In Re Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.; Gabriella Tower, LLC; And Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.—gabriella Tower Contractor Series

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0293
══════════

In re Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.; Gabriella
Tower, LLC; and Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.—
Gabriella Tower Contractor Series,
Relators

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE HUDDLE, joined by Justice Bland, Justice Young, and
Justice Sullivan, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In an earlier case involving five jointly and severally liable
defendants who secured a joint $25 million bond, the Court described
Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 52.006(b)(2) as “an absolute
cap.” In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex. 2015). Now,
in this case involving three jointly and severally liable defendants who
secured a joint $25 million bond, the Court holds that Section
52.006(b)(2)’s $25 million cap is decidedly not absolute. Under the
Court’s holding, the cap applies per judgment debtor, so a bond capped
at $25 million, like the one in this case (and the one in Longview
Energy), actually secures only one defendant, even if the bond was
jointly secured by multiple defendants.
If the holding comes as a surprise—as it surely does for relators—
it is for good reason. The Court’s holding is at odds with the statutory
text, which nowhere manifests a legislative intent to disturb the long-
standing rule permitting joint bonds in supersedeas practice. See, e.g.,
McFarlane v. Howell, 42 S.W. 853, 854–55 (Tex. 1897). The Court’s
holding rewrites the statute, appending words to convert the cap to
“$25 million per judgment debtor” when it reads “$25 million”—full stop.
And more is at stake here than ivory-tower textualism. Today’s holding
drives up the cost of appeals in multi-defendant cases. Indeed, it
appears to require defendants to post security in excess of the judgment
in some cases. This, of course, contravenes the Legislature’s objective to
make supersedeas and the right of appeal more easily available. The
real-world consequences will reverberate most loudly in nuclear-verdict
cases, which are increasingly common and can cripple judgment debtors
regardless of the likelihood of their success on appeal.
Hewing to the text, I would hold that Section 52.006(b)(2)’s
$25 million cap applies per bond, regardless of whether that bond is
secured by one judgment debtor or jointly by two or more. I therefore
would grant mandamus relief requiring vacatur of the trial court’s
contrary order in its entirety. Because the Court grants only partial
relief, still requiring each judgment debtor to secure its own $25 million
bond, I respectfully dissent.
I
Relators are three affiliated construction companies found jointly
and severally liable for over $400 million. To suspend execution of the
judgment pending appeal, all three jointly filed a bond securing up to

2
$25 million should the judgment be affirmed as to any one of them.
Plaintiffs later sought review of the bond, arguing that Section
52.006(b)(2)’s $25 million cap applies per judgment debtor. The trial
court agreed, found that the joint bond secured only one of the three
relators, and declared the other two unsecured, allowing immediate
enforcement of the judgment against them.
After the court of appeals denied it, relators sought relief in this
Court. Their argument is twofold. They argue, first, that the
$25 million cap applies per judgment, not per judgment debtor. Second,
they contend that, even if their lead argument fails, the trial court
abused its discretion in declaring two of them immediately unsecured
without first affording them an opportunity to post additional security.
II
Though we review the trial court’s rulings regarding the amount
of security and modification of the required bond under Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24.3(a) for abuse of discretion, see TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a)(5), a
trial court has no discretion to misinterpret or misapply the law, In re
Millwork, 631 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. 2021). “The correct interpretation
of a statute is a matter of law, which we review de novo.” Sirius XM
Radio, Inc. v. Hegar, 643 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. 2022).
“As with any statute, our interpretation begins with the statute’s
text.” Third Coast Servs., LLC v. Castaneda, 726 S.W.3d 201, 206 (Tex.
2025). We “presume the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with
care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully
omitting words not chosen.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Bagley, 623 S.W.3d
343, 352 (Tex. 2021)). We interpret the words the Legislature chose

3
according to their common, ordinary meaning unless the text supplies a
different meaning. Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 718
(Tex. 2024).
The words the Legislature chose in Section 52.006(b)(2) are
conclusive, and they do not mean what the Court says they do. The
parties and the Court focus on two possible readings of Section 52.006,
applying the $25 million cap either per debtor or across the entire
judgment. Neither is correct. Section 52.006(b) states that “when a
judgment is for money, the amount of security must not exceed the lesser
of: (1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or (2) $25 million.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.006(b). The Court correctly inserts
Chapter 52’s definition of “security” into this language. See id. § 52.001.
Doing so, Section 52.006(b) reads:
[W]hen a judgment is for money, the amount of [a bond or
deposit posted . . . by a judgment debtor to suspend
execution of the judgment] must not exceed the lesser of:
(1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or
(2) $25 million.
Thus, the statute refers to only two caps, with the instruction to
implement the lesser of the two—50 percent of the judgment debtor’s
net worth or, separately, $25 million. What is capped is “the amount of
security,” which, when read with Section 52.001’s definition of
“security,” is the amount of a bond. In other words, the cap does not
apply per debtor or per judgment, as the parties dispute, but per bond.
The Court acknowledges the general proposition that jointly and
severally liable judgment debtors may file a joint supersedeas bond.
Ante at 19–20. Yet it concludes that when those same judgment debtors

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seek the protection of Section 52.006(b)(2)’s cap, a joint $25 million bond
will not suffice. Why not?
The Court makes much of the fact that Chapter 52 defines
“security” as “a [singular] bond . . . posted . . . by a [singular] judgment
debtor.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.001 (emphases added). The
Court reasons that the use of the singular article “a” links each bond,
and the $25 million cap, to a single debtor. In the Court’s view, the
$25 million bond cap may still be “absolute,” Longview Energy, 464
S.W.3d at 358, but only as to each debtor individually. Yet the Court
nowhere explains why this must be so and, indeed, it is not.
In civil statutes, the Legislature has instructed that the “singular
includes the plural and the plural includes the singular.” TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 312.003(b). Indeed, “using the singular over the plural” is more
all-encompassing, referring to both the one and the many, because “the
proposition that many includes only one is not as logically inevitable as
the proposition that one includes multiple ones.” ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
130–31 (2012). Applying these principles to Section 52.006(b), a single
bond may be posted by “a judgment debtor” or by “judgment debtor[s].”
This dovetails with the Court’s concession that joint bonds are
permissible and have been for quite a long time.
The Court counters that pluralization must be all or nothing. So,
it claims, if we read “debtor” to be plural, we must also pluralize
“amount” and “bond.” Such a reading results in the $25 million cap
applying to the amounts of bonds posted by judgment debtors, which the
Court asserts would require that each debtor post an individual bond

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capped at $25 million. But this all-or-nothing approach misapplies the
rule that the singular includes the plural and contradicts the Court’s
own concession that jointly and severally liable debtors may post a joint
bond. The principle that the singular includes the plural allows “debtor”
(but not “amount” and “bond”) to be rightfully pluralized here because
this case involves multiple debtors but only a single bond in a single
amount. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 164 (2021)
(explaining that a singular term may be pluralized to “apply [a statute]
to multiple persons, parties, or things”). Section 52.006 would also
certainly cover situations in which there are multiple “bonds,” and thus
multiple “amounts” of security, so those nouns may be pluralized when
applying the statute to those cases. But that is not this case. The three
relators posted one singular bond, consistent with Texas’s long history
of permitting joint bonds in supersedeas practice. See, e.g., McFarlane,
42 S.W. at 854–55.
Section 52.006(b) caps the amount of a bond at $25 million but
does not mention joint bonds. This is where the background law comes
into play. It has long been the case that suspending execution of a
judgment could be achieved by multiple jointly and severally liable
judgment debtors posting only one bond, so long as the surety is liable
for the full amount of the bond should judgment be rendered against one
of them alone. See id.; ante at 19–20. My reading of Section 52.006(b)
coheres with this rule. The only thing that has changed since we first
acknowledged the practice of superseding judgments with joint bonds is
that the Legislature has capped the amount of a bond needed to suspend
execution at $25 million. There is no textual support for the Court’s

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claim that, in capping the amount of a bond at $25 million, the
Legislature intended to upend the historical practice of obtaining a bond
jointly, as related or aligned defendant–appellants commonly do.
This practice of posting joint bonds has long been accepted, and it
is perfectly consistent with the Court’s assertion that “all parties
appealing from a money judgment must post their own bond.” Ante at
25. When parties post a joint bond, it belongs to each of them and is
rightfully called their “own.” See Fortune v. McElhenney, 645 S.W.2d
934, 935 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, no writ); McFarlane, 42 S.W. at
854–55. It secures each judgment debtor up to the bond’s full amount,
so each has its own bond.
The Court insists that a joint bond is still permissible under its
reading “so long as that bond results in the same liability for each debtor
(in the event the judgment is affirmed) as if they had proceeded under
separate bonds.” Ante at 20. If relators had posted separate bonds (each
capped at $25 million) and the judgment were affirmed as to all three,
the bonds’ sureties would be liable for $75 million. So, the Court asserts,
relators could file a joint bond only if it imposes liability on the bond’s
surety up to $75 million, or three times the Legislature’s cap on the
amount of a bond.
The Legislature is presumed to have enacted Section 52.006 with
complete knowledge of the long-standing practice of jointly and severally
liable defendants filing a joint bond. See Paxton v. Annunciation House,
Inc., 719 S.W.3d 555, 592 (Tex. 2025); SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 318
(“[S]tatutes will not be interpreted as changing the common law unless
they effect the change with clarity.”). Yet the Legislature did not

7
instruct that the cap for a joint bond works differently than for any other
bond. Instead, it commanded that, “the amount of security [defined as
a bond, without limitation] must not exceed . . . $25 million.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.006(b). Joint bonds are not excluded—they are
included. Rather than harmonize the statute’s text with this
background legal practice, the Court contravenes it.1
To bolster its atextual and ahistorical reading, the Court looks to
other post-judgment procedures, assuming this one must behave in the
same way. It reasons that because other supersedeas rules address a

1 Although we need not definitively pass on the meaning of Section
52.006(b)(1), which is not at issue here, the reading I propose does not allow
the gamesmanship the Court portends. The Court argues its per-debtor
reading is the only way to avoid the absurd result that one insolvent debtor
could post a nominal bond representing 50% of its net worth to secure the
entire judgment for all defendants. Ante at 22. There are two other plausible
readings of Section 52.006(b)(1) that avoid this result.
In the first, the alternative cap of “50 percent of the judgment debtor’s
net worth” refers to 50 percent of the debtors’ cumulative net worth when
multiple debtors post a joint bond. Thus, Section 52.006(b) instructs that
security be capped at the lesser of 50 percent of a debtor’s individual net worth
or $25 million when a bond is posted by one debtor, or 50 percent of the debtors’
cumulative net worth or $25 million when multiple debtors post a joint bond.
In the second possible reading, because the net-worth cap expressly
applies to “the judgment debtor’s net worth,” the statute prohibits a judgment
debtor whose bond would be capped at $25 million from relying on another
judgment debtor’s net worth to reduce the cap, even on a jointly filed bond. If
the parties file a joint bond, one or more of the judgment debtors could take
advantage of the net-worth cap to reduce their individual obligation under the
bond. But that would not alter the $25 million cap that otherwise would apply
to the bond.
I do not endorse one of these readings over the other but submit both as
consistent with a per-bond reading of the $25 million cap while avoiding the
absurd scenario the Court raises.

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single judgment debtor, so too must Section 52.006(b)(2). Yet, as the
Court acknowledges, the “Legislature has been active in this area,
striking a multifaceted policy balance between a judgment creditor’s
right to collect and a judgment debtor’s right to appeal.” Ante at 2. To
determine how the Legislature intended a carefully crafted procedure to
operate, we do not look generally to other procedures the Legislature
has established but instead focus on the words the Legislature chose to
design the procedure in question. Context matters, of course, but the
Court reads too much into other post-judgment procedures’ references
to individual judgment debtors. Where statutory provisions
tangentially related to the one at issue do not alter the meaning of clear
text, we should disregard them, not strain to discern some hidden
relevance.
In addition to consistency with text and history, a per-bond
reading has the further benefit of cohering with Chapter 52’s objective,
which this Court described as “mov[ing] further toward protecting
money judgment debtors and the right of appeal” and “deliberately
ma[king] supersedeas more easily available.” Longview Energy, 464
S.W.3d at 358, 360. The Court’s rule is incongruous with this objective.
The statutory history reflects that the Legislature sought to reduce the
burden on judgment debtors pursuing their appellate rights,
particularly in cases involving large judgments. Whereas earlier law
required posting security in twice the amount of the judgment, then an
amount equal to it, Chapter 52 sought to make appeals more available
and less costly. Id. at 357–58. Yet a logical reading of the Court’s

9
holding would require the posting of security that exceeds the judgment
in some cases.
Take, for example, a case involving five defendants found jointly
and severally liable for $100 million. The Court’s rule would seemingly
require any joint bond to be in the amount of $25 million per defendant
for a total security of $125 million—an amount exceeding the judgment.2
That does not make supersedeas more easily available or protect the
right of appeal. Far from it.
Because the Court’s decision rewrites the careful balance the
Legislature struck in Section 52.006, the Legislature may wish to
reconsider whether the statute as currently written best protects the
important competing interests at play.
Conclusion
The Court correctly holds that the trial court clearly abused its
discretion when it immediately invalidated the joint bond, without
providing relators an opportunity to provide additional security before
allowing the judgment’s execution. But I disagree with the Court’s
conclusion that Section 52.006(b)(2)’s $25 million cap applies per
judgment debtor. For the reasons discussed above, I would hold that the

2 The Court insists this is not the case because a joint bond would be

capped at the amount of the judgment—$100 million in this hypothetical—plus
interest and costs. Ante at 26 n.6. But the Court identifies no textual basis for
this assertion. To the contrary, if (as the Court holds) “the amount of security”
in Section 52.006(b) refers only to the amount of a single bond posted by a
single judgment debtor, it must have the same meaning in Section 52.006(a),
which requires “the amount of security” to equal the full amount of damages,
interest, and costs. In the same way the Court’s reading would not permit a
joint bond to be capped at $25 million, it seemingly would not permit a joint
bond to be capped at the amount of the judgment.

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cap applies per bond, so relators’ $25 million joint bond was sufficient to
stay execution against all three relators pending appeal. Accordingly, I
would grant relief requiring vacatur of the trial court’s contrary order in
its entirety. Because the Court fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION FILED: May 22, 2026

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Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0293
══════════

In re Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.; Gabriella
Tower, LLC; and Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.—
Gabriella Tower Contractor Series,
Relators

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued September 11, 2025

JUSTICE BUSBY delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Blacklock, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, and Justice
Hawkins joined.

JUSTICE HUDDLE filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justice Bland, Justice Young, and Justice
Sullivan joined.

A judgment debtor may suspend execution of the judgment
against it while pursuing an appeal. For a money judgment, the debtor
typically does so by posting a bond equal to the compensatory damages
awarded plus interest for the estimated duration of the appeal and costs.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.006(a). But the Legislature has
provided for lower bond amounts in certain cases, including a
$25 million cap and a cap based on the debtor’s net worth. Id.
§ 52.006(b). In this original proceeding involving a multi-debtor
judgment, we consider whether the $25 million cap applies to (1) the
amount of a bond posted by a judgment debtor or (2) the total amount of
all bonds posted by all judgment debtors.
Applying the statute’s plain language and definitions, we hold
that the cap applies to a bond posted by a debtor. Read together, the
relevant sections provide that “the amount of security”—defined as “a
bond . . . posted . . . by a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the
judgment during appeal”—“must not exceed . . . $25 million” or
“50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE §§ 52.001, 52.006(b) (emphases added). This debtor-focused
language is consistent with the law’s general per-debtor approach to
matters involving appellate rights, execution, and suspension of
execution. On the other hand, straying from the text to adopt an all-
debtor cap would create problematic inconsistencies for courts to resolve
without any statutory guidance. The Legislature has been active in this
area, striking a multifaceted policy balance between a judgment
creditor’s right to collect and a judgment debtor’s right to appeal. To
avoid altering this balance, we adhere to the words the Legislature
chose.
The trial court here correctly followed the per-debtor approach,
ruling that each debtor was required to post $25 million to suspend
execution of the judgment against it. But the court abused its discretion
by immediately invalidating the debtors’ joint $25 million bond without
allowing each debtor time to comply with its order regarding the amount

2
of security required before facing execution. We therefore conditionally
grant relief.

BACKGROUND

Kiersten Smith was killed when a construction crane collapsed
during a storm and struck her apartment building. Her parents,
Michele Williams (proceeding individually and on behalf of Smith’s
estate) and James Kirkwood, filed suit and proceeded to a jury trial on
causes of action for negligence and gross negligence against several
defendants: Greystar Development & Construction, LP; Greystar
Development & Construction, LP—Gabriella Tower Contractor Series;
Gabriella Tower, LLC (collectively, the Greystar Entities); and Bigge
Crane and Rigging Co. The jury found that the three Greystar Entities
engaged in a joint enterprise with each other and caused the death of
Smith, resulting in approximately $360 million of non-economic harm.
The jury also awarded a total of $500 million in exemplary damages,
which the trial court reduced based on statutory caps. The trial court
signed a judgment holding the Greystar Entities jointly and severally
liable for over $360 million in compensatory damages and two of the
entities severally liable for exemplary damages.
The Greystar Entities filed a $25 million joint supersedeas bond,
stating that all three sought to appeal the trial court’s judgment and
suspend execution of the judgment pending appeal. Nearly six months
later, Williams and Kirkwood (together, plaintiffs) filed an emergency
motion for review of the joint bond in the trial court. The motion argued
that the joint bond was insufficient as a matter of law and should be
vacated because the $25 million bond cap applied to each defendant

3
individually and did not allow the three Greystar Entities to post a
single bond in that amount. In a reasoned order following a hearing, the
trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion in part and ordered that the joint
bond “could only potentially suspend the judgment against one of the
three judgment debtors” and that “[u]nless and until Defendants file
individual bonds and/or identify which Defendant the current bond shall
apply to, no valid bond is in place.”
In response to the trial court’s bond order, the Greystar Entities
filed a notice designating the joint bond as applicable to Greystar
Development & Construction, LP. They also filed a motion for appellate
review of the trial court’s order. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
24.4(a) allows courts of appeals to review by motion (1) the sufficiency
or excessiveness of the amount of security, (2) the sureties on any bond,
(3) the type of security, (4) the determination whether to permit
suspension of enforcement, and (5) the trial court’s exercise of discretion
under Rule 24.3(a) to order or modify the amount and type of security
after its plenary power expires. The Greystar Entities sought review
under subsections (a)(1) and (5), arguing that the trial court ordered an
excessive amount of security by applying the $25 million cap per debtor
and exceeded its authority under Rule 24.3(a) by invalidating the bond.
After granting a temporary stay, the court of appeals denied the
motion and affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the $25 million
bond cap applies per debtor and that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
24 authorized the trial court to order that the joint bond was invalid.
716 S.W.3d 747, 755-58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, order on mot.). This
original proceeding followed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

4
24.4(a), which permits review of the court of appeals’ ruling by petition
for writ of mandamus in this Court. The Greystar Entities also filed an
emergency motion for temporary relief, which we granted.
The Greystar Entities’ mandamus petition asks this Court to
decide whether the trial court’s order declaring the $25 million joint
bond invalid as to two Greystar Entities violated Section 52.006(b)(2) of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24.3(a). 1 The petition identifies a split among Texas courts
regarding the application of Section 52.006(b)(2). One court reached the
same conclusion as the court of appeals and applied the $25 million cap
to each judgment debtor. See O’Quinn v. Wood, No. 12-08-00011-CV,
2009 WL 2367133, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 10, 2009, order on mot.).
Another court decided differently, construing Section 52.006(b)(2) to cap
the total security posted by all debtors. Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v.
Longview Energy Co., 510 S.W.3d 479, 485 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2014, order on mot.).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s rulings
regarding the amount of security and modification of the required bond
under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.3(a). See TEX. R. APP. P.
24.4(a). Mandamus relief is appropriate when a trial court abuses its
discretion through an error of law or erroneous application of law to fact.
In re Kay, 715 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. 2025). Because Rule 24.4 expressly

1 The Court also received a brief from amicus curiae, the Texas Civil

Justice League, in support of a per-judgment application of Section
52.006(b)(2). The Court appreciates the assistance of the amicus.

5
authorizes this Court to review supersedeas bond orders by mandamus,
a petitioner seeking relief under that rule is not required to show it lacks
an adequate appellate remedy to be entitled to mandamus relief. Id. at
750 n.7; see also In re Nalle Plastics Fam. Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168,
176 (Tex. 2013).

ANALYSIS

I. The $25 million cap on the amount of a supersedeas bond
applies per judgment debtor.

We first consider the Greystar Entities’ challenge to the trial
court’s ruling that the amount of security was insufficient. We conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Read together, the
relevant statutes provide that “the amount of security”—defined as “a
bond . . . posted . . . by a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the
judgment during appeal”—“must not exceed . . . $25 million” or
“50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE §§ 52.001, 52.006(b) (emphases added). This language shows that
the $25 million cap applies to a bond posted by a debtor to suspend
execution of the money judgment against it, not to all bonds posted by
all debtors who are parties to the judgment. The per-debtor cap aligns
with the right to appeal belonging to an individual debtor, a judgment
creditor’s right to collect its judgment from each individual debtor, and
the long-settled requirement that each appealing debtor seeking to stop
collection pending appeal must post security for the full amount it owes
under the judgment.
The Greystar Entities’ contrary position—that the cap applies
collectively to bonds posted by all debtors under a judgment—is in

6
tension not only with the statute’s text but also with the overall scheme
of statutes and rules governing supersedeas practice. Their position
would also require courts to craft exceptions without textual guidance
just to become workable.
In support of their position, the Greystar Entities urge that the
cap’s underlying policy purpose is to make supersedeas more easily
available. But a per-debtor application of the statute also serves that
purpose. We see no compelling reason to conclude that the Legislature
wanted courts to pursue supersedeas reduction to the maximum
possible extent despite contrary indications from text, context, and
established practice when the statute was enacted. Moreover, the
statutory bond cap at issue is but one of multiple paths in the
Legislature’s comprehensive approach to permitting judgment debtors
to suspend enforcement of the judgment without superseding the full
amount of liability. Other paths will lead to lower bonds in many cases;
the Greystar Entities do not explain why this path must carry the full
weight of any policy.

A. Like other post-judgment procedures, supersedeas
is party-specific.

Before examining the statute’s text in more detail, we set the
stage by explaining the post-judgment procedures of which it is a part,
which provide important context that helps inform the statute’s
meaning. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. City of Corsicana, ___
S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1261549, at *4-5 (Tex. May 8, 2026). We presume
that the Legislature uses statutory language with complete knowledge
of existing law. Amazon.com, Inc. v. McMillan, 625 S.W.3d 101, 106-07

7
(Tex. 2021). This presumption requires that we look at the background
body of law when construing statutes. Id. at 107. We similarly rely on
“familiar principles” that have developed over time to resolve “common
question[s]” in an area of the law. City of Denton v. Grim, 694 S.W.3d
210, 215 (Tex. 2024).
Once a trial court signs a final money judgment, various
judgment execution and enforcement procedures are available to a
judgment creditor. 2 Correspondingly, judgment debtors may avail
themselves of procedures to delay execution and enforcement. For
example, a judgment creditor may request a writ of execution 30 days
after a final judgment is signed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 627. But if the judgment
debtor files a motion for new trial, the writ cannot issue until 30 days
after the motion has been ruled on or overruled by operation of law. Id.
A judgment creditor may also appeal the trial court’s judgment, but
perfecting an appeal has not traditionally suspended enforcement of a
final order or prevented execution. See Bills v. Scott, 49 Tex. 430, 432-
33 (1878).
The procedures available to a debtor to delay execution and
enforcement—and to a creditor pursuing them—are specific to the
debtor against whom execution and enforcement are sought. This is true
for writs of execution and garnishment, a judgment debtor’s appellate
rights, the amount collectible under a judgment, and supersedeas bonds.
Execution and the corresponding writ are commonly used to
collect a money judgment against a particular defendant. 5 McDonald

2 See generally 5 McDonald & Carlson, TEX. CIV. PRAC. § 31:2 (2d. ed.

2026).

8
& Carlson, TEX. CIV. PRAC. § 31:22 (2d. ed. 2026). Once the writ issues,
the sheriff or officer receiving it will “call upon the defendant” to provide
an opportunity to designate non-exempt assets to be sold in satisfaction
of the execution. TEX. R. CIV. P. 637. If the defendant designates too
little, “the officer shall levy the execution upon any property of the
defendant subject to execution.” Id. If the officer’s sale returns enough
money to satisfy the execution, “the officer shall immediately pay the
surplus to the defendant.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 34.047(c).
Writs of garnishment are similarly specific to an individual
judgment debtor: they require the garnishee to identify what it owes to
a specific defendant, or what the garnishee has in its possession
belonging to that defendant. TEX. R. CIV. P. 659. The form garnishment
writ in the Rules of Civil Procedure even specifies a single defendant
whose assets are subject to the writ. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 661.
Appeals are also party-specific. A party seeking to alter a trial
court’s judgment “must file a notice of appeal,” whether individually or
jointly, and cannot be granted more favorable relief from the court of
appeals than from the trial court unless it does so. TEX. R. APP. P.
25.1(c). One consequence of requiring each party seeking relief from a
trial court’s multi-party judgment to file its own notice of appeal is that
a nonappealing party generally remains subject to the adverse judgment
even if an appealing party wins reversal. Turner, Collie & Braden, Inc.
v. Brookhollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. 1982). There can also be
differing appeal outcomes for aligned parties, leaving some of them
liable under a judgment that was reversed as to their co-parties.

9
The amount collectible under a judgment is determined in the
same way. A finding of joint and several liability among multiple
judgment debtors allows a judgment creditor to collect the full amount
of the judgment against any one of them. See Horizon Health Corp. v.
Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 872 (Tex. 2017).
Correspondingly, a finding of only several liability limits the judgment
creditor to collecting from each debtor only the portion of the damages
for which that debtor is responsible. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 33.013(a). Each judgment debtor’s liability for a damages award—and
a judgment creditor’s right to collect against that debtor—thus turns on
what damages the judgment awards as to that debtor.
It follows that supersedeas practice is also debtor-specific: “a
judgment debtor may supersede the judgment by . . . filing with the trial
court clerk a good and sufficient bond” or by other prescribed means.
TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a)(2). But a supersedeas bond filed by one party
provides no protection from enforcement and execution to parties who
have not filed a supersedeas bond. Valerio v. Laughlin, 307 S.W.2d 352,
353 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1957, orig. proceeding). A judgment
may therefore be enforced even against parties whose appeal of the
judgment is pending if they have not superseded the judgment. In re
Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd., 98 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. 2003).
The amount of security required to supersede a money judgment
has changed over time. Texas’s first supersedeas statute required at
least double the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs. See In re
Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. 2015) (citations
omitted). This sum was reduced to “the amount of the judgment, plus

10
interests and costs” when the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated. Id. at 357-58. The rules were later amended to permit
trial courts to disallow supersedeas in certain cases when a judgment
did not involve money. Elaine A. Carlson, Reshuffling the Deck:
Enforcing and Superseding Civil Judgments on Appeal After House Bill
4, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 1035, 1057 (2005) (citations omitted).
We later amended former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47,
a predecessor to current Rule 24, allowing alternate security even for
appeals from money judgments. See Isern v. Ninth Court of Appeals,
925 S.W.2d 604, 605-06 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding). The Legislature
decided to address the issue again, adopting a new standard for
alternate security when it enacted Chapter 52 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.002
(repealed 2003)). Then came Section 52.006 in 2003, which includes the
$25 million bond cap at issue in this proceeding. We have observed that
this section was enacted to strike “a new balance between the judgment
creditor’s right in the judgment . . . against the judgment debtor’s right
to . . . appellate review.” Nalle Plastics, 406 S.W.3d at 170 (quoting
Carlson, supra, at 1038).
The $25 million bond cap in Section 52.006(b)(2) is one of many
options now available to any judgment debtor that believes it will suffer
harm if required to post the full amount of compensatory damages,
interest, and costs pending appeal. Notably, all the other options are
debtor-specific. A judgment debtor can alternatively post 50% of its net
worth under Section 52.006(b)(1), subject to a judgment creditor’s right
to contest the net-worth calculation under Texas Rule of Appellate

11
Procedure 24.2(c)(3). Another path is to show the trial court that posting
the full amount will likely cause the judgment debtor to suffer
substantial economic harm. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.006(c).
And a judgment debtor with a net worth of less than $10 million can
post alternate security to supersede a money judgment. Id. § 52.007. 3
Whether any of these procedures ultimately applies to a judgment
debtor in a particular case depends on the amount of the individual
debtor’s liability, its net worth, and the harm it might suffer if required
to post a full bond.
Although this original proceeding raises a new question regarding
the application of Section 52.006(b)(2), the general subject of that
statute and the broader scheme of statutes and rules address familiar
issues regarding enforcement of a money judgment against a debtor.
Judgment debtors have significant (and increasingly accessible)
procedural protections against judgment enforcement during appeal,
but judgment creditors may seek to enforce their money judgments as
to any debtor who has not availed itself of these protections. Whether a
judgment creditor can collect on a judgment against any debtor is a
party-specific inquiry determined by the actions taken by that judgment
debtor. This is the backdrop against which we construe the $25 million
statutory bond cap. See Amazon.com, Inc., 625 S.W.3d at 107.

3 Other jurisdictions have adopted different approaches to striking this

balance. For example, federal courts tax the premiums a judgment debtor pays
for a supersedeas bond against the judgment creditor if the debtor wins
reversal of the judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 39(a)(3), (f)(3); City of San
Antonio v. Hotels.com, L. P., 593 U.S. 330, 335-36 (2021).

12
B. The plain language of Section 52.006(b)(2) imposes a
per-debtor cap.

When interpreting statutes, we give the words chosen by the
Legislature their plain meaning. Am. Pearl Grp. v. Nat’l Payment Sys.,
L.L.C., 715 S.W.3d 383, 387 (Tex. 2025). We must also read these words
in context and use any definitions the statute provides. GEO Grp. v.
Hegar, 709 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Tex. 2025). A statute’s “operative force”
“derives from its text, not from the purpose it was thought to serve at
the time it was enacted.” Paxton v. Am. Oversight, 716 S.W.3d 535, 545
(Tex. 2025).
Section 52.006(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
provides:
Notwithstanding any other law or rule of court, when a
judgment is for money, the amount of security must not
exceed the lesser of: (1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s
net worth; or (2) $25 million.
“[S]ecurity” is defined as “a bond or deposit posted, as provided by the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, by a judgment debtor to suspend
execution of the judgment during appeal of the judgment.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.001.
The parties dispute whether Section 52.006(b)(2) sets $25 million
as (1) the maximum amount of security that can be required for a
judgment debtor to suspend execution of a money judgment, or (2) the
maximum amount of security that can be required for any money
judgment. Read together, the provisions just quoted support the first
interpretation. Incorporating the definition of security, Section
52.006(b)(2) provides that “when a judgment is for money, the amount

13
of . . . a bond or deposit posted . . . by a judgment debtor to suspend
execution of the judgment . . . must not exceed the lesser of:
(1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or (2) $25 million.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 52.001, 52.006(b) (emphases added).
In short, the amount of a bond posted by a debtor must not exceed
the lesser of 50% of the debtor’s net worth or $25 million. Id. § 52.006(b).
This language sets a cap on the amount of a bond posted by a debtor, not
on the amount of security for the judgment. And whether the
$25 million cap or the net-worth cap applies to a particular debtor
depends on that debtor’s net worth. The $25 million bond will be the
lesser option only for debtors with net worths exceeding $50 million; all
other debtors must proceed under the net-worth alternative when
Section 52.006(b) applies.
This textual signal that the cap applies on a per-debtor basis
aligns with the right to appeal a judgment belonging to an individual
debtor and the creditor’s right to collect that judgment from each
individual debtor. Applying the cap on a per-debtor basis also aligns
with the requirement that each appealing debtor seeking to stop
collection must post security for the full amount it owes under the
judgment. Logically, whether the amount of a bond is sufficient to
suspend execution should likewise be judged per debtor, including any
applicable net-worth or dollar-value caps. Nothing in the statute
indicates otherwise.
The Greystar Entities advocate a different interpretation,
arguing that Section 52.006(b)(2) unequivocally applies a $25 million
supersedeas cap to the judgment as a whole. This reading improperly

14
sidelines the Legislature’s definition of security and changes the subject
matter of the statute from the “amount of . . . a bond . . . posted . . . by a
judgment debtor to suspend execution” to the amount of security for a
judgment. Id. §§ 52.001, 52.006(b). But the statute does not address the
amount of “security for a judgment.” It says that when there is a money
judgment, the amount of a bond posted by a debtor to suspend execution
of that judgment must not exceed the lesser of two alternative amounts.
Nor are we persuaded that the omission of the words “judgment
debtor” in Section 52.006(b)(2) means that the $25 million cap applies to
judgments rather than judgment debtors. The Greystar Entities assert
that had the Legislature sought to apply the cap to each judgment
debtor, it could have used the term “judgment debtor” in
Section 52.006(b)(2) as it did in (b)(1)’s net-worth cap. Yet that is
precisely what the Legislature did by defining “security” as “a bond or
deposit posted . . . by a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the
judgment during appeal of the judgment.” Id. § 52.001. In this holistic
reading, “the” judgment debtor whose net worth is used to cap the bond
refers back to “a” judgment debtor who posts a bond.
The Legislature’s choice to repeat the term “judgment debtor” in
(b)(1) is also unsurprising because the net-worth prong is a percentage
calculation, and any percentage calculation must be based on some other
number. For example, Section 52.006(b)(2) could have set its alternative
cap based on a percentage of the judgment, similar to the historical
requirement to post twice the amount of damages awarded. But the
(b)(2) cap is not a percentage calculation: it is a flat $25 million cap, so
there was no need for the Legislature to repeat that the cap applies to

15
the “amount of . . . a bond . . . posted by a judgment debtor.” Id.
§§ 52.001, 52.006(b).
Finally, the Greystar Entities point to the title of Section 52.006,
“Amount of Security for Money Judgment,” as support for applying the
cap to all security posted for the judgment. This argument fails to
account for the definition of “security,” which applies throughout
Chapter 52. See id. § 52.001. When we incorporate the definition of
security into the title, as we must, it reads: “Amount of . . . a Bond
Posted . . . by a Judgment Debtor to Suspend Execution of the Judgment
during Appeal of the [Money] Judgment.” Yet even if the title of
Section 52.006 supported a collective application of the $25 million cap,
that would carry no weight given the plain language of the statute. See
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.024; Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d
42, 47 n.4 (Tex. 2015).

C. Selectively pluralizing one statutory noun is
contrary to the pluralization canon and background
principles of joint bonds.

The Greystar Entities next argue that the singular reference to a
judgment debtor in the definition of “security” is misleading because the
singular encompasses the plural under Texas Government Code
Section 312.003. Under this view, the $25 million bond cap applies to a
bond or deposit posted by judgment debtors. Our dissenting colleagues
also embrace this selective pluralization of the statutory text. Post at
5-6 (Huddle, J., dissenting).
But if we construe “a judgment debtor” to include the plural, we
must do the same for “amount” and “bond,” which results in a
$25 million cap applying to the amounts of bonds posted by judgment

16
debtors. See State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 621 (Tex. 2018) (“[I]f ‘the
offense’ is to include the plural, . . . then logically and consistently ‘the
arrest’ must also include the plural.”). Pluralizing each of these singular
nouns still links the cap to each bond—and the judgment debtor posting
it—rather than capping the total amount of all security for a final
judgment. In other words, even if all nouns are pluralized, each debtor
must still post a bond of $25 million. And rather than resolving the
question presented, pluralizing the singular “judgment debtor” raises
additional questions about what other singular terms throughout
Chapter 52 must be pluralized and how to assess the many resulting
permutations.
Moreover, like the federal Dictionary Act’s similar provision, our
statutory pluralization canon is “obviously . . . not one to be applied
except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the
statute.” First Nat’l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924).
Specifically, statutory pluralization canons “do[] not transform every
use of the singular ‘a’ into the plural ‘several,’” as the Greystar Entities
and the dissent urge here. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 164
(2021). “Instead, [the canon] tells us only that a statute using the
singular ‘a’ can apply to multiple persons, parties, or things.” Id. Thus,
applying the canon to a federal statute requiring the government to
serve “a notice to appear” on an individual it seeks to remove from the
country merely “allows the government to send multiple notices to
appear to multiple people.” Id. Similarly, applying the canon to this
statute capping the amount of “a bond . . . posted . . . by a judgment

17
debtor” merely shows that its use is not limited to single-debtor cases; it
also allows multiple capped bonds to be posted by multiple debtors.
The Greystar Entities also argue for a plural reading of the
singular “judgment debtor” by pointing to the Legislature’s use of an
indefinite article. The net-worth cap in Civil Practice and Remedies
Code Section 52.006(b)(1) is calculated as 50% of “the judgment debtor’s
net worth,” while the definition of “security” in Section 52.001 refers to
“a bond or deposit posted . . . by a judgment debtor.” (Emphases added.)
According to the Greystar Entities, using the definite article the in
Section 52.006(b)(1) restricts the inquiry to a single judgment debtor,
while the indefinite article a in Section 52.001 means “any.” But
construing the cap to apply to “any” judgment debtor still results in a
per-debtor application rather than establishing a maximum amount of
all security for a final judgment.
The dissent seeks to selectively pluralize “a judgment debtor” to
support its own reading that the $25 million bond cap applies neither
per-judgment nor per-debtor, as the parties advocate, but per bond. In
the dissent’s view, “[w]hat is capped is . . . the amount of a bond.” Post
at 4. To the contrary, the text specifies that what is capped is the
amount of “a bond . . . posted . . . by a judgment debtor.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 52.001 (emphasis added). The statute does not mention
joint bonds or provide any indication that they were contemplated. And
as discussed, the pluralization canon does not support the dissent’s
selectively plural reading that the $25 million cap applies to a single
bond posted jointly by multiple debtors.

18
Thus, any support for the dissent’s reading must come from
background principles of Texas law and procedure regarding joint
bonds. We presume that the Legislature knows those principles and will
alter them expressly if it intends to do so. See Paxton v. Annunciation
House, Inc., 719 S.W.3d 555, 592 (Tex. 2025). Here, the Legislature has
remained silent about joint bonds, and the background principles have
been contrary to the dissent’s view for more than a century: multiple
judgment debtors may post a joint bond, but doing so does not change
the amount that must be posted.
We explained in McFarlane v. Howell that “[e]ach [judgment
debtor], who desires to supersede the judgment, is required to give an
appeal bond, and each may give a separate bond; and, while they may
give a joint bond, . . . it was never intended that by doing so either they
or their sureties could change their liability [on the bond] in the
appellate court.” 42 S.W. 853, 854-55 (Tex. 1897). As previously
discussed, this principle is consistent with every other feature of post-
judgment practice and every other bond reduction the Legislature has
passed, all of which operate on a per-debtor basis.
Jointly liable debtors have never been permitted to post separate
bonds that provide the required security only by combining all bond
amounts, as that practice would leave a judgment creditor without
adequate security if the judgment is affirmed only as to some of the
debtors that are party to the piecemeal bonds. Fortune v. McElhenney,
645 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, no writ). For the same
reason, when jointly liable judgment debtors file a joint bond, that bond
must obligate the surety for the entire amount of the judgment, interest,

19
and costs if the judgment is affirmed as to any of the judgment debtors
filing the bond. Id.
This principle protects the creditor’s right to recover the full
amount of the judgment, costs, and interest pending appeal without
requiring multiple judgment debtors to over-secure the judgment
creditor by posting security that exceeds the maximum amount the
judgment creditor could ultimately recover. Under this principle, the
judgment creditor and jointly liable debtors end up in the same position
after an appeal regardless of whether debtors filed separate bonds or a
joint bond. The judgment creditor is not “entitled to recover the amount
of the principal of [a supersedeas bond] as liquidated damages,” but only
(1) the amount of the judgment itself (in the case of a money judgment)
plus costs, and (2) compensation for loss resulting from the delay of an
unsuccessful appeal (such as interest). State v. Watts, 197 S.W.2d 197,
199 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1946, writ ref’d). The judgment creditor’s
eventual recovery on the bond(s) is thus based on the amount of the
judgment as affirmed. Correspondingly, judgment debtors may proceed
under a joint bond so long as that bond results in the same liability for
each debtor (in the event the judgment is affirmed) as if they had
proceeded under separate bonds. McFarlane, 42 S.W. at 854-55.
In contrast, the dissent’s atextual view that $25 million is the
maximum amount of any one bond—whether posted by a single debtor
or jointly by multiple debtors—would place the plaintiffs in a worse
position and the Greystar Entities in a better one after an unsuccessful
appeal than if the Greystar Entities had posted separate bonds capped

20
at $25 million each. Texas joint bond practice provides no support for
that result.
Another anomalous feature of the dissent’s approach is that the
amount each jointly liable debtor must post varies depending on
whether that debtor gets along well enough with one or more of its co-
debtors to be able to agree on posting a joint bond and how much each
debtor will contribute. If so, each debtor finances only its agreed portion
of the $25 million joint bond; if not, each debtor must post its own
$25 million bond. Nothing in the statute indicates that the Legislature
intended the cap to fluctuate depending on the inter-debtor dynamics of
each case.

D. A collective construction of the bond cap would
require judicially crafted exceptions to Chapter 52’s
reticulated scheme.

A per-debtor bond cap not only comports with the statute’s plain
language and general principles of supersedeas practice, appeals, and
judgment collection, it also allows trial courts to apply the statue
without additional court-crafted policy overlays. “[W]e respect policy-
laden statutes as written and give wide leeway to the innumerable
trade-offs reflected therein.” J-W Power Co. v. Sterling Cnty. Appraisal
Dist., 691 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Tex. 2024) (citations omitted). Adopting a
cap on all bonds posted to suspend execution of a judgment would lead
to results that even the Greystar Entities admit are wrong, forcing
courts to craft atextual exceptions to make that interpretation work.
For example, if the bond cap applies per judgment, then “the
judgment is superseded” as to all judgment debtors once the cap is met,
and all enforcement “must be suspended.” TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(f). Thus,

21
one debtor posting $25 million would protect even judgment debtors who
have not appealed against execution for the duration of the appeal. And
under the net-worth cap, one insolvent debtor posting 50% of its net
worth—that is, one dollar—would suspend execution of the judgment as
to all judgment debtors (even ones that have not appealed).
The Greystar Entities concede that these results are incorrect,
but they offer two arguments for avoiding them: (1) each debtor is still
required to be obligated on some sort of bond even after the $25 million
cap on all bonds is reached; and (2) the net-worth cap in subsection
52.006(b)(1) applies per debtor even though the $25 million cap does not.
These arguments are in no way consistent with the statute’s text.
Requiring other debtors to post a bond through court-crafted rules after
a per-judgment cap is met would violate the Legislature’s mandate that
the language of Section 52.006(b) controls “[n]otwithstanding any other
law or rule of court.” And applying the $25 million cap on a per-
judgment basis while applying the net-worth cap on a per-debtor basis
would require this Court to conclude that the language of Section
52.006(b) has different meanings depending on whether it is read in
conjunction with subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2).
The inconsistency in this argument is apparent when one
recognizes that the statutory words the parties read differently appear
in the portion of 52.006(b) preceding the alternative cap amounts
numbered (1) and (2). The parties do not disagree on the meaning of “50
percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth” or “$25 million” under
subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), and these statutory phrases alone cannot
answer the question whether the $25 million cap applies to each debtor

22
or collectively to all debtors posting security to suspend execution of a
judgment. That answer comes from Section 52.006(b)’s prefatory
language that “the amount of security must not exceed” the two
alternative caps, with “security” defined as “a bond or deposit posted . . .
by a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the judgment.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 52.001, 52.006(b). 4
The Greystar Entities center their reading of 52.006(b) on the
“amount of security” posted with respect to any “judgment.” Plaintiffs’
reading also centers on the “amount of security” but emphasizes that
security is defined in Section 52.001 as “a bond or deposit posted . . . by
a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the judgment.” Under either
side’s reading, these words in 52.006(b) should apply the same way to
(b)(1) and to (b)(2).
But the Greystar Entities advocate a per-judgment application of
(b)(2)’s $25 million cap and a per-debtor application of (b)(1)’s net-worth
cap. We decline to construe the statutory phrase “amount of security”
to change meanings when applied to the different subsections at the end
of Section 52.006(b) such that the $25 million cap applies collectively to
all bonds posted by all judgment debtors even though all agree that the
same operative language establishes a per-debtor net-worth cap. 5

4 As the dissent points out, we have said that $25 million is “an absolute

cap.” Longview Energy, 464 S.W.3d at 358. But the statute’s text tells us that
it is an absolute cap on the amount of a bond posted by a debtor.
5 The dissent attempts to avoid the absurd results that will follow for

Section 52.006(b)(1)’s net-worth cap in two different ways. Post at 8 n.1. The
first way is by adding up the calculation for each judgment debtor to determine
a cumulative net-worth cap under Section 52.006(b)(1); of course, applying that
same methodology to Section 52.006(b)(2)’s flat cap results in the same

23
Construing “security” to refer to the total security for a judgment,
as the Greystar Entities urge, or to “the amount of a bond posted by
multiple debtors,” as the dissent urges, also transforms the otherwise
straightforward readings of Section 52.006(a) and 52.006(c). Section
52.006(a) sets the default amount of security for a money judgment at
the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the judgment, interest
for the estimated duration of the appeal, and costs awarded in the
judgment. Allowing multiple debtors to meet this requirement through
piecemeal bonds would leave the judgment creditor without adequate
security if the judgment is affirmed as to only some judgment debtors
found jointly and severally liable. But see Fortune, 645 S.W.2d at 935
(permitting aggregate bonds only if surety is obligated up to full amount
if judgment is affirmed as to any party to the bond).
A greater problem arises under Section 52.006(c)’s provision
permitting a trial court to lower “the amount of the security” to avoid
causing substantial economic harm to a judgment debtor. If “security”
means a bond posted by judgment debtors, one judgment debtor could
use the $25 million joint bond as a starting point to argue that the
amount should be reduced further, which would benefit other parties to
the joint bond who have not made the required showing under Section
52.006(c).

$75 million bond that we hold is required here. The second way is by
presuming without explanation that the statute “prohibits” any judgment
debtor from relying on another’s net worth even though that is the obvious
result of the dissent’s view that Section 52.006 caps “the amount of a bond”
regardless of the number of parties to the bond and whether the parties
proceed under subsection 52.006(a), 52.006(b)(1), 52.006(b)(2), or 52.006(c).
Post at 5.

24
Nothing in the text supports a special construction of “security”
that applies only to Section 52.006(b)(2) but not the remainder of the
Chapter. Following the plain language avoids the problems created
when one statutory term—“a judgment debtor’’—is selectively singled
out for pluralization only one of the many times it appears in a statute.
Of course, applying the $25 million cap on a per-debtor basis
might result in judgment debtors collectively posting an amount of
security exceeding the amount of compensatory damages, costs, and
post-judgment interest awarded in the judgment. But as previously
explained, that result is a common feature of Texas supersedeas practice
that occurs not because of how the bond cap applies but based on the
longstanding principle that all parties appealing from a money
judgment must post their own bond. See 6 McDonald & Carlson, TEX.
APP. PRAC. § 14:10 (2d ed. 2026) (citing Valerio, 307 S.W.2d at 353).
Each party’s bond must secure the full amount for which it is jointly and
severally liable; otherwise, a judgment creditor is not secured for the
entire amount of compensatory damages if the award is affirmed as to
only one jointly liable judgment debtor. Gullo-Haas Toyota, Inc. v.
Davidson, Eagleson & Co., 832 S.W.2d 418, 419-20 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
As discussed above, jointly liable judgment debtors can
alternatively file a joint bond covering the full amount of compensatory
damages, costs, and post-judgment interest, provided that the surety is
liable for the full amount if the judgment is affirmed as to at least one
of the judgment debtors. Fortune, 645 S.W.2d at 935. This option
permits each judgment debtor to supersede the full amount of its

25
potential liability without over-securing the judgment beyond what the
judgment creditor could receive if a money judgment is affirmed. 6 Or,
when the amount of each judgment debtor’s liability falls under a cap,
Section 52.006(b) allows a joint bond obligating each debtor to secure its
capped amount (here, $25 million) and setting the surety’s maximum
liability at the sum of the capped security for all parties to the joint bond
(here, $75 million).

E. There is no compelling policy reason to favor a
collective interpretation that is incompatible with
statutory text and context.

Any application of the bond cap in this proceeding results in a
significant reduction for any Greystar Entity seeking to suspend
enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. Absent some cap, each
would have to post a bond of $360,012,006 plus post-judgment interest
for the duration of the appeal (tens of millions today), or a joint bond in
that amount provided that the surety is liable for the entire amount if
the judgment is affirmed as to any Greystar Entity. See Fortune, 645
S.W.2d at 935.
Our conclusion that the cap applies on a per-debtor basis reduces
the bond amount from more than $400 million to $75 million total
($25 million per debtor), making supersedeas far “more easily available”

6 Thus, in the dissent’s hypothetical case (post at 10), background
principles of Texas law and procedure regarding joint bonds would allow the
five defendants to post a joint bond of $100 million—the amount of the
judgment—plus interest and costs that obligates the surety to pay if the
judgment is affirmed as to any of the defendants. See Fortune, 645 S.W.2d at
935.

26
than without the cap. See Longview Energy, 464 S.W.3d at 358-360.
Even if the jury had not found a joint enterprise, each Greystar Entity’s
several liability would otherwise have required a bond ranging from
$36 million to $198 million (plus interest for the estimated duration of
the appeal) based on the jury’s proportionate responsibility findings.
Under the Greystar Entities’ collective view of the cap, if multiple
Greystar Entities lose their merits appeals, each would be obligated only
on up to one-half or one-third of a $25 million joint bond. Applying the
cap in this way would of course make it easier still for each debtor to
pursue its appeal, but we cannot favor an interpretation in tension with
the text simply because it maximally protects a judgment debtor’s
appellate rights. “[N]o statute pursues a single policy at all costs, and
we are not free to rewrite this statute (or any other) as if it did.”
Advocate Christ Med. Ctr. v. Kennedy, 605 U.S. 1, 19 (2025) (quoting
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69, 81 (2023)). Providing the Greystar
Entities this additional relief would require not only misreading the
plain text of 52.006(b) but also judicially crafting atextual exceptions to
avoid strange results that even the Greystar Entities renounce.
The availability of other procedures making supersedeas more
easily available—including the net-worth cap, lesser security upon a
showing of substantial harm, and alternate security for debtors with net
worths less than $10 million—also cautions against rewriting the
$25 million cap to further protect debtors’ appellate rights. Together,
these procedures reflect legislative policy decisions striking a
multifaceted balance between the creditor’s right to collect a judgment
and the debtor’s right to challenge it. The statutory text of each

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procedure, including the $25 million cap, is the best evidence of those
policy preferences. We may not stray from the text to elevate a
problematic interpretation that maximally implements a policy, and we
should be especially reluctant to do so when the alternative
interpretation advances the same policy. Doing so would risk upsetting
the balance the Legislature sought to strike through this reticulated
scheme.
The other policy considerations the Greystar Entities ask us to
consider include bad pleading incentives for plaintiffs, inadequate
protection of the right to appeal without a per-judgment cap, chilling
effects on appellate rights, and piecemeal execution on a judgment.
None are persuasive.
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 13, 91a, and 166a deter plaintiffs
from filing frivolous pleadings against unrelated parties. And far from
chilling appeals, a per-debtor cap lowers the bar for superseding a
money judgment—here, by more than 90% per debtor given that each
was found jointly liable for compensatory damages of over $360 million.
The trial court might have afforded even greater relief under Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 24.2(b) had it been sought. And rather than
prolong and complicate judgment execution and collection, allowing
judgment creditors to collect against jointly liable judgment debtors who
have not superseded the judgment will reduce any joint liabilities that
remain after appeal under the one-satisfaction rule.
If we decided this case based on whether a per-debtor or all-debtor
bond cap best implements the policies underlying Section 52.006 and the
other supersedeas-reduction statutes—which we may not given the

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text’s mandate—it is not apparent which interpretation would prevail.
And we decline to lob a guess: the text of Section 52.006(b)(2) is the best
evidence we have of the Legislature’s policy preference, and that text
sets a per-debtor bond cap.
* * *
Having concluded that the cap applies per debtor, we hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring each of the
Greystar Entities to post a $25 million bond. The bond cap prohibits a
trial court from requiring “a bond or deposit posted . . . by a judgment
debtor to suspend execution of the judgment during appeal of the
judgment” in an amount exceeding $25 million. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE §§ 52.001, 52.006(b)(2). The trial court here found that a joint
bond filed by all three Greystar Entities capping the surety’s liability at
$25 million “could only potentially suspend the judgment against one of
the three judgment debtors.”
This finding was correct under Section 52.006(b)(2). Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the joint bond
insufficient as to two of the three Greystar Entities.

II. The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it
immediately invalidated the joint bond upon ruling it
insufficient.

The Greystar Entities also ask us to consider whether the trial
court, having ruled the bond insufficient, abused its discretion in
ordering that “no valid bond [was] in place” for at least two Greystar
Entities. This order fell outside the scope of the trial court’s continuing
jurisdiction over supersedeas matters under Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24.3(a) and is not otherwise authorized under Rule 24.1(e).

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The trial court also abused its discretion by not allowing the Greystar
Entities a reasonable time to comply with the court’s ruling regarding
the amount of security required before facing execution.
Rule 24.1(e) generally authorizes trial courts to make “any order
necessary” to protect judgment creditors against loss or damage that
might be caused by a judgment debtor’s appeal. Rule 24.3(a) is narrower
and defines the scope of the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to order
and modify the amount of security and decide the sufficiency of sureties
after its plenary power expires. Plaintiffs argue that both rules
authorize the trial court’s bond order. We disagree.
The trial court’s order determined the amount of security
required from each judgment debtor to suspend execution of the
judgment, but it also went beyond that by ordering that “no valid bond
[was] in place” immediately upon the trial court’s determination that the
bond was insufficient. This order falls outside the scope of the trial
court’s continuing jurisdiction under Rule 24.3(a) to order or modify the
amount or type of security required to continue suspension of the
judgment’s execution.
Had the trial court given each Greystar Entity a reasonable time
to post a separate bond of $25 million (or a joint bond guaranteeing up
to $75 million if the final judgment is affirmed as to all entities on
appeal), such an order would have been authorized under Rule
24.3(a)(1). But the court’s order did more than order the amount of
security: it also declared that the Greystar Entities’ joint bond was not
valid, thereby lifting the suspension of execution immediately. Because
Rule 24.3(a)(1) does not authorize trial courts to invalidate an

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insufficient bond without any opportunity to cure that insufficiency, we
cannot uphold the trial court’s decision to invalidate the bond
immediately under that rule.
Nor do we construe Rule 24.1(e) to enlarge the scope of trial court
jurisdiction after plenary power expires beyond what is prescribed by
Rule 24.3(a). Rule 24.1(e) generally authorizes trial courts to protect
judgment creditors against loss or harm without distinguishing what
protections a trial court can order before and after plenary power
expires. If Rule 24.1(e) authorized trial courts to make orders after
plenary power expires that are not permitted under Rule 24.3(a), then
Rule 24.3(a) would cease to have any meaning.
The only way to preserve meaning for both Rule 24.3(a) and Rule
24.1(e) is to construe Rule 24.3(a) as a list of limited bases for continuing
jurisdiction regarding supersedeas matters after plenary power expires.
See Malouf v. State ex rel. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Tex. 2024) (“When
possible, we construe language in a way that does not render any of it
meaningless.”); see also In re Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations,
LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. 2015) (explaining that the same rules of
construction that govern the interpretation of statutes apply to
procedural rules). Rule 24.1(e) does not confer continuing jurisdiction
beyond the limited bases provided in Rule 24.3(a), and we therefore hold
that Rule 24.1(e) did not authorize the trial court’s order invalidating
the Greystar Entities’ joint bond after plenary power expired.
We note that no subpart of Rule 24 addresses how long parties
have to remedy a bond found insufficient under Section 52.006(b)(2)
before facing execution, although it prescribes 20-day windows following

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trial court net-worth determinations or bond modifications by courts of
appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(c)(2), 24.4(e). This gap leaves the issue
to the trial court’s discretion, and we view it as an abuse of discretion
not to allow a reasonable time to comply with the trial court’s ruling.
Considering the 20-day windows to remedy an insufficient bond in other
parts of Rule 24, we conclude that parties should presumptively be
allowed 20 days to fix a bond found insufficient under Section
52.006(b)(2). Trial courts have some discretion to shorten or lengthen
this time as appropriate in a particular case.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by
immediately invalidating the Greystar Entities’ joint bond as to two of
the entities without providing any time for each entity to post a bond in
a sufficient amount. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus
relief in part and direct the trial court to provide Greystar Development
& Construction, LP—Gabriella Tower Contractor Series and Gabriella
Tower, LLC a reasonable time to post sufficient bonds under Section
52.006(b)(2)’s per-debtor cap. We are confident that the court will
comply, and the writ will issue only if it does not.

J. Brett Busby
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 22, 2026

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