Sarah Gregory and New Prime, Inc. v. Jaswinder Chohan

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 21-0017
══════════

Sarah Gregory and New Prime, Inc.,
Petitioners,

v.

Jaswinder Chohan, et al.,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE BLAND, concurring in part.

The parties agree that a jury’s imposition of mental anguish
damages must be reasonable and consistent with due process, requiring
judicial review. 1 The difficulty lies in articulating a workable legal
standard for evaluating such damages, particularly when the damages
are not linked to an underlying physical injury. The plurality and

1 See Saenz v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex.
1996) (“[T]he law requires appellate courts to conduct a meaningful evidentiary
review of [damages] determinations.”). Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d
434, 443–44 (Tex. 1995) (outlining the historical development of constraints on
such damages).
Justice Devine agree that the mental anguish damages in this case must
be reversed but differ in their approach to that judicial standard. 2
The common ground in their opinions, however, provides a
framework for deciding this case. Both the plurality and Justice Devine
agree that mental anguish damages must be based on the evidence. 3
Both agree that juries must not measure mental anguish damages using
improper yardsticks. 4 Both agree that the jury in this case was told in
error that it should use measures that have no legitimate role in
deciding compensation for mental anguish: artwork, fighter jets, and the
number of miles a defendant’s company has driven. 5 To resolve the
challenge to the mental anguish damages in this case, we neither need
to adopt the plurality’s standard for determining whether the evidence
demonstrates a rational connection to the amount awarded for every
case, nor reject such a standard as Justice Devine advocates. We instead
should leave further development of the law to a case in which the jury
is properly informed about what to consider and, importantly, not told
to apply measurements wholly outside the mental anguish evidence
presented. 6

2 Ante at 4–5 (plurality op.); ante at 14 (Devine, J., concurring).
3 Ante at 12 (plurality op.); ante at 3, 9 (Devine, J., concurring).
4 Ante at 17–19 (plurality op.); ante at 3–4, 9 (Devine, J., concurring).
5 Ante at 17–19 (plurality op.); ante at 14 (Devine, J., concurring).
Although Justice Devine does not join the plurality opinion, he agrees with the
plurality’s resolution of the responsible third party issue. Id.
6The court of appeals held that “[n]one of the awards at issue here meet
[the passion, prejudice, or improper motive] criteria.” 615 S.W.3d 277, 314
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2020). It did not grapple with the effect of counsel’s pleas

2
Counsel’s unchecked directives to the jury to employ mental
anguish measurements based on standards that depart from the
evidence render the verdict legally infirm under long-standing common
law. 7 It is settled law that appellate courts must review mental anguish
damages to confirm that they are not the result of passion or prejudice. 8
This part of the common law standard does not require a subjective

for measurements outside the evidence; rather, it contrasted the improper
arguments with other, correct statements of law and the jury charge. Id. at
308. Those statements and instructions, however, gave no guidance as to the
correct measurement, leaving the verdict open to a no-evidence challenge that
the amount awarded in damages was based on passion or prejudice. See Saenz,
925 S.W.2d at 614; Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 444.
7 As early as 1855, this Court has remanded for a new trial where the
verdict “is so excessive as to warrant the belief that the jury have been [misled]
either by passion, prejudice or ignorance” or “by some undue influence,
perverting the judgment.” Thomas v. Womack, 13 Tex. 580, 584 (1855).
8 Thomas, 13 Tex. at 584 (indicating the court may set aside an
excessive verdict when “there is reason to believe that the jury were actuated
by passion, or by some undue influence, perverting the judgment”); Ft. Worth
& D.C. Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 16 S.W. 1093, 1094–95 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1891)
(declining to set aside jury verdict when there was no indication the jury had
“been misled, or their verdict has been influenced by corruption, passion, or
prejudice”); City of Ft. Worth v. Johnson, 19 S.W. 361, 362 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1892, judgm’t affirmed) (suggesting a jury verdict is infirm if “the amount of
the verdict is so disproportionate to the character of the injury and its effect as
to indicate the existence of passion, prejudice, or improper motive on the part
of the jury”). These early cases came long before Texas permitted recovery for
mental anguish apart from physical injury. As the law expanded to allow
recovery of damages in more situations, the grounds for reversal also
expanded. See Saenz, 925 S.W.2d 607 at 614; Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 443–44.
As this law developed, Texas courts did not abandon this review. See Pope v.
Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. 1986) (indicating remittitur is appropriate
where the jury’s finding is manifestly unjust, even without a showing that the
jury was inflamed by passion, prejudice, or improper motive).

3
determination that a given verdict “shocks the conscience.” 9 It focuses
on inputs: whether the jury was exhorted to consider improper
measurements for mental anguish, placing the amount awarded outside
a reasonable range based on the evidence. The jury in this case was told
to base mental anguish damages on passion (that the trucking company
should be punished with a two-cent fine as mental anguish damages for
each mile its fleet had driven) and prejudice (that the high cost of fighter
jets and artwork should inform mental anguish damages). 10 As the
plurality observes, these arguments destroyed any rational connection
the verdict has to the mental anguish evidence presented. 11
Other cases will present challenges closer to the boundaries of
judicial review. For now, it is enough to say that the mental anguish
verdict in this case is legally infirm under either the plurality’s or
Justice Devine’s articulation of the appropriate standard for review. I
join all but Parts II.C.2 and II.D of the plurality opinion, leaving for
another day the resolution of the debate as to the precise standard of
judicial review. I concur on the common ground for reversal in this case:
the jury’s mental anguish verdict was infected by repeated requests to

9 See ante at 30 (plurality op.).
10The jury’s mental anguish verdict is markedly close to the two-cent
fine. Counsel’s exhortation to the jury to give New Prime “your two cents
worth” for each mile driven by company truckers over the course of a year
encouraged jurors to punish New Prime according to the size of its business
rather than to compensate for grief. The jury awarded $38,801,775, an amount
within one-half of one percent of the total suggested by counsel’s “two cents”
argument. Nothing in the record links this number to the evidence presented.
11 Ante at 17–19 (plurality op.).

4
use improper measures to assess mental anguish damages, warranting
a new trial.

Jane N. Bland
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 16, 2023

5