Michael A. Pohl v. Mark Kentrell Cheatham, Sr.

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 23-0045
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Michael A. Pohl, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

Mark Kentrell Cheatham, Sr., et al.,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued October 2, 2024

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Blacklock, Justice Bland, Justice Young, and Justice
Sullivan joined.

JUSTICE BUSBY filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Lehrmann and Justice Boyd joined.

Justice Devine did not participate in the decision.

Texas Government Code Section 82.0651 creates, among other
civil remedies, a private right of action allowing clients to void a contract
for legal services that was procured through barratry. This case
requires us to consider the extraterritorial reach of Section 82.0651(a)—
that is, whether the Legislature intended Section 82.0651(a)’s private
right of action to be available in cases in which an out-of-state client of
a Texas lawyer seeks to void a legal-services contract when the core
conduct the statute targets—solicitation of a legal-services contract
through prohibited barratry—occurred outside Texas.
The primary defendants here are two Texas lawyers who
represented out-of-state clients in personal-injury litigation filed in
courts outside Texas after others, allegedly on the lawyers’ behalf,
approached those clients in Louisiana and Arkansas to encourage the
lawyers’ retention. After the underlying personal-injury cases settled,
the clients sued the lawyers and their firms in Texas district court,
contending Section 82.0651(a) entitles them to void the legal-services
contracts governing the representation in the underlying
personal-injury cases and to recover fees and penalties under
Section 82.0651(b). The lawyers moved for summary judgment on
various grounds, including that Section 82.0651 does not apply because
the alleged solicitations and procurement of the legal-services contracts
occurred outside Texas. The trial court dismissed all claims, but the
court of appeals reversed, concluding that Section 82.0651 applies
because at least part of the lawyers’ alleged conduct occurred in Texas.
Applying Texas’s presumption that its statutes do not apply
extraterritorially, we conclude that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend
to the nonresident clients’ claims because the conduct that is the
statute’s focus—the solicitation of a legal-services contract through
illegal barratry—occurred outside Texas. Accordingly, we reverse the
court of appeals’ judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed

2
with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and render judgment that
they take nothing on those claims. Nevertheless, we agree with the
court of appeals that the lawyers were not entitled to summary
judgment on the claims for breach of fiduciary duty. We therefore affirm
the court of appeals’ judgment as to those claims and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings.
I. Background
Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons are attorneys licensed in
Texas with their principal offices in Houston. Both were hired to
represent plaintiffs in two separate lawsuits outside Texas that arose
from automobile accidents. As we must when evaluating whether
summary judgment is proper, we take as true the facts as alleged by the
nonmovants.
The Louisiana case: LaDonna Cheatham was driving in
Louisiana when the tread on her car’s tire separated, causing her vehicle
to cross the median and collide with a school bus. LaDonna and three
of her passengers—two of her minor children and a nephew—died, while
LaDonna’s other child survived with severe injuries.
According to the Cheathams,1 they were approached in their
Louisiana home about four days after the accident by Kenneth Talley,
who encouraged them to hire a company called Helping Hands Group to
investigate a potential lawsuit. Allegedly, Talley also touted Pohl’s and
Ammons’s legal services and encouraged the family to hire them. None

1 The plaintiffs below (and respondents here) include LaDonna’s former

husband, Mark Cheatham, Sr.; her mother, Luella Miller; and her son (and
surviving passenger), Mark Cheatham, Jr. For convenience, we will refer to
all three family members collectively as “the Cheathams.”

3
of the Cheathams had requested this visit, nor did they have any
previous relationship with Pohl or Ammons. Mark Cheatham, Sr.,
LaDonna’s former husband and purported father of her three children,
signed an agreement with Helping Hands Group to investigate his
claims, and in return, he was promised $2,000 to offset funeral and
living expenses. Those funds were to come from a separate company
called Helping Hands Financing, LLC. According to plaintiffs, that
company was run by Pohl’s wife, Donalda, and it would pay out the funds
only after the Cheathams agreed to hire Pohl.
A few days later, Pohl visited the Cheathams in person and
encouraged them to sign contingency fee agreements. The Cheathams
allege that Pohl told them that he would associate Ammons on the case
and that Pohl promised to pay Mark Cheatham, Sr. an additional
$18,000 if he agreed to the representation. He and Luella Miller,
LaDonna’s mother, signed contingency fee agreements in Louisiana
with Pohl’s law firm.2
A few weeks later, both Pohl and Ammons personally visited the
Cheathams in Louisiana and asked them to sign new agreements
consenting to Pohl’s association with Ammons and the division of their
fees. The Cheathams allege that Pohl and Ammons offered $500 to
Mark Cheatham, Sr. if he signed. He and Miller agreed and signed the
new agreements.
Ammons eventually filed a lawsuit in Louisiana against the car
manufacturer, the tire manufacturer, and others. While most of the

2 Mark Cheatham, Jr., who was seventeen at the time of the accident,

later affirmed the agreement his father signed.

4
claims in the Louisiana lawsuit were still pending, the Cheathams
received a letter advising them that Pohl’s solicitation of them may have
violated Texas law. After speaking with an attorney in Ammons’s law
firm about these allegations, the Cheathams signed new legal-services
agreements directly with Ammons’s firm. According to the Cheathams,
they were advised that firing Ammons would cause lengthy delays in
obtaining settlements with the remaining defendants. The
personal-injury defendants ultimately settled, and both Pohl and
Ammons received attorney’s fees and reimbursed expenses from the
settlement proceeds.
The Louisiana fee proceeding: Shortly after the Cheathams
filed the underlying barratry lawsuit in Texas, Ammons filed a “petition
for concursus”—a type of impleader proceeding3—in Louisiana and
deposited the full amount of the Cheathams’ settlement, including the
portion Ammons claimed as his fee, into that court’s registry. The
Cheathams responded by filing a motion in the Texas trial court, asking
that Ammons be ordered to turn over the “undisputed” portion of the
settlement funds—the portion going to the Cheathams—and to deposit
the “disputed” portion—Ammons’s fee—with the Texas trial court. At a
hearing on that motion, the parties confirmed that the Louisiana court
“doesn’t have the barratry claim.” Specifically, Ammons’s counsel
informed the Texas court that “[t]he barratry issues are before you. All
of the issues about the settlement are before the Louisiana court.” The

3 See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4651 (“A concursus proceeding is one in

which two or more persons having competing or conflicting claims to money . . .
are impleaded and required to assert their respective claims contradictorily
against all other parties to the proceeding.”).

5
trial court therefore denied the Cheathams’ motion as moot and noted
that the transcript of this hearing “can be used in Louisiana to make
sure that judge doesn’t go contrary to the barratry claim that’s pending
in my court.”
The Louisiana court eventually held an evidentiary hearing and
ordered that Ammons was entitled to his full share of the agreed-upon
fees and expenses from the Cheathams’ settlement. In its findings of
fact, the court noted that, before the hearing, Mark Cheatham, Sr.
alleged that Ammons was not entitled to any fees because the fee
agreement “was procured through illegal and unethical personal
solicitation and it would violate public policy to enforce it.” The court
further noted, however, that Cheatham “withdrew his opposition” and
“failed to support his allegations of impropriety.” The Louisiana court
thus found that Ammons’s legal-services contract with the Cheathams
was “valid and enforceable” and “no impropriety was committed by
Ammons.”
The Arkansas case: David Reese, an Arkansas resident, was
driving in north Texas when the tread on his SUV’s tire separated,
causing the vehicle to roll over. He was ejected and did not survive.
Reese’s wife, Lacy, alleges that the day after his funeral, she was
personally visited in her Arkansas home by Kirk Ladner. As with the
Cheathams, Reese alleges that Ladner encouraged her to sign an
agreement with Helping Hands Group to investigate a potential lawsuit
and offered her money, to be paid by Helping Hands Financing, if she
would sign the agreement and ultimately hire Pohl. Like the
Cheathams, Reese did not request this visit and did not have any

6
previous relationship with Pohl or Ammons. She agreed to retain Pohl
and signed the agreements at her home in Arkansas.
Pohl and Ammons associated with other Arkansas lawyers and
filed a lawsuit in Arkansas. After it settled, both Pohl and Ammons
received attorney’s fees and expenses out of the settlement proceeds.
The Texas barratry lawsuit: According to the Cheathams and
Reese, unbeknownst to them, Talley and Ladner were both part of a
scheme orchestrated by Pohl and Ammons to encourage the clients to
hire Pohl and Ammons to represent them in their respective lawsuits.
The clients allege that Talley and Ladner worked for a company called
Precision Marketing Group, LLC that provided illegal barratry services
to attorneys, including Pohl, that were designated as “marketing
services” but were actually “a pass-through for barratry money.” The
day after the Cheathams signed their agreement with Helping Hands,
but before they had signed an agreement with Pohl, Pohl’s law office
entered into a “Retention of Services Agreement” with Precision
Marketing. Under this agreement, Precision Marketing would provide
“public relations, client liaison and evidence gathering services”
pertaining to the Cheathams’ case. In return, Precision Marketing
would be compensated at an hourly fee, with the total fee not to exceed
thirty percent of Pohl’s net interest in the representation. The same
day, Precision Marketing entered into an agreement with Talley under
which Talley would provide “public relations services” pertaining to the
Cheathams’ case. In return, Talley was promised a share of any
settlement received for the Cheathams. The Cheathams and Reese
allege that the agreements with Precision Marketing were a sham and

7
that Pohl and Ammons worked with these individuals beforehand to
reach out to potential clients such as the Cheathams and Reese.
In 2017, the Cheathams sued Pohl, Ammons, and their respective
law firms, as well as Donalda Pohl, alleging claims for civil barratry,
civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and breach of fiduciary duty. The
Cheathams’ civil barratry claim is based on Texas Government Code
Section 82.0651(a), which creates a statutory cause of action allowing a
client to void a legal-services contract that was procured through
conduct that violates either Texas Penal Code Section 38.12(a) or (b) or
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 7.03. The Cheathams’
conspiracy and “aiding and abetting” claims are derivative claims
premised on the same allegations of barratry that give rise to the
Cheathams’ claim under Section 82.0651(a). The Cheathams’ claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, however, is premised on different conduct: the
attorneys’ failure to disclose certain information before asking the
Cheathams to enter new agreements after the alleged barratry scheme
was revealed.
The following year, Reese, represented by the same attorneys that
represent the Cheathams, filed a “petition in intervention” in the
Cheathams’ Texas suit, asserting largely the same claims against the
same defendants. The Cheathams and Reese eventually together filed
an amended petition.4 The defendants answered and later filed motions
to strike Reese’s intervention, which the trial court denied.

4 The lawsuit did not name Talley, Ladner, Helping Hands Group, or

Precision Marketing as defendants.

8
Pohl and Ammons (and their respective law firms) each sought
partial summary judgment, arguing that the Section 82.0651(a) claim is
a statutory tort claim governed by the two-year statute of limitations.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). They argued that the
Cheathams and Reese were allegedly solicited in 2014, which is more
than two years before they sued in 2017 (the Cheathams) and 2018
(Reese). The trial court denied both motions, explaining in its order that
the four-year statute of limitations applies to Section 82.0651(a) claims
based on an existing legal-services contract.
Ammons later filed a second summary judgment motion. In
addition to asserting that there was no evidence to support any of the
clients’ claims, Ammons argued (1) the Cheathams’ barratry claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they mirror those decided
by the Louisiana court in the fee dispute; (2) Ammons had no affirmative
duty to investigate Pohl’s conduct in obtaining the original
representations before accepting the referral; and (3) the presumption
against extraterritorial application of statutes requires dismissal
because Section 82.0651 does not clearly indicate that it applies to
barratry occurring in other states. Pohl and his wife, Donalda, also filed
new motions for summary judgment arguing that Section 82.0651 does
not reach extraterritorial conduct.
The trial court granted all defendants’ summary judgment
motions without stating the reasons, and the clients appealed. Pohl
cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion
to strike Reese’s intervention. Pohl also argued, as a conditional

9
cross-point to the clients’ appeal, that the judgment in his favor should
be affirmed based on limitations.
The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded. 690 S.W.3d
322, 340 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022). It concluded that
Section 82.0651(a)’s application in this case would not be impermissibly
extraterritorial. Id. at 332–34. The court then rejected Pohl’s argument
as to limitations, concluding that the trial court correctly applied a
four-year limitations period. Id. at 334–36. It also rejected Ammons’s
res judicata argument, holding that Ammons was estopped from
asserting that defense because of representations made to the trial
court. Id. at 336–37. Finally, the court of appeals concluded Reese’s
joinder was proper under Rule 40(a). Id. at 339–40. Pohl and Ammons
petitioned this Court for review, which we granted.5
II. Applicable law
A. Civil liability for barratry
Barratry—generally defined as “the solicitation of employment to
prosecute or defend a claim with intent to obtain a personal benefit”6—
has long been both a criminal offense in Texas7 and a violation of the

5 The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for two additional

defendants: Helping Hands Financing (Donalda’s company) and one of its
employees. 690 S.W.3d at 340. The Cheathams and Reese did not seek review
of that portion of the judgment, so those claims are not before us.
6 State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 n.2 (Tex. 1994).

7 As early as 1769, Blackstone characterized barratry as the offense of

“exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels between his majesty’s subjects.”
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *133. Some version of the
prohibition on barratry has been part of the Texas Penal Code since at least
1879, though the offense originally required an intent to “distress or [harass]”

10
State Bar’s disciplinary rules. In 2011, the Legislature created a civil
cause of action available to those who have entered a legal-services
agreement that was procured through prohibited barratry. The current
version, Government Code Section 82.0651(a), provides:
A client may bring an action to void a contract for legal
services that was procured as a result of conduct violating
Section 38.12(a) or (b), Penal Code, or Rule 7.03 of the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the
State Bar of Texas, regarding barratry by attorneys or
other persons, and to recover any amount that may be
awarded under Subsection (b). A client who enters into a
contract described by this subsection may bring an action
to recover any amount that may be awarded under
Subsection (b) even if the contract is voided voluntarily.

the party being sued. See TEX. PENAL CODE art. 271 (1879) (“If any person
shall willfully instigate, maintain, excite, prosecute or encourage the bringing
of any suit or suits at law, or equity, in any court in this state, in which such
person has no interest, with the intent to distress or [harass] the defendant
therein, or shall willfully bring or prosecute any false suit or suits at law or
equity, of his own, with the intent to distress or [harass] the defendant therein,
he shall be deemed guilty of barratry . . . .”). Since 1901, however, the criminal
barratry statute has more generally prohibited “the fomenting of litigation by
attorneys at law by soliciting employment.” State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404,
408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting McCloskey v. San Antonio Traction
Co., 192 S.W. 1116, 1119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1917, writ ref’d)); see TEX.
PENAL CODE art. 421 (1911) (“[I]f any attorney at law shall seek or obtain
employment in any suit or case at law, or in equity, to prosecute or defend the
same by means of personal solicitation of such employment, or by procuring
another to solicit for him employment in such cause, or who shall, by himself
or another, seek or obtain such employment by giving to the person from whom
the employment is sought money or other thing of value, or who shall, directly
or indirectly, pay the debts or liabilities of the person from whom such
employment is sought, or who shall loan or promise to give, loan or otherwise
grant money or other valuable thing to the person from whom such
employment is sought, before such employment, in order to induce such
employment, whether the same shall be done directly by him or through
another, shall be deemed guilty of barratry . . . .”).

11
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.0651(a). Section 82.0651(b) provides for the
following remedies that a “client” may recover against “any person who
committed barratry”:
(1) all fees and expenses paid to that person under the
contract;
(2) the balance of any fees and expenses paid to any other
person under the contract, after deducting fees and
expenses awarded based on a quantum meruit theory
as provided by Section 82.065(c);
(3) actual damages caused by the prohibited conduct;
(4) a penalty in the amount of $10,000; and
(5) reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.
Id. § 82.0651(b).8
Finally, subsection (e) provides: “This section shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to
protect those in need of legal services against unethical, unlawful
solicitation and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure
that protection.” Id. § 82.0651(e).
To recover under Section 82.0651(a), the client must show that
the client’s legal-services contract “was procured as a result of conduct

8 Section 82.0651(c) also creates a cause of action for a person who was

improperly solicited but did not enter into a legal-services contract. Id.
§ 82.0651(c). Under that subsection, a prevailing plaintiff’s recovery is limited
to the $10,000 statutory penalty, actual damages caused by the prohibited
conduct, and attorney’s fees. Id. § 82.0651(d). Because all the plaintiffs here
entered into legal-services contracts, they brought their claims under
Section 82.0651(a).

12
violating” either Penal Code Section 38.12(a) or (b) or Disciplinary
Rule 7.03. Penal Code Section 38.12(a) provides:
A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an
economic benefit the person:
(1) knowingly institutes a suit or claim that the person has
not been authorized to pursue;
(2) solicits employment, either in person or by telephone,
for himself or for another;
(3) pays, gives, or advances or offers to pay, give, or
advance to a prospective client money or anything of
value to obtain employment as a professional from the
prospective client;
(4) pays or gives or offers to pay or give a person money or
anything of value to solicit employment;
(5) pays or gives or offers to pay or give a family member
of a prospective client money or anything of value to
solicit employment; or
(6) accepts or agrees to accept money or anything of value
to solicit employment.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.12(a). In contrast, subsection (b) creates an
offense for conduct that, generally speaking, constitutes knowing
facilitation or furtherance of the conduct described in subsection (a).
Section 38.12(b) states:
A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) knowingly finances the commission of an offense under
Subsection (a);
(2) invests funds the person knows or believes are
intended to further the commission of an offense under
Subsection (a); or
(3) is a professional who knowingly accepts employment
within the scope of the person’s license, registration, or

13
certification that results from the solicitation of
employment in violation of Subsection (a).
Id. § 38.12(b). Notably, any offense under subsection (b) requires a
predicate finding of either “the commission of an offense under
Subsection (a)” or conduct “in violation of Subsection (a).”
Finally, Disciplinary Rule 7.03, titled “Solicitation and Other
Prohibited Communications,” prohibits the following conduct:
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit through in-person contact, or
through regulated telephone, social media, or other
electronic contact, professional employment from a
non-client, unless the target of the solicitation is:
(1) another lawyer;
(2) a person who has a family, close personal, or
prior business or professional relationship with
the lawyer; or
(3) a person who is known by the lawyer to be an
experienced user of the type of legal services
involved for business matters.
(c) A lawyer shall not send, deliver, or transmit, or
knowingly permit or cause another person to send,
deliver, or transmit, a communication that involves
coercion, duress, overreaching, intimidation, or undue
influence.
....
(e) A lawyer shall not pay, give, or offer to pay or give
anything of value to a person not licensed to practice
law for soliciting or referring prospective clients for
professional employment, except nominal gifts given as
an expression of appreciation that are neither intended
nor reasonably expected to be a form of compensation
for recommending a lawyer’s services. . . .

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(f) A lawyer shall not, for the purpose of securing
employment, pay, give, advance, or offer to pay, give,
or advance anything of value to a prospective client,
other than actual litigation expenses and other
financial assistance permitted by Rule 1.08(d), or
ordinary social hospitality of nominal value.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03(b), (c), (e), (f).
B. Presumption against extraterritoriality
This Court has long recognized that Texas statutes are presumed
not to have extraterritorial effect. See Marmon v. Mustang Aviation,
Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 186–87 (Tex. 1968); Willis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 61
Tex. 432, 434 (1884). Our precedents have not elaborated much on the
presumption or its purpose, perhaps because its logic and animating
principles are self-evident: unless a contrary intent appears, the
Legislature generally legislates with Texas concerns in mind, and Texas
legislation therefore is meant to apply only within Texas’s borders. See
Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., 600 U.S. 412, 417 (2023)
(describing the presumption against extraterritoriality as a
“presumption against application [of a statute] to conduct in the
territory of another sovereign” (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 119 (2013))). The presumption’s real-world import is
significant: it allows courts and litigants to avoid the uncertainty and
discord that can result if, without prior notice, Texas law is determined
to govern conduct in other states or, worse, the law of a foreign state is
haphazardly determined to govern conduct that occurs in Texas. See
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325, 335–36 (2016)
(explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to

15
avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied
to conduct in foreign countries”).
We have recognized the presumption against extraterritorial
application of Texas civil statutes for well over a century. In Willis v.
Missouri Pacific Railway Co., we refused to apply Texas’s wrongful
death statute to a claim by a Texas resident against a railway company
with an office and agent in Texas when the death occurred outside
Texas. We held:
[W]here the right of action does not exist except by reason
of statute, it can be enforced only in the state where the
statute is in existence and where the injury has occurred.
That is to say, the cause of action must have arisen and the
remedy must be pursued in the same state, and that must
be the state where the law was enacted and has effect.
Willis, 61 Tex. at 434.
We affirmed this holding in Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.,
though we clarified that the rule against extraterritorial application of
statutes was not absolute. In Marmon, the Court rejected an argument
that Willis was no longer good law based on the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962), that
states could constitutionally apply the laws of other states based on the
other state’s interest in the dispute. Marmon, 430 S.W.2d at 185–86.
We explained a principle we reaffirm today—the Legislature often has
the authority to give a statute extraterritorial effect, but courts cannot
conclude that the Legislature intended a statute to have extraterritorial
effect absent language that “can be construed as expressly giving
extraterritorial effect” to the statute. Id. at 186; see also id. at 187 (“[N]o
legislation is presumed to be intended to operate outside the territorial

16
jurisdiction of the state . . . enacting it.” (quoting 50 AM. JUR. Statutes
§ 487 (1944))). We reiterated this principle less than two decades ago:
“We start with the principle that a statute will not be given
extraterritorial effect by implication but only when such intent is clear.”
Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 682 (Tex. 2006).
This principle accords with the holdings of the United States Supreme
Court. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 417 (“It is a longstanding principle of
American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.” (cleaned up) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010))); Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115 (“[W]hen a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none
and reflects the presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
III. Analysis
The Pohls and Ammons argue that the private right of action and
remedies set forth in Section 82.0651 are not available to the clients
because the conduct that forms the gravamen of their complaints took
place outside Texas, in Louisiana and Arkansas. For the reasons
discussed below, we agree and hold that the clients’ allegations are not
actionable under Section 82.0651(a).
To resolve the question, we first consider whether the text of
Section 82.0651 expresses an intent that it apply extraterritorially. We
begin with a strong presumption against extraterritorial application of
a Texas statute, which cannot be overcome by implication “but only

17
when such intent is clear.” Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at 682; see Marmon,
430 S.W.2d at 186; see also Abitron, 600 U.S. at 417–21 (examining
whether Congress “affirmatively and unmistakably” indicated that a
provision of the Lanham Act should apply to foreign conduct (quoting
RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 335)). Our examination of Section 82.0651
uncovers no indication that the Legislature intended it should apply to
conduct occurring outside Texas’s borders.
The court of appeals seemingly agreed that Section 82.0651 itself
does not express any intent that it apply extraterritorially. To find the
extraterritorial hook, it looked outside Section 82.0651, to the Penal
Code. It reasoned that, by incorporating Penal Code Section 38.12(a)
and (b) in the definition of civil barratry in Section 82.0651, the
Legislature expressed its intent that Penal Code Section 1.04 also be
incorporated. 690 S.W.3d at 334. Section 1.04 authorizes prosecution
in Texas of a criminal offense even if part of the defendant’s conduct
occurs outside Texas so long as “either the conduct or a result that is an
element of the offense occurs inside this state.” TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 1.04(a)(1). The court of appeals thus concluded that
Section 82.0651(a)’s extraterritorial application is permissible because
“any extraterritorial reach . . . is occurring within the Penal Code.” 690
S.W.3d at 334.
The court of appeals erred in reading the Legislature’s express
incorporation of Penal Code Section 38.12(a) and (b) as a sub silentio
incorporation of Penal Code Section 1.04. See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical
Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011) (“We presume that the
Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, including each word

18
chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.”).
Section 82.0651(a) creates a cause of action for a client whose
legal-services contract was “procured as a result of conduct violating
[Penal Code] Section 38.12(a) or (b)” or Disciplinary Rule 7.03. TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 82.0651(a). The Legislature took care to incorporate two
specific subsections of the Penal Code and one Disciplinary Rule. But it
made no mention of Penal Code Section 1.04.9 We must regard this
omission as intentional and meaningful, particularly in the face of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. See Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at
682 (“[A] statute will not be given extraterritorial effect by implication
but only when such intent is clear.”).
The clients contend that Section 82.0651(e) supports
Section 82.0651(a)’s broader application. Subsection (e) describes the
statute’s purposes: “to protect those in need of legal services against
unethical, unlawful solicitation and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure that protection.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.0651(e).
They argue this statement distinguishes Section 82.0651 from the

9 The clients argue that it was unnecessary for Section 82.0651 to
mention Penal Code Section 1.04 because that provision “automatically
applies” to the criminal offense of barratry under Penal Code Section 38.12.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.03(b) (“The provisions of Title[] 1 . . . apply to offenses
defined by other laws . . . .”). But Penal Code Section 1.03 also states that the
Penal Code does not affect “a right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture,
or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil suit for
conduct this code defines as an offense.” Id. § 1.03(c). Consistent with
Section 1.03’s plain text, we recently held it was error to “import[] this
distinctly criminal jurisdictional component” into “undisputedly civil matters.”
Goldstein v. Sabatino, 690 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex. 2024). Our dissenting
colleagues tellingly ignore both the text of Section 1.03 and our recent opinion
in Goldstein.

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statute the Court refused to apply extraterritorially in Coca-Cola
because in that case, the relevant statute governing anticompetitive
behavior stated that its purpose included “provid[ing] the benefits of . . .
competition to consumers in the state.” 218 S.W.3d at 682 (quoting TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.04). The clients contend that because
Section 82.0651(e) does not limit the statute’s scope to reach only those
“in the state,” the Legislature intended the statute to apply to all clients
wherever situated. By suggesting that the absence of language limiting
the statute’s application can overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the clients flip the presumption on its head. The
presumption requires us to conclude that the persons the Legislature
sought to protect—“those in need of legal services”—surely cannot refer
to every such person around the world or even every person in the
United States. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 420–21 (noting that even
statutory references to “foreign commerce” and “all commerce” are
insufficient to rebut the presumption that a statute is intended to apply
only to domestic commerce). Were it otherwise, the presumption would
have no force at all.
Citing the statute’s legislative history, the clients urge that
Section 82.0651(a) was intended to create a new civil cause of action to
allow clients, including themselves, to combat barratry by Texas lawyers
regardless of where it may occur. They argue that defendants’
construction of the statute is flawed because it creates the incongruous
result that the same conduct could expose the lawyers to criminal
liability and professional discipline in Texas but not civil liability under
Section 82.0651(a). Even if that were true, the fact of an incongruous

20
result in a particular application cannot justify implying the Legislature
intended the statute to apply extraterritorially when its text does not
clearly state that intent. See Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at 682.
Having determined that Section 82.0651’s text does not
demonstrate the Legislature’s clear intent that it apply
extraterritorially, we turn to whether the application of
Section 82.0651(a) to these clients’ claims would be an impermissible
extraterritorial application. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 418 (explaining
that if the relevant statutory provision does not apply extraterritorially,
the court’s second inquiry resolves whether the suit seeks a permissible
domestic application or an impermissible foreign application); see also
RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 337 (noting the Supreme Court’s cases “reflect
a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues” (citing
Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108, and Morrison, 561 U.S. 247)).
To make this determination, courts identify the “focus” of the
Legislature’s concern underlying the provision at issue. Abitron, 600
U.S. at 418. “The focus of a statute is the object of its solicitude, which
can include the conduct it seeks to regulate as well as the parties and
interests it seeks to protect or vindicate.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 585 U.S. 407, 413–14
(2018)). We then ask whether the conduct relevant to that focus
occurred within or outside Texas. See id. (citing Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe,
593 U.S. 628, 633 (2021)). The analysis presumes that claims involve
both domestic and foreign activity and is designed to separate the
activity that matters from the activity that does not. Id. at 419. Indeed,

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the presumption would be meaningless if any domestic conduct could
defeat it. Id.
The court of appeals concluded Section 82.0651(a)’s application
here would not be impermissibly extraterritorial because some of the
defendants’ alleged acts of barratry—knowingly financing the improper
solicitation and knowingly accepting employment that resulted from
that solicitation—occurred in Texas. 690 S.W.3d at 333–34. It held that
liability under Section 82.0651(a) depends on this “criminal behavior,”
so Section 82.0651(a) is not doing extraterritorial work given that these
acts occurred in Texas. Id. at 334. The court of appeals applied the
wrong standard. Extraterritorial application of a civil statute that does
not express it should apply extraterritorially is not permissible merely
because some or any conduct related to the violation occurs in Texas—
this will be true in nearly every case. Rather, the purpose of
determining the “focus” of Section 82.0651 is to home in on the core
conduct the Legislature sought to address—the object of the statute’s
solicitude—and determine where that conduct occurred.10

10 Our dissenting colleagues decry the focus test as indeterminate and

subject to manipulation by courts choosing “their own preferred focus over
other alternatives without tying that choice to the statutory language.” Post
at 4 (Busby, J., dissenting). Yet they reason there is no such risk here because
the Legislature expressly stated the statute’s focus in the text. So far, so
good—we agree the Legislature did so, in Section 82.0651(e). See TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 82.0651(e) (identifying Section 82.0651’s “underlying purposes, which
are to protect those in need of legal services against unethical, unlawful
solicitation and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure that
protection”); see also Gabriel Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n,
646 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tex. 2022) (observing that when a statute states its
purpose as “part of the text enacted into law, we do not disregard it as we would
a statement of purpose plucked from legislative history”); Cadena Comercial

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Applying these principles, we conclude that Section 82.0651(a)’s
focus is to provide a remedy for clients seeking to void legal-services
contracts that were solicited and procured through prohibited barratry.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.0651(e) (stating the underlying purposes of
Section 82.0651 are “to protect those in need of legal services against
unethical, unlawful solicitation and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure that protection” (emphasis added)). And the
conduct relevant to that focus consists of the acts that procured the
legal-services contracts—here, the in-person acts of solicitation. Those
solicitations of the Cheathams and Reese occurred outside Texas, in
Louisiana and Arkansas, respectively. When a client who is not a Texas

USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 355 (Tex. 2017)
(Willett, J., dissenting) (“When legislators articulate an explicit purpose in the
very words of the statute, the Court need not—and should not—speculate.”).
Rather than grapple with this express statutory statement, our
dissenting colleagues wave it off with only passing references. Though they
refer to the Court’s straightforward statutory analysis as an “interpretive
move,” post at 6 (Busby, J., dissenting), it is they who pluck two words from
Section 82.0651(a) to support the broader statutory focus they would prefer the
Legislature to have declared. Whether our dissenting colleagues wish
Section 82.0651(a) created more expansive civil liability for Texas attorneys
representing out-of-state clients is beside the point. See id. at 2 (suggesting
that a result of the Court’s holding will be that “Texas attorneys can still profit
from their allegedly criminal and unprofessional conduct”). What matters here
is that ignoring a plainly relevant statutory provision and cherry-picking from
another is not persuasive statutory construction. It is a wholesale judicial
revision of the statute. See Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468,
484 (Tex. 2016) (“We discern legislative intent from the statute as a whole, not
from isolated portions.”); Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 583 S.W.3d 779, 783
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (“We read statutes as cohesive texts; we
do not cherry-pick words and phrases, read them in isolation, and then decide
they alone represent the Legislature’s intent while ignoring the proper context
of those words and phrase[s].” (citation omitted)).

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resident enters into a legal-services contract that was procured outside
Texas through solicitation that occurred outside Texas, affording the
client a remedy that exists only by virtue of a Texas statute—
Section 82.0651(a)—requires the statute’s extraterritorial application.
The clients rely on Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Daccach,
217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007), but to the extent that case applies, it
supports our conclusion that Section 82.0651(a) should not be applied
extraterritorially. The Court in Daccach considered whether Texas law
should apply to a class action against Texas defendants who sold
securities without registering them in Texas as required by the Texas
Securities Act. Id. at 440–46. Although the Court did not expound on
extraterritoriality, it noted that the sole violation of law alleged was that
the Texas defendants failed to register in Texas before selling or offering
securities. Id. at 443. Thus, unlike here, both the focus of the statutory
provision in question in Daccach and the conduct relevant to that focus
occurred in Texas.
We acknowledge that the defendants are alleged to have engaged
in some conduct in Texas that could support liability under
Section 82.0651(a). For example, funding the solicitation in Texas, as
defendants are alleged to have done, could violate Penal Code
Section 38.12(b) and thus give rise to civil liability under
Section 82.0651(a). But for a defendant to violate Section 38.12(b), there
must also be a violation of Section 38.12(a). In this case, the conduct
violating Section 38.12(a) was the actual solicitation of the clients,
which occurred outside Texas. And the clients conceded at oral
argument that their allegations are limited to the “financing and the

24
directing of the solicitation” and not “the unlawful solicitation.” Because
Section 82.0651’s focus is on the solicitation of the legal-services
contract, and the solicitation undisputedly occurred outside Texas, the
fact that some unlawful conduct, such as the solicitation’s financing,
occurred in Texas does not make the application of Section 82.0651(a) in
this case any less extraterritorial. See Abitron, 600 U.S. at 419 (noting
the presumption would be meaningless if the mere existence of any
domestic conduct could defeat it).
Our conclusion that Section 82.0651(a)’s application in this case
would be impermissibly extraterritorial becomes apparent when one
contrasts a hypothetical Texas-centric application. In the hypothetical,
a client who is a Texas resident alleges that his contract with a Texas
lawyer was solicited and executed in Texas, contemplating the provision
of legal services in Texas for a legal dispute that arose in Texas. In no
way could the application of Section 82.0651(a) to this set of facts be
regarded as extraterritorial. The Texas court adjudicating the dispute
could comfortably apply the statute with no concern for whether it was
empowered to do so. It would have no qualms that it could be exporting
Texas law to provide relief to residents of other states for alleged
violations of Texas law, which may differ in important details from the
law of the state in which they reside.11
Here, by contrast, the conduct that is relevant to
Section 82.0651(a)’s focus—the solicitation of the clients that resulted in

11 While we do not ascribe forum-shopping motives to anyone involved,

we note that Ammons deposited all the settlement funds into the Louisiana
court’s registry, only to have the Cheathams decide they preferred to seek relief
in Texas.

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the allegedly unlawful procurement of legal-services contracts—
occurred outside Texas. The Cheathams and Reese, residents of
Louisiana and Arkansas, respectively, signed the legal-services
contracts they now seek to void in their home states, outside Texas.
Perhaps most critically, they acknowledge that the allegedly improper
solicitation of those contracts—the conduct that is the gravamen of the
case—also occurred outside Texas. Adjudicating their claims under
Section 82.0651(a) would require determining whether the solicitation
outside Texas of non-Texans for legal representation that was to occur
in courts outside Texas violated the laws of Texas. It is inescapable that
applying Section 82.0651(a) to this set of facts would extend Texas law
outside its borders.
Because we conclude that allowing the clients to proceed on their
claims under Section 82.0651(a) would constitute an impermissible
extraterritorial application of the statute, we hold the trial court was
correct in granting all defendants’ motions for summary judgment with
respect to that claim. And because the clients’ claims for civil conspiracy
and “aiding and abetting” depend on defendants’ alleged violations of
Section 82.0651(a), those claims fail as well. See Agar Corp. v. Electro
Cirs. Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 140–41 (Tex. 2019) (describing civil
conspiracy as a “derivative tort” that is “connected to the underlying tort
and survives or fails alongside it”).
The clients also allege that Pohl and Ammons breached fiduciary
duties, primarily through their alleged failure to disclose certain facts
about the legal representation. In addition to alleging that Pohl and
Ammons concealed their alleged barratry scheme, the clients allege that

26
the lawyers had the Cheathams sign new agreements without fully
disclosing material facts and the advantages and disadvantages of those
agreements. They also contend the lawyers refused to turn over
undisputed client funds. These claims are not dependent on the success
or failure of the Section 82.0651(a) claim, and the lawyers’ arguments
regarding the extraterritorial reach of the statute are not a valid ground
for summary judgment on the fiduciary duty claims. We therefore
examine their other arguments to see if any supports summary
judgment on the clients’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty.
As an alternative ground for affirming summary judgment as to
the Cheathams, Ammons argues that their claims are barred by res
judicata. Ammons bases this argument on the Louisiana court’s
rejection, in connection with the fee dispute, of the Cheathams’
allegations of “invalidity and/or unethical conduct” and its findings that
the Cheathams’ legal-services contract was “valid and enforceable” and
that “no impropriety was committed” by Ammons. But as Ammons’s
briefing concedes, it was only “the barratry action” in the underlying
lawsuit that he asserts was based on the same claims decided in the
Louisiana court. Ammons does not contend, nor is there any basis in
the record to conclude, that the Cheathams’ claims for breach of
fiduciary duty were decided or could have been decided in the Louisiana
fee proceeding. Therefore, Ammons’s res judicata argument does not
support summary judgment on the clients’ fiduciary duty claims.
Pohl’s alternative arguments fare no better. Pohl argues first
that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the clients’ claim under
Section 82.0651(a) was governed by a four-year statute of limitations.

27
Given our disposition of the clients’ statutory claims, we need not decide
that precise question. But a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is
expressly governed by the four-year statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 16.004(a)(5). Pohl does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion
that the clients’ claims, including their claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, were brought within four years of when they accrued. Pohl has
thus failed to demonstrate his entitlement to summary judgment on the
clients’ fiduciary duty claim based on limitations.
Finally, Pohl argues that the Court should dismiss Reese’s claims
in their entirety because the trial court erred by denying his motion to
strike Reese’s “petition in intervention.” Pohl argues that a party
seeking to intervene in a lawsuit must have a justiciable interest in the
pending suit and Reese did not have such an interest in the Cheathams’
pending claims. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 154–55
(Tex. 2008) (discussing TEX. R. CIV. P. 60). But as the court of appeals
noted, Reese’s pleading, while labeled an “intervention,” also sought
permissive joinder under Rule 40. 690 S.W.3d at 339–40. Parties are
free to plead and rely on multiple rules when attempting to join a
lawsuit. See Union Carbide, 273 S.W.3d at 156.
Rule 40(a) permits the joinder of plaintiffs who (1) assert the
same right to relief that (2) arises out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and (3) any common
question of law or fact will arise. TEX. R. CIV. P. 40(a). The trial court’s
order expressly permitted Reese to join the suit under Rule 40(a). “[I]n
matters of joinder and misjoinder of parties, the trial courts have a broad
discretion.” Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 332 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex.

28
1960). Pohl failed to demonstrate any abuse of that discretion by the
trial court in permitting Reese to join the suit.
IV. Conclusion
We reaffirm our longstanding presumption that a civil statute
does not have extraterritorial effect unless the Legislature makes clear
that such effect is intended. The Cheathams and Reese, none of whom
are Texas residents, seek to apply Texas’s civil barratry statute to void
contracts for legal services that were procured outside Texas as the
result of alleged acts of solicitation that occurred outside Texas. In other
words, they seek to give Section 82.0651(a) extraterritorial effect.
Because the Legislature has not clearly indicated its intent that this
statute apply extraterritorially, the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment and dismissed the clients’ claims based on the
statute. But Pohl and Ammons have not shown they are entitled to
summary judgment on the clients’ separate claims for breach of
fiduciary duty. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in
part, affirm the judgment in part, and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 9, 2025

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