In Re S.H.

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 26-0030
══════════

In re S.H.,
Relator

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
═══════════════════════════════════════

PER CURIAM

Relator S.H. is a parent simultaneously facing criminal
prosecution and proceedings to terminate her parental rights to her
children. After verifying S.H.’s indigence, the district court presiding
over her parental-termination case appointed counsel for her. The
Harris County Public Defender’s Office (the “Office”), which was
representing S.H. in her criminal case, later agreed to represent her in
the parental-termination proceedings too. The district court removed
the Office’s lawyer who appeared on S.H.’s behalf, concluding that the
court alone had the authority to appoint counsel for S.H. This removal
order was a clear abuse of discretion. We therefore conditionally grant
mandamus relief and direct the district court to withdraw that order.
The conflict central to this petition arose because of S.H.’s parallel
criminal and parental-termination proceedings. On June 11, 2025, the
Department of Family and Protective Services filed a termination action
against S.H., and the court appointed Margaret Lombardo as temporary
attorney ad litem to represent S.H. until it could determine whether
S.H. was “indigent and entitled to a court appointed attorney.” Two days
later, a different trial court ordered the Office to represent S.H. in a
concurrent criminal case against her. On June 16, the
parental-termination court determined that S.H. was, in fact, indigent,
and elevated her temporary attorney ad litem to a permanent attorney
ad litem for the duration of the case. Then, on June 20, the Office agreed
to represent S.H. in her parental-termination proceedings as well.
The public defender, Christine Umeh, entered an appearance of
counsel in S.H.’s parental-termination case before filing an answer and
a motion to substitute counsel on S.H.’s behalf. At the adversary
hearing on the removal of S.H.’s children, the presiding associate judge
questioned Umeh about her role in the case. He stated the need to confer
with the district judge but expressed doubt about “what authority [he
would] even have” to “prevent a mom from choosing her own counsel.”
Two days later, however, the district judge signed two orders. The
first denied Umeh’s motion to substitute as counsel. The second
removed Umeh as counsel. According to that order, because the Office
“is a governmental entity established pursuant to Art. 26.044 Code
Crim. Pro.[,] . . . it is only authorized to provide legal representation and
services to indigent defendants accused of a crime or juvenile offense.”
In the court’s view, parental-termination cases fall outside that
definition, so the court “removed” Umeh as counsel and “appointed”
Lombardo. The court also opined that the Office had “impermissibly

2
usurped the judicial functions of determining a parent’s indigence and
the appointment of counsel.”
S.H. filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the
removal order. The court of appeals summarily denied the petition. ___
S.W.3d ___, 2025 WL 3768103, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Dec. 31, 2025). S.H. then sought mandamus relief from this Court. We
conclude that mandamus relief is warranted.
This Court has repeatedly recognized parental-termination cases
as unique within the civil system. Today’s case illustrates one reason
why. Parents facing termination of parental rights are entitled to
appointed counsel, which is generally unavailable in other civil
litigation. See D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d
854, 858 (Tex. 2025) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013(a)). It is also
well-established in the civil context, however, that parties have the right
to choose their counsel and that deprivation of this right can justify
mandamus relief. See, e.g., In re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d
379, 382-83 (Tex. 2005) (noting that being deprived of the counsel of
one’s choosing is a harm that can give rise to mandamus relief).
Drawing analogies from the criminal context, the only other place we
see the right to court-appointed counsel, a defendant who does not need
appointed counsel may retain any properly qualified attorney to
represent her, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144
(2006); Gonzalez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 831, 836-37 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003), even if indigent recipients of court-appointed representation may
be limited to the offer of counsel provided by the government, see, e.g.,

3
King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Burgess v.
State, 816 S.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
“Mandamus is appropriate to correct an erroneous order
disqualifying counsel because there is no adequate remedy by appeal.”
In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004). Disqualification—which
is functionally what was achieved by the trial court’s sua sponte
“removal” of counsel—is “a severe remedy” that “can result in immediate
and palpable harm, disrupt trial court proceedings, and deprive a party
of the right to have counsel of choice.” In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d
419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
S.H.’s chosen counsel happens to be a public defender. The Code
of Criminal Procedure authorizes county commissioners courts to create
public defender’s offices and provides guidelines for their operations.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.044(b), (i), (j). These guidelines
include prohibitions against “engag[ing] in the private practice of
criminal law,” “accept[ing] anything of value” for the defenders’ services
beyond what the statute specifically authorizes, and accepting an
appointment when the office “has insufficient resources to provide
adequate representation.” Id. art. 26.044(i)(1)-(2), (j)(2).
The statute is silent about providing parallel civil services like
those the Office offered S.H. Instead, it directs the county
commissioners court to “specify . . . the duties of the public defender’s
office.” Id. art. 26.044(b)(1). It is undisputed that the Harris County
Commissioners Court has chosen to expand the Office to provide
“holistic services” like “social security benefit application support, parole
application support, [and] family law advocacy.” It was on this basis

4
that the Office offered to represent S.H. in her parental-termination
case, and no statutory limitation bars the Office from providing such
services.
This brings us to the conflict between Umeh (counsel from the
Office) and Lombardo (counsel appointed by the court). Under the
Family Code, a district court “shall appoint an attorney ad litem to
represent . . . an indigent parent” in a parental-termination suit
brought by the Department. TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013(a)(1). The
district court properly did so by appointing Lombardo after determining
that S.H. was indigent. The conflict arose, however, because the court
deemed Umeh’s appearance as S.H.’s counsel a “usurp[ation of] judicial
functions.” The court stated that the Office improperly intruded upon
the court’s role in determining indigence and appointing counsel.
This conclusion was erroneous. As Umeh made clear at the
adversary hearing, she is not purporting to be S.H.’s court-appointed
counsel in the parental-termination proceedings. Rather, she appeared
as S.H.’s chosen counsel, who happens to be providing those services
through the Office at no cost to S.H.
Just as an indigent parent in a parental-termination case might
be represented by a nonprofit organization, the Office provided its
services outside the scope of the court’s appointment authority. Nothing
about the Office’s representation of S.H. constitutes a judicial
determination of indigence or supplants the authority of the district
court. If a parent deemed indigent were provided with court-appointed
counsel before a wealthy relative learned of her plight and hired an

5
attorney for her, the district court could hardly use Section 107.013 to
prevent the parent from choosing to use that retained counsel.
We see no basis to treat this matter any differently. We are aware
of no legal impediment to the Office’s authority to represent S.H. Nor is
the Office subject to the district court’s authority or oversight in its
retention of clients—or, more precisely, the Office is subject to the very
same authority that a court always has over all lawyers appearing
before it, regardless of a party’s indigence or wealth. Court-appointed
counsel remains an important protection that many parents will
desperately need, including parents who may start with outside counsel
but eventually need the court’s assistance in securing counsel capable of
representing them in difficult and draining parental-termination
proceedings.
One final complication in this case is that S.H. did not seek relief
from this Court from the order denying her motion for substitution of
counsel, but only from the trial court’s removal order. The two orders
are linked, however. The order removing Umeh necessarily meant that
there was no basis to substitute counsel. While our decision today
formally addresses only the removal order, its effect is to require the
district court to allow S.H. to proceed with Umeh as the lead counsel of
her choosing. The district court should expeditiously resume
proceedings on that basis. The parties have informed this Court of the
need for clarity and expedition in this case so that S.H.’s children can
receive the specialized care and stability they need. We recognize that
similar needs warrant expedition in all such cases.

6
Without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(c), we
therefore conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court
to vacate its order removing Umeh as S.H.’s counsel. We are confident
the trial court will comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not.

OPINION DELIVERED: June 5, 2026

7