Lanoard Murad Bayouth v. Tammie Lynn Bayouth — Opinion by Justice Trotter

Opinion filed October 22, 2026
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-25-00090-CV
__________
IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ADDISON KAY BAYOUTH, AN
INCAPACITATED PERSON
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1777
O P I N I O N
This appeal arises from the trial court’s order that dismissed Appellant
LaNoard Murad Bayouth’s application for appointment as permanent guardian of
the estate of Addison Kay Bayouth and awarded attorney’s fees to Appellee,
Tammie Lynn Bayouth.
In two issues, LaNoard argues: (1) the trial court erred when it found that
LaNoard lacked standing to file a guardianship application because he had an interest

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that was adverse to Addison; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it
awarded Tammie attorney’s fees based on a finding that LaNoard’s application was
brought 	in 	bad 	faith 	and 	lacked 	just 	cause. 	See 	T EX. 	E ST. 	CODE 	A NN.
§ 1055.001(b)(1) (West Supp. 2025), § 1155.151(c) (West 2020). We affirm.
I. Factual Background
LaNoard and Tammie divorced on July 1, 2010. The divorce proceeding was
filed in the 326th District Court of Taylor County, in cause no. 41062-C. Tammie
was awarded primary custody of her and LaNoard’s daughter, Addison, and
LaNoard was ordered to pay child support to Tammie for Addison’s benefit. This
child support obligation continued after Addison turned eighteen because she is
disabled and has been adjudicated to be totally incapacitated. 	Tammie, with no
objection from LaNoard, was appointed as the permanent guardian of Addison’s
person on July 15, 2024.
Because LaNoard became disabled, he received monthly social security
disability payments. LaNoard paid $2,650 per month in child support for Addison’s
benefit, which was paid directly to Tammie. An additional monthly social security
disability payment of $1,829, because of LaNoard’s disability, was also paid for
Addison’s benefit directly to Tammie as Addison’s representative payee. Tammie
also received a lump-sum social security payment of $21,264 on Addison’s behalf
in December 2023.
On January 31, 2024, LaNoard filed a petition to modify his child support
obligation in the 326th District Court, in cause no. 41062-C. On August 30, 2024,
LaNoard filed an amended petition to modify his child-support obligation alleging
that he was entitled to a credit against his child support payments equal to the amount
of the social security payments that he made to Tammie on behalf of Addison. See
T EX. FAM . CODE A NN. § 154.132 (West Supp. 2025).

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On September 13, 2024, LaNoard filed the instant application to be appointed
permanent guardian of Addison’s estate. In his application, LaNoard asserted that
“[a]lternatives 	to 	guardianship 	and 	available 	supports 	and 	services 	to 	avoid
guardianship were considered, but none were feasible and would avoid the need for
a guardianship of the estate.” Furthermore, his application listed Addison’s property
as “personal effects [and] monthly Social Security benefits in the estimated amount
of $1,850.00, and . . . child support from [LaNoard] in the amount of $2,650.00.”
In response to LaNoard’s application, Tammie filed a motion in limine
pursuant to Section 1055.001(c) of the Estates Code, asserting that LaNoard lacked
standing to apply for guardianship of Addison’s estate because of his adverse interest
that arose from his filing of the petition to modify his child support obligation in the
326th District Court. LaNoard responded that his only adverse interest pertained to
Tammie, not Addison, because Tammie received the payments; on appeal, he
contends that he was only seeking to receive the statutory credit provided by
Section 154.132 of the Family Code, as alleged in his amended petition to modify.
He also stated in his response, without including it in his application, that the reason
he was pursuing guardianship was to prevent Tammie’s mismanagement of the
payments that were due Addison.
At the hearing on the motion in limine, Tammie testified that Addison was
nineteen and diagnosed with Down Syndrome, which required a heightened level of
care, with Tammie being her primary caretaker. Tammie stated that a special needs
trust with First Financial Trust and Asset Management Company was created for
Addison soon after she was born that “has not really been funded,” but it was
something she wanted to fund; she testified that she tried to discuss the matter of
funding the trust with LaNoard but he would not agree to it. Tammie testified that
she originally provided her personal bank account information to deposit Addison’s

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social security payments in that account but about four months later, she opened a
separate account for Addison for the monies to be deposited into. 	Tammie also
described how the litigation had “been hard on Addison” and that it took time away
from Tammie’s care for her and was a financial burden.
LaNoard testified that, by the modification proceeding that he initiated in the
326th District Court, it was his intent to reduce his child support obligation by
“$1,800 per month or more.” 	LaNoard acknowledged that he did not pay his
monthly child support directly to Addison and both the child support payments and
the social security benefits for her benefit were paid directly to Tammie. LaNoard
further acknowledged the existence of the irrevocable special needs trust for the
benefit of Addison that was managed by the First Financial Trust Department, which
was obligated to manage the trust “for Addison’s needs based on her best interest.”
LaNoard 	stated 	that 	he 	filed 	his 	application 	for 	guardianship 	“because 	of
mismanagement of the money and how [Addison would] be taken care of afterwards
if it’s continued to be mismanaged.” LaNoard also stated that he had not proposed
alternatives to guardianship but that he was “willing to discuss all options.”
On 	cross-examination 	by 	Addison’s 	attorney 	ad 	litem, 	who 	supported
Tammie’s 	motion 	in 	limine, 	LaNoard 	acknowledged 	that 	Tammie 	was 	the
representative payee for the social security payments due Addison, Tammie was the
obligee under the trial court’s child support order, and the only other property that
Addison 	possessed 	consisted 	of 	nominal 	personal 	effects. 	LaNoard 	also
acknowledged that a special needs trust was an alternative to guardianship for the
management of any property that belonged to Addison. 	LaNoard asserted that he
explored one alternative ground to guardianship that was not acceptable to him—a
special needs trust controlled by Tammie. The following exchange then occurred:

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Q. 	All right. 	Your current special needs trust is operated by -- the
trustee is First Financial Trust, right?
A. Right.
Q. So there are other trustees that would be possibilities?
A. True.
Q. Okay. What other alternatives did you explore?
A. None.
After this exchange, LaNoard acknowledged that he considered an Achieving a
Better Life Experience (ABLE) account but did not find it to be a reasonable
alternative because the funding requirements were capped at one-hundred thousand
dollars. When asked why the cap concerned him given the existing trust, LaNoard
explained that he was concerned about how the trust was managed by First Financial
and his lack of input into the creation of any trust for Addison’s benefit. However,
LaNoard later stated, “I have no concerns about how [the trust] is being run.”
Finally, LaNoard answered affirmatively when asked whether he was aware that
alternatives to guardianship exist that he and Tammie could explore.
The trial court, in ruling on Tammie’s motion in limine, stated:
The fact of the matter is, there was a filing to establish an estate
-- guardian of the estate position. In looking at the pleadings in and of
themselves, I think the case law is pretty firm on this. 	That in and of
itself proves there is an adverse interest; therefore, there is a conflict.
I’m going to grant your motion in limine.
Hearing arguments in regards to the just cause [and] bad faith
based on the fact of the timing of the filings, I do find bad faith and just
cause. I award attorney’s fees.
The trial court signed an order consistent with its oral pronouncements. 	See E ST.
§§ 1055.001(b)(1), (c), 1155.151(c). No findings of fact or conclusions of law were
requested or filed.

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II. Analysis
A. 	LaNoard’s Standing
In his first issue, LaNoard argues that the trial court erred when it determined
that LaNoard had an interest adverse to Addison and therefore lacked standing to
file a guardianship application.
1. 	Standard of Review
“[W]hether a party has standing to participate in a guardianship proceeding is
a question of law” that we review de novo. In re Guardianship of E.M.D., No. 11-
20-00042-CV, 2020 WL 6193990, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 22, 2020, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Guardianship of Miller, 299 S.W.3d 179, 188
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)); In re Guardianship of Benavides, No. 04-13-
00197-CV, 2014 WL 667525, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 19, 2014, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). “When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself
should serve as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” 	E.M.D., 2020
WL 6193990, at *3 (quoting In re Guardianship of Bernsen, No. 13-17-00591-CV,
2019 WL 3721339, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 8, 2019, pet.
denied) (mem. op.)).
When the record contains separate factual recitations, “all findings necessary
to support the trial court’s judgment are implied.” Miller, 299 S.W.3d at 188 (citing
Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992)); Silverio v.
Silverio, 625 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (“Even in
instances when a judgment contains factual recitations, when separately filed
findings of fact are not requested or made, a judgment will be upheld based on
implied findings.” (citing In re Castillo, 101 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2003, pet. denied))). Because the only evidence presented at the hearing regarding
LaNoard’s standing was that he has an action pending in the district court to modify

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his child support obligation, we presume LaNoard’s district court filing was the basis
for the trial court’s determination that LaNoard had an adverse interest to Addison
and thus lacked standing. See Silverio, 625 S.W.3d at 684.
2. 	Application
Any person has the right to apply for the guardianship of a ward’s estate unless
that person “has an interest that is adverse to [the] proposed ward or incapacitated
person.” See E ST. § 1055.001. If the applicant has an interest that is adverse to the
interests of the proposed ward, the applicant lacks standing to apply for the
guardianship. 	See id. 	“Because the Estates Code does not define what constitutes
an interest adverse to the proposed ward, we must look to its ordinary meaning and
appellate 	court 	decisions 	addressing 	standing 	challenges 	to 	formulate 	an
understanding of how the term has been applied in different contexts.” 	Bernsen,
2019 WL 3721339, at *6.
We have held that when there is no evidence of how the proposed ward would
define their interests, which appears to be the circumstance here, an interest is
adverse to the ward’s “when the applicant’s interests would not promote and protect
the proposed ward’s well-being.” 	E.M.D., 2020 WL 6193990, at *3 (quoting In re
Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 379 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding)). 	Other courts of
appeals have applied a similar interpretation. See Betts v. Brown, No. 14-99-00619-
CV, 2001 WL 40337, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 18, 2001, no
pet.) (not designated for publication) (“[A]n interest is adverse to an interest of a
proposed ward under [the Probate Code predecessor to Section 1055.001] when that
interest does not promote the well-being of the ward.”). Furthermore, the ordinary
meaning of the term “adverse interest” is “an interest that is opposed or contrary to
that of someone else.” 	E.M.D., 2020 WL 6193990, at *3 (quoting Bernsen, 2019
WL 3721339, at *6).

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While the Texas Supreme Court has not directly addressed what constitutes
an “adverse interest” in the context of Section 1055.001, it has favorably cited the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ analysis of Section 1055.001 in Betts when describing
adversity of guardianship proceedings in another context.1 See Thetford, 574
S.W.3d at 379 n.52 (citing Betts, 2001 WL 40337, at *4).
LaNoard argues that the proper inquiry for determining the existence of
adversity is “whether the relief sought would materially harm the ward’s welfare,
not merely whether the petitioner’s interest is a potential conflict.” Tammie urges
an interpretation based on the ordinary meaning of the term that existing case law
has expressed. 	We conclude that the proper inquiry for determining adversity is
guided by our decision today and others that we have cited—Thetford, E.M.D., and
Betts.
The standard for determining whether an applicant has an interest adverse to
the potential ward that would deprive the applicant of standing differs from the
standard for determining whether a person has a conflict of interest and is precluded
from 	being 	appointed 	guardian. 	E.M.D., 	2020 	WL 	6193990, 	at 	*3. 	The
standards differ because “standing under [S]ection 1055.001(b)(1) is a threshold
requirement that must be met to simply proceed with an application which is unlike
the merits[-]based determination of which person should be appointed as guardian.’”
Id. 	(quoting 	In 	re 	Guardianship 	of 	Gilmer, 	No. 	04-14-00362-CV, 	2015
WL 3616071, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
1In Thetford, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of adversity as it relates to
guardianship proceedings in the context of a lawyer’s ability to represent a third-party seeking guardianship
over that same lawyer’s incapacitated client under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 375.

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At the outset, we address LaNoard’s contention that the petition he filed in the
district court to credit the social security payments Addison receives against his child
support payments paid for her benefit constitutes “an action expressly permitted by
statute and one that did not reduce the total support [Addison] received.” LaNoard’s
monthly child support obligation was $2,650 and Tammie received an additional
$1,829 monthly social security payment on Addison’s behalf because of LaNoard’s
disability. 	If the trial court were to grant LaNoard’s petition, his monthly child
support payment would be reduced by or “subract[ed] from” the amount of the
monthly social security disability payment made for Addison’s benefit—and it
would then become $821. 	See FAM . §§ 154.132(a), 157.009. 	Therefore, while
LaNoard’s contention is correct that his total monthly child support amount may not
change—which appears to be the basis of his argument, especially in his reply
brief—the total amount of money that Tammie would receive for Addison’s benefit
would if LaNoard prevailed in the district court on his petition to modify because
Tammie currently receives monthly child support and social security payments for
Addison’s benefit.
We believe the court’s analysis in Benavides as to what constitutes an
“adverse interest”—a case that both parties cite—to be instructive. 	In Benavides,
the applicant was involved in an action apart from the guardianship application in
which she sought to invalidate a prenuptial agreement and reclassify the ward’s
separate property as community property. Benavides, 2014 WL 667525, at *1. The
applicant’s attempt in Benavides to reclassify the disputed property would have
potentially deprived the ward of a future half-interest in that property. 	Id. 	In
affirming the probate court’s order granting the appellees’ motion in limine, the
court held that the litigation filed by the applicant caused the applicant to have an
adverse interest to the proposed ward. Id.

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Like the nature of the motion that was apart from the guardianship application
in Benavides, Appellant essentially seeks to change and recharacterize a portion of
the funds that will be received for Addison’s benefit in the future. In this instance,
and even if LaNoard is correct2 that he is entitled to a modification of his monthly
child support payment, the result of the adverse inquiry for the purpose of
determining his standing to apply for a guardianship of her estate remains the same.
As in Benavides, LaNoard seeks to “reclassify” a portion of the social security
funds that would be paid for Addison’s benefit and in turn transform it into a credit
for his existing child support obligation, thus significantly reducing the total amount
of funds that would be received for Addison’s benefit in the future. 	See In re
Guardianship of Valdez, No. 04-07-00712-CV, 2008 WL 2332006, at *1–2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio June 4, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the person
contesting the application had an interest adverse to the proposed ward when he filed
a trespass-to-try-title lawsuit against the proposed ward). Under either scenario, the
underlying adversity is a pending and separate proceeding filed by LaNoard that
seeks to reduce the property that will be received for Addison’s benefit in the future,
while he simultaneously seeks to obtain an offset for himself. This is an interest that
is “opposed or contrary” to the ward and does not “promote and protect the proposed
ward’s well-being”—i.e., it is an adverse interest. See Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 379;
Betts, 2001 WL 40337, at *4.
The case before us contrasts with the facts in Betts, which LaNoard relies on
to support his argument. 	See Betts, 2001 WL 40337, at *4. 	There, the court held
that no adverse interest existed because the proposed ward merely guaranteed a loan
2We express no opinion regarding LaNoard’s entitlement to a modification of his child support
obligations to account for social security—a matter more appropriately resolved in the separate
modification proceeding that he filed in trial court cause no. 41062-C in the 326th District Court.

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for the applicant and in doing so granted the lender a security interest in the ward’s
assets. 	Id. 	There was also no showing that the applicant’s interest “would be
contrary to promoting the well-being of [the proposed ward.]” Id. Unlike in Betts,
Addison’s monthly benefits are not only potentially at risk because of LaNoard’s
conduct. 	Instead, LaNoard is actively seeking to reduce the monthly income that
Tammie would receive for Addison’s benefit.
Because 	the 	Legislature 	requires 	this 	credit 	be 	applied 	in 	certain
circumstances, that LaNoard might be entitled to it does not automatically render his
interest less adverse. In Benavides, the applicant’s separate action was based on the
laws that govern the division of marital property. 	Here, the separate, pending
modification action filed by LaNoard is based on the Family Code’s treatment of
social security benefits in determining the amount of a person’s child support
obligation. 	Thus, just as the spouses’ litigation over the division and character of
their marital estate did not diminish the adverse character of the interest in
Benavides, because the Family Code allows one to take advantage of the very credit
that LaNoard seeks does not diminish or negate his adversity to Addison.
In his reply brief, LaNoard asserts that Benavides is inapplicable because that
case involved “direct litigation by a plaintiff against a ward as a defendant.”
However, it is not the style or nature of LaNoard’s child support modification action
that makes his interest adverse. Rather it is, as explained above, his desire to obtain
a ruling that would reduce the income that he would pay to Tammie in the future for
Addison’s benefit and transform it into an offset in his favor, a result that would
certainly not promote Addison’s well-being. Moreover, other courts have held that
an adverse interest exists even when there is no direct pending litigation between the
proposed ward and the guardian. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Olivares, No. 07-
07-0275-CV, 2008 WL 5206169, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, pet.

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denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the applicant had an interest adverse to the ward
when the evidence showed he engaged in self-dealing and despite having the ability
to earn wages, he lived off the potentially incapacitated ward’s finite estate).
Bernsen, another case on which LaNoard relies, further shows that LaNoard’s
interest is adverse to Addison’s. 	In Bernsen, the court held that an applicant who
was involved in litigation against the proposed ward would nonetheless have an
interest adverse to the ward’s interest even if she “disclaimed all rights to inherit
money and property.” Bernsen, 2019 WL 3721339, at *10. The court reasoned that
even if the applicant did not have a direct link to the litigation, because her children
would have possibly received money from the underlying suit and because she
would thus have an obligation to manage those monies, “the trial court could infer
that [the applicant] is placing the welfare of her children above [the proposed ward.]”
Id. 	Thus, Bernsen confirms that it is the interest of the proposed guardian when
compared to the interest of the proposed ward that is the focus of the adversity
inquiry, not the style of the case and how the parties are designated.
Decisions that involve self-dealing, and suing the proposed ward, share a
common feature—the proposed guardian is not acting in the ward’s best interest
while instead promoting the guardian’s own interest. 	While no court has directly
addressed the factual scenario that we are confronted with here, we conclude that
when a proposed guardian is actively involved in a separate pending action that seeks
to reduce the monthly income that he is obligated to pay for the ward’s benefit, while
at the same time channeling that same income to himself, such affirmative action
constitutes an interest adverse to the proposed ward. Therefore, because LaNoard is
currently involved in a separate legal action that has the potential to deprive Addison
of significant funds, while simultaneously retaining those funds for himself, we hold
that LaNoard “has an interest that is adverse” to Addison as contemplated by

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Section 1055.001. See E ST. § 1055.001(b), (c). As such, in this case, the trial court
did not err when it found that LaNoard lacks standing to apply for the guardianship
of Addison’s estate.
Accordingly, we overrule LaNoard’s first issue.
B. 	Award of Attorney’s Fees
In his second issue, LaNoard challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s
fees to Tammie because it found that LaNoard’s guardianship application was
brought in bad faith and without just cause.
1. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to a guardian that are related
to a guardianship application for an abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship of A.B.,
630 S.W.3d 489, 493 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. denied) (citing Meduna v.
Holder, No. 03-02-00067-CV, 2003 WL 124214, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 16,
2003, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Thus, we will reverse an award of attorney’s fees in a
guardianship dispute “only if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding
rules and principles, such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. (quoting
In re Guardianship of Laroe, No. 05-15-01006-CV, 2017 WL 511156, at *20 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 8, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision
and do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. 	Id. 	The trial court’s
findings can be supported by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 495–96. Moreover, for
purposes of an attorney’s fee award, the trial court is entitled to make inferences
from the factual evidence as to a party’s motivation and credibility. Id. at 497 (citing
McCain v. NME Hosps., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 757–58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993,
no writ)).

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2. Application
The Estates Code authorizes the assessment of attorney’s fees against a party
to a guardianship proceeding who is found to have “acted in bad faith or without just
cause in prosecuting or objecting to an application in the proceeding.” 	E ST.
§ 1155.151(c) (emphasis added). 	As we have held, because the statute uses the
disjunctive term “or,” a finding of either bad faith or lack of just cause will justify
an attorney’s fee award. A.B., 630 S.W.3d at 496.
The trial court may not appoint a guardian for a proposed ward unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “alternatives to guardianship that
would avoid the need for the appointment of a guardian have been considered and
determined not to be feasible.” 	E ST. § 1101.101(a)(1)(D). 	Alternatives to a
guardianship include the creation of a special needs trust and the appointment of a
representative payee. See id. § 1002.0015(4), (7).
Here, in granting Tammie’s request for attorney’s fees, the trial court found,
and stated on the record, that LaNoard’s application was brought in bad faith and
without just cause. A finding on either basis will support an attorney’s fee award.
As such, we will address each finding in turn.
a. 	Just Cause
In this context, the term “just cause” means that the action must have a legal
basis that is reasonable under the circumstances and be factually supported during
the hearing. 	A.B., 630 S.W.3d at 496. For the trial court to find that a party acted
“without just cause,” that party must have either provided (1) no evidence of any
factual grounds for bringing the action, or (2) grounds that were unreasonable or did
not support the legal basis proffered. Id. Unlike bad faith where the focus is one’s
improper motive, the “just cause” inquiry here turns on the absence of a legal basis
to bring the action or a dearth of factual support. Id. Furthermore, a party lacks just

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cause when that party is unable to provide any evidence to raise a substantial fact
issue on that party’s claim. 	Id. at 496–97. The trial court also may consider one’s
reckless ignorance of the current condition and/or the needs of the prospective ward
for whom application of guardianship concerns. Id. at 497.
LaNoard argues there was just cause to file his application because the record
demonstrates that Tammie: “(1) deposited [Addison]’s back benefits into her
personal account for four months; (2) failed to timely complete representative payee
reporting; and (3) [d]elayed establishing a separate account for [Addison]’s funds.”
Tammie responds that based on the evidence presented at the motion in limine
hearing, a guardian of Addison’s estate was not necessary.
Based on this record, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that
LaNoard filed his guardianship application without just cause. In A.B., we held that
the proposed ward’s father contested an application for guardianship without just
cause when his pleadings were in stark contrast to his in-court testimony. Id. at 497–
98. The father’s pleadings indicated that his daughter was “very competent and can
easily function with a modest amount of assistance.” 	Id. at 497. However, during
the application hearing, the father testified that the proposed ward could not manage
her finances, make complex business decisions, vote responsibly, choose where to
live, or provide food, clothing, and shelter for herself. Id. Additionally, the evidence
that the father presented consisted of testimony from a lay witness who made
observations about the proposed ward during the witness’s limited interactions with
her. Id. at 498–99.
In this case, LaNoard’s application asserts that alternatives to guardianship
were considered but none were feasible and would obviate the need for guardianship
of Addison’s estate. However, at the hearing, LaNoard testified that alternatives to
guardianship were feasible—a key finding that is necessary before a trial court grants

16
a guardianship application. Particularly, LaNoard acknowledged that a special needs
trust is an alternative to guardianship and testified that he has no issues with the way
that First Financial is managing the in-place special needs trust on behalf of Addison.
Rather, LaNoard’s complaint is that he had no input as to how the trust is managed,
not that this alternative is infeasible.
LaNoard acknowledged that Tammie is the representative payee for Addison
and both the child support and social security monies are paid directly to Tammie,
which is a statutorily authorized alternative to guardianship. See E ST. § 1002.0015.
LaNoard further acknowledged that Addison has no substantial personal property;
therefore, the only property that LaNoard expressly mentioned in his application was
subject to an alternative to guardianship—either the special needs trust or Tammie’s
function as representative payee. 	Thus, like the differences in the applicant’s
assertions in his petition in A.B. when compared to his testimony at the hearing,
LaNoard’s testimony, which conflicts with the contentions in his application,
supports the trial court’s finding that he filed the application without just cause.
Although LaNoard argues that the reason he filed the application was because
he was concerned about Tammie’s mismanagement of the funds that were paid for
Addison’s benefit, the only evidence presented to support this argument is that
Tammie first deposited the monthly social security income due Addison into
Tammie’s personal account for four months, before transferring those funds into a
separate account for Addison’s benefit, and that she cannot remember exactly when
she filed a payee report. However, the trial court as the factfinder, was entitled to
give little or no weight to this evidence, especially considering the conflicting
evidence presented by LaNoard about his concerns of the management of Addison’s
property. 	See 	A.B., 630 S.W.3d at 498–99 (discussing how in a just cause
determination, the trial court was entitled to give little or no weight to evidence

17
presented by the party against whom attorney’s fees were assessed, particularly
when the circumstances indicate that the evidence is weak).
Finally, the evidence regarding how these proceedings have negatively
affected Addison further supports the trial court’s determination that LaNoard acted
without just cause in filing the guardianship application. See id. at 496–97.
Given the deferential standard of review that we must employ, and the nature
of the evidence and pleadings that the trial court considered, we cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion when it found that LaNoard filed his application for
guardianship of Addison’s estate without just cause.
b. Bad Faith
“Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but is the ‘conscious
doing of a wrong for [a] dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose.’” 	A.B.,
630 S.W.3d at 495 (quoting Laroe, 2017 WL 511156, at *21). For bad faith, there
must be an improper motive that underlies the party’s actions. Id. at 495–96.
Because LaNoard’s application for guardianship was filed approximately two
weeks after he filed his amended petition in which he seeks to modify his child
support obligation, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the
application was brought without a proper motive—namely, to circumvent the district
court’s disposition of LaNoard’s pending petition to modify.
As we have discussed, LaNoard asserted in his application that alternatives to
guardianship were not available, but his testimony at the hearing contradicted his
assertion. 	LaNoard listed in his application that his areas of concern—Addison’s
child support funds, social security benefits, and personal effects—needed to be
protected. 	However, at the time his application was filed, other measures were in
place to protect Addison’s estate—Tammie receives Addison’s child support
payments on her behalf, Tammie receives Addison’s social security benefits on her

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behalf as payee, and there is a special needs trust in place for Addison’s benefit. See
In re Guardianship of Yung Lo Yang, No. 02-16-00353-CV, 2017 WL 2979826, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a party opposed a guardianship
application in bad faith when evidence indicated that the party acted contrary to the
ward’s interests and undermined the proceeding).
Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances and the trial court’s
ability to also rely on circumstantial evidence, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it found that LaNoard filed his application in bad faith
and 	for 	the 	improper 	purpose 	of 	circumventing 	the 	pending 	child 	support
modification action to gain control over Addison’s property.
Accordingly, we overrule LaNoard’s second issue.
III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
October 22, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.