Steve Huynh, Individually Yvonne Huynh, Individually Huynh Poultry Farm, LLC D/B/A Steve Thi Huynh Poultry Farm D/B/A Huynh Poultry Farm T & N Poultry Farm, LLC Thinh Bao Nguyen, Individually Timmy Huynh Poultry Farm Timmy Huynh, Individually And Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Frank Blanchard, Angelia Snow, Tanya Berry, Kimberly Riley, John Miller, Amy Miller, Chad Martinez, Emily Martinez, Mersini Blanchard, Malakoff Properties, LLC, and Ronny Snow

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 21-0676
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Steve Huynh, Individually; Yvonne Huynh, Individually; Huynh
Poultry Farm, LLC d/b/a Steve Thi Huynh Poultry Farm d/b/a
Huynh Poultry Farm; T & N Poultry Farm, LLC; Thinh Bao
Nguyen, Individually; Timmy Huynh Poultry Farm; Timmy
Huynh, Individually; and Sanderson Farms, Inc.,
Petitioners,

v.

Frank Blanchard, Angelia Snow, Tanya Berry, Kimberly Riley,
John Miller, Amy Miller, Chad Martinez, Emily Martinez,
Mersini Blanchard, Malakoff Properties, LLC, and Ronny Snow,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE HUDDLE, joined by Chief Justice Hecht and Justice
Bland, and by Justice Young as to Part I, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the trial court’s
entry of a shutdown injunction was an abuse of discretion. But I
disagree with some of what the Court says along its winding path to that
conclusion. What made this case grant-worthy is that the trial court’s
injunction—which effectively shuts down the entire chicken-growing
operation—ignores well-established guardrails concerning the scope of
an injunction and grants relief far beyond what the evidence supports,
including relief the neighbors never sought. It further disregards the
robust regulatory system the Legislature and Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) created to carefully balance the
competing interests at play. The very first iteration of the injunction
was a total shutdown. In short, the order cracked a nut with a
sledgehammer.
That error should be the focus of the Court’s opinion. I grant that
the chickens stink—a lot—and that the growers do not contest that some
of their business practices failed to pass the smell test. But the Court
meanders, occasionally fighting the jury’s resolution of factual disputes
and failing to emphasize that what really matters for today’s purposes
is not the chickens’ stench or the growers’ transgressions but, rather,
the trial court’s decision to issue a shutdown injunction of a lawful
business as its very first attempt to craft an equitable remedy.
I. An injunction was proper.
From a fifty-thousand-foot view of this case, there is much about
which I agree with the Court. The Court correctly rejects the growers’
three arguments for why no injunction was proper. First, they argue
that because the jury found in answer to Question 4 that the nuisance
was temporary, the trial court could not issue a permanent injunction.
Their position is that a permanent injunction is not available to abate a
temporary nuisance. Second, the growers argue that the jury’s finding
that there was a temporary nuisance necessarily means there was no
imminent harm, which is, of course, a necessary element for injunctive

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relief. Third, they claim the neighbors could not obtain injunctive relief
because they had an adequate alternative remedy at law in the form of
damages. The Court correctly rejects all three arguments. But, in
explaining why they do not carry the day, the Court sends murky
messages. I write separately to underscore the real—and dangerous—
problem with the trial court’s injunction that the Court unfortunately
obscures.
A. With proper evidentiary support, a permanent
injunction can issue to abate a temporary nuisance.
Courts are bound by the jury’s factual determinations unless they
are unsupported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. See Crosstex
N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 613, 615 (Tex. 2016)
(explaining the circumstances in which courts may set aside findings);
see also, e.g., Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 774
(Tex. 2003) (emphasizing the principles that “a court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the jury” and “the jury is the sole judge of the
weight and credibility of testimony”). No party challenges the jury’s
factual findings as unsupported by sufficient evidence. Therefore,
neither the trial court nor this Court could ignore them in determining
appropriate injunctive relief. See, e.g., Livingston v. Livingston, 537
S.W.3d 578, 589 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)
(“[Defendant] was entitled to have the jury determine ultimate issues of
fact, but it was for the trial court, based on those factual determinations,
to decide the expediency, necessity, and propriety of the injunctive relief
requested by [Plaintiff].” (citing State v. Tex. Pet Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d
800, 803 (Tex. 1979))). Although the trial court is responsible for
building the injunction, the jury’s factual determinations are the

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building blocks upon which injunctive relief rests. Cf. Bostow v. Bank of
Am., No. 14-04-00256-CV, 2006 WL 89446, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Jan. 17, 2006, no pet.) (“The jury’s findings on issues of fact
are binding; however, equitable principles and the appropriate relief to
be afforded by equity are only to be applied by the court itself.”).
In response to Questions 1 and 3, the jury found each grower
negligently and intentionally caused a private nuisance to each
neighbor. Question 4 then asked the jury to select between two options
relating to the type of injury that was proximately caused by the
nuisance: (1) injury “of such a character as to recur repeatedly,
continually, and regularly”; or (2) injury “of such a character that any
anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent,
and not reasonably predictable.” As to each neighbor, the jury selected
the second option—it found that (a) there was a nuisance and (b) the
nuisance was not one that would recur “repeatedly, continually, and
regularly.”
Despite this, the Court’s opinion appears to suggest—despite
disclaimers to the contrary—that the trial court could have disregarded
the jury’s answer to Question 4. 1 See ante at 39 (concluding that,

1 In Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas), L.P., we

clarified that the ultimate question of temporary or permanent injury to real
property is decided by the court as a question of law. 449 S.W.3d 474, 481 (Tex.
2014). However, nowhere in Gilbert Wheeler did we say that the court can
ignore jury findings that are relevant to this determination. In fact, we said
the opposite. See id. (“[W]e recognize that questions regarding the facts that
underlie the temporary-versus-permanent distinction must be resolved by the
jury upon proper request.”). If the jury here had instead found that the
nuisance was “of such a character as to recur repeatedly, continually, and

4
because “Defendants’ operations are indisputably permanent, the
Neighbors could have argued for a presumption of permanent
interference”). I disagree. First, as the Court concedes, it would be
unnecessary for the trial court to relabel the nuisance as permanent
rather than temporary to support issuance of a permanent injunction.
Second, the Court’s suggestion improperly usurps the jury’s fact-finding
role in this case. The record reflects conflicting evidence on how
permanent or temporary the nuisance-level odors were. The jury
resolved that conflict and determined the nuisance-level odors were of a
character that would only recur “occasional[ly], irregular[ly], [and]
intermittent[ly].” We are bound by that factual determination. See
Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792, 796 (Tex. 1951) (“The jury, not the
court, is the fact finding body. The court is never permitted to substitute
its finding and conclusions for that of the jury.”). The Court should view
the finding deferentially, not with hostility.
While I agree with the growers that the jury found facts that can
only support a temporary nuisance, I agree with the Court that this
finding does not preclude the trial court from issuing a permanent
injunction. This is because a nuisance may be temporary in that the
discomfort and annoyance it causes remit at times. But it is
nevertheless permanent in that it is not going to cease in the future,
even if the future annoyance worsens for periods and then wanes. To
analogize, a disease may be permanent even if its symptoms are not
ever-present. Its symptoms may worsen at times and then subside, but

regularly,” the trial court could not conclude that the nuisance was, to the
contrary, temporary.

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the diagnosis remains. The same is true here: the fact that the odors
were not constantly present does not foreclose the use of a permanent
injunction to abate them because it is known that the odors would recur
despite the unpredictability of knowing when and to what extent. See
generally Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 272
(Tex. 2004) (describing a temporary nuisance).
With that in mind, it is no wonder that we have repeatedly said
the ultimate determination to enjoin conduct that causes a nuisance
does not turn on whether the nuisance is labeled temporary or
permanent. See id. at 284 (“[C]haracterization of a nuisance as
temporary or permanent should not depend on whether it can be
abated.”); see also Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610 (“A court ‘may decide to
abate a nuisance whether it is temporary or permanent, and may choose
not to abate either even if that is the only remedy requested.’” (quoting
Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 286–87)). Although the court’s power to issue
injunctive relief is not unbounded (more on that later), the court’s ability
to permanently enjoin a nuisance does not turn on the nuisance’s
characterization as temporary or permanent, just as the need for
treatment of a disease is not solely reserved for when symptoms are
most acute.
B. The jury’s finding of a temporary nuisance did not
preclude the trial court’s finding of imminent harm.
The growers next argue that no injunction should have issued
because the jury’s finding that the nuisance was temporary precludes a
finding of imminent harm. “To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a
party must prove (1) a wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) an
irreparable injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law.”

6
Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 792 (Tex. 2020). But
“the question of whether imminent harm exists to warrant injunctive
relief is a legal question for the court, not a factual question for the jury.”
Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc.,
975 S.W.2d 546, 554 (Tex. 1998). Since imminent harm is a legal
question, it is not subject to a jury’s ultimate determination. Cf. W & T
Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu, 610 S.W.3d 884, 900 (Tex. 2020) (noting that
legal questions are answered by courts subject to the jury’s underlying
factual findings). I agree with the Court that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by concluding that the nuisance, though not found
by the jury to be permanent, created imminent harm warranting a
permanent injunction.
C. The neighbors lack an adequate remedy at law for
future damages.
The growers next contend no injunction should have issued
because the neighbors have an adequate remedy at law: damages. See
Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 792. If the only harm suffered by the neighbors was
a set of past intrusions for which damages are reasonably calculable,
then damages would be an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Bank of
Sw. N.A., Brownsville v. Harlingen Nat’l Bank, 662 S.W.2d 113, 116
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1983, no writ) (finding an
adequate remedy at law for damages where the defendant was capable
of paying the plaintiff a calculable amount for its past wrongs). Here,
however, the neighbors seek to prevent the nuisance from recurring in
the future, and the quantum of future damages—if any there might be—
is uncertain. See, e.g., Sharma v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 231 S.W.3d 405,
427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“The potential

7
damage . . . cannot be easily calculated and therefore a legal remedy is
inadequate.”). Indeed, the whole purpose of an injunction is to avoid
future wrongs. See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633
(1953) (“The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future violations
. . . .”).
The growers insist that there is an adequate remedy for these
future harms: more litigation. Under this theory, because the jury found
that recurrence of the nuisance-level odors would be “not reasonably
predictable,” the neighbors would have to wait for the nuisance to recur
and then rush to court. This “remedy” leaves all parties before us “in a
state of perpetual litigation,” and, as we noted in the past, while “‘good
fences make good neighbors,’ repeated litigation is unlikely to.”
Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 278 (footnote omitted) (quoting ROBERT FROST,
Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON (1914)). Ultimately, if a remedy at
law “will lead to a multiplicity of suits, ‘that very fact prevents it from
being complete and adequate.’” Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146,
152 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Repka v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 186 S.W.2d 977, 980
(Tex. 1945)).
II. The shutdown injunction exceeded the proper limits on
the scope of injunctions.
I concur with the Court’s judgment that the trial court’s
injunction was too broad and must be narrowed on remand. But the
Court goes astray, in my view, by (1) discussing irrelevant evidence
under the guise of balancing equities to determine the scope of an
appropriate injunction; and (2) failing to clearly direct the trial court to
craft an injunction that accords with the Legislature’s policy choices for

8
remedying nuisance-level chicken farm odors, as reflected in the Texas
Health and Safety Code and TCEQ regulations.
A. A total shutdown of a lawful business should be a
last resort, not a first.
Injunctions are exceedingly powerful tools. They are not an
option of first resort, but an option of last resort once the court is
satisfied there are no adequate legal remedies. Butnaru v. Ford Motor
Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 210 (Tex. 2002) (“The general rule at equity is that
before injunctive relief can be obtained, it must appear that there does
not exist an adequate remedy at law.” (quoting Republic Ins. Co. v.
O’Donnell Motor Co., 289 S.W. 1064, 1066 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1926, no
writ))). So trial courts issuing injunctions—particularly permanent
ones—must craft them as narrowly as possible. Holubec v.
Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 40 (Tex. 2003) (“[I]njunctions must be
narrowly drawn and precise.” (quoting Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d
38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992))).
In my view, the Court’s analysis strays from a proper balancing
of the equities in two important respects. First, the Court details the
growers’ sins regardless of whether they caused or contributed to the
nuisance. A court charged with balancing equities should balance them
with a nose to abating the nuisance above all else. See, e.g., Hot Rod
Hill Motor Park v. Triolo, 276 S.W.3d 565, 568–72 (Tex. App.—Waco
2008, no pet.) (engaging in factual analysis to balance the equities with
a focus towards considerations relating to the nuisance in question); see
also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Discretion is not whim, and limiting
discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle

9
of justice that like cases should be decided alike.” (quoting Martin v.
Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005))). Whether the growers
unjustly obtained federal subsidies, for example, is irrelevant except to
the extent that it causes or contributes to the nuisance. This is because
injunctions must not operate as punishments, but as correctives. See
Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 780 (Tex. 1958).
The Court’s focus on the growers’ bad acts distracts from the
simple black-letter principle that the order sidestepped: “an injunction
must be narrowly tailored to address the offending conduct—it must not
be so broad that it would enjoin a defendant from acting within its lawful
rights.” TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202,
212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see also Fairfield
Ests. L.P. v. Griffin, 986 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no
pet.) (explaining that an overly broad injunction granting more relief
than a plaintiff is entitled to by enjoining a defendant from conducting
lawful activities or exercising legal rights is an abuse of discretion).
Given these well-established limits on injunctive relief, it will
almost never be appropriate for a trial court to issue a shutdown order
whose scope necessarily enjoins unlawful and lawful activity as its very
first remedy. There is nothing innately improper about operating a
chicken farm. In our industrialized society, some odors from a variety
of industries are unavoidable. See Sherman Gas & Elec. Co. v. Belden,
123 S.W. 119, 120 (Tex. 1909) (noting that the lawful and ordinary use
of new businesses may sometimes have the effect of changing values of
nearby property). Thus, the trial court’s task is to craft an injunction

10
that halts the activity that raises the odors to an unlawful level but
permits activity that does not.
“A ‘nuisance’ is a condition that substantially interferes with the
use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or
annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and
enjoy it.” Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 593 (quoting Holubec, 111 S.W.3d at
37). Our definition of nuisance reflects an “effort[] to incorporate the
requirement that the hurt and inconvenience be ‘substantial’ and
‘unreasonably’ annoying or discomforting to a person of ‘ordinary
sensibilities.’” Id. Therefore, in abating the nuisance, the trial court
should craft an injunction that is the least restrictive way to reduce the
nuisance-level odors to levels that a person of ordinary sensibilities
would not regard as unreasonably annoying. The goal, emphatically, is
not to eliminate all unpleasant odors entirely. Cf. Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by
the extent of the violation established . . . .”). So the “injunction must be
specific in its terms to be enforceable, describing in clear and precise
detail the acts sought to be restrained.” Wiese v. Heathlake Cmty. Ass’n,
384 S.W.3d 395, 399 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
Injunctions “should be broad enough to prevent subsequent violations of
those already committed, but not so broad as to enjoin a defendant from
activities that are a lawful and proper exercise of his rights.” Id.; see
also Holubec v. Brandenburger, 214 S.W.3d 650, 657 (Tex. App.—Austin
2006, no pet.) (“[A]n injunction will be granted only to restrain actually
existing nuisances, and not to restrain an intended act on the ground
that it may become a nuisance.”).

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B. The injunction must align with existing Texas law
governing acceptable poultry-farm odor levels.
As noted above, well-established law provides that an injunction
must be narrowly tailored to abate a nuisance but without enjoining
lawful conduct. Thus, to determine the appropriate scope of an
injunction in a case like this, a trial court must determine the point at
which odor emission goes from lawful to unlawful—and then craft its
injunction to prohibit only the latter. This may seem a daunting task in
this case, for few law-school courses address chicken-farm odor
management. Thankfully, Congress and the Texas Legislature have
created a comprehensive scheme to balance competing interests on this
precise issue. The trial court in this case seemingly disregarded it but,
on remand, it must ascertain the line between lawful and unlawful odor
emissions and craft an injunction that dovetails with that legislative
determination.
Under federal law, states are required to regulate their air
quality. Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
How the states choose to do so, however, is up to them. See id. In Texas,
the Legislature passed the Texas Clean Air Act in 1967. See BCCA
Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2016); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 382.001–.551. The Act created the TCEQ
and empowers that agency to administer and enforce the Act’s
provisions. BCCA, 496 S.W.3d at 5; see also Brazoria County v. Tex.
Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 128 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004,
no pet.) (“In Texas, [the] TCEQ is the state agency generally charged
with protection of air quality within the state.”). Pursuant to this
legislative scheme, the TCEQ acts to prevent or abate nuisances related

12
to air quality. Cf., e.g., Slay v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 351 S.W.3d
532, 534–37 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied) (providing an
example of TCEQ enforcement actions). In essence, Texas law specifies
the degree of odor a chicken farm lawfully may emit, and, rather than
enjoin the growers’ operations entirely, the trial court should have
consulted the legislative and regulatory scheme and crafted its
injunction to align with it. The trial court erred by failing to do so.
In crafting an injunction, Section 382.068 of the Health and
Safety Code, aptly titled “Poultry Facility Odor; Response to
Complaints,” provides important, detailed guidance. It reflects a system
in which the TCEQ responds to complaints about poultry odors and,
upon finding an air-quality violation, issues a notice of violation (NOV).
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.068(b), (c). If problems persist
and the TCEQ issues three NOVs in one year, then a “comprehensive
compliance agreement” is entered between the violator and the TCEQ.
Id. § 382.068(d). This agreement “must include an odor control plan that
the executive director determines is sufficient to control odors.” Id.
As the Court discusses, the TCEQ was aware of the problem in
this case and issued several NOVs. 2 In accordance with the Health and
Safety Code, the growers and the TCEQ agreed to a Strategic Odor
Control Plan. The neighbors assert that the growers did not adequately
implement it and that the TCEQ did not adequately enforce it. But that
is no evidence that the Plan itself was insufficient to abate the
nuisance-level odors so as to achieve compliance with Texas law, had it

2 In fact, six weeks before the beginning of trial, the TCEQ had issued

two NOVs.

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been implemented properly. The trial court, of course, does not dictate
the TCEQ’s response to violations. But it should not, out of frustration
with the TCEQ’s perceived lack of interest, ignore the TCEQ’s detailed
regulatory system and determination about what conduct would be
sufficient to achieve compliance. It must grapple with the factors the
TCEQ regulates—number of chickens, frequency of cycles, proper
ventilation, maintenance of facilities, etc.—to ascertain the extent to
which the growers can both grow chickens and comply with the law and
then craft its injunction to permit that level of activity.
The Strategic Odor Control Plan presumably does this and could
serve as a guide for crafting a proper injunction. 3 This is not to say that
the trial court must regurgitate the Plan in its injunction, but neither
may it ignore the TCEQ entirely. Though this exercise may be tedious,
aligning the injunction with TCEQ regulations is necessary to ensure
that injunctions respect rather than reject the Legislature’s
determination of the extent to which the growers must scale back their
operations to reduce nuisance-level odors without going so far as to
prohibit the growers’ lawful conduct. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 476 F. Supp. 2d 275, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“[A]ny injunctive or equitable relief which might eventually issue from

3 The Court, confusingly, suggests there was no Plan that if properly

implemented could control the odors, see, e.g., ante at 20–21, despite testimony
in the record to the contrary. The Court incorrectly frames testimony from a
TCEQ official that the Plan was turned in late and that a separate self-audit
was insufficiently detailed to conclude the Plan itself is not worth considering
in an injunction order. See, e.g., ante at 20–21, 49 n.50, 70.

14
this Court will surely take into account the need for consistency and
coordination with the actions of the involved state agencies.”).
None of this is to say that a permanent injunction shutting down
a chicken farm would never be appropriate. It might be in the face of
continued, willful violations of an existing, narrower injunction. Cf.
Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc.,
937 S.W.2d 60, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996) (“The Court
considered the fact that an earlier, more narrow injunction failed to
accomplish its purpose . . . .”), aff’d as modified, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.
1998). But a trial court should not, as its very first attempt to abate a
nuisance, issue an injunction that permanently prohibits lawful
business activity. This is doubly true when there exists a regulatory
scheme that is intended to address and ameliorate the very
nuisance-level odors the trial court seeks to abate. As courts we give
effect to laws and regulations; we must not create our own.
* * *
The trial court abused its discretion in entering an injunction that
prohibits lawful conduct along with unlawful conduct. I therefore
concur in the Court’s judgment reversing and remanding for the trial
court to modify the scope of its injunction. On remand, it must consider
existing Texas law, as set forth in the Texas Health and Safety Code and
TCEQ regulations, to craft a narrower injunction that accords with the
Legislature’s careful determination of the balance between the growers’
interest in running a lawful business and the neighbors’ interest in
enjoying their property.

15
Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 7, 2024

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