Innova Electronics Corporation

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: September 29, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Innova Electronics Corporation
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Serial No. 97851338
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Mark B. Garred of Stetina Brunda Garred & Brucker,
for Innova Electronics Corporation.
Kenneth Leichter, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 134.
Sophia Kim, Managing Attorney.
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Before Goodman, Larkin and Lebow,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Innova Electronics Corporation, seeks a registration for the proposed
mark CARSCAN (in standard characters) on the Principal Register for “Automobile
diagnostic services provided on-line, via a computer network and by telephone” in
International Class 42.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(e)(1) of
1 Application Serial No. 97851338 was filed on March 22, 2023, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s alleged bona fide intent to use the
mark in commerce. Applicant claims ownership of Registration No. 3477892.

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the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), on the ground that the proposed mark is
merely descriptive of the identified services, and under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the standard-
character mark WRECK CHECK CAR SCAN, registered on the Principal Register
for “Inspections of Automobiles consisting of collision repair, diminished value, total
losses, improper repairs and lemon law/dealer fraud” in International Class 42.2
When the refusals were made final, Applicant appealed.3 The appeal is briefed.4
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the refusal under Section 2(e)(1) and
do not reach the refusal under Section 2(d). See, e.g., In re Princeton Equity Grp. LLC,
No. 97397212, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 242, at *2-3 (affirming the refusal to register under
Section 2(e)(2) and not reaching the Section 2(d) refusal).
I. Mere Descriptiveness – Applicable Law
“A mark is merely descriptive if it immediately conveys knowledge of a quality,
feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used.”
Brooklyn Brewery Corp. v. Brooklyn Brew Shop, LLC, 17 F.4th 129, 146 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2012)). See also Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1)
(“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
2 See December 18, 2023 Office Action. Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system and identify the documents by
title, date, and page in the downloadable .pdf version.
3 See April 10, 2024 Office Action; 1 TTABVUE. Citations to the briefs and other post-
prosecution documents are to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.
4 See 4 TTABVUE (Applicant’s Brief); 12 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s Brief); 13
TTABVUE (Applicant’s Reply Brief).

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goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it … (e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection
with the goods [or services] of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively
misdescriptive of them ….”).
“A term need not immediately convey an idea of each and every specific feature of
the [services] in order to be considered merely descriptive; it is enough if it describes
one significant attribute, function or property of the [services].” In re Korn Ferry, No.
90890949, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 224, at *5 (quoting In re Zuma Array Ltd., No.
79288888, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *7).
Descriptiveness is not considered in the abstract. It must be considered in relation
to the particular goods or services for which registration is sought, the context in
which the mark is used, and the possible significance the term would have to the
average purchaser because of the manner of its use or intended use. Coach Servs.,
668 F.3d at 1378; In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 963-64 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The question
is not whether someone presented only with the mark could guess the goods or
services, but “whether someone who knows what the goods and[/or] services are will
understand the mark to convey information about them.” DuoProSS Meditech Corp.
v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Tower
Tech, Inc., No. 75709532, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 300, at *10-11).
We consider the commercial impression of the mark as a whole. Real Foods Pty
Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 906 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018). If each component
of a compound mark retains its merely descriptive significance in relation to the goods

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or services, the combination is itself merely descriptive unless it creates a new,
incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP,
373 F.3d 1171, 1174-75 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Zuma Array, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *8.
II. The Examining Attorney’s Evidence and Argument
The Examining Attorney contends that CARSCAN is a compound of CAR and
SCAN; that CAR means an automobile and SCAN means to look at carefully or
thoroughly, or to examine; and that in the field of automobile diagnostics, SCAN is a
term of art for reading a vehicle’s onboard diagnostic codes with a scanner or scan
tool.5 Taken together, the Examining Attorney argues, CARSCAN immediately
describes the function of Applicant’s services: scanning cars as part of automobile
diagnostic services provided online, over a computer network, and by telephone.6
In support, the Examining Attorney made of record dictionary definitions of CAR
and SCAN;7 a J.D. Power article describing automobile diagnostic services as taking
a close look at a car to determine whether there are issues with it;8 and third-party
website and industry materials using “scan,” “scanner,” “scan tool,” and “diagnostic
scanning” in connection with automobile diagnostic activity, including those of AirPro
Diagnostics, ALLDATA Diagnostics, Christian Brothers Automotive, Flexihub,
5 12 TTABVUE 12-15 (Examining Attorney’s Brief).
6 Id.
7 See January 26, 2026 Subsequent Final Office Action, at TSDR 7-8.
8 Id. at TSDR 9-11.

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ProTech, Sun Devil Auto, JTape, Mitchell, OBDeleven, OCTech, and TDT.9 The
Examining Attorney also points to Applicant’s own website, which uses “OBD2
scanner,” manufacturer-specific “scan tools,” and related “scanner” FAQs in
connection with diagnosing listed car brands.10
III. Applicant’s Arguments
Applicant argues that CARSCAN is at most suggestive because it “could allude to
a multitude of automotive inspection services wholly unrelated to diagnostics,” such
as a visual survey for dents or a physical smog check, and therefore does not describe
Applicant’s online and telephone diagnostic services with particularity.11
But the test is not whether the mark, viewed in the abstract, could refer to other
automotive activities. Bayer, 488 F.3d at 963-64. Someone who knows that the
services are “automobile diagnostic services provided on-line, via a computer network
and by telephone” will understand CARSCAN to convey that those diagnostic services
involve scanning cars. DuoProSS, 695 F.3d at 1254. The mark need not describe every
detail of the identification. Korn Ferry, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 224, at *5.
As noted above, Applicant also claims ownership of, and relies on, Registration
No. 3477892 (“the ’892 Registration”) for the mark CARSCAN for “automotive
diagnostic devices, including code readers and scan tools” in Class 9, which issued in
9 Id. at TSDR 12-16 (AirPro); 17-21 (ALLDATA), 23-24 (Christian Brothers Automotive), 26-
34 (Flexihub), 55-57 (JTape), 63-67 (Mitchell), 68-71 (OBDeleven), 72-85 (OCTech), 86-90
(ProTech), 102-03 (Sun Devil Auto), 107-09 (TDT).
10 Id. at TSDR 41-54.
11 4 TTABVUE 9-11 (Applicant’s Brief).

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2008. Applicant argues that the USPTO did not treat CARSCAN as descriptive of
those goods, that the Class 42 services are closely related to those goods, and that the
mark should be treated consistently.12 Each application, however, must be decided on
its own record. In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Cf. In re
Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The PTO is required to
examine all trademark applications for compliance with each and every eligibility
requirement, including non-genericness, even if the PTO earlier mistakenly
registered a similar or identical mark suffering the same defect.”). The ’892
Registration covers goods, not the services here, and it does not bind us on this record.
In re the Dot Commc’ns Network LLC, No. 77792690 (TTAB 2011).
Applicant further argues that more than seventeen years of use of CARSCAN on
diagnostic goods, and the absence of other live CARSCAN registrations owned by
third parties, show a strong association between Applicant and those goods and
related services.13 But Applicant has not claimed acquired distinctiveness under
Section 2(f). Evidence that consumers associate a term with a particular source, and
evidence of length of use, goes to acquired distinctiveness, not inherent
distinctiveness. See In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Inherent distinctiveness does not depend on a showing that consumers
actually identify the particular mark with the particular business; this is a question
of acquired distinctiveness, or secondary meaning.”); In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd.,
12 Id. at 11-12.
13 Id. at 12.

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797 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1379 (an
applicant may prove acquired distinctiveness with “length and exclusivity of use”).
Finally, Applicant argues that any doubt on descriptiveness must be resolved in
its favor.14 We have no such doubt. The dictionary evidence, the term-of-art use of
“scan” in automobile diagnostics, Applicant’s own use of “scan” and “scanner,” and
the third-party marketplace evidence all point the same way: the proposed mark is
merely descriptive of the identified services.
IV. Conclusion
We find that CARSCAN immediately describes a significant function of the
identified services and is thus merely descriptive of those services under Section
2(e)(1).
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed under Section 2(e)(1) of the
Trademark Act.
14 Id.