Southwest Airlines Pilots Assoc. v. The Boeing Co., 2026 Tex. Bus. 68 (1st Div.) (mem. op.)

2026 Tex. Bus. 68
The Business Court of Texas,
First Division
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES PILOTS
ASSOCIATION (SWAPA),
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOEING COMPANY,
Defendant.
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Cause No. 25-BC01A-0040
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Memorandum Opinion and Interlocutory Order
Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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¶1 	Before the Court is Defendant The Boeing Company’s Renewed
Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment and responsive filings. By its
renewed motion, Defendant The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) moves for
summary judgment on all claims asserted by Plaintiff Southwest Airlines
Pilots Association (“SWAPA”), arguing that the claims brought in Plaintiff’s
Consolidated and Amended Petition cannot satisfy proximate cause as a matter
of law. While the Court finds that the motion is well-taken, the Court
concludes that the motion is only partially dispositive. Accordingly, as

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explained below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to SWAPA’s
pleaded consequential damages only.
I. 	Scope of Boeing’s Motion
¶2 	Boeing’s renewed motion challenges all of SWAPA’s claims
(fraudulent 	and 	negligent 	misrepresentation, 	tortious 	interference,
negligence, and fraud by nondisclosure) on grounds that SWAPA cannot
establish the essential element of proximate causation. SWAPA’s response
presumes that proximate causation is a necessary element of its claims but
contends that its pleading supports recovery under that standard. Boeing’s
earlier motion on the same grounds was denied without prejudice. See Sw.
Airlines Pilots Assoc. v. The Boeing Co., 2026 Tex. Bus. 37, at ¶¶ 17-18 (1st
Div.) (mem. op.).
¶3 	The parties are correct that proximate cause is an essential
element for each of SWAPA’s claims. But that causation standard applies only
to consequential damages. See Lesikar v. Rappeport, 33 S.W.3d 282, 305 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2000) (explaining that “courts speak of a proximate cause
or a foreseeability showing in the context of special or consequential actual
damages only, not in the context of direct actual damages"). Proximate cause
is not the requisite standard for direct damages. Id. Therefore, Boeing’s

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motion—which 	only 	challenges 	proximate 	cause—reaches 	all 	pleaded
consequential damages sought by SWAPA's claims; it cannot reach any direct
damages.
¶4 	Moreover, 	the 	Texas 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	require 	that
consequential damages be specifically pleaded. See T EX . R. CIV . P. 56; Lesikar,
33 S.W.3d at 305. The Rules do not require parties to plead direct damages
with any specificity. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945
S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. 1997) (contrasting direct damages and consequential
damages); AKIB Constr. Inc. v. Shipwash, 582 S.W.3d 791, 809 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2019). For this reason, causation of direct damages is not
susceptible to being weighed at the pleadings stage. Instead, the Court can
assess only whether SWAPA’s pleaded consequential damages lie beyond the
reach of proximate causation as Boeing contends in its motion.
II. 	Proximate Causation and SWAPA’s Pleaded Consequential Damages
¶5 	SWAPA’s initial pleadings advanced, through various causes of
action, what can be summarized as two categories of claims. First, SWAPA
alleged Boeing rushed its rollout of the 737 MAX, leading to two crashes and
the grounding of the fleet, and resulting in costly federal investigations.
SWAPA sought damages based on flights its pilots would have piloted, dues it

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would 	have 	received, 	and 	fees 	it 	incurred 	in 	connection 	with 	the
investigations—all of which constitute consequential damages. Separately,
SWAPA alleged misrepresentations, omissions, and tortious interference with
its collective bargaining negotiations with Southwest Airlines ("Southwest").
SWAPA’s pleadings failed to articulate damages attributed to this second
category.
¶6 	Presented with Boeing’s prior motion, this Court determined that
proximate causation was lacking for the first category of claims—reaching the
same conclusion as Illinois federal courts presented with similar actions. See
Sw. Airlines Pilots Assoc., 2026 Tex. Bus. 37, at ¶¶ 6, 8 (discussing In re
Boeing 737 MAX Pilots Litig., 638 F.Supp.3d 838 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (mem. op.),
and Christensen v. Boeing Co., No. 20 C 1813, 2021 WL 83548 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
11, 2021) (mem. op.)). As to the second category, the Court concluded that the
pleaded damages bore no causal link to the misconduct alleged. Even so, Texas
law required SWAPA be afforded an opportunity to replead. Id. at ¶ 16.
Accordingly, the Court directed SWAPA to replead to specify damages
proximately caused by Boeing’s alleged interference in SWAPA’s collective
bargaining negotiations. Id.

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¶7 	Yet, SWAPA failed to cure its deficiency. In its amended petition,
SWAPA doubled down on its pleading of special damages only in the form of
lost wages, lost dues, and attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Pl.’s Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 245–
46, 249 (lost wages); id. at ¶¶ 259–60 (lost dues and attorneys’ fees). But
even according to SWAPA, these damages were not proximately caused by any
acts 	or 	omissions 	by 	Boeing 	in 	connection 	with 	SWAPA’s 	collective
bargaining negotiations; to the contrary, SWAPA’s pleading attributes these
damages to the grounding of the aircraft and subsequent investigations. For
example, SWAPA pleads:
• 	“With the 737 MAX removed from service, SWAPA Members were
deprived of the economic benefits . . ..” Pl.’s Am. Pet. at ¶ 245 (emphasis
added).
• 	“Southwest’s published flight schedules that incorporated the 737
MAX when compared to Southwest’s actual operations subsequent to the
grounding . . ..” Id. at ¶ 249 (emphasis added).
• 	“In connection with both [federal] investigations, SWAPA also had to
prepare for government-run interviews . . . SWAPA was forced to spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees that it would not have but
for Boeing’s misconduct.” Id. at ¶¶ 258-59 (emphasis added).

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SWAPA’s petition does not allege that the grounding of the fleet, subsequent
investigations, or resulting damages were caused in any way by Boeing’s
interference 	with 	SWAPA’s 	collective 	bargaining 	negotiations 	with
Southwest. Taking SWAPA’s own allegations as true, the Court concludes as
a matter of law that proximate cause does not exist for SWAPA’s alleged
consequential damages of lost earnings, lost dues, and incurred attorneys’
fees.
¶8 	In sum, consistent with In re Boeing (638 F.Supp.3d 838) and
Christensen (2021 WL 83548), this Court holds that SWAPA cannot establish
proximate cause for its pleaded damages related to the grounding of the 737
MAX fleet and related federal investigations. Further, nothing Boeing said or
failed to say, or did or failed to do, in relation to SWAPA’s collective
bargaining negotiations with Southwest is alleged by SWAPA to have caused
the grounding of the 737 MAX fleet. On its face, SWAPA’s pleading negates
any 	causal 	link 	between 	Boeing’s 	alleged 	interference 	with 	SWAPA’s
collective bargaining process and SWAPA’s pleaded consequential damages.
The Court therefore finds that Boeing should prevail on its motion.
¶9 	However, the Court cannot grant greater relief than Boeing sought
in its motion. See G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex.

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2011) (per curiam). As previously noted, Boeing’s motion only reaches the
consequential damages pleaded in SWAPA's live petition and no more. To the
extent SWAPA seeks direct damages for representations or omissions made
by Boeing to SWAPA and its Members which induced it to enter into a
disadvantageous collective bargaining agreement with Southwest, SWAPA’s
claims for those damages remain pending before the Court.
¶10 	IT 	IS 	THEREFORE 	ORDERED 	that 	Defendant 	The 	Boeing
Company’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 	is GRANTED and
SWAPA’s claims for consequential damages, including lost wages, lost dues,
and attorneys’ fees are DISMISSED. SWAPA’s claims for direct damages
remain pending. This is an interlocutory order.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
ANDREA K. BOURESSA
Judge of the Texas Business Court,
First Division
SIGNED ON: September 28, 2026.