Shalondria R. Simpson v. Artillery Construction, LLC and Jason Junkin — Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wilson

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 22, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00301-CV
SHALONDRIA R. SIMPSON, Appellant
V.
ARTILLERY CONSTRUCTION, LLC AND JASON JUNKIN, Appellees
On Appeal from the 11th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2022-41719
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant 	Shalondria 	R. 	Simpson 	appeals 	the 	trial 	court’s 	judgment
confirming an arbitration award and denying her motion to vacate the award. In four
issues Simpson contends the award should be vacated because of the arbitrator’s
evident partiality, the arbitrator exceeded her powers, public policy requires vacatur,
and the Texas General Arbitration Act (TAA) requires disclosure of an arbitrator’s
intent to run for public office. We conclude Simpson did not establish evident
partiality or that the arbitrator exceeded her powers. We further conclude that public

2
policy is not a ground for vacatur under the TAA, and the TAA does not require an
arbitrator to disclose intent to run for public office. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment confirming the award.
BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2018, Simpson contracted with appellees Artillery Construction
and Jason Junkin to build a home. After delays and allegedly improper construction,
Simpson 	sued 	appellees 	asserting 	claims 	for 	negligence, 	negligent
misrepresentation, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, breach of
contract, and breach of warranty. Simpson later amended her petition to include
claims of fraud and fraudulent inducement. Asserting a corporate alter ego theory,
Simpson alleged that Junkin was jointly and severally liable in his individual
capacity. The home construction contract signed by Simpson and Junkin contained
a mandatory binding arbitration clause. The trial court granted the parties’ agreed
motion to arbitrate, and they agreed on Felicia Harris-Hoss as the arbitrator.
After a multi-day hearing and post-hearing briefing, the arbitrator signed a
final award in favor of Simpson awarding past repair damages of $22,440.00 plus
arbitration fees and costs and pre- and post-award interest. During the arbitration
hearing the arbitrator heard testimony from Simpson, Junkin, owner of Artillery
Construction, and four expert witnesses. The arbitrator found that Junkin was not
jointly and severally liable and awarded damages against Artillery Construction.
Simpson filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the
arbitrator showed evident partiality by failing to disclose and deliberately concealing
her political and social affiliations.
In the motion to vacate, Simpson asserted that, after the arbitrator’s final
award, Simpson investigated the arbitrator’s online presence and learned that the
arbitrator had deleted “editorial blog posts on social and legal issues, and deleted or

3
de-identified other social media pages she controlled or contributed to where she had
previously 	published 	hours 	of 	political 	townhalls 	and 	candidate 	interviews.”
According to Simpson, between 2020 and 2024, the arbitrator conducted primary
campaigns for Congress and, in connection with those campaigns, published
political and social opinions online. Following losses in those campaigns the
arbitrator deleted the previously published opinions from the internet. Simpson
specifically addressed the arbitrator’s failure to disclose and later delete the
following items:
(1) an entire website of political and election-related blog posts offering
the arbitrator’s opinion on dozens of issues—many legal issues—
published by the arbitrator less than three years before the Plaintiff
agreed to Harris Hoss;
(2) multiple social media platforms that were deleted or deidentified to
remove Harris Hoss’s name;
(3) Harris Hoss’s present intent to run for political office and
(4) which is only relevant given the present intent to run for office, the
scope of campaign donations previously accepted by Harris Hoss from
the defense bar, and somewhat notoriously litigious builders.
Simpson attached the arbitrator’s disclosure notice to the motion to vacate. In
that notice the arbitrator disclosed that she had been appointed to mediate one other
case involving appellees’ counsel and two cases involving Simpson’s counsel. The
arbitrator further disclosed that she had mediated a suit in which an entity known as
Builders First Source, Inc. was a party; the entity was not represented by either firm
or counsel in the underlying case. The arbitrator also disclosed that Simpson’s
counsel was a “Facebook ‘friend.’” The arbitrator invited the parties and their
counsel to let her know if there was “anything known to them that is relevant to these
disclosures and/or whether there are any questions concerning the disclosures and/or
my independence and impartiality to arbitrate this matter.” The record does not
reflect any response to the arbitrator’s invitation.

4
Simpson also attached copies of the online posts that she alleged were deleted
before the arbitration began:
• 	An advertisement for Facebook Live events to assist voters in
learning about local Brazoria and Fort Bend County political
candidates and proposed charter amendments.
• 	An online article announcing the arbitrator’s campaign for
Congress in which the arbitrator expressed political opinions.
• 	Social media posts expressing political opinions.
• 	A website advertising the arbitrator’s mediation and arbitration
business.
• 	An 	online 	article 	describing 	campaign 	rules 	for 	judicial
candidates and informing voters on ways to learn about judicial
candidates.
• 	Reports 	of 	receipts 	and 	disbursements 	for 	the 	arbitrator’s
Congressional campaign, which lists cash on hand, but no
receipts or disbursements for the reporting period.
• 	A statement of candidacy for Congress filed October 15, 2020.
The record does not reflect individual campaign contributions made to any of
the arbitrator’s campaigns. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the
motion to vacate and confirmed the arbitration award. This appeal followed.
A NALYSIS
In Simpson’s first issue she argues the trial court erred in confirming the
arbitration award due to evident partiality. In her second issue Simpson argues the
arbitrator exceeded her powers. In Simpson’s third issue she contends public policy
requires that the trial court vacate the award because the arbitrator “intentionally
deleted and deidentified previously public legal commentary.” In Simpson’s fourth
issue she contends the TAA requires an arbitrator who is running or intends to run
for public office to disclose those intentions to potential litigants.

5
I. 	Standard of Review and Governing Law
We review a trial court’s order confirming an arbitration award under a de
novo standard. Moody Nat’l Grapevine MT, LP v. TIC Grapevine 2, LP, 651 S.W.3d
450, 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). Because Texas law
favors arbitration, judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow.
Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. 2016). We indulge every reasonable
presumption in favor of upholding the arbitration award. Denbury Onshore, LLC v.
Texcal Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d 511, 515 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, no pet.).
The TAA lists specific grounds for vacating an arbitration award and provides
that unless such grounds are offered, “the court, on application of a party, shall
confirm the award.” Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 89–90 (Tex. 2011)
(quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.087). One of the circumstances
justifying vacatur under the TAA is if the rights of a party were prejudiced by the
“evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator.” Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 171.088(a)(2)(A); see also Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land &
Cattle Co., 518 S.W.3d 422, 431 (Tex. 2017). The standard for evident partiality
requires vacating an award if an arbitrator “fails to disclose facts which might, to an
objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality.”
Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Tex.
2014) (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149
(1968)). Information that is trivial does not rise to this level and need not be
disclosed. Id.
II. 	Simpson did not establish evident partiality.
In Simpson’s first issue she contends the trial court erred in failing to vacate
the arbitration award under section 171.088(a)(2)(A) due to evident partiality by the

6
arbitrator. Simpson’s argument for vacatur is based on “the arbitrator’s concealment
of her authored writings and failure to disclose professional viewpoints relevant to
the subject matter of this dispute.” Simpson pointed to several articles written by the
arbitrator that are available online, but were not disclosed by the arbitrator. Simpson
argued that the arbitrator “deliberately failed to identify public-facing content that
would be material to the parties’ understanding of her views and then demonstrated
evident partiality by blocking counsel for a litigant on social media sometime
between the hearing and the issuance of the award.” Simpson admitted that her
“intensive investigation” was not initiated until after the date of the arbitrator’s
award. Simpson argued that the arbitrator’s bias resulted in the discounting of her
uncontroverted testimony at the arbitration hearing. Simpson also contends the
arbitrator expressed partiality against her counsel by blocking counsel on social
media after the arbitration hearing.
In 	support 	of 	vacatur, 	Simpson 	cites 	decisions 	in 	which 	courts 	have
determined that an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a conflict or past relationship with
a party or counsel showed evident partiality on the part of the arbitrator. Those
decisions are case specific and distinguishable from the arguments made by Simpson
in this case.
In Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1997), the
dispute was submitted to a panel of three arbitrators—two were “non-neutral” and
one was neutral. Id. at 629–30. The neutral arbitrator failed to disclose that three
weeks before the arbitration, the law firm of one of the non-neutral arbitrators
referred a substantial piece of litigation to him. Id. at 631.The supreme court
concluded the referral might have conveyed an impression of the arbitrator’s
partiality to a reasonable person. Id. at 637.
In Tenaska, the arbitrator disclosed that the law firm representing one party to

7
the arbitration had recommended him as an arbitrator in three other arbitrations. 437
S.W.3d at 520. He also disclosed that he was a director of a litigation services
company and attended a meeting at the law firm, but there was no indication the firm
and company would ever do business. Id. The arbitrator did not disclose, however,
that all his contacts at the large firm were with the same two lawyers that represented
the party to the arbitration at issue. Id. He also did not disclose that he owned stock
in the litigation services company that was actively pursuing business opportunities
with the firm and conducted significant marketing for that company. Id. The
arbitrator participated in meetings or contacts with the two lawyers in question to
solicit business from the firm for the company and he allowed one of the two lawyers
to edit his disclosures in the arbitration to minimize his contacts. Id. The supreme
court concluded the undisclosed information “might yield a reasonable impression
of the arbitrator’s partiality to an objective observer.” Id.
In Builders First Source-S. Tex., LP v. Ortiz, this court found evident partiality
based on the fact that counsel for one of the parties had appeared before the arbitrator
in two prior matters. 515 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
pet. denied). This court held the arbitrator’s failure to disclose the connection was
not trivial under the facts of that case. The arbitrator was “specifically asked on the
disclosure form whether any of the law firms in the case had appeared before her in
past arbitrations.” Id. The arbitrator responded in a sworn answer, “‘no’ and that she
had conducted a conflicts check and had nothing to disclose.” Id. Although the
arbitrator subsequently amended her disclosure to identify two arbitrations in which
counsel for the respondent had appeared before her, the disclosure was not made
until almost one year into the arbitration, which did not allow the petitioner an
opportunity to timely object to the appointment. Id. at 459. We concluded the failure
to disclose two prior appearances before the arbitrator by a party representative was

8
not trivial and “might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of
partiality.” Id.
The facts of this case are not analogous to those of TUCO, Tenaska, or Ortiz,
which all involved situations of an arbitrator who did not timely disclose information
that to an objective observer might create the impression of partiality. Simpson
identified no financial relationship, professional connection between the arbitrator
and any party or their counsel, and no portion of the arbitration proceedings where
the arbitrator expressed bias. Simpson’s political or cultural views were not at issue
and were never part of the arbitration. The arbitrator’s prior political articles and
social media activity were unrelated to home construction, the DTPA, or any subject
matter at issue in the arbitration. Without a nexus between the allegedly undisclosed
information and the parties, counsel, or subject matter of the dispute, Simpson’s
allegations amount to speculation insufficient to establish evident partiality. See
Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (5th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting a similar post-award challenge on the impartiality of an
arbitrator based on undisclosed relationships unrelated to the parties, attorneys,
claims, witnesses, or testimony in the case). We overrule Simpson’s first issue.
III. 	Simpson did not establish that the arbitrator exceeded her powers.
In Simpson’s second issue she asserts the trial court erred in confirming the
award 	despite 	evident 	partiality 	of 	the 	arbitrator, 	complete 	disregard 	of
uncontroverted evidence of damages, clear deceptive trade practices, and the
arbitrator’s construction of a conflicting contract in favor of the drafter. Although
Simpson couches this argument in terms of evident partiality, in her brief she cites
section 171.088(a)(3)(A) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires a
court to vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator exceeded her powers. Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.088(a)(3)(A). Initially, we note that Simpson did not

9
preserve this issue for review because she did not raise the issue of the arbitrator
exceeding her powers in her motion to vacate the award. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)
(requiring complaint to be made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or
motion in order to preserve error for appellate review).
Moreover, Simpson’s arguments that the arbitrator disregarded evidence and
misconstrued the contract are actually complaints that the arbitrator committed
errors of law or made mistakes of fact. However, an arbitrator does not exceed her
authority simply because she may have misinterpreted the contract or misapplied the
law. See iGeo, LLC v. Jiang, No. 14-24-00691-CV, 2026 WL 1102131, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]rbitrators do
not exceed their authority by deciding issues that are raised by the pleadings and
submitted for the arbitrators’ determination.”). Such a complaint, that the arbitrator
decided the issue incorrectly or made mistakes of law or fact, is not a complaint that
the arbitrator exceeded her powers. See City of Houston v. Houston Prof’l Fire
Fighters’ Ass’n, Local 341, No. 14-18-00418-CV, 2020 WL 1528078, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 31, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The proper
inquiry is not whether the arbitrator correctly decided an issue, but whether the
arbitrator had authority to decide the issue at all. Forest Oil, 518 S.W.3d at 431.
The parties do not dispute that the arbitration clause in their contract gave the
arbitrator the authority to decide the dispute. Simpson argues that the arbitrator
demonstrated evident partiality and exceeded her power by ignoring uncontested
evidence that was central to her claims. As the factfinder, the arbitrator was obligated
to judge the credibility of the witnesses and choose who to believe or disbelieve. See
Ouzenne v. Haynes, No. 01-10-00112-CV, 2012 WL 1249420, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 12, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Simpson has not shown
that the arbitrator acted with evident partiality or outside the scope of her authority.

10
We overrule Simpson’s second issue.
IV. 	Public policy does not require vacatur of the arbitration award.
In Simpson’s third issue she asserts that public policy requires vacatur of the
award because the arbitrator “intentionally deleted and deidentified previously
public legal commentary on a plethora of issues.” Initially, we note Simpson
provided no evidence in the trial court that the arbitrator “intentionally deleted”
information. Simpson presented evidence that certain information had been on the
internet 	concerning 	the 	arbitrator’s 	political 	and 	cultural 	thoughts, 	but 	that
information was no longer on the internet at the time of Simpson’s post-award
investigation.
In arguing this issue, Simpson primarily relies on the courts’ holdings in
TUCO, Tenaska, and Ortiz, which we distinguished above as involving undisclosed
financial or professional relationships, not political opinions or social media activity
unrelated to the dispute. Under the TAA, a party may avoid confirmation of the
arbitrator’s award “only by demonstrating a ground expressly listed in section
171.088.” Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d at 495. The TAA leaves no room for courts to
expand on those grounds in vacating an arbitration award. Id. at 494. A party seeking
to vacate an arbitration award may not invoke extra-statutory or common law
reasons for vacatur. Id. at 495. Simpson cites no authority in which violation of
public policy may be used as a ground for vacating an arbitration award.
Because Simpson’s public policy argument does not fit within the TAA’s
exclusive vacatur grounds, we overrule her third issue.
V. 	Simpson has not established that the TAA requires an arbitrator who is
running or intends to run for political office to disclose those intentions.
In Simpson’s fourth issue she asserts the TAA requires an arbitrator to
disclose her intent to run for political office. In Texas, a neutral arbitrator must

11
disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression
of the arbitrator’s partiality. TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 636. Without authority, Simpson
contends this court “should hold that an arbitrator with a present intent to run for
public office must disclose that fact to potential litigants before them.” Simpson cites
no authority requiring an arbitrator to disclose political activity unrelated to the
subject matter of the arbitration, or candidacy for public office. Nor does the TAA
require vacatur of an award for such nondisclosure. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 171.088.
Simpson has not established that the arbitrator failed to disclose information
that “might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of partiality.”
See Ortiz, 515 S.W.3d at 458. We overrule Simpson’s fourth issue.
C ONCLUSION
The trial court properly confirmed the arbitration award because Simpson did
not establish any statutory grounds for vacatur. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
/s/ 	Randy Wilson
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wilson and Bridges.