Hannah Mehta v. Manish Mehta

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-0507
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Hannah Mehta,
Petitioner,

v.

Manish Mehta,
Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
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JUSTICE LEHRMANN, joined by Justice Busby, concurring.

The Family Code authorizes an award of spousal maintenance
when the maintenance-seeking spouse “will lack sufficient
property . . . on dissolution of the marriage to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051. Evaluating those
needs, and the property available to meet them, is often relatively
straightforward when the divorcing couple has no dependent children.
But when they have children, the analysis becomes more complicated.
It is superficially tempting to say that child support, which of course is
for the benefit of the children, should not be considered in determining
eligibility for spousal maintenance. However, the Court rightly rejects
such a simplistic holding, which would ignore both (1) the reality that a
maintenance-seeking spouse’s expenses significantly overlap with
child-related expenses and (2) the impact that child support has on a
maintenance-seeking spouse’s ability to provide for her own needs. As
a practical matter, assessing eligibility for spousal maintenance
requires consideration of all financial resources available to the
maintenance-seeking spouse, including child support, but it also
requires consideration of all reasonable expenses—whether shared or
specific to the spouse or the children. Thus, I am pleased to join the
Court’s opinion, and I write separately to make some additional points
in support of this conclusion.
Though provision of child support has long been a parental duty
in Texas, see Gully v. Gully, 231 S.W. 97, 98 (Tex. 1921), Texas did not
codify its child support guidelines until 1989. 1 Before that, trial courts
had broad discretion in ordering child support, which led to inconsistent
awards. Susan C. Blackwell, Child Support Guidelines in Texas: a Step
in the Right Direction, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 861, 863 (1989). The
guidelines ensure consistency by generally requiring child support
awards to be calculated based on a percentage of the obligor’s monthly
net resources and the number of children. 2

1 See Act of May 12, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 617, § 6, 1989 Tex. Gen.

Laws 2030, 2036–40, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20,
§ 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 282 (recodified as amended at TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 154.125(b)).
2 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.125(b) (providing that for one child, the

award is twenty percent of monthly net resources; for two children, twenty-five

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The basis for the specific percentages adopted in Section 154.125
is unknown. 3 But child support awards generally seek to achieve the
central goal of “help[ing] a custodial parent maintain an adequate
standard of living for the child.” Williams v. Patton, 821 S.W.2d 141,
145 (Tex. 1991). Thus, they help reduce post-divorce financial
disparities between the parents, protecting children from additional
disruptions during and after their parents’ divorce. That said, child
support payments are not intended or expected to cover all of a child’s
expenses; the obligee-parent must make up the difference. See Gully,
231 S.W. at 98 (noting that both parents have a duty to support their
minor children).
Without question, child support payments are intended “for the
benefit of the child,” not the obligee-parent. See TEX. FAM. CODE

percent; for three children, thirty percent; for four children, thirty-five percent;
for five children, forty percent; for six or more children, “[n]ot less than the
amount for [five] children”). The percentage is lower if the obligor spouse’s
monthly net resources are less than $1,000. Id. Additional provisions apply if
the obligor spouse’s resources exceed a certain amount. See id. § 154.126.
3 In its most recent review of Texas’s child support guidelines, the Office

of the Attorney General noted that it could not locate any “specific
documentation of the economic rationale for the percentage ranges” ultimately
adopted. Child Support Div., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,
Texas Child Support Guidelines Review Report 2021 36 (2021),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/child-support/child-support-guidelines-
review. The review speculated, however, that the guidelines were modeled
after Wisconsin’s, which in turn are based on a 1982 study entitled “On
Measuring the Cost of Children.” Id. The Wisconsin guidelines provide “the
minimum amount each parent is expected to contribute to the support of their
children” and “expect[] that the custodial parent shares his or her income
directly with their children.” Id. The Office of the Attorney General’s review
concluded that “one might argue that the same economic rationale forms the
basis of the current Texas guidelines.” Id.

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§ 151.001(a)(8). But any resource that “help[s] a custodial parent
maintain an adequate standard of living for the child” is for the benefit
of the child. See Patton, 821 S.W.3d at 145. That includes payment of
expenses that are specific to the child, such as medical expenses, clothes,
or extracurricular activities. But it also includes payment of
commingled household expenses that are necessary for parent and child
alike, such as the mortgage, utilities, and groceries. So, a spouse who
receives and properly spends child support for the benefit of the child
will unavoidably benefit to some extent from that support. But any
incidental benefit to the parent does not diminish the obligatory benefit
to the child.
Moreover, as the Court notes, the availability of child support for
child-related expenses eases the burden on the obligee-parent’s other
available resources. Ante at 13. It is for this reason that trial courts do
not err when they include child support payments as “property”
available “to provide for the [maintenance-seeking] spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051. Importantly, however,
that is only one side of the equation and thus presents an incomplete
financial picture. To ensure that trial courts fairly and accurately assess
eligibility for spousal maintenance, it may be simplest in many cases to
consider all incoming resources of the maintenance-seeking spouse,
including child support, against all reasonable expenses, including
child-related expenses. Such an analysis does not violate the
requirement that child support payments be used for the benefit of the
child. Rather, it merely recognizes the reality that child support
payments often benefit both the child and the obligee-parent and that a

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custodial parent’s child-related expenses are highly relevant to her
ability to meet her own minimum reasonable needs.
Consider the following hypothetical. A maintenance-seeking
spouse has a monthly net salary of $3,000 and receives $1,000 in child
support payments. The spouse’s total monthly expenses—which I
assume for purposes of the hypothetical are reasonable and which
include expenses that are child-specific, spouse-specific, and shared by
the entire household—are $5,000. Essentially, the spouse has $4,000
coming in and $5,000 going out, so she nets –$1,000 per month and does
not have sufficient property available to meet her minimum reasonable
needs. For purely mathematical purposes, excluding the $1,000 in child
support from the income side of the equation is irrelevant so long as the
maintenance-seeking spouse’s total expenses are also discounted by
$1,000 because the child support payment has eased the burden on other
resources that would otherwise be devoted to the expenses that the
support payment covers. Under that calculation, the spouse has $3,000
coming in and $4,000 going out, and the result is the same: the
maintenance-seeking spouse nets –$1,000 per month and does not have
sufficient property available to meet her minimum reasonable needs.
Finally, and again for mathematical purposes, a portion of the
child support payments could be considered on the income side of the
equation to reflect that some expenses benefit both the child and the
maintenance-seeking spouse. But identifying that portion is both
impracticable and unnecessary. It is impracticable because most shared
household costs—housing, utilities, groceries, etc.—cannot reasonably
or accurately be isolated or traced to one member of the household. And

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it is unnecessary because, whatever that portion turns out to be, it would
need to be accounted for on the expense side of the equation. Returning
to the hypothetical, if the trial court determines that sixty percent of the
$1,000 child support payment—$600—is property available to the
maintenance-seeking spouse to meet her needs (and thus counts as
income for spousal-maintenance purposes), the amount of the remaining
forty percent of the payment—$400—would still need to be subtracted
on the expense side (because that portion frees $400 of the
maintenance-seeking spouse’s resources that would otherwise be spent
on the child). Under that calculation, the spouse has $3,600 coming in
and $4,600 going out, netting the same –$1,000.
Considering all available income—from whatever
source—against all reasonable expenses thus avoids convoluted math
problems and ensures that neither parent can use child support
payments to unfairly affect the spousal-maintenance determination.
With this understanding, it becomes clear that the flaw in the court of
appeals’ analysis of Hannah’s eligibility for spousal maintenance was
not its inclusion of child support payments as property available to meet
her minimum reasonable needs. Indeed, including those payments is
consistent with how other courts of appeals conduct the eligibility
analysis. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Elabd, 589 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2019, no pet.); Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 257 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); In re Marriage of McFarland,

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176 S.W.3d 650, 656–57 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). 4 The
court of appeals here further appeared to correctly recognize that all
Hannah’s expenses are relevant to the equation, as it considered her
entire mortgage and all property-tax payments without needlessly
attempting to isolate the nebulous portion of those expenses that
benefits Hannah as opposed to the children. 703 S.W.3d 100, 113 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2023). Instead, the court of appeals’ error was in
refusing to consider qualitative evidence of Hannah’s minimum
reasonable needs on the expense side of the equation. The Court aptly
explains why courts may not ignore such evidence. Ante at 14–15.

* * * *

Certainly, child support is “for the benefit of the child,” while
spousal maintenance provides for the “spouse’s minimum reasonable
needs.” But those purposes are aligned, not antagonistic. Child support
is material to a maintenance-seeking spouse’s ability to meet her own
minimum reasonable needs, but so too are the expenses to which that
support may be directed. The Court properly recognizes those important
considerations in correctly determining that the trial court did not abuse

4 These courts also properly considered the maintenance-seeking
spouse’s total monthly expenses in determining eligibility. See Elabd, 589
S.W.3d at 285; McFarland, 176 S.W.3d at 657.

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its discretion in awarding Hannah spousal maintenance. Accordingly, I
concur in the Court’s judgment and join its opinion.

Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 20, 2025

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