctive relief in other contexts will
generally apply in this context as well. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 65.011 (listing requisites for writs of injunction); Pike v. Tex.
EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 792 (Tex. 2020) (listing requisites
for permanent injunctive relief).
To begin with, an appellate court can hardly endeavor to preserve
the parties’ rights pending appeal without making a preliminary inquiry
into what those rights are. Thus, the likely merits of the parties’
respective legal positions are always an important consideration when
a court is asked to issue an order determining the parties’ legal rights
pending appeal. There is little justice in allowing a party who will very
likely lose on the merits to interfere with the legal rights of the opposing
party during the appeal, if this can be avoided. Likewise, it may often
be unjust to require a party who is very likely to succeed on the merits
to wait for the lengthy appellate process to play out before exercising his
legal rights.
Consideration of the merits of the parties’ legal positions
commonly informs a court’s assessment of the advisability of injunctive
relief. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.011(1) (asking whether “the
applicant is entitled to the relief demanded”); Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 792
(requiring showing of “a wrongful act”). The relevance of the merits to
requests for injunctive relief does not vanish when courts must rule

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expeditiously. To the contrary, trial courts asked to issue temporary
injunctions or temporary restraining orders commonly must consider
the likely merits of the parties’ positions. See Abbott v. Harris County,
672 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2023) (temporary injunction); In re Abbott, 628
S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tex. 2021) (temporary restraining order). In a similar
way, appellate courts asked to issue temporary relief pending appeal
should make a preliminary inquiry into the likely merits of the parties’
legal positions. The merits need not—and often should not—be
definitively determined at this preliminary stage, but “just relief” that
“preserve[s] the parties’ rights” cannot be afforded without some
consideration of the merits.
Another essential consideration attendant on any request for
injunctive relief, including in this posture, is the injury that will befall
either party depending on the court’s decision. As in the underlying
temporary-injunction context, the applicant for a stay pending appeal
should be expected to show that he will suffer irreparable harm if relief
is not granted. Courts must likewise consider the harm that other
parties or the public will suffer if relief is granted—as well as any
potential injury to non-parties caused by granting or denying relief. The
equitable balancing of these harms is a required aspect of a court’s effort
to preserve the parties’ rights pending appeal. See Huynh v. Blanchard,
___ S.W.3d ___, 2024 WL 2869423, at *24–25 (Tex. June 7, 2024).
While the likely merits and the balance of harms are two required
considerations in every case in this posture, we do not foreclose
consideration of other matters, depending on the circumstances. A stay
pending appeal is a creature of equity, and a court asked to issue one

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may take into account other case-specific equitable considerations that
bear on its exercise of discretion. 3
***
Applying this standard here, we conclude that the State’s motion
for temporary relief should be granted. Although we make no definitive
statement about the merits, the State has raised serious doubt about the
constitutionality of the Uplift Harris program, and this potential
violation of the Texas Constitution could not be remedied or undone if
payments were to commence while the underlying appeal proceeds.
Article III, section 52(a) of the Texas Constitution provides that
“the Legislature shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town
or other political corporation or subdivision of the State to lend its credit
or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual,
association or corporation whatsoever.” The Constitution contains other
similar statements. See TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 50 (prohibiting the
giving or lending of credit of the State to persons and entities), 51
(prohibiting grants of public money to individuals and others); id.
art. XI, §3 (prohibiting local governments from making “any
appropriation or donation” to private entities); id. art. XVI, § 6(a)
(prohibiting any “appropriation for private or individual purposes”).

3 “The principles governing courts of equity govern injunction
proceedings if not in conflict with this chapter or other law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 65.001; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 136, 138 (Tex. 2004) (noting that mandamus review is “largely controlled
by equitable principles” and hence it “resists categorization,” requires
“flexibility that is the remedy’s principal virtue,” and includes considerations
that “implicate both public and private interests”); In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d
313, 317 (Tex. 2002) (noting that courts exercising equity jurisdiction must
“among other things, balance competing equities”).

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Under this Court’s precedent interpreting these provisions, a
government in Texas that desires to dole out public funds must, among
other things, “retain public control over the funds to ensure that the
public purpose is accomplished and to protect the public’s investment.”
Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 384.
The record indicates that Uplift Harris has advertised a “no
strings attached” stipend to those lucky enough to win its lottery. It
appears there will be no public control over the funds after they are
disbursed. It likewise appears there will be no monitoring of the
recipients’ day-to-day purchases, so it is unlikely the County will know
how recipients spend the money and whether any legitimate public
purpose was achieved thereby. The application states that funds must
not be used for terrorism, fraud, or other nefarious activities, but we are
given no indication that the County intends to, or even could,
meaningfully enforce these restrictions or truly monitor the recipients’
expenditures. Indeed, a County official testified that the program is not
designed “to monitor what people do with the things they buy.”
This is quite unlike a food-stamp program, a housing voucher, or
a medical-care program, in which the public funds can only be directed
to their intended purpose. It appears that, for all practical purposes,
there truly are “no strings attached,” and we are directed to no precedent
indicating that a government in Texas may make such payments
without running afoul of our Constitution’s restrictions. At this
preliminary stage, the State has raised serious doubt that the Uplift

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Harris program can satisfy the “public control” requirement of this
Court’s Gift Clause precedent.
The County argues, in the alternative, that the Uplift Harris
program qualifies as “economic development” and is therefore
separately authorized by article III, section 52-a of the Texas
Constitution—even if the program otherwise violates the Gift Clauses.
Under section 52-a, “the legislature may provide for the creation of
programs and the making of loans and grants of public money . . . for
the public purposes of development and diversification of the economy
of the state.” TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52-a. We have not previously
decided a case involving section 52-a. Without foreclosing further
development of the County’s argument, we are skeptical of the County’s
position at this preliminary stage.
Under the County’s permissive reading of section 52-a, nearly any
direct gift of public money that will likely be spent by the recipient could
qualify as “economic development”—on the theory that any boost in
overall consumer spending is good for the economy. If this is right, then
section 52-a comes close to repealing the Gift Clauses’ ban on “gratuitous
payments to individuals.” Tex. Mun. League, 74 S.W.3d at 383. Such
payments could nearly always be portrayed as good for the economy in
some sense.
Without resolving the issue, we think it more likely that by
authorizing “grants of public money . . . for the public purposes of
development and diversification of the economy of the state,”
section 52-a removed doubt about the constitutionality of conventional
economic-development grants, by which governments promote business

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growth and job creation through grant agreements designed to ensure
that the recipient of public funds spends them in a way that has an
economic benefit for the wider community. In other words, section 52-a
appears designed to clarify that “development and diversification of the
economy of the state” qualify as “public purposes.” We remain skeptical
of the County’s argument that a program of unmonitored, “no strings
attached” cash payments to individuals serves “the public purposes of
development and diversification of the economy of the state” as
envisioned by section 52-a.
Turning to the balance of harms, we have recognized that “ultra
vires conduct” by local officials “automatically results in harm to the
sovereign as a matter of law.” State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 410
(Tex. 2020). Indeed, the violation of duly enacted state law by local
government officials “clearly inflicts irreparable harm on the State.”
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. City of Austin, 565 S.W.3d 425, 441 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2018, pet. denied) (quoting Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 602 n.17
(2018)). We have likewise recognized that the State has a “justiciable
interest in its sovereign capacity in the maintenance and operation of
its municipal corporations in accordance with law,” and that “[a]s a
sovereign entity, the State has an intrinsic right to . . . enforce its own
laws.” Hollins, 620 S.W.3d at 410 (quoting Yett v. Cook, 281 S.W. 837,
842 (Tex. 1926) and State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 790 (Tex. 2015)). 4
The harm alleged here is irreparable in an additional sense as
well. Once the funds are distributed to individuals, they cannot feasibly

4 To the extent the County challenges the State’s standing to bring this

suit, our recognition in Hollins and elsewhere that the State has a justiciable

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be recouped if it is later determined they were paid in violation of the
Texas Constitution. The parties do not seem to disagree on this reality.
As for injury to other parties, the County itself will suffer no
cognizable injury unless its legal rights are incorrectly circumscribed
during the pendency of the appeal. The County is not harmed by being
required to follow the Texas Constitution. Again, it remains possible
the County will ultimately succeed on the merits. But we must judge
the likely harm to the County’s legal rights in light of our preliminary
assessment of the merits, which does not favor the County.
As for harm to the public, in general the citizens of Harris County
are not harmed by requiring the County to abide by the Texas
Constitution. A very small percentage of Harris County citizens will
temporarily be denied receipt of the disputed payments if a stay is
granted. But if those payments would have been illegal, then the
temporary denial of them is not a harm that can tip the scales in the
County’s favor. Requiring the government to follow the law benefits
everyone. Temporarily preventing expenditure of these funds while the
State’s appeal proceeds ensures public funds are not irrecoverably spent
in violation of the Texas Constitution. Whether Harris County’s
proposal would actually violate the Texas Constitution remains an open
question at this early stage of the litigation.
***
For these reasons, the State’s Rule 52.10 motion is granted.
Harris County is ordered to refrain from distributing funds under the

interest in assuring that its political subdivisions comply with Texas law
sufficiently establishes the State’s standing at this juncture.

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Uplift Harris program until further order of this Court. 5 The court of
appeals should proceed to decide the temporary-injunction appeal now
pending before it. The State’s petition for writ of mandamus remains
pending in this Court.

James D. Blacklock
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 14, 2024

5 The County states that, under federal requirements, it must spend the

funds by September 30, 2026, but it must “commit” funds to Uplift Harris by
December 31, 2024. The precise nature of what constitutes “committing” funds
is not entirely clear, but the State does not ask us to prevent the County from
earmarking or assigning federal funds to the program. Today’s stay prevents
the County from disbursing the funds to individual recipients or to third-party
intermediaries until further order of this Court.

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