Werner Enterprises, Inc. and Shiraz A. Ali v. Jennifer Blake, Individually and as Next Friend for Nathan Blake, and as Heir of the Estate of Zackery Blake, Deceased; And Eldridge Moak, in His Capacity as Guardian of the Estate of Brianna Blake

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-0493
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Werner Enterprises, Inc. and Shiraz A. Ali,
Petitioners,

v.

Jennifer Blake, individually and as next friend for Nathan Blake,
and as heir of the estate of Zackery Blake, deceased; and Eldridge
Moak, in his capacity as guardian of the estate of Brianna Blake,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued December 3, 2024

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Young, and Justice
Sullivan joined.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Huddle joined.

JUSTICE BLAND filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which
Justice Boyd and Justice Huddle joined.

Justice Lehrmann did not participate in the decision.
A negligent actor incurs liability only for damages proximately
caused by his negligence. Proximate cause is not established merely by
proof that the injury would not have happened if not for the defendant’s
negligence. Instead, proximate cause requires, among other things,
proof that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing
the injury. The substantial-factor requirement incorporates “the idea of
responsibility” into the question of causation. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez,
819 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. 1991) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 431 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1965)). Thus, even if the defendant’s
negligence is part of the causal chain of events that led to the injury, the
defendant is not liable if his involvement was a mere “happenstance of
place and time.” Id. Instead, the substantial-factor requirement means
that liability falls only on a party whose substantial role in bringing
about the injury is such that he is “actually responsible for the ultimate
harm.” Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 224 (Tex. 2010).
Liability does not fall on other participants in the causal chain whose
actions merely “created the condition which made the injury possible.”
IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d
794, 803 (Tex. 2004).
These principles require judgment for the defendants in the
terrible circumstances of this highway-collision case. The driver of a
pickup truck traveling too fast on an icy, divided interstate highway
suddenly lost control, hurtled across a 42-foot-wide median, and collided
with the defendant’s 18-wheeler before the defendant had time to react.
The collision killed one of the pickup’s occupants and severely injured
three others. The plaintiffs proved at trial that, if not for the

2
18-wheeler’s speed, which was below the speed limit but still unsafe for
the icy conditions, the accident likely would not have occurred or the
injuries would have been less severe. We must conclude, however, that
this proof is insufficient to establish that the defendant’s negligence was
a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs’ injuries. The
defendant’s presence on the highway, combined with his speed,
furnished the condition that made the injuries possible, but it did not
proximately cause the injuries. Rather, the sole proximate cause of this
accident and these injuries—the sole substantial factor to which the law
permits assignment of liability—was the sudden, unexpected hurtling of
the victims’ vehicle into oncoming highway traffic, for which the
defendants bore no responsibility.
To assign legally significant causal force—that is, proximate
causation—to any other human factor in this accident would be to
distort the tragic reality of what transpired. This awful accident
happened because an out-of-control vehicle suddenly skidded across a
wide median and struck the defendant’s truck, before he had time to
react, as he drove below the speed limit in his proper lane of traffic. That
singular and robustly explanatory fact fully explains why the accident
happened and who is responsible for the resulting injuries. Because no
further explanation is reasonably necessary to substantially explain the
origins of this accident or to assign responsibility for the plaintiffs’
injuries, the rule of proximate causation does not permit a factfinder to
search for other, subordinate actors in the causal chain and assign
liability to them. Compared to the central and defining fact about this
accident’s cause—the pickup careening across a wide median into

3
oncoming interstate-highway traffic—anything the defendant did or
didn’t do to contribute to the possibility of such an accident is too
attenuated to qualify as the substantial factor necessary for proximate
causation.
Because our holding regarding proximate cause requires
judgment for the defendants, we do not reach any other issues. The
judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and judgment is rendered
in favor of the defendants.
I.
On the afternoon of December 30, 2014, Trey Salinas was driving
his F-350 pickup with four passengers—Jennifer Blake and her three
children—on I-20 eastbound near Odessa. That morning, the National
Weather Service issued a winter weather advisory indicating that ice
was likely to accumulate on the roads and cause hazardous driving
conditions. The temperature dropped below freezing in Odessa around
9:30 a.m. At 2:50 p.m., the National Weather Service updated its
advisory to say that freezing rain had begun and that temperatures
would remain below freezing all afternoon.
Testimony from a driver behind Salinas suggested that Salinas
was driving approximately 50-60 miles per hour when he lost control of
his pickup at approximately 4:30 p.m. In the course of two to three
seconds, Salinas’s F-350 left I-20 eastbound, crossed the 42-foot grassy
median, entered traffic on I-20 westbound, and collided with a Werner
Enterprises 18-wheeler driven by Shiraz Ali. Ali was a driver in training
with Werner. His trainer, Jeffrey Ackerman, was in the 18-wheeler’s
sleeper berth. Ali testified that as soon as he saw Salinas’s truck, he

4
“pressed on the brake as hard as [he] could.” The plaintiffs’ expert
witness testified that Ali’s split-second reaction to the oncoming vehicle
“was appropriate to the conditions that he saw coming up ahead of him.”
Nevertheless, the vehicles collided, killing one of the Blake children and
severely injuring the three other Blake family members traveling with
Salinas.
There is little question that driving conditions were hazardous on
both sides of the road. In addition to the winter weather advisory, there
was evidence that 18-wheelers parked off the side of the highway to get
off the slick roads. There was also evidence that in the ninety minutes
preceding the collision, there were several accidents—single-vehicle and
multi-vehicle—on I-20 westbound and I-20 eastbound. At 3:00 p.m., a
driver on I-20 westbound lost control, crossed the center median, and
collided with a vehicle on I-20 eastbound approximately 4.5 miles from
where Salinas and Ali collided. Also at 3:00 p.m., a driver elsewhere on
I-20 westbound hit a concrete barrier. At 4:01 p.m., roughly 100 feet
down I-20 westbound from that accident, another vehicle lost control
and hit a concrete barrier. At 3:30 p.m., a car went off the road on
I-20 eastbound. The officer responding to the 3:30 p.m. accident
described the roads as “so icy I couldn’t drive very fast or I would have
gone out of control.” While that officer was responding to the 3:30 p.m.
accident on I-20 eastbound, a pileup occurred on I-20 westbound. A
different driver—traveling on I-20 westbound approaching the pileup—
hit her brakes to avoid colliding with the stopped vehicles. In doing so,
she lost control of her car, which went into the center median, rolled,
and entered traffic on I-20 eastbound, where it collided with an

5
eastbound 18-wheeler. The driver of that 18-wheeler estimated he was
traveling at five miles per hour at the time of impact. The car’s driver
was not injured. The officer responding to that accident said the driver
lost control of her car “because of the icy roadway” and described the
roads as “covered in ice.” This cross-median accident was roughly
50 miles away from where Salinas and Ali collided. The first responders
at Ali and Salinas’s collision also recounted that the roads were icy and
that they needed to travel slowly, approximately 10-15 miles per hour.
One of the responding officers testified, “You couldn’t walk on [the road].
It was like a skating rink.”
Neither Ali nor Ackerman checked the weather before they
started the stretch of the drive on which the collision occurred. They
had no knowledge of the 2:50 p.m. advisory, and at trial, Ali could not
remember if he had seen the earlier advisory. Ali testified that the roads
were wet but that he didn’t need to drive any slower because the truck
“handled just fine. Traction was good.” There was also evidence that
Ali passed three different accidents in the hour preceding the
collision. Ali testified that he did not remember seeing these accidents
but would not deny that he did.
Ali’s speed was extensively discussed at trial. From 2:41 p.m. to
4:26 p.m., the Blakes’ expert testified that Ali’s speed averaged
60.57 miles per hour. Immediately prior to the F-350 crossing the
median at 4:30 p.m., Ali was accelerating at full throttle after having
slowed down. When Ali pressed the brake after spotting the F-350, the
18-wheeler was going approximately 50 miles per hour. At the time of
impact, the 18-wheeler was going approximately 43-45 miles per hour.

6
The plaintiffs’ expert testimony indicated that roughly two seconds
transpired between when Salinas lost control in the eastbound lanes and
when he collided with Ali in the westbound lanes.
The collision was catastrophic for the Blake family.
Seven-year-old Zackery Blake was killed. Twelve-year-old Brianna
Blake was rendered a permanent quadriplegic. Fourteen-year-old
Nathan Blake and Jennifer Blake suffered traumatic brain injuries as
well as physical injuries. Salinas was treated at a local hospital but was
discharged within hours.
Jennifer Blake, individually and as next friend for Nathan Blake
and as heir of Zackery Blake’s estate, and Eldridge Moak, in his capacity
as guardian of Brianna Blake’s estate, sued Werner and Ali. Werner
acknowledged that Ali was acting in the course and scope of his
employment and accepted vicarious liability for his conduct.
The jury found Werner and Ali liable. It apportioned 70% of the
responsibility for causing the Blakes’ injuries to Werner employees other
than Ali, 14% to Ali, and 16% to Salinas. It awarded Jennifer Blake
$16,500,000, Nathan Blake $5,000,000, and Brianna Blake $68,187,994.
The district court rendered judgment against Werner and Ali, awarding
these amounts plus court costs and interest. The Blakes settled with
Salinas before trial. Werner and Ali received a credit from the
settlement.
Werner and Ali appealed. They challenged: (1) the legal and
factual sufficiency of the jury’s negligence liability finding against Ali,
(2) the legal and factual sufficiency of the jury’s negligence liability
findings against Werner, (3) jury charge issues, (4) apportionment

7
issues, (5) admission of evidence, and (6) the award of future medical
expenses. 672 S.W.3d 554, 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023).
The case was argued to a three-justice panel, but before the panel issued
a decision, the court voted to consider the case en banc. Werner Enters.,
Inc. v. Blake, 2021 WL 3164005, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
July 27, 2021) (en banc order). The en banc court of appeals affirmed
the district court’s judgment. 672 S.W.3d at 618. Four justices
dissented, across two opinions. The dissenting justices agreed with the
majority that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s negligence finding
against Ali. Id. at 618 (Christopher, C.J., dissenting), 627 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). The first dissent would have held that the district court
erred in submitting Question 1 of the jury charge, the “direct” theory of
Werner’s liability. Id. at 623 (Christopher, C.J., dissenting). Because
apportionment was based, in part, on the jury’s answer to Question 1,
the dissent would have remanded for a new trial. Id. The second dissent
would have rendered a take-nothing judgment as to the Blakes’
derivative theories of liability against Werner based on the “Admission
Rule”—the idea that an employer’s admission that an employee was
acting in the course and scope of his employment generally prevents
plaintiffs from pursuing derivative theories of negligence against the
employer—which the second dissent would have adopted. Id. at 625
(Wilson, J., dissenting). The second dissent would have remanded the
remaining claims for a new trial. Id.
Werner and Ali petitioned for review in this Court. They argue:
(1) Ali’s negligence, if any, did not proximately cause the accident, (2) Ali
owed no duty to the Blakes under these circumstances, (3) Werner

8
cannot be held liable for the accident under a negligent training theory
or other derivative theories, (4) the Court should adopt the “Admission
Rule” when assessing employer liability, (5) the court of appeals
overlooked multiple Casteel problems in the jury charge, and (6) the
jury’s apportionment findings are unsupported by the evidence. We
granted the petition.
II.
A.
We first consider the defendants’ contention that Ali’s negligence
was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. The requirement
of proximate cause has been a foundational pillar of the common law
throughout our history. As the ancient maxim instructs, “In jure non
remota causa sed proxima spectatur” (“In law, the immediate, not the
remote, cause is considered”). Wichita City Lines, Inc. v. Puckett,
295 S.W.2d 894, 898 (Tex. 1956) (attributing the Latin phrase to Sir
Francis Bacon (1561–1626)).
We have described proximate cause as requiring application of “a
practical test, the test of common experience, to human conduct when
determining legal rights and legal liability.” Hous. Lighting & Power
Co. v. Brooks, 336 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. 1960) (quoting City of Dallas v.
Maxwell, 248 S.W. 667, 670 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, holding approved,
judgm’t adopted)). Our precedents divide proximate cause into two
elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) foreseeability. Pediatrics Cool Care
v. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tex. 2022). The two elements are
distinct, but they often entail overlapping considerations because they

9
operate together to focus liability on those with a sufficient connection
to and responsibility for the injuries.
Cause in fact has two components: (1) “but-for” causation, and
(2) “substantial-factor” causation. Id. The defendant’s negligence is the
“but-for” cause of an injury if, “without the act or omission, the harm
would not have occurred.” Id. (quoting Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645,
658 (Tex. 2018)). But-for causation is essential to liability, but proving
but-for causation alone does not establish that the defendant’s
negligence was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. “[I]t is not
enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been
negligent.” Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a). The plaintiff must also prove that “the
[negligent] act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about
the injury.” Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. 2017); see also
Pediatrics, 649 S.W.3d at 158.
The slippery word “substantial” can be difficult to nail
down in many contexts. But in this context, our precedents provide
useful contours. We have on several occasions described the
“substantial-factor” requirement with reference to the following
instructive passage from the Restatement:
The word “substantial” is used to denote the fact that the
defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the
harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause,
using that word in the popular sense, in which there
always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the
so-called “philosophic sense,” which includes every one of
the great number of events without which any happening
would not have occurred.

10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a; see Lear Siegler,
819 S.W.2d at 472; Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 224; Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d
at 402; Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex. 2007).
A key insight of this passage, to which we have pointed before, is
that within the concept of proximate cause, there “always lurks the idea
of responsibility.” Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472; Crump, 330 S.W.3d
at 224; Flores, 232 S.W.3d at 770. The requirement of proximate
causation—with its subsidiary requirement of substantial-factor
causation—compels inquiry into whether, given the nature of the
defendant’s causal connection to the accident, it is reasonable to
conclude that he is “actually responsible for the ultimate harm.” Crump,
330 S.W.3d at 224. If, on the other hand, the defendant’s conduct
“merely creates the condition that makes the harm possible, it is not a
substantial factor in causing the harm as a matter of law.” Stanfield v.
Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 97 (Tex. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).
In other words, “cause in fact is not established where the defendant’s
negligence does no more than furnish a condition which makes the
injuries possible.” IHS, 143 S.W.3d at 799.
B.
By answering “yes” to the question about Ali’s liability, the jury
found that Ali’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about
the Blakes’ injuries. To overcome that finding on appeal, the defendants
must demonstrate that no reasonable juror could have so found. See
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005) (“Judgment
without or against a jury verdict is proper at any course of the
proceedings only when the law does not allow reasonable jurors to decide

11
otherwise.”). We “must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors
could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could
not.” Id. at 827.
We conclude the defendants have made this demanding showing.
The jury charge distinguished between but-for causation and
substantial-factor causation and required the jury to find both.
Given a proper understanding of substantial-factor causation—an
understanding consistent with the jury charge given in this case—no
reasonable juror could assign responsibility for these injuries to anyone
other than the driver who lost control of his vehicle and hurtled across
a 42-foot median into oncoming highway traffic, thereby causing this
accident and these injuries in every legally relevant sense of the word. 1
In defense of the verdict, the Blakes point to evidence that if Ali
had been going fifteen miles per hour, then “[t]he pickup would have
spun safely across the roadway and into the grass because there was
nothing for it to hit.” They also emphasize that Ali knew that passenger
vehicles are more likely than 18-wheelers to slide on ice, and he knew
what the consequences of such a loss of control in front of an 18-wheeler
would be. He also knew or should have known the conditions were

1 Regarding the question—“[w]as the negligence, if any, of Shiraz Ali in

the operation of the Werner truck on December 30, 2014, a proximate cause of
the injuries in question?”—the jury charge defined proximate cause as:
a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an injury,
and without which cause such injury would not have occurred.
In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained
of must be such that a commercial truck driver using ordinary
care would have foreseen that the injury, or some similar injury,
might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one
proximate cause of an injury.

12
hazardous, and he therefore should have driven more carefully or
perhaps stayed off the road altogether. And ultimately his excessive
speed at least exacerbated the Blakes’ injuries, as compared to what the
injuries would have been had Ali been traveling at a safe speed. The
Blakes thus argue that Ali’s negligent speed was a proximate cause, not
merely a furnishing condition, of their injuries. Ali’s negligent speed
was plainly a but-for cause of the accident, they contend, and because
his negligence did not terminate before the injury, Ali can be liable for
it. Moreover, the causal connection was not so attenuated as to foreclose
liability, they urge. The bottom line, for the plaintiffs, is that Ali was
negligently driving too fast on ice, and because of that fact, he was
unable to avoid colliding with the vehicle carrying the Blakes. He
therefore caused them greater injury than if he had been traveling more
slowly, and a reasonable juror could consider Ali’s speed a proximate
cause of the Blakes’ injuries.
The court of appeals agreed. 672 S.W.3d at 578. It considered
Ali’s testimony that he knew that passenger vehicles are more likely to
lose control on ice than 18-wheelers and that he knew what the
consequences of a passenger vehicle losing control on an icy highway in
front of an 18-wheeler would be. Id. at 577. The court of appeals also
looked to both parties’ accident-reconstruction expert testimony, which
indicated that if Ali had been driving fifteen miles per hour, the collision
would not have happened. Id. Evaluating this evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury finding, the court of appeals concluded that
the evidence enabled a reasonable juror to find that Ali’s negligence was
a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries, that his negligence

13
was a but-for cause of the injuries, and that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the injuries could result from his negligence. Id.
at 577–78. The court of appeals thus held that sufficient evidence
supported the jury’s finding that Ali’s negligence was a proximate cause
of the Blakes’ injuries. Id. at 578.
We can assume sufficient evidence that Ali’s speed—and even his
presence on the icy road at all—was negligent under these weather
conditions. And we can assume that Ali’s negligent driving was a but-for
cause of the injuries, in that “without [Ali’s negligence] harm would not
have occurred.” Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d at 402. The Blakes focus their
defense of the verdict primarily on the abundant evidence impugning
Ali’s driving and his decisions in the hours and moments leading up to
the accident. They do not fault Ali, however, for his reaction once
Salinas lost control. To the contrary, their expert testified that Ali did
the best he could during the two seconds preceding the crash. 2 Ali’s

2 Q. And I think you testified that it only took Mr. Salinas’[s]

vehicle 2.1 seconds to get across the grassy median?
A. To the area of impact, yes, that’s about right.
Q. Okay.
A. About two seconds.
Q. And that you testified that Mr. Ali had reacted within a half
a second?
A. Yeah, he -- Mr. Ali reacted basically as soon as he saw that
pickup truck beginning to enter the center median by taking his
foot off the gas and moving it towards the brake. So his reaction
was appropriate to the conditions that he saw coming up ahead
of him.

14
negligence, instead, was to be found only in the manner of his driving
before Salinas lost control across the median from him. The plaintiffs’
principal theory of the case is that if Ali had not been driving too fast in
the icy conditions, things would have turned out much differently for the
Blakes, who would be alive and well if not for Ali’s unsafe driving.
Powerful as this line of argument may be in the wake of such
terrible consequences for the blameless victims, it addresses only but-for
causation. It does not account for the requirement of substantial-factor
causation, which we conclude is lacking here as a matter of law. That is
so because the sole substantial factor in bringing about this accident—
the singular fact that substantially explains why the accident happened
and who is responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries—was Salinas’s losing
control of his F-350 and crossing a 42-foot grassy median into oncoming
highway traffic before Ali had time to react. The Blakes are correct, of
course, that there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury.
Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 471. That does not mean there is always
more than one proximate cause. On these facts, we hold that there was
only one.
“Where the initial act of negligence was not the active and
efficient cause of plaintiffs’ injuries, but merely created the condition by
which the second act of negligence could occur, the resulting harm is too
attenuated from the defendants’ conduct to constitute the cause in fact
of plaintiffs’ injuries.” IHS, 143 S.W.3d at 799. Likewise, the

Q. Okay. So no criticisms about how fast he reacted to seeing
Mr. Salinas come across?
A. No, not at all. He reacted very quickly.

15
“‘happenstance of place and time’ may be too attenuated for liability to
be imposed under the common law.” Id. (quoting Lear Siegler,
819 S.W.2d at 472). 3
Under the undisputed facts of this case, the Blakes’ injuries
happened because Trey Salinas, in the course of two or three seconds,
lost control of his F-350, hurtled across the median into oncoming traffic
on I-20, and collided with a vehicle driving below the speed limit in its
proper lane on the other side—a vehicle which, tragically for the Blakes,
happened to be an 18-wheeler. Ali’s “initial act of negligence”—whether
it was his speed in icy conditions or his presence on the highway—
“merely created the condition by which the second act of negligence
[Salinas’s loss of control] could” bring about the injury. Id. “[T]he
resulting harm is too attenuated from [Ali’s] conduct to constitute the
cause in fact of plaintiffs’ injuries.” Id.
Nothing Ali did or didn’t do contributed to Salinas’s truck hitting
ice, losing control, veering into the median, and entering oncoming
traffic on an interstate highway. However Ali was driving, the presence
of his 18-wheeler in its proper lane of traffic on the other side of I-20

3 The dissenting justices emphasize distinctions between the facts of

this case and the facts of Lear Siegler and other precedents of this Court on
which we rely. Post at 7–8 (Bland, J., dissenting). We do not rely on Lear
Siegler and our other precedents describing the law of substantial-factor
causation because of factual similarities between those cases and this one. We
rely on them, instead, because in our view the legal rule to which they give
rise, when applied to the facts of this case, dictates the result we reach. Our
two precedents that bear some factual similarity to this case are Biggers v.
Continental Bus System, Inc., 303 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. 1957), and Baumler v.
Hazelwood, 347 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1961). As discussed in Part II.C., we upheld
the jury verdict in Biggers but reversed it in Baumler, as we do today.

16
at the precise moment Salinas lost control is just the kind of
“happenstance of place and time” that cannot reasonably be considered
a substantial factor in causing these injuries. Instead, Salinas losing
control and hurtling across the median was the substantial factor in
bringing about the injuries. The presence of Ali’s truck on the other side
of the median at that precise moment was merely “the condition that
ma[de] the harm possible.” Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 97 (quoting IHS,
143 S.W.3d at 800).
Surely, as the plaintiffs urge, if Ali had been driving more slowly,
Salinas would not have collided with him. Just as surely, however, if
Ali had been driving 100 miles per hour, Salinas would not have collided
with him. Had either driver been driving much slower or faster, this
accident would not have happened as it did. See Myers v. Bright,
609 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Md. 1992) (“[H]ad [the plaintiff] been going much
faster she also would have avoided the accident.”). And if no vehicle at
all had been in Salinas’s path as he crossed into oncoming traffic, the
Blakes would not have been injured. On the other hand, if the vehicle
in that spot had been a small car rather than an 18-wheeler, Salinas’s
F-350 could have killed or severely injured its occupants.
The position and speed of the vehicles on the other side of a
broadly divided highway when an oncoming F-350 suddenly hurtles
across the median toward them is precisely the kind of “happenstance
of place and time” that can have enormous consequences for the victims
of an accident but cannot reasonably be considered the proximate cause
of the accident or the resulting injuries. As between the two drivers
involved in a head-on collision, substantial-factor causation requires us

17
to assign legal responsibility to the driver whose negligence made the
collision happen—not to a driver whose negligence merely happened to
bring him to a time and place at which another driver unexpectedly and
negligently collided with him before he had time to react. The
environment on the other side of the divided highway is “the condition
that ma[de] the harm possible,” Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 97 (quoting
IHS, 143 S.W.3d at 800), but the proximate cause of the harm is the
out-of-control vehicle entering oncoming traffic. The only contribution
Ali’s speed (or his decision to stay on the road) made to bringing this
accident about was that it put him, in that fateful moment, directly in
the path of Salinas’s careening F-350—a tragic “happenstance of place
and time” if ever there was one, but not a happenstance for which Ali or
his employer can reasonably be held responsible under this Court’s
precedents. 4

4 We are concerned here only with the assignment of responsibility as

between two drivers for injuries caused by the collision of their vehicles. In
other words, the question is whether Salinas’s driving errors or Ali’s driving
errors—or some combination of the two—proximately caused the plaintiffs’
injuries. As between Salinas’s driving and Ali’s driving, we hold that Salinas’s
driving was the sole proximate cause of the Blakes’ injuries as a matter of law.
We do not thereby hold that the at-fault driver’s negligence is always the sole
proximate cause of the injuries arising from a collision. If the allegation were
that a defect in the design of either vehicle contributed to the injuries, for
instance, our analysis of causation would require additional considerations
that are not required when assigning responsibility as between the driving
errors of the two drivers involved in the accident. See, e.g., Hyundai Motor Co.
v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1999) (discussing
vehicle-manufacturer liability under a products-liability theory). Or, if the
allegation were that injury-causing conduct apart from the way the two
vehicles were driven exacerbated the plaintiffs’ injuries, responsibility could
be apportioned to the injury-enhancing party. See Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v.
Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 562–64 (Tex. 2015) (holding that failure to wear a

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C.
The Blakes rely on our decision in Biggers v. Continental Bus
System, Inc., 303 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. 1957). Biggers involved a collision
between a car and a commercial bus on a rural stretch of two-lane
highway eight miles north of Huntsville in 1951. Id. at 361. The road
was wet with rain. Id. at 362. At the point of collision, just north of a
small bridge, the highway was 24-feet wide. Id. at 361. The bus was
driving at an excessive speed northward but was properly on the right
side of the two-lane road. Id. at 361–62. At the same time, three
passenger vehicles were traveling southward in a single line toward the
bridge. Id. As they approached the bridge, the first vehicle “slowed
down to observe the creek to ascertain if it was too muddy for fishing.”
Id. at 362. Reacting to the first car, the second and third cars traveling
behind the first car also slowed, but the third car slid into the car in
front of it. Id. The contact “propelled” the second car “somewhat
diagonally eastward into the bus’[s] right-hand side of the highway,”
where it collided with the bus. Id.
Biggers focuses on the foreseeability aspect of proximate cause,
not on the requirement of substantial-factor causation we apply today.
We determined that the possibility of such a collision was foreseeable
under the circumstances:
It would be wholly out of keeping with reality to hold that
an operator of an automobile traveling on a modern,
heavily-traveled public highway cannot and should not,
under any circumstances, reasonably foresee that an
automobile approaching from the opposite direction may,

seatbelt can be considered alongside driver error in assessing proportionate
responsibility for injuries caused by a collision).

19
for some reason, enter the wrong traffic lane and thus be
endangered by excessive speed which makes stopping,
deceleration or turning aside to avoid a collision impossible
or more difficult.
Id. at 364.
Biggers is legally distinguishable from our decision today in part
because it primarily addresses foreseeability and but-for causation
rather than focusing on the requirement of substantial-factor causation
as enunciated in our more recent decisions. That is not to suggest these
discrete inquiries are sealed off from one another. Just as the
substantial-factor inquiry incorporates “the idea of responsibility” into
the question of proximate cause, Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472, the
foreseeability inquiry likewise “addresses the proper scope of a
defendant’s legal responsibility for negligent conduct,” Zanetti,
518 S.W.3d at 402. Both inquiries involve “practical” application of the
“test of common experience, to human conduct.” Brooks, 336 S.W.2d
at 607 (quoting Maxwell, 248 S.W. at 670). And both inquiries serve a
common purpose, which is to ask, under the banner of proximate cause,
“whether a defendant’s blameworthy act was sufficiently related to the
resulting harm to warrant imposing liability for that harm on the
defendant.” Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 839 (1996)
(discussing proximate cause generally). Naturally, similar
considerations will often bear on both substantial-factor causation and
foreseeability.
The two are nevertheless distinct. Foreseeability asks “what
should reasonably be anticipated in the light of common experience
applied to the surrounding circumstances.” Biggers, 303 S.W.2d at 364.

20
Substantial-factor causation asks, also in light of common experience,
whether “the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the
harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word
in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of
responsibility.” Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 224 (quoting Lear Siegler,
819 S.W.2d at 472).
Biggers is also factually distinguishable from today’s case,
primarily because it involved vehicles traveling in close proximity on a
narrow, two-lane highway crossing a bridge. Applying a “practical,
common sense test, the test of common experience,” Biggers rejected the
defendants’ contention that, in such circumstances, the excessive speed
of the vehicle traveling in its proper lane can never be a proximate cause
of a collision with an oncoming car that moves unexpectedly into
oncoming traffic. 303 S.W.2d at 364.
The very same “practical, common sense test, the test of common
experience” yields a different result, in our view, when applied to the
modern experience of driving on a four-lane highway divided by a broad,
grassy median. The vehicles in Biggers were operating in narrow
quarters at a bridge crossing, sharing a two-lane road, approaching each
other in close proximity. Vehicles on a divided highway, by contrast,
operate on what are essentially two different roads. The possibility that
a driver on a two-lane rural highway will mistakenly enter oncoming
traffic, while still remote as a matter of common experience outside of
designated passing zones, is vastly more likely than the possibility that
a driver on a broadly divided highway will cross the median and enter
oncoming traffic. Nothing in Biggers suggests we must extend its

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reasoning about the practical realities of driving on a two-lane highway
in 1951 to the much different practical reality of driving on a four-lane,
divided interstate highway in the twenty-first century. 5 We need not
overrule Biggers, but neither does it compel the result of this case.
Even in the context of two-lane highways divided only by a stripe
of paint, we made clear after Biggers, in the factually similar case of
Baumler v. Hazelwood, that the defendant’s excessive speed is not
necessarily a proximate cause of a collision with an oncoming driver who
suddenly veers onto the wrong side of the road. See Baumler v.
Hazelwood, 347 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. 1961). Distinguishing Biggers,
we held that liability in such circumstances “depends upon the facts.”
Id. at 565. We overturned a jury verdict assigning liability to a driver
who was struck when another vehicle entered his side of the road, just
as we do today. Id.
A key fact, in both Baumler and Biggers, was the reaction time
available to the driver traveling in his correct lane. The reaction time
was just a split second in Baumler. Id. at 564. Yet in Biggers, “the car
which got into the pathway of the bus got there at least 3 1/2 seconds
before the collision.” Id. at 565. Indeed, as we noted in Baumler, the
Court in Biggers hypothesized that if, instead of 3.5 seconds, the car had
“entered the bus’[s] lane of traffic less than two seconds before the

5 According to the Texas Department of Transportation, Texas’s first

interstate highway was the Gulf Freeway (I-45) in Houston, the first major
portion of which opened in 1952, one year after the accident in Biggers. See
Interstate and U.S. Highway Facts, TEX. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.dot.state.tx.us/tpp/hwy/ihhwyfacts.htm (last visited June 25,
2025).

22
collision,” then “we might find justification for setting aside” the verdict.
Biggers, 303 S.W.2d at 363. In today’s case, the Blakes’ expert agreed
that the entire sequence of events—from Salinas losing control to the
moment of collision all the way across the median—lasted no more than
roughly two seconds. Ali’s reaction time after Salinas “got into the
pathway” of the 18-wheeler on the wrong side of the interstate was
therefore much lower than the 3.5 seconds available to the bus driver in
Biggers. Indeed, as mentioned above, the plaintiffs’ expert witness
found no fault in the way Ali reacted once Salinas’s vehicle started
hurtling toward him. See supra note 2.
Both Biggers and Baumler demonstrate, as we would expect, that
identifying the proximate cause of an accident on the road “depends
upon the facts.” Baumler, 347 S.W.2d at 565. That does not mean,
however, that a jury may always answer as it chooses, irrespective of
the facts. As in Baumler, an appellate court must overturn a jury verdict
if the facts in evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict,
do not support a reasonable theory of proximate causation. In these
prior cases, as today, one key fact informing our assessment of
proximate cause is the defendant driver’s reaction time. Yet, as
discussed above, the most decisive fact distinguishing this case from
Biggers is the vast difference between a 24-foot-wide two-lane highway
and an interstate highway divided by a 42-foot grassy median.
We are directed to just one other reported American case in which
an out-of-control vehicle crossed the wide median of a modern, divided
highway and the injured plaintiff sued a driver who had insufficient
time to react before colliding with the errant vehicle. See Creel v. Loy,

23
524 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Mont. 2021). As here, the court granted the
possibility that the defendant was driving too fast given the rainy
conditions. See id. at 1100. The court nevertheless concluded that the
injuries “were not foreseeably and substantially caused by [the
defendant’s] alleged negligence.” Id. at 1100–01 (applying Montana law
on proximate causation). 6
Neither the dearth of such cases nor the outcome of the Montana
case should be surprising. Head-on collisions tragically do happen. But
as a “practical” matter of “common experience,” we normally would not
blame the driver who stayed in his lane and was struck, before he had
time to react, by an out-of-control vehicle careening unexpectedly across
a wide median into oncoming traffic. Brooks, 336 S.W.2d at 607 (quoting
Maxwell, 248 S.W. at 670). Even in treacherous conditions—perhaps
especially in treacherous conditions—each driver has a personal
responsibility to maintain control of his vehicle and to stay on his side
of the road. Our shared sense that each driver on the road bears that
basic responsibility is what makes modern high-speed driving possible.
Every driver proceeds in unspoken reliance on other drivers
maintaining control of their vehicles and staying on their side of the
road. Our lives are in each other’s hands every second we spend on a
highway in the multi-ton steel projectiles we drive. In most cases, we

6 The dissenting justices conclude that the evidence of causation in Creel

v. Loy was weaker than the evidence adduced against Ali. Post at 8 (Bland, J.,
dissenting). Perhaps so. We do not mention Creel because it is factually
indistinguishable from this case or because it plays any particular guiding role
in our thinking about Texas law. Creel’s significance is that it highlights the
striking scarcity of precedent from any jurisdiction validating the theory of
traffic-accident liability advanced in this case.

24
are able to move about the world safely and reliably on modern
highways, but that is only because we trust other drivers not to lose
control of their deadly vehicular weapons and careen head-long into us.
Our modern economy—indeed, our modern way of life—is built on that
trust. When a driver breaks that trust and causes a deadly accident,
legal responsibility lies with him, not with the driver he hits after losing
control.
That general rule may be subject to some variance, as in Biggers
and Baumler, when the accident involves vehicles driving in close
proximity on two-lane roads. But we struggle to imagine a scenario in
which the law could ever reasonably fault a driver on one side of a
broadly divided highway for a collision caused by an oncoming vehicle
that loses control, crosses the median, and strikes him before he has
time to react.
For these reasons, as a matter of law, Ali’s negligence was not a
substantial factor in bringing about the Blakes’ injuries, the sole
proximate cause of which was Salinas’s loss of control. The defendants
also argue that the injury to the Blakes was not foreseeable and that Ali
owed no duty to oncoming drivers and passengers under these
circumstances. We need not confront these issues, which are rendered
superfluous by our holding regarding the substantial-factor element of
proximate causation.
III.
We turn now to the effect of our holding regarding Ali’s liability
on the liability of Ali’s employer, Werner. For the following reasons, the

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judgment against Werner cannot stand given that its driver, Ali, did not
proximately cause the plaintiffs’ injuries.
The jury was asked to assign both (1) “derivative” liability to
Werner for inadequate training and supervision of Ali, and (2) “direct”
liability to Werner independent of its training and supervision of Ali.
The jury did so. The court of appeals affirmed on both counts, but only
after reaching the conclusion—which we reverse above—that sufficient
evidence supports the jury’s finding that Ali’s negligence proximately
caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. 672 S.W.3d at 578, 602, 605.
As for Werner’s “derivative” liability, the court of appeals upheld
the jury’s finding that Werner’s negligent training and supervision of Ali
proximately caused the injuries. Id. at 605. It pointed to evidence that
Ali lacked the training and experience to safely drive an 18-wheeler in
hazardous conditions and that Werner knew or should have known that
he was unfit for the assignment. Id. at 603–05.
Werner’s negligent training and supervision, even if proved, could
not have been a proximate cause of the Blakes’ injuries because Ali’s
negligent driving was not a proximate cause. We have not recognized
negligent training or supervision as an independent theory of tort
liability. But with respect to the analogous allegation of negligent
hiring, we have determined that any such claim “requires negligence by
two separate parties: the employer’s negligence in hiring the employee
and the employee’s subsequent negligent act or omission. Both
negligent acts must proximately cause the injury.” Endeavor Energy
Res., L.P. v. Cuevas, 593 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. 2019).

26
Assuming that claims for negligent training and supervision have
independent viability apart from an employer’s usual respondeat
superior liability, such claims would be subject to the same requirement
we have applied to negligent hiring claims. Under that rule, because
Ali’s driving was not a proximate cause of the accident, there can be no
derivative liability imposed on Werner for its failure to adequately train
or supervise him. In other words, because Ali’s unsafe driving did not
proximately cause the injuries, Werner cannot be separately liable for
facilitating Ali’s unsafe driving.
The principal theory of “direct” liability, which the court of
appeals affirmed, was that Werner created unreasonable risk for other
travelers by sending an inexperienced, trainee driver like Ali into winter
weather unable to access important updates about the weather.
672 S.W.3d at 591–99. Werner breached this duty, the court of appeals
held, by sending Ali on the run without access to important weather
updates, allowing him to drive despite his receiving a low score on a
recent driving exam, and sending him into the storm untrained to
deliver a time-sensitive load. Id. at 599. The Blakes rest their theory of
Werner’s direct liability on this Court’s recent observation that “a party
who takes affirmative acts that create a danger on a public highway can
be held responsible for the results of those actions, along with other
responsible actors.” See United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans,
668 S.W.3d 627, 639 (Tex. 2023).
This theory of liability cannot be separated from the predicate
question of Ali’s responsibility for the accident. Like the “derivative”
liability theory of negligent hiring and supervision, this “direct” liability

27
theory takes for granted that Ali’s driving proximately caused the
injuries and then seeks to assign responsibility for Ali’s unsafe driving
to Werner. This ostensibly “direct” theory of liability is therefore just as
“derivative” of Ali’s liability as the negligent hiring and supervision
claim.
There are no viable theories of liability alleged against Werner
that are independent of Ali’s responsibility for the Blakes’ injuries. All
the claims against Werner are, in that sense, “derivative” of Ali’s
liability—for which Werner would bear responsibility as Ali’s employer,
whether or not the Blakes alleged additional theories of Werner’s
liability. 7 As a result, all claims against Werner fail for the same reason
that all claims against Ali fail: Ali’s driving did not proximately cause
this accident or the resulting injuries, the sole proximate cause of which
was Salinas’s catastrophic loss of control of the vehicle carrying the
Blakes.
IV.
The foregoing holdings dispose of all claims and require rendition
of judgment for the defendants. We therefore do not reach the parties’
remaining issues. The court of appeals’ judgment is reversed, and
judgment is rendered for the defendants.

7 The defendants and some amici ask us to adopt the “Admission Rule,”

under which defendants who admit that an employee was acting in the course
and scope of employment need not also defend against other derivative theories
of negligence. Because our holding regarding proximate cause disposes of all
claims against Werner even in the absence of the Admission Rule, we need not
consider the matter further.

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James D. Blacklock
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 27, 2025

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