RER Ventures, LLC and RER Kalvest Investments, LLC v. Softvest, L.P. — Concurring Opinion by Justice Soto

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
————————————
No. 08-24-00303-CV
————————————
RER Ventures, LLC and RER Kalvest Investments, LLC, Appellants
v.
Softvest, L.P., Appellee
On Appeal from the 112th District Court
Upton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 22-03-U4924-OTH
C ON C U R R IN G OP I N I ON
I reach the same result as the majority opinion does, but I do so by harmonizing the 2010
AOG Deed language. Because the parties agree that SoftVest’s interest is directly tied to the
interest Ranch 76 Trust (Ranch 76) conveyed to AOG in 2010, my opinion focuses on Ranch 76’s
intent when it stated it was conveying to AOG its interest in the right to receive royalties payable
out of production from Section 116. I start with the nature of the interest Ranch 76 held at the time
of the 2010 conveyance by analyzing the interest Currie held in Section 116 when she conveyed
her royalty interest in September 1959 to Ranch 76’s predecessors in interest, as that was the same

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royalty interest conveyed to Ranch 76 in 2002. From there, I examine the interest Ranch 76
conveyed to AOG in 2010, which in turn AOG conveyed to SoftVest.
A. What was the nature of the royalty interest Currie conveyed in 1959?
As the majority opinion recognizes, prior to 1959, Currie held a 1/32nd nonparticipating
royalty interest (NPRI) in the property identified as Section 116 in Upton County. However, in
1954, the owner of the executive rights to the mineral estates on Sections 116, 12, and 40 entered
into a lease with Gulf Oil Corporation, which the parties agreed created a community lease that
pooled all of the royalty interests on the leased tract (the 1954 Lease).1 Currie ratified the 1954
Lease in 1959. When a party enters into a community lease of this nature (or later ratifies such a
lease), it “effects a cross-conveyance among the owners of minerals under the various tracts of
royalty or minerals in a pool so that they all own undivided interests under the unitized tract in the
proportion their contribution bears to the unitized tract.”2 See Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd.
P’ship, 457 S.W.3d 52, 62–63 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d
210, 213 (Tex. 1968)); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Hahn, 704 S.W.3d 515, 525 (Tex. 2024)
(recognizing same). In other words, “[a]s between the lessors themselves, each relinquishes his
1 The majority initially seeks to distinguish community leasing and pooling of royalty interests, but then acknowledges
that they have the same “primary legal effect despite differences in the mechanics of their formation and in their
secondary effects,” citing Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766, 774, 777 & nn.27, 34
(Tex. 2017). The 1954 Lease clearly evinced the intent to create a community lease with pooled interests among all
of the several owners of the lease—including their assignees—by providing that upon the assignment of the lease,
“[d]rilling or production on any portion of the premises covered by this lease shall inure to the benefit of the several
owners of the lease upon all portions of the leased premises so far as concerns the continuance of this lease in effect
under the terms hereof.” It further provided that “[a]ll covenants and agreements of Lessor herein contained shall run
with the above-described land and minerals thereunder, and the rentals and royalties hereunder, and all covenants and
agreements of Lessee shall run with the estate created under the terms hereof, all of which shall extend to, and be
binding upon, the heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.”
2 Although Currie’s royalty interest on Section 116 did not include any executive rights to enter into leases, by ratifying
the 1954 Lease, she was given her proportionate share of the undivided interest in the unitized tract “just as if [she]
had been a party to the lease.” See London v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
1988, writ denied) (citing Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 844 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.);
Standard Oil Co. v. Donald, 321 S.W.2d 602, 605–606 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

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right to have his own tract separately developed . . . and each gains the right to share
proportionately in royalties from wells on the other included tracts.” Southland Royalty Co. v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1952). Thus, as the Texas Supreme Court has
recognized, “[t]he ‘primary legal consequence’ of pooling [is] . . . that production anywhere on a
pooled unit is treated as production on every tract in the unit.” Hooks, 457 S.W.3d at 62 (quoting
Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794, 798–99 (Tex. 2014)); see also London
v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (recognizing
that all royalty interest owners in the land subject to the lease share in production no matter where
the well is drilled on the leasehold).
Accordingly, when Currie ratified the 1954 Lease in March 1959, she no longer held a
separate 1/32 NPRI on Section 116; instead, she owned an undivided royalty interest in the unitized
tract, entitling her to receive royalties in proportion to the contribution her royalty interest in
Section 116 made to the tract. In turn, the owners of the royalty interests on Sections 12 and 40
also received undivided royalty interests in the unitized tract, in accordance with their respective
contributions to the tract.3 Therefore, Currie’s original interest in Section 116 still had relevance
in the sense that it indicated her proportionate interest in the unitized tract.
Significant to this appeal, Currie’s royalty interest in the community lease, although
considered an “undivided” interest, was nevertheless freely alienable; she was free to transfer it in
whole or in part to a third party. See Aery v. Hoskins, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 684, 697–98 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (recognizing that an undivided royalty interest in a unitized block
3 The majority opinion discusses whether these royalty interests were appurtenant to each other, but the parties
themselves do not rely on any arguments about appurtenant interests in their briefs.

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is a property right that can be “freely acquired and conveyed”) (citing MCEN 1996 P'ship v.
Glassell, 42 S.W.3d 262, 263 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied)).4
In September 1959, Currie did just that when she executed a royalty deed, stating that she
was conveying all of her royalty interests to the oil, gas and other minerals to be produced in and
under Section 116 to J.H. Crouch. The royalty deed stated that the conveyance was “subject to”
the 1954 Lease and Currie’s ratification of the 1954 Lease earlier in 1959. All parties appear to
agree that this gave J.H. Couch full ownership of Currie’s undivided royalty interest in the unitized
tract, which gave him the right to receive royalties from production occurring anywhere on the
unitized tract created in the 1954 Lease, which included Sections 12, 40, and 116, in proportion to
Section 116’s contribution to the tract.
Thereafter, in March 2002, J.H. Crouch, as grantor, conveyed to the J.H. and Jo Doris
Crouch 1997 Family Trust (the Crouch Family Trust)
all of [his] undivided interest, in and to all the oil, gas and minerals, including, but
not limited to, mineral interests, royalty interests, overriding royalty interests in oil
and gas leases, on gas and mineral leases, working interests, unit agreements,
pooling agreements, communization agreements and production payments, in, on,
under and produced from all lands in which Grantor owns an interest located in the
United States of America, including, but not limited to, those certain lands and
leases described in Exhibit A. attached hereto and made a part hereof for all
purposes[.]
Exhibit A included a list of seven properties in Upton County, including Section 116, as
well as one other section of land located in Upton and Reagan Counties. Exhibit A stated that it
was Grantor’s intent to grant all of his right, title and interest to “all oil, gas and mineral rights
4 See also MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49, 52–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(discussing rights of grantee who received an “entire undivided interest” in a unitized tract); see generally Chambers
v. San Augustine Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 514 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.) (recognizing that a
lessor’s royalty interest under a pooled lease is considered an “interest in real property”) (citing Pounds v. Jurgens,
296 S.W.3d 100, 107 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Sheffield v. Hogg, 77 S.W.2d 1021, 1030
(Tex. 1934)).

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owned by Grantor wherever located in the United States of America, whether correctly or
incorrectly described above or omitted in its entirety on this Exhibit A.” In addition, it provided
that this conveyance was made “subject to”
any rights now existing to any lessee or assigns under any valid and subsisting oil
and gas lease heretofore executed . . . it being understood and agreed that said
Grantee shall have, receive and enjoy the herein granted undivided interest in and
to all bonuses, rents, royalties and other benefits which may accrue thereunder from
and after the effective date hereof, precisely as if the Grantee herein had been at the
date of making said lease and/or leases the owner of a similar undivided interest in
and to the Property and none other and Grantee one of the lessors therein.
All parties appear to agree that this conveyance gave the Crouch Family Trust the right to
receive royalties from production occurring anywhere on the unitized tract that was created by the
1954 Lease in proportion to Section 116’s contribution to the tract.
In February 2007, the Crouch Family Trust, as Grantor, used virtually identical language,
and a virtually identical Exhibit A, to convey all of its right, title and interests to the same eight
sections of land to Gary B. Crouch, Trustee of Ranch 76, as grantee, subject to all existing leases,
giving Ranch 76 the same rights under the leases as if it had been the original lessor. Once again,
based on the language of this conveyance, the parties appear to agree that Ranch 76 was granted
the right to receive royalties from production occurring anywhere on the unitized tract that was
created in the 1954 Lease, in proportion to Section 116’s contribution to the tract.
B. What interest did Ranch 76 intend to convey to AOG in 2010?
Having determined that Ranch 76 owned an undivided interest in the unitized tract entitling
it to royalties for production occurring anywhere on the tract, the critical question is whether
Ranch 76 intended to give AOG its entire interest in the unitized tract, or whether it intended to
give AOG a limited portion of that interest, i.e., the portion corresponding to its royalty interest on
Section 116, while reserving the portion of its royalty interest on Sections 12 and 40.

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In March 2022, Ranch 76 quitclaimed to RER any royalty interest it still had from
production in Sections 12 and 40 (the RER Quitclaim Deed). In the RER Quitclaim Deed,
Ranch 76 first described the history of the conveyances, referencing the 1954 Lease and Currie’s
1959 ratification of the 1954 Lease, and recited that by virtue of the 2007 conveyance from the
Crouch Family Trust, Ranch 76 received ownership of a “communitized non-participating royalty
interest that entitled its owner to an undivided 1/32 of 1/32 of 322.38/1308.88 of the one eighth
royalty on oil, gas and other minerals produced from or attributable to the following tracts of land
situated in Upton County,” which expressly included Sections 12, 40, and 116. The RER Quitclaim
Deed then recited that Ranch 76’s 2010 conveyance to AOG only transferred the interest Ranch 76
had in production on Section 116, and that it “retained” the interest it had in production from
Sections 12 and 40. The RER Quitclaim Deed also recited that AOG had conveyed to third parties
the interest it received from the 2010 AOG Deed, but further stated that “none of [those]
conveyances” contained a description of Sections 12 or 40. The RER Quitclaim Deed thus stated
that Ranch 76 was assigning, conveying and “quitclaim[ing]” any interest it had in those two
sections in the unitized tract to RER, but was doing so “without warranty of title, express or
implied.”
As the majority recognizes, the RER Quitclaim Deed came almost 12 years after Ranch 76
conveyed its rights to AOG, therefore, the statements made in the deed are not dispositive in
determining the nature of the interest Ranch 76 intended to convey in its earlier 2010 AOG Deed.
Instead, the dispositive question is whether the language in the 2010 AOG Deed itself demonstrates
that Ranch 76 intended to sever its interests in the three sections in the unitized tract by transferring
only its proportionate royalty interest in Section 116 to AOG, while “retaining” its interests in
Sections 12 and 40 (as RER contends), or whether Ranch 76 intended to transfer all of its royalty

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interests in the unitized tract in proportion to Section 116’s contribution to the tract (as SoftVest
contends). Based on my interpretation of the 2010 AOG Deed, and after harmonizing all of its
provisions, I agree with SoftVest that Ranch 76 did not retain any royalty interest in Sections 12
and 40, and therefore Ranch 76 gave nothing to RER in the RER Quitclaim Deed.
The focus of the parties’ conflicting arguments is on their interpretation of a single, lengthy
sentence in the 2010 AOG Deed’s granting clause. The granting clause stated that Ranch 76 was
conveying to AOG the following:
all of Grantor’s rights, title and interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in an under
that may be produced from or pooled with the following described lands, together
with all of Grantor’s interest in all leasehold interests, royalties and overriding
royalties payable out of production from the lands situated in Upton County, Texas,
as described below [referencing Exhibit A] together with the rights of ingress and
egress at all times to the extent Grantor currently has the right to use the surface
estate of the property described above, for the purpose of mining, drilling,
exploring, operating, and developing the lands for oil, gas and other minerals, and
storing, handling, transporting, and marketing the same (collectively the
“Conveyed Interests”).
Exhibit A described six of the sections of land in Upton County that were listed in the exhibits to
the earlier conveyances, including Section 116.5
Mirroring the language in the 2022 RER Quitclaim Deed, RER argues that because the
2010 AOG Deed only referred to Section 116, and did not mention Sections 12 and 40, Ranch 76
intended to convey only the royalty interest it had in Section 116, while retaining its royalty interest
in Sections 12 and 40. In support, RER contends that when Currie ratified the 1954 Lease, based
on the doctrine of cross-conveyance, she was given three separate royalty interests in the three
different sections in the unitized pool; in turn, RER contends, those interests were not
“inseparable,” thereby allowing Ranch 76 to separately transfer to AOG the royalty interest as it
existed in Section 116. Specifically, RER points to the clause in the 1954 Lease, which states that
5 It eliminated two of the other sections of land listed in the earlier exhibits.

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“[t]he rights and estates of either party hereto may be assigned in whole or in part.” And RER
argues that this is what Ranch 76 intended to do in the 2010 AOG Deed: separately assign to AOG
its royalty interest in Section 116, but not its royalty interest in Sections 12 and 40.
Though I agree Ranch 76 could have assigned only a portion of its “undivided” royalty
interest in the unitized tract, the fact that the 2010 AOG Deed only mentions Section 116 does not,
standing alone, support a finding that Ranch 76 intended to do so. As explained above (and as the
RER Quitclaim Deed reflects), because of the nature of the 1954 Lease, Ranch 76 held an
“undivided” interest in the unitized tract, entitling it to receive production from the entire tract—
regardless of where the production occurred—in proportion to Section 116’s contribution to the
tract. Thus, a reference to production on Section 116 would necessarily include production
anywhere on the other two tracts. In other words, there would be no need for Ranch 76 to expressly
mention in the 2010 AOG Deed that it was conveying its interest in the entire unitized tract, as the
reference to its interest in Section 116 would be sufficient to encompass its interest in the entire
tract under the doctrine of cross-conveyance. See Hooks, 457 S.W.3d at 62.
RER, however, points out that in the first portion of the granting clause, the 2010 AOG
Deed referred to the rights Ranch 76 had in the minerals that may be “produced from or pooled
with” the described lands (as reflected in Exhibit A), while the second portion of the granting
clause referred to Ranch 76’s leasehold and royalty interests payable out of production from the
same lands, without any mention of pooling. RER maintains that this in effect set up two separate
and discrete conveyances to AOG: the first conveying Ranch 76’s mineral interests, whether
pooled or not; and the second conveying Ranch 76’s royalty interest in Section 116, without
reference to the other two sections with which it was pooled. The only logical interpretation of this
language, RER argues, is that Ranch 76 intended to retain its royalty interest in Sections 12 and

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40; it reasons that, because a royalty interest is part of the mineral estate, it is automatically
conveyed with the mineral estate unless it is excepted from a deed. See Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d
791, 797 (Tex. 2017) (recognizing that “the conveyance of an interest in the minerals in place
carries with it by operation of law the right to a corresponding interest in the royalty”). RER
contends that there was no need for the 2010 AOG Deed to mention Ranch 76’s mineral interests
separately from its royalty interests unless Ranch 76 intended for them to be conveyed separately.
According to RER, any other interpretation would create a “surplusage” or redundancy, which is
contrary to the rules of deed interpretation requiring courts to consider all words and phrases in a
deed and avoid rendering any phrases meaningless. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128
S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex. 2003) (Schneider, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “[c]ontracts are to be
read as a whole, and an interpretation that gives effect to every part of the agreement is favored so
that no provision is rendered meaningless or as surplusage”).
I conclude that RER’s interpretation of the 2010 AOG Deed fails for several reasons. First,
RER dissects the granting clause and homes in on only a portion of it, overlooking the basic
principle of deed interpretation requiring courts to “employ a holistic approach aimed at
ascertaining intent from all words and all parts of the conveying instrument.” WTX Fund, LLC v.
Brown, 595 S.W.3d 285, 293 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. denied) (citing Hysaw v. Dawkins,
483 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2016)). When attempting to discern the parties’ intent, courts must
“construe words and phrases together and in context, not in isolation,” and any “[a]pparent
inconsistencies or contradictions must be harmonized, to the extent possible, by construing the
document as a whole.” Id. (citing Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 13); see also Point Energy Partners., LLC
v. RC Permian Co., 669 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. 2023) (courts “do not read contractual phrases in
isolation”). Thus, “in construing a document such as a deed, . . . we read the document as one

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cohesive text.” Victory Energy Corp. v. Oz Gas Corp., 461 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2014, pet. denied).
Contrary to this fundamental principle, RER’s interpretation would have us consider the
two phrases in a single sentence in the granting clause separately, rather than trying to harmonize
their meaning. And I agree with SoftVest that the two phrases can be harmonized. As SoftVest
points out, while the first phrase of the granting clause refers to the “minerals” to be produced
from the land, thereby indicating the conveyance of a mineral estate, the second portion states that
the conveyance was being made “together with” all royalty interests. As RER recognizes, royalty
interests are, by their very nature, part of the mineral estate. See Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 9
(discussing the five attributes of a mineral estate, which includes “the right to receive royalty
payments”). Thus, these two parts of the granting clause sentence can be harmonized by
interpreting them to mean that Ranch 76 intended to emphasize that it was including any and all
royalty interests it owned along with the conveyance of its mineral estate.
Drafters of legal documents “often include redundant language to illustrate or emphasize
their intent.” See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 642 S.W.3d 569, 582 (Tex. 2022). Because
the granting clause stated it was conveying Ranch 76’s mineral interests “together with” its royalty
interests, this language indicates an intent to emphasize that its royalty interests were included,
rather than excluded, from its mineral interest conveyance. See Together with, MERRIAM–
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1314 (11th ed. 2003) (defining “together with” as “in
addition to; in association with”). I would therefore interpret the two phrases in the granting clause
together, to result in a single conveyance of all of Ranch 76’s royalty interest in the entire unitized
tract.

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A closer look at the second phrase of the granting clause confirms this interpretation. The
second phrase provides that Ranch 76 is conveying all of its leasehold interests or royalties
“payable out of production” on the described properties, to include Section 116, which included
royalties payable from the entire unitized tract. Thus, if Ranch 76 had intended to exclude its
royalty interests in Sections 12 and 40, it had to expressly state that intent in the 2010 AOG Deed.
See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2012, pet. denied) (recognizing that when a mineral interest is conveyed, it passes all of the
grantor’s interests unless “expressly reserved or excepted” in the deed); Cockrell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. 1956) (“it is fundamental that a warranty deed will pass
all of the estate owned by the grantor at the time of the conveyance unless there are reservations
or exceptions which reduce the estate conveyed”). Stated otherwise, to exclude a portion of its
rights, Ranch 76 was required to “identify, with reasonable certainty, the property to be excepted
from the larger conveyance.” Angell v. Bailey, 225 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007,
no pet.). Here, I see no language in the 2010 AOG Deed from which to conclude that Ranch 76
intended to except from conveyance any of its royalty interests in the unitized tract.
Finally, the “subject to” clause in the 2010 AOG Deed, when read in harmony with the
remaining provisions in the deed, demonstrates Ranch 76’s intent to convey all of its royalty
interest in the unitized tract that was originally created by the 1954 Lease, rather than creating an
exception. As SoftVest points out, the 2010 AOG Deed’s “subject to” clause was nearly identical
to those in the earlier conveyances, providing that the conveyance was made “subject to any rights
now existing in any lessee or assigns under any valid and subsisting oil and gas lease” on the
subject properties. At the time of the conveyance, the 1954 Lease that pooled all of the royalty

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interests in Sections 12, 40, and 116 was still in existence. And the 2010 AOG Deed provided that
AOG, as the grantee
shall have, receive, and enjoy the granted undivided interests in and to all bonuses,
rents, royalties, and other benefits which may accrue to the Conveyed Interests . . .
precisely as if Grantee [AOG] had been at the date of making the lease and/or
leases, the owner of a similar undivided interest in and to the Conveyed Interests
and Grantee was the lessor.
By virtue of this provision, AOG effectively stepped into Currie’s shoes under the 1954
Lease, obtaining the same interest Currie had under the 1954 Lease when she ratified it in 1959,
i.e., the right to receive royalties from production occurring on any of the sections within the
unitized tract, including production from Sections 12 and 40, in proportion to Section 116’s
contribution to the tract.6 See Gardner Energy Corp. v. McNeil, McNeil, & Holt, No. 08-23-00140-
CV, 2023 WL 8937162, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 27, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(recognizing that when a deed contains language making the conveyance subject to an existing
lease, the grantee effectively steps into the grantor’s shoes under the terms of the existing lease,
“entitling them to receive the same royalties and benefits as the Grantors were receiving at the
time of the conveyance”). Therefore, the inclusion of the subject-to clause supports a conclusion
that Ranch 76 intended to convey all of its royalty interest in the unitized tract to AOG.
C. Conclusion
After harmonizing all of the relevant provisions in the 2010 AOG Deed, I conclude that
Ranch 76 conveyed to AOG the right to receive royalties from production occurring on any
6 RER, however, points out that the “subject to” clause states it was only applicable to the “Conveyed Interests” as set
forth in the deed, and RER once again maintains that the granting clause only conveyed Ranch 76’s royalty interest in
Section 116 rather than in the entire unitized tract. In other words, RER contends that the “subject to” clause in the
2010 AOG Deed indicates an intent to except the remaining tracts of land from the conveyance. But, as explained
above, the remaining provisions in the 2010 AOG Deed demonstrate Ranch 76’s intent to convey all of its interest in
production on the entire unitized tract. Therefore, I conclude that the “conveyed interests” covered all of Currie’s
interest in the lease.

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section of the unitized tract in proportion to Section 116’s contribution to the tract, and in turn,
SoftVest was given the right to receive 87.5% of that interest. I therefore agree with the majority
opinion’s conclusion that, because Ranch 76 conveyed all of its royalty interest in the unitized
block to AOG, Ranch 76’s subsequent quitclaim deed to RER conveyed nothing and the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in SoftVest’s favor should be affirmed.7
LISA J. SOTO, Justice
October 20, 2026
Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
Soto, J., concurring
7 Having rejected the notion that Ranch 76 intended to sever its interests in the unitized tract, I find that RER’s
argument regarding the “rule of non-apportionment” does not apply and does not require a contrary result.