Happy Valley Hannah, Ltd.

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 24, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Happy Valley Hannah, Ltd.
_____
Serial No. 98423787
_____
David L. Principe and Soowon Lee, of Phillips Lytle LLP,
for Happy Valley Hannah, Ltd.
Samantha Cruzado, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 128,
Travis Wheatley, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Wellington, Lebow, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Happy Valley Hannah, Ltd. (Applicant), appeals the refusal of its application to
register the standard-character mark THE HAPPIEST VALLEY on the Principal
Register for goods identified as “Hats; Ponchos; T-shirts; Clothing jackets; Hooded
sweatshirts; Long-sleeved shirts,” in International Class 25.1
1 Application Serial No. 98423787 was filed on February 27, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging a bona fide intent to use the mark for the
identified goods.

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Registration was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with the mark HAPPY VALLEY, in standard
characters, which is registered on the Supplemental Register for goods identified as
“Headwear; Shirts; Sweatshirts,” in International Class 25.2
After final refusal,3 Applicant simultaneously appealed4 and requested
reconsideration.5 After the Examining Attorney denied reconsideration,6 we resumed
the appeal,7 which is now ready for decision. For the reasons explained below, we
affirm the refusal to register.
ANALYSIS
A. Section 2(d) refusals generally
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
2 Reg. No. 5899279 issued on October 29, 2019, with a date of first use anywhere and in
commerce of September 1, 2013. The Office has accepted the Section 8 Declaration of
Continued Use.
3 See May 12, 2025, Final Office Action. Citations in this opinion to the application record
refer to the version of the documents as downloaded in .pdf format from the Trademark
Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).
4 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and appeal record are to the Board’s TTABVUE
electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents the docket number
assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE, and any number immediately following
“TTABVUE” identifies any specifically cited page(s).
5 See Sept. 4, 2025, Request for Reconsideration (bundled as part of a Petition To Revive
Abandoned Application – Failure To Respond Timely To Office Action, which was granted).
6 See 4 TTABVUE.
7 See 5 TTABVUE.

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to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). To determine whether confusion
is likely, we use the roadmap set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). du Pont lays out several factors that may be relevant
in making this determination. See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Though du Pont lists thirteen such factors, we generally
address only those that are relevant and material to the case before us. See, e.g., Shen
Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Octocom Sys., Inc.
v. Hous. Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Typically, those are
the factors that the parties address and on which there is relevant evidence in the
record. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72
(Fed. Cir. 2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir.
2000). After making findings on the relevant factors, we then weigh them together to
determine if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger
Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
B. Comparison of the goods
We’ll start our review of the relevant factors with one that is straightforward in
this case. The second likelihood of confusion factor listed in du Pont is “[t]he similarity
or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration.” 476 F.2d at 1361. Here, the application lists “Hats; Ponchos; T-shirts;
Clothing jackets; Hooded sweatshirts; Long-sleeved shirts.” The cited registration

Serial No. 98423787
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lists “Headwear; Shirts; Sweatshirts.” The goods thus overlap.8 In light of this, the
Examining Attorney points out the obvious: the goods are legally identical in part.9
Applicant does not address this factor. We agree that the goods are legally identical
in part.10 “[W]hen marks would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the
degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” In
re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Century
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same);
In re La Peregrina Ltd., No. 78676199, 2008 WL 695794, at *3 (TTAB 2008) (“Where,
as in the present case, the marks appear in connection with, at least in part, legally
identical goods, the degree of similarity between the marks that is necessary to
support a finding of likely confusion declines.”) (citation omitted). Thus, when we do
our final weighing, this factor will weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is
likely.
C. Comparison of the trade channels and classes of customers
Next, two more straightforward factors. du Pont tells us that we must assess “[t]he
similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels” and the
“buyers to whom sales are made.” 476 F.2d at 1361. The Examining Attorney asserts
8 We note that if confusion is likely as to any goods in the class, registration must be
refused. See, e.g., SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981); Shunk Mfg.
Co. v. Tarrant Mfg. Co., 318 F.2d 328, 330 (CCPA 1963).
9 See 8 TTABVUE 11.
10 See, e.g., Joseph & Feiss Co. v. Sportempos, Inc., 451 F.2d 1402, 1404 (CCPA 1971) (“the
goods specified … are in part identical and otherwise considered substantially the same, or
so related as to represent in law a distinction without a difference”).

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that where, as here, the goods are legally identical in part, we must presume that the
legally identical goods travel in the same channels of trade to the same classes of
purchasers.11 See, e.g., Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d
1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (where “[t]he parties’ recited services were in part legally
identical,” the Board “properly found Stone Lion’s application and Lion’s registrations
covered the same potential purchasers and channels of trade”); In re Yawata Iron &
Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 754 (CCPA 1968) (considering the channels of trade and
classes of purchasers to be the same where “legally identical goods”). We agree, so
these two factors also will weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
D. Comparison of the marks
We now turn to the two factors that Applicant addresses. We begin with “[t]he
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Our primary
reviewing court has termed this, along with the comparison of the goods or services,
a “predominant” or “fundamental” inquiry in the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976).
Because people usually are exposed to marks at “spaced intervals,” Grandpa
Pidgeon’s of Mo., Inc. v. Borgsmiller, 477 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1973), they “ordinarily
must depend upon their past recollection” when later exposed to a similar mark.
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981). So, when
11 See 8 TTABVUE 11-12.

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we compare marks, we don’t do a “side-by-side comparison,” but rather consider the
marks “in light of the fallibility of memory.” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Diamond Alkali Co. v. Dundee Cement Co.,
343 F.2d 781, 784 (CCPA 1965) (the test is whether confusion is likely when “the
marks are compared by separate recall later in time and removed in place”).
We assess marks by looking at their “appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); accord In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Similarity in all aspects is not required, however. This factor
supports refusal “if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to
cause confusion.” Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (citation omitted); see also Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740
(CCPA 1953) (“it is proper to consider [the marks’] appearance, sound and meaning
… but a combination of all three factors need not necessarily exist”) (cleaned up;
citations omitted).
“Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena Hosp., 774
F.3d at 752 (citation omitted). “The proper test is … whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who
encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”
i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Knox Indus. Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) (“The issue is whether the marks
are confusingly similar, not whether they are identical.”) (citation omitted).

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Applicant’s mark is THE HAPPIEST VALLEY; the registered mark HAPPY
VALLEY. Applicant argues that the marks are visually and aurally different. It
points out that its mark adds a third word (“THE”) and uses “HAPPIEST,” not
“HAPPY,” before “VALLEY.”12 Applicant adds that “the mark and the cited mark are
not likely to cause confusion based on the common term ‘VALLEY.’”13 Visually and
aurally, they’re not identical. But they don’t have to be. See, e.g., Bridgestone Ams.
Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Exact
identity [of marks] is not necessary to generate confusion as to source of similarly-
marked products.”) (citation omitted). And, in any event, these visual and aural
differences aren’t that great. They are the sort of small-scale differences that may
well recede in consumers’ memory when, with their fallible memories, see, e.g., St.
Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751, they conjure their “past recollection” of the previously
seen mark, Franklin Mint, 667 F.2d at 1007. We find that the marks are visually and
aurally quite similar.
As to meaning and connotation, both marks contain “VALLEY,” and both modify
“VALLEY” with words that describe the same emotion (happiness), albeit in different
degrees. So their meanings are quite similar.14 As to connotation, Applicant points
12 See 6 TTABVUE 10.
13 See id. at 10-11.
14 Applicant does not argue that the article “THE” in its mark changes the meaning of the
words that follow, as opposed to other aspects of the mark. Cf. In re Fat Boys Water Sports
LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 WL 3915986, at *9 (TTAB 2016) (“although the registered mark
includes the word ‘THE,’ which is absent from Applicant’s mark, the presence or absence of
this word is unlikely to allow consumers to meaningfully distinguish the marks”); In re Thor
Tech, Inc., No. 78634024, 2009 WL 1098997, at *2 (TTAB 2009) (finding the beginning word
“THE” in one mark to lack “any trademark significance”); U.S. Nat’l Bank of Ore. v. Midwest

Serial No. 98423787
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out that the registered mark appears on the Supplemental Register (as opposed to
the Principal Register) because the Office determined that HAPPY VALLEY was
“primarily geographically descriptive” of the source of the goods because that is a
commonly used nickname for State College, Pennsylvania, where the owner of the
registration is located.15 Applicant argues that, as a result, the marks have different
connotations, because its mark, by contrast, is not geographic, due to “the addition of
‘THE’ and the superlative ‘HAPPIEST’” which “creates a different commercial
impression … .”16 We agree with Applicant that, based on the ordinary, well-
understood meanings of the common words that constitute Applicant’s mark,
Applicant’s mark simply connotes a valley somewhere where inhabitants have a
higher degree of happiness than any other valley. We also agree that the registered
mark connotes a particular, known valley. So, we agree with Applicant that the
marks’ respective connotations are somewhat different.
Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 1977 WL 22507, at *5 (TTAB 1977) (one mark’s addition of the word
“THE” added “little distinguishing matter”).
15 See 6 TTABVUE 14-15 (discussing materials in the application file of the registered mark
that are attached to Applicant’s March 19, 2025, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR
79-100 (initial refusal) and TSDR 74-78 (owner’s response, which was to amend the
application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register)).
16 See 6 TTABVUE 15. Applicant also urges that its mark “suggests a promotional phrase,”
id., or “evokes a feeling and a brand promise,” id. at 17. These characterizations of what
Applicant’s mark “evokes” or “suggests” seem like they describe an advertising function, not
a connotation that consumers would perceive. In any event, Applicant points us to no
evidence supporting these characterizations. See generally Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901
F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (an assertion of a fact in a brief “is not evidence under any
of the relevant rules”) (citation omitted); In re Teledyne Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 968, 971 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (“argument of counsel” is no substitute for evidence).

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Putting all the evidence of record together, we find that the marks are aurally and
visually quite similar, have similar meanings, but somewhat different connotations.
As we mentioned above, however, the marks do not have to be similar in all aspects
for this factor to support a conclusion that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Krim-Ko Corp.,
390 F.2d at 732; Hancock, 203 F.2d at 740. And, of course, as we have already
mentioned, we must account for the “fallibility of memory.” See, e.g., St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d at 751; see also Gegenuber Dem Julichs-Platz v. Chesebrough-Pond, Inc., 470
F.2d 1385, 1386 (CCPA 1972) (“Side-by-side comparison is not the test. The focus
must be on the ‘general recollection’ reasonably produced by appellant’s mark and a
comparison of appellee’s mark therewith.”) (citation omitted).
Overall, we find that the overall commercial impressions of the marks, compared
in their entireties, are very similar. When we perform the final weighing of the
relevant factors, this factor will count in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
Just how much this will weigh in favor of the refusal may vary depending on the next
factor we discuss.
E. The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods
Applicant also argues that HAPPY VALLEY is a weak mark, and that its mark is
different enough that confusion is unlikely.17 We assess arguments that a cited mark
is weak under the sixth factor in du Pont. See Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361) (“[t]he number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar goods.”)). The Federal Circuit has explained that:
17 See 6 TTABVUE 13-16.

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[t]he purpose of introducing evidence of third-party use is to
show that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora
of such similar marks that customers have been educated to
distinguish between different such marks on the bases of
minute distinctions. Third-party use is relevant to show that
a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope
of protection.
Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (cleaned up; citations omitted); see also King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s
Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401 (CCPA 1974) (“The expressions ‘weak’ and ‘entitled
to limited protection’ are but other ways of saying, … that confusion is unlikely
because the marks are of such non-arbitrary nature or so widely used that the public
easily distinguishes slight differences in the marks under consideration as well as
differences in the goods to which they are applied, even though the goods of the
parties may be considered ‘related.’”). This is the main theme of Applicant’s brief. As
Applicant’s appeal brief concludes: “The cited mark HAPPY VALLEY is entitled to
only the thinnest scope of protection, which Applicant’s mark does not transgress.”18
“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth factor:
conceptual strength and commercial strength.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (citations
omitted). Here, Applicant argues that the mark in the cited registration is both
conceptually weak and commercially weak.19
As we noted above, the mark in the cited registration is registered on the
Supplemental Register (as opposed to the Principal Register) because the Office
18 6 TTABVUE 18.
19 Id. at 13-16 (argument about conceptual weakness); id. at 16 (argument about commercial
weakness).

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determined that HAPPY VALLEY was “primarily geographically descriptive” of the
source of the goods. In addition, Applicant has placed in the record additional articles
showing that “Happy Valley” is a known location.20 Based on the registered mark’s
appearing on the Supplemental Register and the additional evidence of geographic
descriptiveness, we agree with Applicant that the cited mark is conceptually weak.
While we agree with Applicant that the mark of the cited registration is
conceptually weak, we think Applicant overstates the significance of the cited
registration’s placement on the Supplemental Register. Quoting the 1975 Board
decision in In re Hunke and Jochheim, 1975 WL 20781, at *2 (TTAB 1975), Applicant
urges that there is a general rule that the scope of protection of registrations on the
Supplemental Register is “limited to the substantially identical notation and/or to the
subsequent use and registration thereof for substantially similar goods.”21 But in
1978, our primary reviewing Court rejected an argument that “citation of marks on
the Supplemental Register under § 2(d) be limited to marks identical to that sought
to be registered,” saying “[n]o reason exists, however, for the application of different
standards to registrations cited under § 2(d).” In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 308
(CCPA 1978). Instead, the Court held that “[t]he level of descriptiveness of a cited
mark may influence the conclusion that confusion is likely or unlikely, … but that
fact does not preclude citation under § 2(d) of marks on the Supplemental Register.”
20 See March 19, 2025, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 20-60; see also Sept. 4,
2025, Request for Reconsideration, at TSDR 18 (Wikipedia entry for Happy Valley).
21 Id. at 13; see also id. at 16 (“This reality [being registered on the Supplemental Register
due to geographic descriptiveness] severely narrows the registrant’s scope of protection to the
point where only a virtually identical mark could cause confusion.”).

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Id. at 308-09 (citation omitted). In light of Clorox, the Board later “expressly
disavowed” that there is any “categorical rule that citation of registrations on the
Supplemental Register is limited to registrations of ‘substantially identical’ marks
for ‘substantially similar goods.’” See In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392,
2016 WL 5219811, at *6 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Smith and Mehaffey, No. 74213737,
1994 WL 417267, at *2-3 (TTAB 1994)).
Applicant also argues that the mark of the cited registration is commercially
weak. Specifically, Applicant points to the results of an online search it performed on
www.yellowpages.com for entries containing the words “Happy Valley” in State
College, PA.22 The results comprise snippets of listings showing the names,
addresses, and general business categories of the businesses.23
We see three problems with this list. First, these search result snippets do not
show how, if at all, the businesses use “Happy Valley” as a mark. Nor do they show
the degree of exposure of the clothes-buying public to these names. See, e.g., Anthony’s
Pizza & Pasta Int’l, Inc. v. Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co., No. 91171509, 2009 WL
4075365, at *7-8 (TTAB 2009) (telephone book listings “are of limited probative value
… because they do not demonstrate that the public is aware of the businesses, or the
number of their customers, or their trading area”) (citation omitted); see also In re
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Google search results
that provided very little context of the use of ASPIRINA deemed to be “of little value
22 See 6 TTABVUE 16.
23 See Sept. 4, 2025, Request for Reconsideration, at TSDR 20-33.

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in assessing the consumer public perception of the ASPIRINA mark”); In re Thomas,
No. 78334625, 2006 WL 1258862, at *6 (TTAB 2006) (Board unpersuaded mark was
weak based on Google search results because, inter alia, “without evidence as to the
extent of third-party use, such as how long the websites have been operational or the
extent of public exposure to the sites, the probative value of this evidence is
minimal”).
Second, these businesses are all in one area: the State College, Pennsylvania,
area. But we are concerned here with nationwide trademark rights because neither
the cited registration nor Applicant’s mark is limited to that, or any other, particular
area. Cf. Anthony’s Pizza, 2009 WL 4075365, at *7-8 (even nationwide telephone book
listings discounted).
Third, and most important, the listed businesses span a wide variety of services,
comprising healthcare services, mortgage services, restaurants, massage services,
power-washing services, lawn services, veterinary services, and retail stores that
feature goods such as beverages, draperies, hemp fabric, art, optical goods, and
general merchandise. None appear to use “Happy Valley” on clothing items, as in
Applicant’s mark and the mark in the cited registration. And we need to confine
ourselves to the clothing market, because that’s what both the application and
registration identify. As our primary reviewing Court has stated:
[T]he real world segment of the public is limited to the market
or universe necessary to circumscribe purchasers or users of
products or services like those being offered by the parties
under a common mark. Such limits are important to the
rationale underlying this factor. Only if other offerings under
the common mark are also directed to that relevant public is

Serial No. 98423787
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it reasonable to infer that they may have become conditioned
to draw fine lines between sources of related goods or services.
Omaha Steaks, 908 F.3d at 1325 (citing Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors,
Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded by Applicant’s argument that the mark
of the cited registration is commercially weak.
In sum, while we find the commercial weakness evidence neutral, the conceptual
weakness of HAPPY VALLEY is a factor that will rest on Applicant’s side of the scale
when we perform our weighing of the factors—the task to which we next turn.
F. Conclusion as to whether confusion is likely
Having made findings on the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors, our final
step is to assess these findings together to determine if, on balance, they indicate that
confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384. Because the factors
may interact with one another, the weight each factor is given depends on the overall
circumstances in the case. See id. at 1381; In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206
(Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus, this step is not a “simple tally of factors.” Swagway, LLC v.
ITC, 934 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank
Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
We found the goods to be legally identical in part. This is not only an important
factor by itself, see, e.g., Pink Lady Corp. v. L.N. Renault & Sons, Inc., 265 F.2d 951,
953 (CCPA 1959) (similarity or dissimilarity of the goods “is logically a factor of
considerable importance to be given much weight in reaching the ultimate
conclusion”) (citation omitted), but it also affects how we assess the similarities and

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dissimilarities in the marks: “When marks would appear on virtually identical goods
or services, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely
confusion declines.” Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d
874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992); accord In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
And because the goods are identical, we also found that the channels of trade and
classes of customers also are presumed to be identical. So, these two factors add more
weight in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
The comparison of the marks, of course, is a “predominant” factor in the weighing.
See, e.g., Herbko Int’l, 308 F.3d at 1165; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.,
281 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Federated Foods, 544 F.2d at 1103 (“The
fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”). Here,
notwithstanding their somewhat different connotations, we found the marks to be
very similar. But mark similarity interacts with two other factors here. We agreed
with Applicant that HAPPY VALLEY is geographically descriptive and therefore
conceptually weak. And “[m]arks that are descriptive … are entitled to a narrower
scope of protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source identification,
than their more fanciful counterparts.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362-63; see also id. at
1364 (weakness of the common segment could indicate that other “portions of such …
marks … are sufficient to distinguish the marks as a whole and to make confusion
unlikely”) (citation omitted). Generally, when this factor weighs in an applicant’s

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favor, we’d need to see more mark similarity than otherwise. But, as we mentioned
earlier in this section, our finding that goods are in part legally identical tugs the
mark similarity factor in the other direction. See, e.g., Century 21, 970 F.2d at 877
(identical goods indicates that less mark similarity than otherwise would likely cause
confusion); accord Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363; Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d at 1348. So
that somewhat offsets the effect of conceptual weakness on mark similarity.
On balance, we conclude that the cited mark’s conceptual weakness is not enough
to carry the day here. The other factors collectively outweigh it, in our view. Thus,
registration must be refused under Section 2(d).
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.