Cindy Thompson, Individually and as Heir of Charles Thompson, and Cc & T Investments, LLC v. Mae Landry

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-0875
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Cindy Thompson, Individually and as Heir of Charles Thompson,
and CC & T Investments, LLC,
Petitioners,

v.

Mae Landry,
Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
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Argued January 16, 2025

JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

More than a decade after a default judgment foreclosed
longstanding tax liens, the property owner sued to collaterally attack
that judgment and void a subsequent purchaser’s deed. Relying on our
decision in Mitchell v. MAP Resources, Inc., 1 the owner claims the
default judgment violates her due process rights because the taxing

1 649 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. 2022).
authorities failed to properly serve her with suit papers, leading to
foreclosure of the liens.
The subsequent purchaser of the property—who paid the
judgment—counters that the owner had notice of the property’s sale
years before she brought her collateral attack. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the trial court sustained the collateral attack,
setting aside the default judgment and tax sale. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that fact issues exist regarding the adequacy of service
in the underlying tax suit.
The subsequent purchaser petitioned for review, urging that the
owner’s notice of the property’s sale years earlier defeats her claim as a
matter of law. We agree with the purchaser that a property owner may
not set aside a subsequent property purchase on due process grounds if
the owner obtained notice of the default judgment or the property’s sale
during the statutory limitations and redemption period. Such an owner
has notice of any due process violation in time to assert a legal remedy.
Further, a subsequent purchaser may advance equitable defenses
against a collateral attack if a prior owner unreasonably delays, to the
current owner’s detriment, in suing to quiet title after obtaining notice
of the judgment or the property’s sale. The evidence in this case,
however, fails to conclusively demonstrate the date of such notice.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
I
Respondent Mae Landry inherited her grandmother’s partial
interest in a nearly twelve-acre property in Chambers County. In

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February 2004, taxing authorities sued to foreclose unpaid tax liens on
the property dating back more than a decade. 2 The authorities served
Landry’s grandmother—who was listed as the record owner—by
publication, posting the suit on the courthouse door. 3 When Landry did
not answer the suit, the trial court rendered a default judgment
awarding delinquent taxes and related fees on May 9, 2005.
In December 2006, Petitioner Cindy Thompson purchased the
property at a tax foreclosure sale and paid the outstanding tax liens on
the property. The taxing authorities issued Thompson a constable’s deed
on February 6, 2007. The deed was recorded three days later on
February 9. Thompson has paid the taxes on the property since that
time.
During these events, Landry and her husband resided in a mobile
home on a portion of the property. Landry was born in a different house
on the property and has lived on the land all her life. When Landry’s
grandmother died in the 1980s, the interest in the property passed to
Landry, though she was never named as the record owner of the
property. In 2009, Landry’s husband leased the property containing the
home from Thompson’s husband. The Landrys paid rent and continued
to live in the home.

The tax suit was styled Chambers County et al. v. Ford et al.,
2

No. CV21042, in the 344th District Court of Chambers County, Texas.
3 The taxing authority also served by publication at least ten others

with an interest in the same property. The parties dispute whether one
landowner was personally served.

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In January 2016, the Thompsons sought to evict the Landrys. 4
Landry obtained a temporary restraining order to stop the eviction. She
then attempted to intervene in the tax suit to set aside the May 2005
default judgment. The trial court granted relief, but the court of appeals
directed the trial court to vacate its order as the trial court’s power to
modify the judgment had expired. 5
In June 2018, more than ten years after the sale, Landry sued
Thompson, seeking to set aside Thompson’s purchase of the property.
Landry claimed that service of citation by publication on her
grandmother in the tax suit violated Landry’s right to procedural due
process. Thompson moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Tax
Code’s limitations period bars this suit. In addition, Thompson raised
laches and estoppel as equitable defenses. Landry filed a cross-motion,
arguing that the taxing authorities’ improper service in the tax suit
violated due process, voiding both the judgment and the subsequent tax
sale. The trial court granted Landry’s motion and denied Thompson’s. It
declared the 2005 default judgment void and awarded title to Landry.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that fact
issues exist as to whether the taxing authorities’ citation by publication
in the tax suit violated due process. 6 The court went on to hold, however,

4 Landry’s testimony suggests that this was the second eviction
attempt. The first notice was served in 2015 and dismissed by the justice court.
5 In re Thompson, 569 S.W.3d 169, 172–75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding).
6 704 S.W.3d 21, 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023).

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that Mitchell precluded Thompson’s limitations defense, and that
Thompson did not conclusively establish any equitable defense. 7
Landry does not challenge the court of appeals’ holding that fact
issues exist as to the efficacy of the service of process in the tax suit.
Thus, the court of appeals’ reversal of her motion for summary judgment
is not before our Court. Thompson, however, challenges the denial of her
motions for summary judgment on limitations and her equitable
defenses, which she contends bar Landry’s suit as a matter of law. We
review a trial court’s rulings on the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment de novo, considering both sides’ evidence, determining all
questions presented, and rendering the judgment the trial court should
have rendered. 8
II
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 117a governs service of citation in
delinquent-tax suits. 9 Rule 117a requires personal service of citation on
Texas residents. 10 However, if a plaintiff cannot obtain the defendant’s
name and residence through diligent inquiry, then Rule 117a(3) permits

7 Id. at 36.

8 Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005);

Mitchell, 649 S.W.3d at 188.
9 Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a (“In all suits for collection of delinquent ad
valorem taxes, the rules of civil procedure governing issuance and service of
citation shall control the issuance and service of citation therein, except as
herein otherwise specially provided.”).
10 Id. R. 117a(1) (“Where any defendant in a tax suit is a resident of the

State of Texas and is not subject to citation by publication under subdivision 3
below, the process shall conform substantially to the form hereinafter set out
for personal service . . . .”).

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alternative service by publication. 11 Publication can occur either
through classified advertising or, if not available, through posting on the
courthouse door. 12
Under the rule, taxing authorities must not resort to substituted
service when reasonable diligence will provide the information
necessary to accomplish personal service. 13 Under Tax Code
Section 33.54, a defaulting owner of a homestead must bring suit
against a subsequent purchaser to challenge the sale within two years
after the deed is filed in the real property records. 14 A property owner
may also redeem the property within the same two-year period by

11 Id. R. 117a(3) (permitting publication “[w]here . . . the name or the

residence of any owner of any interest in any property upon which a tax lien is
sought to be foreclosed, is unknown to the attorney requesting the issuance of
process or filing the suit for the taxing unit, and such attorney shall make
affidavit that . . . the name or residence of such owner is unknown and cannot
be ascertained after diligent inquiry”).
12 Id. (“The citation shall be published in the English language one time

a week for two weeks in some newspaper published in the county in which the
property is located . . . . If there is no newspaper published in the county, then
the publication may be made in a newspaper in an adjoining county . . . . The
maximum fee for publishing the citation shall be the lowest published word or
line rate of that newspaper for classified advertising. If the publication of the
citation cannot be had for this fee, . . . then service of the citation may be made
by posting a copy at the courthouse door of the county in which the suit is
pending . . . .”).
13 Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 241 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex. 1951).

14 Tex. Tax Code § 33.54(a) (providing an “action relating to the title to

property may not be maintained against the purchaser of the property at a tax
sale unless the action is commenced” before the “second anniversary of the date
that the deed executed to the purchaser is filed of record, if on the date that
the suit to collect the delinquent tax was filed the property was” the owner’s
residence homestead).

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paying the subsequent purchaser the amount paid for the property. 15 In
Mitchell, we held that an owner who failed to receive notice that
comports with due process may bring an action to collaterally attack a
tax default judgment outside the limitations period because such a
failure voids the judgment. 16
III
This case presents questions we did not address in Mitchell. First,
may a subsequent purchaser raise the former owner’s notice of the
default judgment or property sale within the limitations period as a
defense? Second, may a subsequent purchaser raise an equitable
defense to an action to set aside the property sale based on unreasonable
delay after obtaining notice of the judgment or sale? Thompson claims
that Landry had notice of the sale of the property within the limitations
period and thus Landry’s suit to void Thompson’s property deed must
fail. The court of appeals disregarded this defense, holding Landry’s
claim to be completely “independent” of the statutory limitations
period. 17
A
At play in this lawsuit are two kinds of notice. The first kind is
whether the taxing authorities gave proper notice in serving Landry’s

15Id. § 34.21(a) (“The owner of real property sold at a tax sale to a
purchaser other than a taxing unit that was used as the residence homestead
of the owner . . . may redeem the property on or before the second anniversary
of the date on which the purchaser’s deed is filed for record by paying the
purchaser the amount the purchaser bid for the property . . . .”).
16 649 S.W.3d at 194.

17 704 S.W.3d at 33.

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grandmother with the suit to foreclose the outstanding tax liens. Notice
of a lawsuit is an elementary requirement of constitutional due
process. 18 Thus, when the government seizes property to satisfy a debt,
it must provide the owner with “notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.” 19 While actual notice is preferable
for foreclosure of a property interest, constructive notice may suffice
upon a showing that personal service is not reasonably available. 20 If a
taxing authority cannot reasonably identify a property owner’s name
and location to obtain personal service, then constructive notice such as
citation by posting satisfies due process. 21
In Mitchell, we examined diligent inquiry as a necessary
prerequisite for citation by publication to satisfy due process. 22 There,

18 B. Gregg Price, P.C. v. Series 1 – Virage Master LP, 661 S.W.3d 419,

422 (Tex. 2023); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
19 Gill v. Hill, 688 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Jones v. Flowers,

547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006)).
20 Id. at 868; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170

(2002) (explaining that “the Due Process Clause does not require . . . heroic
efforts by the Government” to ensure notice); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (“The
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”).
21 Mitchell, 649 S.W.3d at 190; see also In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 559

(Tex. 2012) (“For missing or unknown persons, service by . . . ‘indirect and
even . . . probably futile’ means did not raise due process concerns.” (quoting
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317)).
22 649 S.W.3d at 191. Citation by publication or posting violates due

process when the address of a known defendant is readily ascertainable from
public records that someone who actually wants to find the defendant would
search. Id. at 190; E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 564 (explaining that a reasonable search

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the heirs of an original owner of mineral interests in real property sued
subsequent tax-sale purchasers of those interests, seeking to void a tax
foreclosure judgment against them. 23 As with Landry’s grandmother,
the taxing authorities served the Mitchell plaintiffs by publication,
posting notice of the suit on the courthouse door. 24 The record, however,
contained no evidence of the attempts to locate those defendants, and
some evidence countered a conclusory statement in an affidavit that
such efforts were made. 25 In concluding that the taxing authorities’
service was inadequate, we held that a “complete failure of service
deprives a litigant of due process and a trial court of personal
jurisdiction; the resulting judgment is void and may be challenged at
any time.” 26
In this case, the court of appeals held that fact issues exist
regarding whether the taxing authorities’ service efforts were
reasonably diligent so as to satisfy due process. 27 Landry did not file a
cross-petition in this Court to seek reinstatement of the trial court’s
summary judgment in her favor. 28 Accordingly, the issue of whether

“must include inquiries that someone who really wants to find the defendant
would make”).
23 Mitchell, 649 S.W.3d at 183–84.

24 Id. at 184.

25 Id. at 185–86.

26 Id. at 194 (quoting E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 566).

27 704 S.W.3d at 34–35.

28 Tex. R. App. P. 53.1 (“A party who seeks to alter the court of appeals’

judgment must file a petition for review.”).

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Landry has established a due process violation in the underlying tax
case of the sort recognized in Mitchell remains for further proceedings
in the trial court.
B
The second kind of notice at play in cases like this one is notice of
the due process violation itself. While a constitutionally infirm default
judgment is void, the remedy sought here and in similar cases is not
merely to declare the judgment void. It is also to set aside a subsequent
sale and void the subsequent purchaser’s real property deed. The owner
challenges not only the default judgment but also the sale to a purchaser
who was not a party to any due process violation. When an owner—or
the owner’s successor—obtains notice of the sale of the property interest,
it affects a court’s power to void the deed and quiet title in favor of the
of the previous owner.
By statute, an owner who loses her homestead property through
a sale premised on a constitutionally infirm default judgment has two
years from the time the constable’s deed is recorded to redeem the
property or sue to regain title to the property deeded to a subsequent
purchaser. 29 Actual notice of divestment within the limitations period
affords a party aggrieved by a due process violation the opportunity to
remedy the harm caused by a sale that relied on a void judgment. So
long as the party has an adequate remedy at law, due process does not

29 Tex. Tax Code §§ 33.54, 34.21(a).

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demand equity to intervene in allowing a remedy against the
subsequent purchaser. 30
Mitchell did not address the effect of this kind of notice because
the record was “devoid of information regarding how and when [the
plaintiffs] learned of the judgment.” 31 The court of appeals in this case,
however, incorrectly characterized the limitations provision as
“irrelevant” when an owner sues a subsequent purchaser and claims a
due process violation. 32 The limitations period is only “irrelevant” if the
owner establishes that she failed to gain notice of the sale during that
period. The limitations period represents a time within which an owner
with notice of another’s claim to the property may exercise legal rights
of recovery against that party without the aid of equity. Notice of the
default judgment or subsequent purchase within the limitations period
will defeat a claim brought against the subsequent purchaser to recover
property lost at a tax sale due to a due process violation.
Thompson moved for summary judgment in this case based on
such notice. We conclude, however, that the summary judgment record
does not establish the date that Landry obtained notice of Thompson’s
claim to ownership of the property or of the default judgment. Landry
acknowledged that she and her husband lived on the property during
the entire course of these events and paid rent at some point, but the

30 See LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. White, 246 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Tex.

2007) (“By definition, equitable remedies apply only when there is no remedy
at law . . . .”).
31 649 S.W.3d at 197.

32 704 S.W.3d at 33 (quoting Mitchell, 649 S.W.3d at 194).

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lease proffered as summary judgment evidence is dated August 3,
2009—outside of the two-year limitations period that began to run on
February 9, 2007, with the recording of the constable’s deed. 33
Accordingly, we leave resolution of the date of Landry’s notice of
Thompson’s claim to the property to the factfinder.
IV
We now turn to whether a subsequent purchaser may raise
equitable defenses in a suit by a former owner even in cases in which
the owner does not receive notice of the competing claim to the property
until after limitations expires. Thompson primarily relies on a laches
defense. We have generally described the essential elements of laches as
“(1) unreasonable delay by one having legal or equitable rights in
asserting them; and (2) a good faith change of position by another to his
detriment because of the delay.” 34
The court of appeals declined to resolve whether an equitable
defense is available in this case, distinguishing In re E.R. as a case

33 Tex. Tax Code § 33.54.

34 Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989). This

court has defined laches as “not mere delay but delay that works a
disadvantage to another.” Culver v. Pickens, 176 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. 1943)
(quoting Ross’ Est. v. Abrams, 239 S.W. 705, 709 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1922), aff’d, 250 S.W. 1019 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, judgm’t adopted)). When
a party that knows its rights and “takes no steps to enforce them until the
condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he
cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced,” delay is
deemed inequitable and operates as estoppel against enforcement of the right.
Id. at 170–71.

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involving the parent–child relationship and emphasizing that this Court
left the question open in Mitchell. 35
In E.R., this Court considered the issue of equitable defenses to a
due process challenge to a default judgment in the parental rights
context. 36 We held that service by publication was invalid in that case,
and thus the statutory six-month deadline to challenge the termination
of parental rights did not bar the parent’s collateral attack. 37 But we
noted that equitable relief may not be available when a parent, knowing
of the judgment, “unreasonably stands mute” while another party
substantially relies on the judgment. 38 We turned to the Second
Restatement of Judgments to explain the “bounds” of such a collateral
attack:
[A] party may not challenge an invalid default judgment if,
(1) after receiving actual notice of the judgment, she
manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid; and
(2) granting relief would impair another person’s
substantial interest of reliance on the judgment. 39

The record in E.R. did not reveal when the parent learned of the
termination order, and thus our Court remanded the notice issue. 40

35 704 S.W.3d at 36.

36 385 S.W.3d at 555.

37 Id. at 566.

38 Id. at 569.

39 Id. at 567 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 (Am. L.

Inst. 1982)).
40 Id. at 569.

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Later, in Mitchell, we took “no position on whether laches or any
other equitable doctrine can provide a valid defense to a notice-based
collateral attack on a judgment transferring property.” 41 Crucially, the
record in Mitchell was devoid of information regarding the timing and
character of any notice of divestment, and thus we remanded the issue
regarding the application of E.R. for further development. 42
We hold that a subsequent purchaser may raise equitable
defenses based on a former owner’s notice of the default judgment or the
subsequent purchaser’s competing title to the property. The defense we
described in E.R. applies with equal force in cases like this one, when a
party aggrieved by a due process violation receives notice of it after
limitations runs but conforms their conduct accordingly. 43 Landry filed
suit eleven years after the default judgment. Thompson adduced
summary judgment evidence in the form of the lease and Landry’s
testimony that she was aware her husband was paying rent, some
evidence of conforming conduct. During the intervening years,
Thompson paid the taxes on the property; Landry did not. A party
adversely affected by a void judgment may not unreasonably stand mute
in circumstances in which a party claiming title would deny the
judgment’s effect. As in E.R., however, the record does not reveal the
date of Landry’s notice. Because the record does not establish the timing
of Landry’s notice of Thompson’s claim to the property, the court of

41 649 S.W.3d at 196.

42 Id. at 197.

43 See 385 S.W.3d at 569.

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appeals properly remanded Thompson’s equitable defenses for
consideration on remand.
* * *
Notice during the limitations period that property has been sold
to satisfy a tax default judgment defeats an action against the purchaser
to recover the property brought outside the limitations period. In such
cases, the aggrieved owner has notice of the harm resulting from any
constitutional violation and an adequate legal remedy. Equitable
defenses are also available to a subsequent purchaser when the former
owner obtains notice of the purchaser’s title to the property outside the
limitations period but unreasonably delays in seeking relief to the
detriment of the purchaser. In this case, however, the subsequent
purchaser has not conclusively established an equitable defense.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.

Jane N. Bland
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 9, 2025

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