In The Interest of I.H. aka O.G., a child — Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bridges

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 20, 2026
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-26-00463-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF I.H. AKA O.G., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 306th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 24-CP-0102
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, D.G. , appeals from the order terminating his parental rights as to
I.H., a.k.a. O.G. (Olivia).1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Olivia was born in October 2024. The Department of Family and Protective
Services received a Priority I neglectful supervision referral after S.H. (Mother)
tested positive for drugs at delivery. Mother admitted using methamphetamines and
1 Olivia is a pseudonym, which we use to protect the identity of the minor involved in this
case. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.

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cocaine up until the day she gave birth to Olivia. Soon thereafter, the Department
filed an Original Petition for Protection of a Child, for Conservatorship, and for
Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship seeking, among other
things, permission to take emergency possession of Olivia, permission to determine
whether appellant, the alleged father, was the father of Olivia, and termination of
both parents’ parental rights. A few days later the Department was named temporary
sole managing conservator of Olivia on an emergency basis. 	When no potential
family or kinship placement options were found among Mother’s family, Olivia,
once she was discharged from the hospital, was placed in foster care with appellees
B.G.W. and B.H. 	The trial court designated the Department the Temporary
Managing Conservator of Olivia after a full adversarial hearing. 	The trial court
ordered genetic testing and once it was completed, it signed an Agreed Temporary
Order Adjudicating Paternity and Dismissing Unknown Father finding appellant to
be Olivia’s father.
Once appellant had been adjudicated Olivia’s father, the Department moved
to change Olivia’s placement from appellees’ foster care to the care of her paternal
great aunt, C.M. 	The trial court granted the Department’s motion and Olivia was
placed in C.M.’s care.
Appellees filed a Petition in Intervention in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child
Relationship approximately ten months after Olivia had originally been placed in
their care. Appellees requested the termination of both parents’ parental rights and
the adoption of Olivia.2 The Department moved to strike the intervention, and
appellant joined the Department’s motion. 	The trial court ultimately denied the
2 Appellees filed multiple amended petitions in intervention. 	Their live pleading at the
time of the jury trial was their Fourth Amended Petition in Intervention in Suit Affecting the
Parent-Child Relationship.

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Department’s motion. The next day appellees filed a Request for Jury Trial.
Mother eventually signed an Affidavit of Voluntary Relinquishment of
Parental Rights to The Department of Family and Protective Services, which was
filed with the court. 	The trial court subsequently signed an order terminating
Mother’s parental rights.
Olivia’s paternal great aunt, C.M., filed a petition in intervention seeking the
termination of the parental rights of both parents and then adoption of Olivia. The
trial court orally denied appellees’ motion to strike the intervention prior to the
beginning of voir dire for the jury trial. The trial started the next day.
At trial, the Department did not request termination of appellant’s rights.
Instead, only appellees sought termination of appellant’s parental rights. Appellees
sought termination of appellant’s parental rights under grounds (C), (D), (E), (H),
and (L)(iv) of section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 161.001(b)(1) (establishing grounds for the involuntary termination of parental
rights). 	Numerous witnesses testified during the trial, and we summarize the
evidence relevant to the termination of appellant’s parental rights below.3
Robin Richter
The Department called Robin Richter, a CPS Investigator, to testify. Richter
testified that she was assigned to Olivia’s case after a Priority I neglectful
supervision intake. The allegation was that Olivia had just been born, Mother had
tested positive for drugs, and the hospital assumed that once the baby’s tests came
back, she would also test positive. Richter went to the hospital where she spoke to
Mother. 	According 	to 	Richter, 	Mother 	admitted 	that 	she 	had 	been 	doing
3 Appellant is the only party who filed a notice of appeal in this case. Neither the
Department, nor C.M., appealed the trial court’s termination order.

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methamphetamines and cocaine up until the day she gave birth to Olivia.
Olivia 	also 	tested 	positive 	for 	drugs 	and 	she 	experienced 	withdrawal
symptoms. 	The 	hospital 	diagnosed 	Olivia 	with 	low 	birth 	weight, 	neonatal
withdrawal from maternal use of drugs, pre-term birth at thirty-six weeks; and
newborn affected by maternal use of cocaine. 	Olivia remained in the hospital for
about a week.
Mother identified appellant as Olivia’s father. According to Richter, Mother
identified no other possible fathers. Richter further testified that Mother stayed in
the hospital for about a day before she left and then disappeared. Richter was unable
to locate Mother again.
Richter also talked to appellant on the telephone. Appellant informed Richter
he was aware that Olivia had been born. 	Appellant was not willing to meet with
Richter because he told her he was not certain whether he was the father and he
wanted to make sure before he got involved.
As part of her investigation, Richter did background and criminal history
checks on both Mother and appellant. 	Richter found that Mother had a history of
extensive involvement with CPS. 	Mother had had five children, all of whom had
been removed and placed elsewhere. 	Richter also discovered that Mother had a
criminal history, including drug cases, theft cases, and burglary cases.
Richter next testified about her research into appellant’s background. 	Her
investigation revealed that appellant did not have a history of involvement with CPS,
but he did have criminal cases. 	Appellant’s criminal history included drug cases,
theft cases, an indecency with a child conviction from 2001, and a related failure to
register as a sex offender.
As part of her investigation, Richter also spoke with hospital staff about

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Mother’s interactions with Olivia. The hospital staff reported that Olivia had to be
removed from Mother’s room due to concerns about Mother’s ability to properly
care for Olivia. 	The hospital staff also informed Richter that Mother was not
addressing Olivia’s needs when Olivia would cry. The staff further informed Richter
that the nursing staff would often have to come into Mother’s room and take over
feeding Olivia due to Mother passing out while feeding the baby. Richter prepared
an affidavit containing her findings when she completed her investigation. The
affidavit was filed with the trial court, and it was also admitted into evidence during
the trial.
When no potential family or kinship placement options were found, once
Olivia was discharged from the hospital, she was placed in foster care with appellees
B.G.W. and B.H. Children such as Olivia are placed in foster care so they have a
safe place to go. 	Richter told appellees that the length of Olivia’s stay with them
was unknown. 	Richter told appellees there was a potential father. 	Richter’s
involvement in the case ended at that point in time.
Christine Kalichman
Kalichman was a conservatorship worker at the Department and she worked
on Olivia’s case once Richter’s involvement ended. As a conservatorship worker,
Kalichman was expected to create family service plans for both parents, make
monthly visits with the parents, follow up on services, measure the progress being
made, and make home visits to ensure that the child’s needs were being met. While
Kalichman worked on Olivia’s case, the Department’s permanency goal was family
reunification with a concurrent goal of relative conservatorship. 	At that time,
Mother was the primary family being considered, but Kalichman did not have
contact with Mother throughout her involvement in the case.
Olivia was in foster care with appellees throughout Kalichman’s involvement

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in the case. Kalichman testified that Olivia had a stiff left arm that required physical
therapy during that time period. Kalichman further testified that Olivia was doing
well in appellees’ care and she had no concerns about that care. Appellees did ask
Kalichman about adopting Olivia, but she informed them that the case was too new
and that family placements would be explored first.
The trial court ordered appellant to undergo DNA testing to determine
whether he was Olivia’s father. According to Kalichman, appellant missed his first
appointment because he was in the hospital, but he made the second. 	The DNA
results were not received while Kalichman worked on Olivia’s case. Even though
the results had not been received, Kalichman discussed possible family placement
options with appellant. Appellant did not believe he was capable of caring for Olivia
due to his health issues, but he did identify his aunt, C.M., as a possible placement.
Kalichman developed a service plan for appellant. Appellant’s plan included drug
testing. Kalichman explained to appellant that missed drug tests counted as positive
tests. 	Kalichman testified that, while an alleged parent cannot be required to
participate in services, they can choose to participate in them. Appellant opted not
to participate in services until he was determined to be Olivia’s father through the
paternity test.
Appellant D.G. Appellant testified next. Appellant stated that he never told
the Department workers that he wanted Olivia to live with him. Appellant explained
that he told them that he wanted Olivia to live with his aunt because he knew his
own situation, which included a bad record and his poor health. Appellant testified
that he has Stage D congestive heart failure that requires frequent hospitalizations.
Appellant testified that he provided back-up documentation on his medical condition
to the caseworker assigned to the case, Amy Banks. Appellant stated that he gave
the Department permission to look at everything. Appellant continued that he cannot

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work as a result of his heart condition and he collects disability. As for his criminal
record, appellant admitted that he had a 2001 conviction for indecency with a child
which requires him to register as a sex offender. 	Appellant testified that he was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance in a different county. Finally, he
admitted that he had a pending charge of possession of a controlled substance, which
he refused to discuss.
Once appellant was adjudicated as Olivia’s father, the trial court ordered him
to follow his family service plan. 	Appellant’s service plan included parenting
classes and random drug testing. 	Appellant testified that he never attended the
required parenting classes. 	Appellant was notified to take a drug test on multiple
occasions by caseworker Amy Banks. Appellant denied that he was informed that
missed drug tests were treated as positive tests. Appellant never went for a drug test
throughout the duration of the case. Appellant explained that he missed some tests
because he was hospitalized. When asked why he did not go for tests once he got
out of the hospital, appellant offered that sometimes he was not feeling good, but
ultimately he admitted that he just “wasn’t going to do it. I didn’t want to do it.”
Appellant also testified about his relationship with Mother. Appellant allowed
Mother to use an RV he was working on when she had no other place to go.
Appellant knew Mother had drug issues and used drugs during her pregnancy.
Appellant was present at the RV with Mother when her water broke and she went
into labor. Appellant attempted to carry Mother to the car, but she could not make
it. They called 9-1-1 and a police officer delivered Olivia outside the RV. Appellant
was not allowed to go with Mother and Olivia to the hospital. 	Appellant instead
went the next day. Appellant visited with Mother, but he left soon after he arrived.
Appellant did not suspect that he was Olivia’s father because Mother had been with
other men. Regardless, appellant gave the hospital his address before he left.

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Appellant addressed his relationship with Olivia. Appellant testified that he
visits Olivia at least twice a week. 	His visits are supervised by his aunt, Olivia’s
great aunt.
Amy Banks
Amy Banks is a conservatorship caseworker for the Department. Banks took
over the case after Kalichman left the Department. Banks was the caseworker when
appellant’s DNA test results came back showing that appellant was Olivia’s father.
Banks notified appellant that he was Olivia’s father and it was at this point that
appellant identified his aunt C.M. as a possible placement.
Banks contacted C.M. and asked if she was willing to be a placement for
Olivia. 	C.M. agreed and Banks performed background checks and a preliminary
home study. 	C.M. had no history with CPS, but she did have a dismissed assault
family violence charge. 	Banks also visited C.M.’s home and found it to be clean,
orderly, and presenting no safety hazards. Banks observed that there was no child
furniture in the house, but stated that is common and the Department provides
assistance to address that need. C.M. disclosed that she had fibromyalgia and lupus,
but after Banks reviewed letters from C.M.’s doctors, she had no concerns about
C.M.’s ability to care for a child.
The Department contracted for a complete home study to be performed by CK
Family Services. 	The home study was completed, Banks reviewed it, and her
supervisor approved it. At this point the Department determined that Olivia should
be moved to C.M’s home. According to Banks, the Department made this decision
because Olivia would still receive assistance, but would be placed with relatives.
The transfer did not take place at that time because the Court Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA), Gail Hopshire, opposed the change. 	Banks explained that
Hopshire was concerned about C.M.’s age and her ability to handle a one-year-old

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child as well as with C.M.’s health issues. Hopshire did not, however, express any
safety concerns if Olivia was transferred to C.M.’s care. As a result of the lack of
an agreement on placement of Olivia, a hearing was held and the trial court ordered
Olivia transferred to C.M.’s care.
Banks reported that once paternity was established, appellant completed a
psychosocial assessment, partially attended individual therapy, participated in
visitation with Olivia, and provided items to C.M. to help take care of Olivia. Banks
clarified that, while appellant participated in therapy, he was discharged without
successfully completing the therapy. Appellant never did drug testing while Banks
was involved in the case even though he was notified that missed tests are treated as
positives. Appellant told Banks that he missed the tests because he was hospitalized,
but he did not provide Banks any documentation substantiating his claim. 	Banks
testified that appellant’s ability to interact with Olivia was limited by his health
condition, for example he had a limited ability to carry her. Banks was aware that
appellant was a sex offender. Banks testified that there had been no issues in that
area.
Banks testified that the Department sought a home study addendum when it
learned that some of the information C.M. had provided, that a son was in the
military, was not correct. 	The Department learned that the son was actually in
prison. 	The home study addendum was completed and the Department had no
further concerns about placing Olivia with C.M. 	Finally, Banks testified that the
Department’s goal at the time of trial was for C.M. to be appointed Olivia’s
permanent managing conservator. The Department was not seeking termination of
appellant’s parental rights and adoption because Olivia would possibly still qualify
for assistance if appellant’s rights were not terminated.
Devin Siordia

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Siordia is the chief program officer of CASA of Galveston County. 	In that
role, Siordia works directly with the advocacy department’s supervisors and also
with special programs. 	Siordia observed a Chick-fil‑A visit between appellant,
Olivia, and C.M. and had no concerns. 	Siordia made multiple home and daycare
visits including unannounced checks, and she found nothing concerning. 	Siordia
reported that C.M.’s home was appropriate under CASA’s standards and Olivia was
clean with no marks or bruises during visits and checks. 	Siordia testified that
placement with C.M. was in Olivia’s best interest because she was with her
biological family. 	Siordia admitted that CASA’s recommendation had previously
been for Olivia to remain with appellees, but it changed once she took over after the
previous CASA volunteer resigned.
Siordia was the Department’s final witness to testify. 	Appellant did not
present any witnesses because he had already testified and he rested at that point.
The remaining witnesses, with the exception of C.M., were presented by appellees.
Helen Wilson
Wilson is C.M.’s sister. 	Wilson had occasional contact with appellant and
C.M. 	Wilson learned that appellant was going to have a child with Mother while
Mother was still pregnant. 	When appellant told her that Olivia was placed with
C.M., Wilson asked him why did he want to make her leave a good foster home that
was taking good care of Olivia. Finally, Wilson testified that she knows her sister
and that C.M. was interested in taking care of Olivia to get the money provided to
foster parents by the State.
Gail Hopshire
Hopshire was the first CASA volunteer working on Olivia’s case and she
handled the job for about a year. 	Hopshire voiced concerns about placing Olivia

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with C.M. Among those concerns was C.M.’s age, chronic medical conditions, and
her 2020 arrest for assault on a family member. 	Hopshire’s opinion remained the
same, that it was in Olivia’s best interest to remain with appellees.
Cheyanne Rivera
Appellees served as foster parents to Rivera’s daughter. Rivera met appellees
during the reunification process with her daughter. 	Rivera found appellees to be
loving and sweet.
Carolyn Cooke
Cooke is a kinship development worker for the Department. Kinship workers
are assigned to a kinship or fictive kin caregiver once a child is placed in their home.
A kinship worker also provides support for the placement and guides the caregiver
through the process to become a foster parent. Kinship workers also assist caregivers
with resources and benefits that might be available through the Department and the
community.
Cooke was the kinship worker assigned to C.M. 	Cooke prepared the home
study addendum that had been requested by the conservatorship worker. 	The
addendum was requested because there were perceived issues with the original home
study. Cooke stated that Olivia was not removed from C.M.’s home after the home
study addendum was completed. 	Cooke testified that C.M. is a licensed foster
parent.
Ashley Gary
Gary was a Department caseworker who covered for Banks while Banks was
on medical leave. During that time, Gary conducted two home visits at appellees’
home. Gary observed that Olivia was thriving with appropriate care by appellees.
Gary discussed appellee foster mother’s desires regarding Olivia and she responded

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that they wished to adopt Olivia. 	This conversation occurred before Gary had
learned the details of what was happening in Olivia’s case, particularly that a father
was involved. 	Gary admitted that she should have checked the Department’s
information about the case before engaging in this type of conversation with the
foster parents. Ultimately, the foster parents and the CASA volunteer filled Gary in
on the details of Olivia’s case. 	Finally, Gary admitted that she advised appellee
foster mother that she should intervene in the Department’s lawsuit and how to go
about intervening. Gary testified that she referred appellees to an attorney and that
she was trained that this was part of her duties with respect to foster parents.
Angela Balderas Allison
Allison is a licensed clinical social worker. 	Allison completed appellant’s
psychosocial evaluation and conducted three individual therapy sessions with
appellant. 	Appellant reported no mental health issues or anxiety to Allison.
Appellant also denied any substance abuse. Appellant did disclose that he suffered
from congestive heart failure and he admitted a lengthy criminal history. Appellant
did not, however, disclose (1) that he had a possession of a controlled substance
conviction, or (2) his sex offender status. Ultimately, appellant was discharged from
individual 	therapy 	and 	Allison 	testified 	that 	his 	discharge 	was 	considered
“unsuccessful.”
Patrice Lewis
Lewis prepared the initial assessment of C.M.’s home. 	Lewis sent C.M a
questionnaire prior to her initial visit. 	Both C.M. and her adult son, K.M., were
present at the meeting. 	Lewis met first with C.M. 	C.M. did not complete the
questionnaire before Lewis arrived, so they reviewed it together. Lewis completed
the home assessment based on the information C.M. provided.

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C.M. reported her belief that Mother had a history of drug use and was
incapable of taking care of Olivia. C.M. also told Lewis that she believed neglect
had occurred and there was a need to protect Olivia because neither parent was able
to do so. 	C.M. voiced support for both of Olivia’s parents in their efforts at recovery
and to resolve their issues. 	C.M. also expressed her willingness to keep Olivia
long‑term, and that she has friends who were supportive of the placement and willing
to assist her during the transition period. C.M. reported no tobacco usage and Lewis
saw no signs tobacco was used in the home. C.M. admitted that she did not have a
good relationship with her family. C.M. also reported her readiness to be a support
system for Olivia.
C.M. reported that she had three adult sons: L.M., W.K., and K.M. 	C.M.
reported that one son, W.K., was in the military and she did not have contact
information for him. 	Lewis talked with K.M. next. 	K.M. lived in C.M.’s home.
K.M. reported that he was single, had no children, and was employed. He reported
no 	involvement 	with 	the 	Department, 	no 	substance 	abuse 	history, 	criminal
convictions, or mental health issues.
Lewis did have concerns, which she included in the home assessment. These
included (1) C.M’s self-reported involvement in an assault where she reported that
the charge had been dismissed; 	(2) child vulnerability due to C.M.’s age; (3)
insufficient references; (4) there was no emergency contact at the time of the
assessment; and (5) Lewis was unable to contact one adult son.
Zendra Miranda
Miranda was the director of Olivia’s daycare while she was in appellees’ care.
Miranda knew appellees only through that contact. Miranda found appellees to be
nurturing with Olivia, attentive to her, and supportive of her. Miranda testified that
she had no concerns about appellees’ care of Olivia.

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Ashley Myles
Myles was a case manager at The Sanctuary Foster Care Services and served
as appellees’ case manager while they cared for Olivia. Myles saw them monthly.
Myles described appellees’ home as loving and caring. Myles described it as one of
the “good homes” on her caseload. Appellees were a licensed foster-to-adopt home.
Myles testified that appellee foster mother believed from the arrival of Olivia in her
home, that adoption of Olivia was likely based on information she had received from
a prior Sanctuary caseworker.
K.M., C.M.’s adult son
K.M. is C.M.’s son and Olivia’s cousin. Appellant is also his cousin and he
testified that he “knows him.” K.M. testified that he occasionally spends time with
his mother’s family. K.M. testified that his mother does not currently smoke. K.M.
also did not see appellant at Thanksgiving or Christmas. K.M. had observed strong
bonding between Olivia and C.M. and he had no caregiving concerns about C.M.
K.M. referred to C.M. as an outstanding parent.
Vanessa Howard
Howard has known appellant and C.M. about fifteen years, she considers them
family, and she described a common‑law style relationship with appellant. Howard
picks Olivia up from daycare or C.M.’s house a couple of times a week, helps with
supplies and doctor visits, and assists appellant with transportation due to appellant’s
health. Howard serves as an emergency contact for C.M. as well as acts as a support
system for both C.M. and appellant. Howard testified that she is willing to continue
supporting C.M. and Olivia regardless of her relationship with appellant. Howard
has observed a strong bond between Olivia and C.M. 	Howard occasionally
supervises visits between appellant and Olivia and she had never observed Olivia

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alone with appellant. Finally, Howard is employed in the UTMB billing department.
Mark Wilkerson
Wilkerson is a private investigator hired by appellees. Wilkerson prepared a
report of his investigation and it was admitted into evidence as an exhibit. Wilkerson
testified that he did not observe appellant making an unsupervised visit with Olivia.
He also never saw C.M. having difficulties keeping up with Olivia. Wilkerson never
saw C.M. act improperly with Olivia. 	Wilkerson also found that appellant was
compliant with his sex offender registration.
Appellee B.G.W.
B.G.W. and her husband, appellees and intervenors, were Olivia’s foster
parents for about 346 days. They are a licensed foster family. They intervened in
the lawsuit because they love Olivia, want what is best for her, and believe adopting
her is in Olivia’s best interest. As intervenors they were seeking the termination of
appellant’s parental rights and adoption of Olivia. B.G.W. hoped appellant would
still be able to have contact if his rights were terminated.
B.G.W. is a teacher. Her household consists of her husband, B.H., a newborn
child, and occasionally her father and stepmother. 	B.G.W.’s seventeen-year-old
stepson also lives with them at times. Appellees also have a large extended family.
They all help with Olivia’s care. 	Once it was determined that Olivia had
developmental issues, appellees have made certain she has received appropriate
medical care and therapies. 	B.G.W. has no information that Olivia was unsafe
staying with C.M.
C.M.
C.M. called herself as her only witness. C.M. testified she is appellant’s aunt
and helped to raise him. Once the DNA test confirmed that Olivia was appellant’s

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child, C.M. was immediately willing to care for her. C.M.’s opinion did not change
once she learned about Olivia’s needs. C.M. admitted that she has fibromyalgia and
lupus but stated those conditions do not impact her ability to care for Olivia. C.M.
continued that she had not experienced any recent fibromyalgia flare-ups, nor any
issues related to her lupus. C.M. stated that she must limit her sun exposure because
of the lupus. C.M. stated that she has no concern about her ability to care for Olivia.
C.M. testified that she is a licensed foster parent. C.M. denied financial motivations
for becoming a licensed foster parent. 	She instead went through the licensing
process so that she could be sole managing conservator of Olivia.
C.M. has lived in her home for about five years and has no plans to move.
C.M.’s son lives with her in the house part time. 	He also lives with his father the
remainder of the time. Olivia has her own room in C.M.’s house and it is equipped
with both a baby bed and a queen bed. C.M. also keeps a nebulizer, an EpiPen, and
a humidifier in Olivia’s room as well. C.M. uses them to help with Olivia’s asthma
and allergies, or to deal with an emergency. C.M. also has a playroom stocked with
toys for Olivia.
C.M. testified that Olivia has made progress while in her care. 	C.M. stated
that Olivia is very intelligent and learns quickly. 	Olivia is walking, but she drags
her leg. 	C.M. was shown how to do therapy to address Olivia’s leg-dragging. 	In
addition, Olivia is receiving occupational therapy and physical therapy at UTMB,
and she is scheduled to begin speech therapy in the near future. C.M. also stated that
Olivia is potty training. Olivia attends daycare where C.M. reports she is doing well.
C.M. and Olivia attend church weekly.
C.M. supervises visits between appellant and Olivia and never delegates that
responsibility. C.M. believes those visits have gone well and she has had no safety
issues during appellant’s visitations. Appellant has visitations two or three times a

17
week although he has missed some as a result of hospitalizations. C.M. expressed
concern that appellant has a pending drug possession charge, did not complete drug
testing, nor take parenting 	classes. 	C.M. believed 	that 	appellant’s 	frequent
hospitalizations contributed to both the lack of drug testing and parenting classes.
C.M. denied telling Amy Banks, or anyone else, that her son, W.K., was in
the military. C.M. identified her son, L.M., as a person who would care for Olivia
if anything happened to her. 	When she was asked how many granddaughters she
had, C.M. initially answered two, but corrected herself when prompted by the
questioning attorney, to three. 	C.M. admitted that her granddaughters had never
seen or met Olivia. 	Finally, C.M. testified that she wants to be designated sole
managing conservator of Olivia so Olivia can continue living with her.
At the close of the evidence, the jury terminated appellant’s parental rights
based on Ground E (endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child)
and the best interest of the child. 	The jury also named appellees as Permanent
Managing Conservators of Olivia. Soon thereafter, the trial court signed an Order
of Termination which reflected the jury’s verdict. This appeal followed.
A NALYSIS
Appellant raises three issues in this appeal challenging the trial court’s
termination order. We address appellant’s issues in order.
I. 	The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s
motion to strike appellees’ intervention.
Appellant argues in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied his motion to strike appellees’ intervention because they did not establish
standing to pursue the termination of his parental rights. 	In appellant’s view,
appellees did not have standing because they served as Olivia’s foster parents for
less than twelve months, the minimum time provided for foster parents to have

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standing to file an original Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR).
See Tex. Fam. Code § 102.003(a)(12) (stating that a foster parent may file an original
SAPCR suit if a child was placed by the Department in the person’s home for at least
twelve months ending not more than ninety days preceding the date of the filing of
the petition).4 As explained below, we disagree.
A. 	Standard of review and applicable law
In termination cases, trial courts enjoy discretion when deciding a motion to
strike an intervention. 	In re H.B.N.S., Nos. 14-05-00410-CV, 14-06-00102-CV,
2007 WL 2034913, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 17, 2007, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision
must be arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. A trial court has no discretion in determining
what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Camberg,
247 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to de novo review.
Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002). 	When
construing statutes, our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the
legislature’s intent. Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd.,
555 S.W.3d 29, 38 (Tex. 2018). 	We rely on the plain meaning of the text as
expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative
definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd
results. 	Id. 	We presume that the legislature intended the entire statute to be
effective. 	Vitol, Inc. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 529 S.W.3d 159, 168 (Tex.
4 This section of the Family Code was amended effective September 1, 2025. 	The
Department initiated this litigation on October 28, 2024, and appellees first intervened in the
litigation on August 18, 2025, before the effective date of the amendments. We therefore apply
the former law and all citations to the Family Code in this opinion are to the version effective prior
to the September 1, 2025 amendments.

19
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). 	We also presume that the legislature
chose a statute’s language with care, intentionally including each word chosen, and
omitting words purposefully. Id. at 168. Another fundamental principle of statutory
construction is that, when construing a statute, a reviewing court must consider the
act as a whole and not just as single phrases, clauses, or sentences. Fredericksburg
Care Co. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Tex. 2015). We must give effect to each
provision of a statute so that none is rendered meaningless or mere surplusage. TIC
Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016).
The 	inquiry 	here 	focuses 	on 	the 	statutory 	prerequisites 	for 	standing
established by the legislature. See In re S.A.M., 321 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). When standing has been conferred by statute,
the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis. 	In re
K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
Standing to intervene is determined at the time the intervention is filed. 	In re
H.B.N.S., 2007 WL 2034913, at *4. Generally, an intervenor must have standing to
maintain an original suit in order to intervene. In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 83 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
B. 	Appellees had standing to intervene.
While appellant focuses his argument only on the twelve-month time period
found in section 102.003(a)(12), appellees actually alleged standing under section
102.005(3) and (5).5 Thus, appellant’s first issue presents a question involving the
5 Appellant also mentions section 102.004(b-1) in his standing argument. 	Section
102.004(b-1) states that a foster parent may only be granted leave to intervene in a suit seeking
possessory conservatorship if they meet the requirements established by section 102.003(a)(12).
See Tex. Fam. Code § 102.004(b-1). 	Because we conclude section 102.005(5) provides an
independent basis for appellees’ standing, we conclude we need not separately address section
102.004(b-1).

20
interaction between two sections of the Family Code, section 102.003(a)(12) and
section 102.005.
Section 102.003(a)(12) provides that a foster parent of a child placed by the
Department in the person’s home for at least twelve months ending not more than
ninety days preceding the date of the filing of the petition has standing to file an
original SAPCR suit. 	See Tex. Fam. Code § 102.003(a)(12); In re A.L.H., 515
S.W.3d at 83. Section 102.005(5), on the other hand, allows “another adult whom
the court determines to have had substantial past contact with the child sufficient to
warrant standing” to file an original suit “requesting only an adoption or for
termination of the parent-child relationship joined with a petition for adoption.” Id.
at 	§ 	102.005(5). 	Appellant 	argues 	that, 	between 	the 	two 	statutes, 	section
102.003(a)(12) is the more specific because it addresses foster parents’ standing to
file a SAPCR, while section 102.005 generically references only “an adult” or
“another adult.” 	Id. 	Appellant continues that this more specific provision must
control because construing “an adult,” or “another adult” to include foster parents
would 	render 	the 	twelve 	month 	requirement 	found 	in 	section 	102.003(12)
meaningless. 	In making this argument, appellant asks this court to add language,
such as “an adult other than a foster parent,” or “another adult except a foster parent,”
to section 102.005(3) and (5). This we cannot do. 	See Christus Health Gulf Coast
v. Aetna, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2013) (“We must take the Legislature at
its word, respect its policy choices, and resist revising a statute under the guise of
interpreting it.”). If the legislature wished to exclude foster parents it knew how to
write the statute to accomplish that goal. 	See In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 884–
85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (recognizing legislature’s policy
choice to expand standing beyond the standing provided by section 102.003). 	We
must respect the policy choice the legislature made by choosing to not exclude foster

21
parents from the coverage of section 102.005. Id.
Our sister courts who have considered this issue have both agreed. See In re
K.T.R., No. 10-22-00219-CV, 2022 WL 17834491, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec.
21, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The plain language of the Family Code allows
foster parents to establish standing other than through Section 102.003(a)(12)”); In
re C.E.L., No. 09-21-00294-CV, 2022 WL 619670, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Mar. 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding foster parents had standing to
intervene 	with 	a 	petition 	for 	termination 	and 	adoption 	pursuant 	to 	section
102.005(3)).
This 	interpretation 	does 	not 	render section 102.003(a)(12) meaningless
because of the broad nature of SAPCRs. 	Section 102.003 establishes general
standing to file a SAPCR. See Tex. Fam. Code § 102.003. A SAPCR is a suit filed
under Title 5 of the Family Code which requests the appointment of a managing
conservator or a possessory conservator, access to or support of a child, or the
establishment or termination of the parent-child relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code §
101.032(a). Section 102.005 on the other hand establishes those persons who have
standing to file a specific subset of SAPCRs, a suit requesting adoption, or a suit for
both termination of the parent-child relationship and adoption. Id. at § 102.005. The
legislature, exercising its policy-making role, chose the broad language found in
section 102.005(5) allowing “another adult whom the court determines to have had
substantial past contact with the child sufficient to warrant standing” to file a suit
seeking adoption, or a suit for both termination of the parent-child relationship and
adoption. 	Id. at § 102.005(5). 	It is not this court’s function to second-guess the
legislature’s policy choices. 	See In re S.A.M., 321 S.W.3d at 792 (“It is not this
court’s office to choose between competing policies addressed by the legislature’s
chosen language.”); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

22
Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding) (“Unless and until the Texas Legislature amends the
Texas Family Code to achieve the result Sullivan urges, there is no basis to deny
standing in this type of case.”). Because appellees had standing to intervene in the
litigation initiated by the Department, we overrule appellant’s first issue.
II. 	Sufficient evidence supports the termination of appellant’s parental
rights.
Appellant argues in his second issue that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to terminate his parental rights under Ground E of section 161.001(b)(1)
of the Family Code. Appellant argues in his third issue that the evidence is legally
and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination of his parental
rights was in Olivia’s best interest. We address each contention in order.
A. 	Standard of Review
In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship under Family Code
section 161.001, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence one
or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (1) of section 161.001(b)
and that termination is in the best interest of the child under subsection (2). See Tex.
Fam. Code § 161.001; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019); In re J.L., 163
S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious
matter implicating fundamental constitutional rights. 	See In re of J.F.G., 627
S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2021); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 531 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Although parental rights are of constitutional
magnitude, they are not absolute. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tex. 2018);
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
Due 	to 	the 	severity 	and 	permanency 	of 	terminating 	the 	parent-child
relationship, Texas requires clear and convincing evidence to support such an order.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001; In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 310; In re J.F.C., 96

23
S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002). 	“Clear and convincing evidence” means “the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex.
Fam. Code § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264. 	This heightened burden of
proof results in a “correspondingly searching standard of appellate review.” 	In re
A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination
case, we must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged
finding to determine whether a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief
or conviction that the finding was true. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex.
2009). We assume that the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding
if a reasonable fact finder could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a
reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved. 	See id.; In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d
46, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Because of the heightened
standard, we also must be mindful of any undisputed evidence contrary to the finding
and consider that evidence in our analysis. In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 531.
In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence under the clear-and-
convincing standard, we consider and weigh disputed evidence contrary to the
finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631;
In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence
that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so
significant that a fact finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. 	In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at
345. We give due deference to the fact finder’s findings, and we cannot substitute
our own judgment for that of the fact finder. 	In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108
(Tex. 2006).

24
To affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one
termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best-interest finding—
even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground. 	In re N.G.,
577 S.W.3d at 232; In re L.M., 572 S.W.3d 823, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
B. 	Sufficient evidence supports termination under Ground E.
Appellant argues in his second issue that legally and factually insufficient
evidence supports termination of his parental rights under Ground E of section
161.001(1) of the Family Code. We disagree.
The jury found that appellant violated former subsection E of section
161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code. The trial court terminated appellant’s parental
rights based on that finding. Subsection E provides that a trial court may terminate
the parent-child relationship if the fact finder determines by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent has:
(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-
being of the child.
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Under subsection E, the evidence must show the endangerment was the result
of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failure to act. 	In re S.R., 452
S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Termination
under subsection E must be based on more than a single act or omission; the statute
requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent. Id.
A court properly may consider actions and inactions occurring both before and after
a child’s birth to establish a “course of conduct.” 	Id. 	While endangerment often
involves physical endangerment, the statute does not require that conduct be directed

25
at a child, or that the child actually suffer injury; rather, the specific danger to the
child’s well-being may be inferred from a parent’s misconduct alone. Id. A parent’s
conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
child’s physical and emotional well-being. Id. A parent’s drug use can also qualify
as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct endangering the child’s
well-being. Id. at 361. Continued illegal drug use after a child’s removal is conduct
that 	jeopardizes 	parental 	rights 	and 	may 	be 	considered 	as 	establishing 	an
endangering course of conduct. 	Id. at 362. 	Finally, the relationship of the parent
and child, as well as a parent’s efforts to improve or enhance parenting skills, are
relevant in determining whether a parent’s conduct results in endangerment under
subsection E. See id. at 362. The record is replete with evidence from each of these
categories.
Evidence admitted during the trial established that appellant has an extensive
criminal history. This evidence was entered through judgments as well as through
appellant’s own testimony and admissions. Appellant’s criminal history included a
conviction for indecency with a child as well as for arson, burglary of a habitation,
possession of a controlled substance, and failure to register as a sex offender. This
history of criminal activity subjects Olivia to a life of uncertainty and instability
thereby endangering her physical and emotional well-being. 	See In re J.J.L., 578
S.W.3d 601, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“A parent’s
criminal conduct and imprisonment are relevant to the question of whether the parent
engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the well-being of the child”).
Evidence was also presented that, at the time of trial, appellant had a pending
case against him for possession of cocaine. 	The trial evidence established that
appellant was arrested for this charge after appellant had been adjudicated as Olivia’s
father. 	The evidence indicates the alleged conduct occurred in April 2025, which

26
would have been before the trial court’s initial paternity order. But, appellant’s aunt,
Helen Wilson, testified that appellant told her he was going to be a father while
Mother was still pregnant. 	The jury could have believed this testimony and
concluded that appellant’s continued drug abuse knowing he was going to be a father
endangered Olivia. 	See id. at 611 (“A parent’s continuing substance abuse can
qualify as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct endangering the
child’s well-being.”): In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 361–62 (“Continued illegal drug use
after a child’s removal is conduct that jeopardizes parental rights and may be
considered as establishing an endangering course of conduct.”).
In addition, there was testimony from appellant and Amy Banks, as well as
documents admitted into evidence, establishing that appellant did not submit to court
ordered drug testing in compliance with his service plan. Appellant explained that
he missed some tests because he was hospitalized. 	When asked why he did not go
for tests once he left the hospital, appellant offered that sometimes he was not feeling
good, but ultimately, he admitted that he just “wasn’t going to do it. I didn’t want
to do it.” 	While appellant testified he was not aware these missed tests would be
treated as positive results, caseworker Kalichman testified that she did inform
appellant that missed drug tests would count as positive drug tests. See T.D. v. Tex.
Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 683 S.W.3d 901, 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024,
no pet.) (“The factfinder may infer from a parent’s missing Department-requested
illegal-drug tests during a parental-rights-termination suit that the tests missed would
have come up positive.”). 	The jury, as the fact finder, could have believed
Kalichman’s testimony, disbelieved appellant’s testimony, and concluded that
appellant chose to miss drug tests because he was still engaging in illegal substance
abuse.
There was also evidence that appellant knew Mother was using illegal drugs

27
while she was pregnant and he chose to not do anything about it. 	As explained
above, the jury could have believed Wilson’s testimony that appellant knew he was
the father while Mother was pregnant. It was undisputed that appellant did nothing
to try to protect an unborn Olivia from Mother’s illegal drug use. 	This evidence
supports the endangerment finding. 	See In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749–50 (Tex.
2022) (stating that a parent’s knowledge of the other parent’s drug use during
pregnancy and corresponding failure to attempt to protect the unborn child from the
effects of the drug abuse can contribute to an endangering environment and support
an endangerment finding).
Appellant admitted that he did not attend the parenting classes required by his
service plan. In addition, the evidence established that appellant did not successfully
complete his required individual therapy. 	This evidence also supports the jury’s
endangerment finding. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 362–65.
Reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the termination
finding under subsection E, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have
formed a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the finding that appellant engaged
in endangering conduct and left Olivia in endangering conditions. See In re J.O.A.,
283 S.W.3d at 344. 	In light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a
reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of this termination finding is
not so significant that a fact finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief
or conviction as to the truth of these termination findings. 	See In re H.R.M., 209
S.W.3d at 108. We hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
the predicate termination finding under subsection E. 	We overrule appellant’s
second issue.
C. 	Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best interest finding.
Appellant argues in his third issue that legally and factually insufficient

28
evidence supports the finding that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in
Olivia’s best interest.
Termination 	must 	be 	in 	the 	child’s 	best 	interest. 	Tex. 	Fam. 	Code
§ 161.001(b)(2). Texas courts presume two conditions to be in a child’s best interest:
(1) prompt, permanent placement in a safe environment, id. § 263.307(a); and
(2) remaining with the child’s natural parent. In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). 	The best-interest analysis focuses
on the child, not the parent. 	In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2018, no pet.).
A court may consider these non-exclusive factors, known as the Holley
factors, in its best-interest analysis: the desires of the child; the physical and
emotional needs of the child now and in the future; the physical and emotional
danger to the child now and in the future; the parental abilities of the persons seeking
custody; the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting
the best interest of the child; the plans for the child by the individuals or agency
seeking custody; the stability of the home or proposed placement; acts or omissions
of the parent 	that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not
appropriate; and any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). This list of factors is not exhaustive, and evidence
is not required on all the factors to support a finding that termination is in the child’s
best interest. In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2012, no pet.). Further, while no one factor is controlling, analysis of one factor may
be adequate in a particular factual situation to support a finding that termination is
in the best interest of the child. In re R.H.W. III, 542 S.W.3d. 724, 735 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). 	The Family Code also identifies factors the
court may consider in evaluating a parent’s willingness and ability to provide the

29
child with a safe environment. 	See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(b). In making this
analysis, we must bear in mind that permanence is of paramount importance in
considering a child’s present and future needs. 	In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
We turn first to Olivia’s desires and needs. Olivia was eighteen months old
at the time of trial and was therefore too young to express a meaningful preference
regarding termination of appellant’s rights. 	In this situation, the fact finder may
consider whether Olivia has bonded with her foster family, has been well-cared for
while in their care, and has spent minimal time with her father, appellant. See In re
J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). There
was evidence that Olivia had bonded with appellees while in their care. 	The
evidence also establishes that Olivia has spent minimal time with appellant and that
was only through supervised visits. Because appellant is a registered sex offender
that would be a consideration indefinitely. There is also evidence that Olivia bonded
with C.M. and was receiving necessary services, but, there was also evidence in the
record that Olivia regressed in her speech development after being placed with C.M.
This factor weighs in favor of the best interest finding.
Next, we consider Olivia’s current and future emotional and physical needs
and the present and future emotional and physical danger factors together. 	The
evidence was undisputed that Olivia is developmentally delayed as a result of
Mother’s drug use which will require consistent future physical, occupational, and
speech therapy to address. 	Olivia also has medical issues related to asthma and
allergies. The evidence established that appellant had no ability or plans to address
those issues beyond urging the appointment of C.M. as permanent managing
conservator. Evidence established that appellees were meeting Olivia’s needs while
she was in their care and they had plans to continue providing the services and

30
therapies Olivia needs if appellant’s parental rights were terminated and she was
returned to their care.
Turning to the present and future emotional and physical danger, the evidence
mentioned above in the endangerment section weighs heavily against appellant. The
risk that appellant might be sent to prison presents a risk of future emotional and
physical harm to Olivia. 	In re J.L.L., 578 S.W.3d 601, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). 	While the record evidence points out that there were no
safety concerns for Olivia in C.M.’s care, we conclude this does not offset the
problems presented by appellant’s issues. Further, C.M.’s age, she was in her sixties
at the time of trial, and chronic health issues, must be considered because, if
something happens to C.M. such that she can no longer care for Olivia, Olivia’s life
could be thrown into turmoil as a new caregiver would need to be found because
appellant expressed that he was not capable of caring for a child due to his health
and other issues. 	In that situation, we must look to C.M.’s extended family. 	The
evidence established that C.M. was estranged from much of her family, and the
person she indicated would take over caring for Olivia if anything happened to her,
one of her adult sons, did not testify during the trial. 	The fact finder could have
considered this evidence when making its best interest determination. In re R.H.W.
III, 542 S.W.3d. at 735 (stating that in conducting a best interest analysis, a court
may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the
evidence as well as the direct evidence). As for appellees, the evidence establishes
that there was little to no risk of present or future emotional or physical danger to
Olivia. 	There is also evidence that appellees had a supportive extended family
already involved in Olivia’s life who were willing and able to help and support her
if the need arose. Considering both Olivia’s present and future needs and any present
and future dangers, we conclude these factors weigh in favor of the best interest

31
finding. 	See In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d at 927 (stating that permanence is of
paramount importance in best interest analysis).
The 	parenting 	abilities 	of 	the 	individuals 	seeking 	custody 	and 	their
willingness to fulfill the parental role are factors that impact the best interest
analysis. As stated above, appellant admitted he is not capable of fulfilling the duties
of a parent and asked for his aunt to be designated Olivia’s permanent managing
conservator. Appellant also demonstrated little interest in learning how to become
a better parent because he chose to not participate in any parenting classes offered
by the Department. Appellant also showed little interest in addressing his own issues
because he chose to not participate in the required drug testing and he was discharged
from individual therapy without successfully completing it. Turning to C.M., while
the evidence suggests she adequately performs the duties of a parent to Olivia, the
evidence supports that she is estranged from most of her family. The evidence also
establishes that C.M. rarely interacts with her own children and grandchildren
beyond her adult son who occasionally stays at C.M.’s house. The fact finder could
have inferred from this evidence that C.M’s parenting skills and willingness to fulfill
a parental role were lacking. See In re J.G.S., 550 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2018, no pet.) (affirming best interest finding based on inferences from
admitted evidence); In re R.H.W. III, 542 S.W.3d. at 735 (stating that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to support termination). 	Conversely, the evidence
establishes that appellees were good, involved foster parents to Olivia, planned to
adopt her if appellant’s parental rights were terminated, and were supported in those
efforts by an extended family. This factor weighs in favor of the best interest finding.
Turning to the stability of the home or the proposed placement, the evidence
establishes that appellees had a stable, loving home environment with the resources
to support Olivia and address her continuing needs caused by Mother’s drug use.

32
Appellant, on the other hand, did not have stable housing nor lifestyle, and was at
risk of returning to prison on a drug charge. 	C.M. had lived in her home for five
years and had equipped it to handle a young child by the time of the trial. 	C.M.
would have continuing access to resources through the Department to assist her in
taking care of Olivia. 	There was evidence however, that C.M. was motivated to
become Olivia’s permanent managing conservator to gain access to the financial
resources provided by the Department. The fact finder could have considered this
evidence in making its best interest determination. We still conclude, however, that
this factor is neutral.
Next, we examine any acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and any excuse for the parent’s
acts or omissions. 	Appellant is a registered sex offender which weighs heavily
against appellant. Further, appellant did nothing to stop Mother from using illegal
drugs while she was pregnant. Appellant offered as an excuse that he was not certain
he was the father, but there was also evidence that he told his aunt, Helen Wilson,
he was the father while Mother was still pregnant. Additionally, appellant did not
complete a single drug test even though he had been warned that missed tests are
treated as positive results. He proffered that he missed some of the tests because he
was hospitalized, but he failed to turn over to the caseworkers assigned to Olivia’s
case any documentation supporting his contention. 	With respect to the tests he
missed when he was not hospitalized, appellant’s offered explanation was that he
just did not want to do them. 	As for C.M., she was unaware Mother was pregnant
and that appellant was in a relationship with Mother, and C.M. first found out about
Olivia from appellant after she was born. C.M.’s next conversation with appellant
about Olivia did not occur until after the paternity test established that appellant was
Olivia’s father. This evidence further supports that C.M. had little contact with the

33
members of her family, including appellant, and lacked a support system to help her
with Olivia going forward. There was no evidence in the record that appellees were
responsible for any acts or omissions that indicated they were not capable of an
appropriate parent-child relationship. This factor weighs in favor of the best interest
finding.
Having reviewed the record evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s
best interest finding, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the finding that termination of appellant’s
parental rights was in Olivia’s best interest. In light of the entire record, the disputed
evidence that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the best-
interest finding is not so significant that a fact finder could not reasonably have
formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of appellant’s parental rights was
in Olivia’s best interest. See In re S.R, 452 S.W.3d at 370–71. We hold the evidence
is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that termination of the parent-
child relationship was in Olivia’s best interest. We overrule appellant’s third issue.
C ONCLUSION
Having overruled appellant’s issues raised in his appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights as to Olivia.
/s/ Chad Bridges
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher, and Justices Bridges, and
Boatman.