William W. Ruth v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0613
══════════

William W. Ruth,
Petitioner,

v.

Commission for Lawyer Discipline,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE HUDDLE, concurring in the judgment.

I join in the Court’s judgment but not its opinion. The Court holds
that Rule 4.02(a) of the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct—
and, indeed, every disciplinary rule that is prefaced with the phrase “[i]n
representing a client”—does not apply to a lawyer who represents
himself. This holding contradicts the rule’s plain language and is at
odds with the well-accepted premise that a person can simultaneously
occupy two roles: in this case lawyer and client. It follows from this
premise that a lawyer who participates in a judicial proceeding pro se
is, in fact, “representing a client” within the rule’s meaning. It just so
happens that the client is him.
Following this logic, as most jurisdictions have, I would hold that
a lawyer participating in a judicial proceeding pro se is “representing a
client” and thus subject to discipline under Rule 4.02(a). Still, I agree
that the attorney in this case should not be subject to discipline, albeit
for a narrower reason than the one the Court espouses: he could have
justifiably relied on contrary guidance from the Texas Committee on
Professional Ethics and, accordingly, should not suffer the unduly harsh
punishment imposed. I would therefore reverse the judgment of
suspension, as the Court does, for this narrower reason. But, unlike the
Court, I would clarify that Rule 4.02(a) applies to self-represented
attorneys. This would strengthen the ethical standards the Court’s
opinion unfortunately degrades.
I
The Commission for Lawyer Discipline brought a disciplinary
action against William Ruth. Ruth represented himself, and the
Commission was represented by counsel. Nevertheless, Ruth included
Commission members’ email addresses on the electronic service list of
filings, causing them to be sent directly to the members’ email inboxes.
After two of Ruth’s filings were served directly on the Commission’s
members in this way, counsel for the Commission emailed Ruth,
informing him that was improper and should stop.
Less than an hour later, Ruth sent Commission counsel a defiant
response. Two days after that, Ruth again caused a court filing to be
sent directly to Commission members. He did so a total of three times
after being instructed that such direct communications were improper.

2
Ruth also sent a letter directly to the Commission chair,
requesting that Commission counsel recuse, and he directly served
Commission members with correspondence addressed to the district
judge presiding over the case, which set forth various complaints,
including that Commission counsel should be disqualified.
No doubt fed up with a cantankerous Ruth, the Commission
doubled down, hitting Ruth with a second disciplinary proceeding while
the first remained pending. This time, the Commission alleged that
Ruth’s conduct in the first disciplinary proceeding—serving filings and
correspondence on individual Commission members directly rather than
through counsel—independently merited punishment. The asserted
basis for further discipline? Disciplinary Rule 4.02(a). Dubbed the “no
contact” rule, it states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or
cause or encourage another to communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person, organization or
entity of government the lawyer knows to be represented
by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized
by law to do so.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 4.02(a). The trial court granted
the Commission’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Ruth
violated Rules 4.02(a) and 8.04(a)(1). 1 The punishment for sending the
missives directly to Commission members instead of their counsel? A
five-year active suspension from the practice of law.

1 Rule 8.04(a)(1) prohibits lawyers from “violat[ing] these rules . . .
whether or not such violation occurred in the course of a client-lawyer
relationship.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.04(a)(1).

3
Ruth appealed, arguing that Rule 4.02(a) does not apply because
he was not “representing a client.” The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that “a lawyer acting pro se represents himself as a client.” 696
S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024). Ruth petitioned this
Court for review.
II
As when construing statutes, we review the meaning of the
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct de novo. In re Caballero, 272
S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2008). Our interpretation therefore begins with
the rule’s text. See Third Coast Servs., LLC v. Castaneda, 726 S.W.3d
201, 206 (Tex. 2025). We must give effect to all a rule’s words and, if
possible, not treat any language as mere surplusage. Caballero, 272
S.W.3d at 599. We interpret the rule’s language according to its
common, ordinary meaning unless the text supplies a different meaning
and in light of its context. See Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d
712, 718 (Tex. 2024).
Though the aspirational spirit of the disciplinary rules
encourages lawyers to “maintain the highest standards of ethical
conduct,” the rules themselves set the “minimum standards of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶¶ 1, 7. When
“difficult issues of professional discretion” arise in determining whether
conduct is proscribed by the rules, lawyers are admonished to look to the
“principles” embodied in the rules. Id. ¶ 7.
The controlling question is whether Ruth was “representing a
client” when he communicated directly with Commission members he

4
knew to be represented by counsel regarding active litigation in which
he was representing himself. I begin by examining the meaning of key
relevant terms, beginning with “client.” The rules do not define “client”
in the sense that a dictionary would. But the preamble tells us that “[a]
lawyer is a representative of clients.” Id. ¶ 1. It explains that a lawyer
may serve as an advisor, advocate, negotiator, intermediary,
spokesperson, or evaluator for a client. Id. ¶ 2. In each role, the lawyer
zealously pursues the client’s interests. Id. ¶ 3. This is his raison d’être.
This understanding is consistent with the dictionary definition of
“client,” which is a “person or entity that employs a professional for
advice or help in that professional’s line of work; esp., one in whose
interest a lawyer acts, as by giving advice, appearing in court, or
handling a matter.” Client, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
In most instances, a “lawyer” and a “client” are two distinct
entities. But this is not always the case, and nothing requires that two
distinct entities occupy the two roles. As the court of appeals observed,
one person may occupy the role—or wear the hat—of both “lawyer” and
“client.” 696 S.W.3d at 239. That is what happens when a lawyer
represents himself in any judicial proceeding.
A hypothetical proves the point. Imagine a docket call in which a
trial judge calls a cause number and several people approach the bench
in response. The judge asks them to make appearances for the record,
so that she may understand who’s who. A lawyer acting pro se and
wishing to provide a complete answer would state his name, perhaps
including the name of his law firm, and add that he represents himself.
But what if instead he gave only his name, and the judge asked, “Who’s

5
your client?” It is unthinkable that he would respond, “no one” or “I
don’t have one.” He would obviously say “me” or “I’m representing
myself.”
Ruth, who undisputedly is a lawyer, is also the client—the person
for whose interests Ruth is advocating. He meets the dictionary
definition of “client” as he is “one in whose interest a lawyer acts.”
Client, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); see also Pro se litigant,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (one who “represents oneself
in a court proceeding”).
The prefatory phrase “[i]n representing a client” is not, as the
Court concludes, rendered meaningless by this interpretation. It cabins
the rule’s application to circumstances in which a lawyer is acting in a
representative capacity, i.e., as a lawyer for someone. Thus, the rule
does not apply when a lawyer chats with his neighbor (who is
represented by counsel) about the neighbor’s ongoing legal headaches
because the lawyer is not representing himself or anyone else in those
communications.
Context also supports applying the rule to lawyers acting pro se.
First, Rule 3.08(a) states that a lawyer shall not work on a case “if the
lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness . . .
unless . . . the lawyer is a party to the action and is appearing pro se.”
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.08(a)(4). There, the rules make
an express exception for lawyers appearing pro se. No such exception
exists in Rule 4.02(a). Second, the disciplinary rules nowhere use
“pro se” to broaden a rule’s application. These contextual clues signal
that pro se lawyers are included in the rules’ scope unless expressly

6
excepted. Were it otherwise, the exception in Rule 3.08(a)(4) would be
surplusage, which we strive to avoid. See Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 642 S.W.3d 569, 581 (Tex. 2022). Because Rule 4.02(a) does
not expressly exclude pro se lawyers, then, it includes them.
As the Court acknowledges, see ante at 11, applying Rule 4.02(a)
to lawyers acting pro se is consistent with the rule’s express purpose,
which is to prevent “efforts to circumvent the lawyer-client relationship
existing between other persons, organizations or entities of government
and their respective counsel.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT
4.02 cmt. 1. Whether a lawyer is representing himself or someone else,
directly contacting another represented party regarding that matter
circumvents that party’s counsel and threatens unfair influence.
Rule 4.02 even prohibits “communications that in form are between a
lawyer’s client and another [represented] person” if the lawyer is
“involve[d] in devising and controlling their content” or if the lawyer
“cause[s] or encourage[s] the communication.” Id. cmts. 1–2. The point
is to totally avoid the asymmetry inherent in such interactions absent
consent. See In re News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding), mand. granted sub nom., In
re Users Sys. Servs., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 1999). Consistent with
the preamble, we should apply the principle embodied in the rule to hold
that it applies to lawyers who are representing themselves.
This interpretation is not novel. As the Court acknowledges, most
jurisdictions to address the issue have interpreted similar no-contact
rules to apply to lawyers representing themselves. See, e.g., In re Steele,
181 N.E.3d 976, 978–80 (Ind. 2022); In re Hodge, 407 P.3d 613, 654–55

7
(Kan. 2017); Medina Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Cameron, 958 N.E.2d 138, 141
n.1 (Ohio 2011); In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, 789 N.W.2d 73,
76 (N.D. 2010); In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Haley, 126 P.3d 1262,
1267–69 (Wash. 2006); In re Discipline of Schaefer, 25 P.3d 191, 199–200
(Nev. 2001); Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 925 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Idaho
1996); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 108–09 (Wyo. 1994); In
re Segall, 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ill. 1987). For example, in interpreting
Indiana’s Professional Conduct Rule 4.2, which contains the same “[i]n
representing a client” language at issue here, the Indiana Supreme
Court rejected arguments similar to Ruth’s, including that a pro se
lawyer is not “representing a client.” Steele, 181 N.E.3d at 978–79.
Instead, the court reasoned that “an attorney who proceeds pro se in a
matter functionally occupies the roles of both attorney and client” and
that applying the rule to lawyers acting pro se was consistent with the
rule’s purpose. Id. at 979.
Closer to home, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reached the
same conclusion. See Vickery v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 5 S.W.3d
241, 259–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
Vickery held that Rule 4.02(a) applied to a lawyer who “acted as his own
attorney” “to negotiate a settlement.” Id. at 259. The court agreed with
other courts that “have held that where an attorney is representing
himself, he is necessarily representing a client and can be charged with
unauthorized contact.” Id. It also explained that applying the rule to
pro se lawyers furthers the rule’s goal “to preserve the integrity of the
client-lawyer relationship by protecting the represented party from the

8
superior knowledge and skill of the opposing lawyer.” Id. (quoting News
Am. Publ’g, 974 S.W.2d at 100). 2
To sum up, text, context, policy, and persuasive authorities all
support applying Rule 4.02(a) to a lawyer who represents himself. On
what basis, then, does the Court reach the opposite conclusion? It does
not parse the text but, rather, concludes that the text is unclear. It
reasons that when a lawyer acts pro se, “in one sense he is both lawyer
and client, and in another sense he is neither lawyer nor client.” Ante
at 11. How can a lawyer acting pro se be neither lawyer nor client?
Dictionaries, experience, and common sense tell us he is both.
None of this is to say that I applaud the Commission’s decision to
open a second disciplinary proceeding against Ruth. I am sure more
weighty infractions require the Commission’s attention, and Ruth’s
discipline—a five-year suspension—seems wildly excessive. But there
was a legitimate path to avoid an unjust outcome in this case and still
take the opportunity “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
Ruth has pointed to an advisory opinion issued by the Texas
Committee on Professional Ethics. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op.
653, 79 Tex. B.J. 234 (2016). The Committee concluded that Rule 4.02(a)

2 These cases are consistent with the ABA’s interpretation of Model
Rule 4.2, which contains the phrase “[i]n representing a client” found in our
rule. See MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 4.2; A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp.,
Formal Op. 502, at 4 (2022) (“There are decades worth of disciplinary cases,
civil cases, and ethics opinions concluding that a lawyer acting in a pro se
capacity may not communicate directly with a represented adversary or other
represented person about the subject of the representation without the consent
of that person’s lawyer, unless the communication is authorized by law or court
order.” (footnotes omitted)).

9
“does not apply to a lawyer who is a party to a lawsuit or transaction but
does not represent any other party in the matter.” Id. at 234. We are of
course not bound by Committee opinions. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.092(c).
Such opinions, however, are intended to advise attorneys as to their
legal obligations. See id. § 81.092(a); Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, &
Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. 2015).
“[I]n an ideal world, Texans who seek guidance on [a legal]
question from their government could confidently rely on the answer.”
In re Carlson, 712 S.W.3d 71, 72 (Tex. 2025). “We do not live in that
ideal world,” and as a result Texans have sometimes relied on
governmental entities only to later be told by courts that their reliance
was misplaced. Id. To correct for this imperfection, we have made
exceptions to protect due-process rights where individuals have honestly
relied on the guidance of governmental entities when that advice turned
out to be faulty. See Mosley v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 593
S.W.3d 250, 268 (Tex. 2019) (vindicating the due-process claim of a
woman who followed the government’s instructions “only to be informed
that in so doing she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies
and was not entitled to judicial review”).
I would do the same here. Because Ruth may have reasonably
relied upon the guidance provided by the Committee on Professional
Ethics, it would be unjust and would implicate constitutional concerns
to allow Ruth to be penalized in this case—certainly with a five-year
suspension. See Elliott v. City of College Station, 717 S.W.3d 888, 898
(Tex. 2025) (“Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, our duty
. . . [is] to avoid unnecessary constitutional issues.” (quotation marks

10
omitted)). It also raises equitable estoppel issues when a governmental
entity (the State Bar through the Committee on Professional Ethics)
gives an individual advice and then that same entity (the State Bar
through the Commission for Lawyer Discipline) turns around and
punishes the individual for following its own advice. See PDT Holdings,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 712 S.W.3d 597, 606–07 (Tex. 2025). Thus, I would
reverse the judgment. That does not preclude us, though, from fulfilling
our judicial duty to declare what the text of the rule requires, even
though that text was read differently by the court of appeals and the
Committee on Professional Ethics. To the extent the Court believes
there is a rule of lenity problem, it could cure it for all future cases by
declaring Rule 4.02(a) to mean what it says—that it applies to lawyers
representing themselves.
The Court’s contrary reading renders Rule 4.02(a) inapplicable to
pro se lawyers whose direct-to-client communications may be more
grave than Ruth’s. Even more concerning, Rule 4.02(a) is not the only
rule with the prefatory language, “[i]n representing a client.” The
phrase is in a number of other important rules. See, e.g., TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.04(c), 4.04(a). Lawyers should not
get a free pass to violate these rules simply because they act pro se.
Under the Court’s holding, they will.
Conclusion
By its terms, and consistent with its context and purpose,
Rule 4.02(a) applies to lawyers representing themselves. The Court’s
contrary conclusion regrettably lowers professional standards governing
pro se lawyers in “representing” their clients. The Court should instead

11
hold that the rule applies to lawyers acting pro se, which would clarify
the standard for lawyers and for the State Bar and its Commission for
Lawyer Discipline. But I agree with the Court that the judgment here
should be reversed, given Ruth’s apparent reliance on an opinion by the
State Bar’s own Professional Ethics Committee that Rule 4.02(a) does
not apply to a lawyer who represents only himself. See Mosley, 593
S.W.3d at 268. With these additional thoughts, I concur in the Court’s
judgment.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 12, 2026

12

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0613
══════════

William W. Ruth,
Petitioner,

v.

Commission for Lawyer Discipline,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued November 5, 2025

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Blacklock, Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Bland,
Justice Young, Justice Sullivan, and Justice Hawkins joined.

JUSTICE HUDDLE filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibits a lawyer, “[i]n representing a client,” from communicating
with persons known to be represented by another lawyer about the
subject of the representation unless the other lawyer consents or the
communication is authorized by law. The issue in this disciplinary
proceeding is whether that no-contact rule applies to a lawyer acting
pro se. The court of appeals held that it does and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment suspending the petitioner from the practice of law for
violating the rule. We hold that the rule does not apply to a pro se
lawyer and therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.

I. Background

In August 2020, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline initiated
a disciplinary proceeding against William Ruth, alleging that Ruth
engaged in professional misconduct in the course of representing a
plaintiff in a personal injury suit. Ruth opted to represent himself in
the disciplinary proceeding, while the Commission was represented by
Stephanie Strolle with the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
After Ruth included individual Commission members on the
electronic service list for two motions he filed, Strolle emailed Ruth,
instructing him to stop “improperly communicating directly with
Commission members, parties who are represented by counsel.”
Thereafter, Ruth served Commission members with several more filings
and wrote a letter to the former Commission chair requesting that
Strolle be recused from the case. He also served Commission members
with correspondence addressed to the district judge requesting that
certain matters be heard prior to any trial setting, including a deposition
demand, a motion for summary judgment, and a motion to disqualify
Strolle.
At that point—in December 2021—the head of the Office of the
Chief Disciplinary Counsel’s San Antonio office emailed Ruth to “again
demand” that he “stop contacting members of the Commission in any
manner.” The email further stated that Ruth’s contact with the

2
Commission members, who were represented by counsel, “is in
deliberate violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct.” Ruth had no further communication with any Commission
members.
In April 2022, while the disciplinary proceeding was still
pending, 1 the Commission initiated a second disciplinary proceeding
against Ruth premised on his communications with the represented
Commission members in the first proceeding. 2 The Commission alleged
violations of Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 4.02(a)
and 8.04(a)(1). See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02(a),
reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (TEX. STATE BAR
R. art. X, § 9) (prohibiting a lawyer, “[i]n representing a client,” from
communicating with knowingly represented persons about the subject
of the representation absent the other lawyer’s consent or legal
authorization); id. R. 8.04(a)(1) (prohibiting violations of the disciplinary
rules “whether or not such violation occurred in the course of a
client–lawyer relationship”).
The Commission moved for partial summary judgment, arguing
the evidence established as a matter of law that Ruth engaged in
professional misconduct. Specifically, the Commission asserted that, by
“repeatedly serv[ing] pleadings, motions, and correspondence on

1In December 2021, the district court granted partial summary
judgment for the Commission, finding that Ruth engaged in acts of professional
misconduct in violation of various disciplinary rules.
2 Initially, the Commission alleged additional, unrelated grounds of
professional misconduct against Ruth in the second proceeding. However, the
Commission abandoned those claims before trial.

3
individual members of the Commission . . . in attempts to have his
opposing counsel removed from the first disciplinary case,” Ruth
communicated with a government entity he knew to be represented
about the subject of the representation in violation of Rules 4.02(a) and
8.04(a)(1). Ruth responded that the summary judgment evidence failed
to show that he communicated with Commission members, that they
received such communications, or that he knew the members were
represented by counsel. The trial court granted the Commission’s
motion in pertinent part, finding the evidence conclusively established
that Ruth “communicated or caused or encouraged another to
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person,
organization or entity of government the lawyer knew to be represented
by another lawyer regarding that subject, without the consent of the
other lawyer . . . or being authorized by law to do so.”
After holding that Ruth committed professional conduct by
violating Rules 4.02(a) and 8.04(a)(1), the trial court held a hearing to
determine the proper sanction. The court rendered judgment that Ruth
be actively suspended from the practice of law for five years. The court
also awarded the Commission attorney’s fees and expenses. Ruth
appealed. 3

3 While the appeal was pending, the trial court in the first disciplinary

proceeding signed a final judgment suspending Ruth from the practice of law
for eighteen months, a period overlapping with the five-year suspension period
in this proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed that judgment. Ruth v.
Comm’n for Law. Discipline, No. 04-23-00122-CV, 2024 WL 3512152 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio July 24, 2024, pet. filed). Ruth filed a petition for review,
which is pending in this Court.

4
In the court of appeals, Ruth focused on the purely legal argument
that the no-contact rule, which restricts lawyer communications “[i]n
representing a client,” does not apply to a lawyer acting pro se. The
court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment,
holding that “a lawyer acting pro se represents himself as a client” and
is subject to Rule 4.02. 696 S.W.3d 233, 239–40 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2024).
We granted Ruth’s petition for review.

II. Analysis

The sole issue presented involves the meaning and application of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Those rules,
along with opinions interpreting them, provide disciplinary standards
for Texas attorneys. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. 1998); see
also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE ¶ 7 (“[The
disciplinary rules] stat[e] minimum standards of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.”). In
interpreting the disciplinary rules, we apply statutory-construction
principles. In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2008). We
therefore analyze the rule at issue by looking to the plain and common
meaning of its words and construing them in the context of the rules as
a whole. See CHCA Woman’s Hosp. v. Lidji, 403 S.W.3d 228, 231–32
(Tex. 2013); In re Off. of Att’y Gen., 456 S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. 2015) (“We
construe the words of a statute according to their plain meaning and in
the context of the statute’s surrounding provisions.”).
As a general matter, a lawyer must comply with the disciplinary
rules regardless of whether he is acting in a representative role. TEX.

5
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.04(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall
not . . . violate these rules . . . whether or not such violation occurred in
the course of a client–lawyer relationship[.]”); see also id. PREAMBLE ¶ 4
(“A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both
in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and
personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for
legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others.”). For
example, the rules place a blanket prohibition on a lawyer’s “engag[ing]
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” or
“constituting obstruction of justice.” Id. R. 8.04(a)(3)–(4).
However, some rules are expressly confined to a lawyer’s conduct
“[i]n representing a client.” 4 E.g., id. R. 1.01(b), 4.04(a). One of those
rules—Rule 4.02, the no-contact rule—is at issue here and states in
pertinent part:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or
cause or encourage another to communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person, organization or
entity of government the lawyer knows to be represented
by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized
by law to do so.

4 Other rules are impliedly so constrained because they govern specific

aspects of the client–lawyer relationship. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02 (with certain exceptions, requiring a lawyer to abide
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation, whether to
accept a settlement offer, and certain criminal matters), 1.05 (governing a
lawyer’s protection of confidential information of a client or former client),
1.16(a) (governing when a lawyer must decline to represent or terminate
representation of a client).

6
Id. R. 4.02(a). 5 Comment 1 to the rule 6 explains that it is “directed at
efforts to circumvent the lawyer–client relationship existing between
other persons, organizations or entities of government and their
respective counsel,” extending to communications that, “because of the
lawyer’s involvement in devising and controlling their content, . . . in
substance are between the lawyer and the represented person.” Id.
R. 4.02 cmt. 1. Comment 2 confirms that the communication prohibition
does not extend to the client, stating that “communication between a
lawyer’s client and persons, organizations, or entities of government
represented by counsel” is not prohibited “as long as the lawyer does not
cause or encourage the communication without the consent of the lawyer
for the other party.” Id. R. 4.02 cmt. 2.
The Commission argues that while a pro se lawyer-litigant is a
party to a suit, he is also “representing a client”—himself—and that
Rule 4.02 thus applies. The court of appeals agreed, holding that an
attorney who proceeds pro se “functionally occupies the roles of both
attorney and client.” 696 S.W.3d at 239 (quoting In re Steele, 181 N.E.3d
976, 979 (Ind. 2022)). The court also noted that applying Rule 4.02 to
pro se lawyers serves the rule’s purpose of “preserv[ing] the integrity of
the client–lawyer relationship by protecting the represented party from

5 Rule 4.02(b) places the same constraints on a lawyer’s communication

with a person the lawyer “knows to be employed or retained for the purpose of
conferring with or advising another lawyer about the subject of the
representation.” Id. R. 4.02(b).
6 The comments to the disciplinary rules “illustrate or explain
applications of the rules, in order to provide guidance for interpreting the rules
and for practicing in compliance with the spirit of the rules.” Id. PREAMBLE
¶ 10.

7
the superior knowledge and skill of the opposing lawyer.” Id. (quoting
In re News Am. Pub., Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1998, orig. proceeding), mand. granted sub nom. In re Users Sys. Servs.,
Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 1999)); see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02 cmt. 1. Ruth responds that the rule
unequivocally does not apply to a party, which includes a party who
happens to have a Texas law license.
In some jurisdictions whose disciplinary rules contain a
no-contact rule with the same “[i]n representing a client” prefatory
language as the Texas rule, 7 the rule itself expressly answers the
question of its application to pro se lawyers. For example, New York
Disciplinary Rule 4.2(a) is almost identical to Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas
Rules, but New York Rule 4.2(c) additionally provides that “[a] lawyer
who is acting pro se or is represented by counsel in a matter is subject
to paragraph (a), but may communicate with a represented person [with
reasonable advance notice to the represented person’s counsel], unless
otherwise prohibited by law and unless the represented person is not
legally competent.” N.Y. Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0]
rule 4.2(c). And supplementing Rule 4.2(a) of the California disciplinary
rules, which again contains the same prefatory language as the Texas
rule, is a comment confirming that the rule “does not prohibit a lawyer
who is a party to a legal matter from communicating on his or her own
behalf with a represented person in that matter.” Cal. Rules of Prof.

7 Most jurisdictions have adopted a version of the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, so the rules often use similar
language.

8
Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 3. In Oregon, “[t]he narrowness of [Oregon’s
similarly worded no-contact] rule was recognized by the Bar and the
[Oregon Supreme C]ourt by the 1986 addition . . . of the words: ‘This
prohibition includes a lawyer representing the lawyer’s own interests.’”
In re Mettler, 748 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Or. 1988) (quoting Or.
DR 7-104(A)(1), superseded by Ord. Adopting the Or. R. of Pro. Conduct,
C.J. Ord. No. 04-44 (Dec. 1, 2024), Or. R. Pro. Conduct R. 4.2 (amended
2026)).
Absent clarifying language in the rule or comments themselves,
authorities on the issue diverge, both in Texas and among other
jurisdictions. In Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals observed that an attorney representing
himself “is necessarily representing a client” and therefore concluded
that such an attorney violates the no-contact rule by communicating
directly with an opposing, represented party without the requisite
consent or authorization. 5 S.W.3d 241, 259–60 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Most jurisdictions to address the issue
have held similarly, 8 and the American Bar Association issued a divided
formal ethics opinion concluding that the model rule on which Rule 4.02
is based “applies to a pro se lawyer because pro se individuals represent

8 See, e.g., Steele, 181 N.E.3d at 980; In re Hodge, 407 P.3d 613, 654–55

(Kan. 2017); Medina Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Cameron, 958 N.E.2d 138, 140–41, 141
n.1 (Ohio 2011); In re Disciplinary Action of Lucas, 789 N.W.2d 73, 76–77 (N.D.
2010); In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Haley, 126 P.3d 1262, 1273 (Wash.
2006); In re Schaefer, 25 P.3d 191, 199–200 (Nev. 2001); In re Segall, 509
N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ill. 1987); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 108–09
(Wyo. 1994).

9
themselves and lawyers are no exception to this principle.” ABA COMM.
ON ETHICS & PRO. RESP., Formal Op. 22-502, at 1 (2022).

By contrast, the Restatement, while recognizing contrary
authority, takes the position that the no-contact rule’s prohibition on
communication with a represented person does not apply if “the lawyer
is a party and represents no other client in the matter.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 99(1)(b) (A.L.I. 2000); see also id.
cmt. b (“The anti-contact rule constrains a lawyer who represents
another person in the matter.”). The Texas Committee on Professional
Ethics issued an advisory opinion agreeing with the Restatement and
explaining that the Texas disciplinary rules “are based in part on
treating clients as separate persons with whom lawyers, also as separate
persons, may establish representation relationships.” TEX. COMM. ON
PROF’L ETHICS, Op. 653, 79 Tex. B.J. 234, 234 (2016). The committee
further concluded that, for purposes of applying Rule 4.02, viewing “a
lawyer who is a party in a matter . . . as part lawyer and part client with
the lawyer part representing the client part in the matter . . . strain[s]
the language of the Rule beyond its intended meaning.” Id.
Importantly, however, the committee also affirmed that a pro se lawyer’s
communications with a represented person “will be subject to other
requirements of the Texas Disciplinary Rules” and that the lawyer must
therefore avoid communications “that in the circumstances would
constitute ‘conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation’ in violation of Rule 8.04(a)(3).” Id.
We see merit in both positions. A pro se litigant “represents
oneself in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer.” Pro se

10
litigant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); see also Pro se, id.
(“[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf; without a lawyer”). When that
litigant is a licensed attorney, in one sense he is both lawyer and client,
and in another sense he is neither lawyer nor client. See ABA COMM. ON
ETHICS & PRO. RESP., Formal Op. 22-502, at 7 (dissenting committee
members opining that “[s]elf-representation is simply not ‘representing
a client,’ nor will an average or even sophisticated reader of these words
equate the two situations”); see also In re Disciplinary Proc. Against
Haley, 126 P.3d 1262, 1273 (Wash. 2006) (Sanders, J., concurring)
(“Lawyers cannot retain themselves any more than pro se litigants can
claim legal malpractice or ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
As to the rule’s purpose of safeguarding the lawyer–client
relationship between other persons and their respective counsel, TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02 cmt. 1, we do not disagree
with the court of appeals that applying the rule to pro se lawyers serves
that purpose, 696 S.W.3d at 239–40. That application is at odds with
Comment 2, which clarifies that the prohibition does not extend to
communications between a lawyer’s client and represented persons.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02 cmt. 2. The
comments thus point in opposing directions.
And notwithstanding Comment 1, the Connecticut Supreme
Court’s decision in Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 578 A.2d
1075 (Conn. 1990), provides good reason for declining to apply the rule
here. The issue in Pinsky was whether Connecticut’s no-contact rule
prohibited a represented lawyer-litigant from communicating with the
opposing, represented party about the subject of the suit. Id. at 1079.

11
In that case, the owner of the building in which Pinsky maintained his
law office sought to evict him. Id. at 1076. Pinsky, who was represented
by counsel in the proceeding, communicated directly with the landlord
regarding the eviction, leading the landlord to file a complaint with the
grievance committee. Id. at 1076–77. The Connecticut Supreme Court
held that, because Connecticut’s no-contact rule authorizes contact
between litigants and “limit[s] the restriction on communications with
represented parties to those situations where the attorney is
‘representing a client,’” Pinsky did not violate the rule. Id. at 1079.
We agree with the court’s conclusion in Pinsky, as holding
otherwise would leave the no-contact rule’s prefatory language
meaningless. See Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271
S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008) (“The Court must not interpret the statute
in a manner that renders any part of the statute meaningless or
superfluous.”). If the no-contact rule authorizes a represented litigant
who happens to be a lawyer to communicate with another represented
person, we doubt there is a legitimate basis to hold that it prohibits a
pro se litigant who happens to be a lawyer from doing so, 9 at least absent
more explicit direction in the rule to that effect.
An illustration in the Restatement, which as noted takes the
position that “[a] lawyer representing his or her own interests pro se
may communicate with an opposing represented nonclient on the same
basis as other principals,” modifies the Pinsky facts to highlight the
triviality of the distinction:

9 The concurrence does not address this perplexing dichotomy.

12
Lawyer A, who rents law-office space from Landlord,
receives a letter from Lawyer B, representing Landlord,
directing Lawyer A to vacate by a certain date. Lawyer A
telephones Landlord without the prior consent of Lawyer B
and insists to Landlord that the lease prohibits the
eviction. Lawyer A has not violated the rule of this Section.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 99 cmt. e. Under
the court of appeals’ and the concurrence’s reasoning, Lawyer A was
“representing a client” and thus violated the Texas no-contact rule. But
if the illustration is tweaked to say that Lawyer A “hires an attorney to
represent him in the dispute and then telephones Landlord without the
prior consent of Lawyer B,” the lawyer cannot have violated the rule,
even though the rule’s purpose would arguably be better served by
concluding that he did.
Given the rule’s lack of express language regarding its
applicability to pro se lawyers, we are hesitant to subject such lawyers
to disciplinary action for violating it. 10 We have similarly subjected
uncertain penal statutes, including those that impose civil penalties, to

10 According to the concurrence, the rule’s context supports applying the

rule to lawyers acting pro se. Post at 6–7 (Huddle, J., concurring). The
concurrence points to Rule 3.08(a)(4), which prohibits a lawyer from working
on a case “if the lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a
witness . . . unless . . . the lawyer is a party to the action and is appearing
pro se.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08(a)(4). In the
concurrence’s view, that rule’s exception for pro se lawyers signals that they
are within the rules’ scope unless expressly excepted. Post at 6. Importantly,
however, Rule 3.08 does not contain the prefatory “in representing a client”
language that is at the heart of this case. As discussed, absent that limiting
language, a lawyer must comply with the disciplinary rules regardless of
whether he is acting in a representative role. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.04(a)(1). The express exception is therefore necessary because
the rule would otherwise necessarily apply to a lawyer acting pro se.

13
strict construction. See Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712,
718–19 (Tex. 2024) (citing City of Houston v. Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 764,
770 (Tex. 2006)). This rule of lenity, which “applies only to the extent
the statute at issue is unclear or ambiguous,” is motivated by the
principle that persons must have “sufficient notice of the conduct that
will subject them to statutory penalties.” Id. at 719–20; see also id. at
720 (noting our previous recognition “that enforcing penalties exacted
through ambiguous penal statutes risks denying citizens their
constitutionally protected right to ‘due process of law, in violation of the
principles of right’” (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. State,
100 S.W. 766, 767 (Tex. 1907))). In applying the rule of lenity, we have
explained that “the degree of clarity required may vary in proportion to
the severity of the penalty a statute imposes” and that “‘the more severe
the penalty, . . . the more rigid will be the construction of its provisions.’”
Id. (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry., 100 S.W. at 767).
Unquestionably, a disciplinary proceeding against a licensed
attorney is “highly penal” as it can result in suspension or even
disbarment, depriving the person “of the right to pursue and reap the
profits of a profession, to fit himself for which he may have spent years
of toil, and upon which he is dependent for a livelihood.” Webster v.
Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 493 (Tex. 2024) (quoting
Scott v. State, 24 S.W. 789, 789 (Tex. 1894)). To be sure, the disciplinary
rules play a vital role in ensuring that lawyers “maintain the highest
standards of ethical conduct” and that “the law will continue to be a
noble profession.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE
¶¶ 1, 9. But given the potentially severe consequences of violating those

14
rules, the Commission alleging such a violation must show that the
lawyer “engaged in conduct that falls ‘clearly within the [applicable
rule’s] terms.’” See Malouf, 694 S.W.3d at 721 (quoting Agey v. Am.
Liberty Pipe Line Co., 172 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. 1943)). We cannot
conclude that a pro se lawyer’s communication with a represented
person about the subject of the representation falls clearly within
Rule 4.02’s terms. See Haley, 126 P.3d at 1275 (Sanders, J., concurring)
(“Application of the rule of lenity [to Washington’s no-contact
rule] . . . demands that we adopt the stricter, narrower construction,
excluding self-represented lawyers.”).
As a matter of policy, perhaps Rule 4.02 should apply to a pro se
lawyer or even to a represented lawyer. Perhaps the rule should be
amended to clearly say so. But it does not clearly say so now, and “we
do not revise our rules by opinion.” State Dep’t of Highways & Pub.
Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992). Accordingly,
Rule 4.02 did not prohibit Ruth from communicating directly with
members of the Commission, which was represented by counsel, about
the disciplinary proceeding.
We emphasize that our holding—a disciplinary rule governing a
lawyer’s conduct “[i]n representing a client” does not extend to a pro se
lawyer—does not give a lawyer carte blanche to engage in unethical
conduct or otherwise abuse the litigation process. As discussed, most of
the disciplinary rules are not so cabined, including Rule 8.04’s blanket
prohibition against “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.04(a)(3). As another example, Rule 3.01 provides that “[a]

15
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis
for doing so that is not frivolous.” Id. R. 3.01. A frivolous filing or
assertion is one that, among other things, is “made primarily for the
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person” or “contains
knowingly false statements of fact.” Id. R. 3.01 cmts. 2–3; 11 see also, e.g.,
id. R. 3.02 (“In the course of litigation, a lawyer shall not take a position
that unreasonably increases the costs or other burdens of the case or
that unreasonably delays resolution of the matter.”), 3.03 (describing a
lawyer’s duty of candor toward the tribunal). We need not exhaustively
quote the disciplinary rules that are not limited to a lawyer’s
representative conduct; suffice it to say, they are numerous and hold
lawyers accountable for their professional misconduct.

III. Conclusion

We hold that Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
conduct “[i]n representing a client,” does not apply to a pro se lawyer.
The court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse

11 The rule also confirms that a lawyer must conform to “any more
stringent applicable rule of practice or procedure.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01 cmt. 4.

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the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss the disciplinary proceeding
against Ruth.

Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 12, 2026

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