Sharon Feiereisen

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 16, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Sharon Feiereisen
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Serial No. 98837930
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Ursula B. Day of Law Firm of Ursula B. Day,
for Sharon Feiereisen.
Rebecca Eubank, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 116,
Heather Schubert, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Lykos, Heasley, and Stanley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Stanley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Sharon Feiereisen (“Applicant”) seeks to register on the Supplemental Register
the standard-character mark THE MOM CLUB for the following goods and services:1
1 Application Serial No. 98837930 was filed on November 5, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce. After the Examining Attorney refused registration on the
ground that the mark is merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), see May 12, 2025 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 5-6, Applicant filed
an amendment to allege use and amended the application to seek registration on the
Supplemental Register, alleging July 31, 2024 as the date of first use anywhere and in
commerce for the goods and services in both classes. See August 6, 2025 Amendment to Allege
Use; August 7, 2025 Response to Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 9-10. The amendment to

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Clothing, namely, hats, shirts, in International Class 25;
and
Social club services, arranging, organizing and hosting
social events, get-togethers, and parties for hosts and their
guests, in International Class 41.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, as used in
connection with the identified goods and services, so resembles two registered
marks—both owned by the same entity and both for the mark MOMS CLUB—as to
be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. The cited registrations
are:
• Registration No. 1935326 for the mark MOMS CLUB, in typeset form, for
“providing a support group for at home mothers,” in International Class 45.
Registration No. 1935326 issued pursuant to a claim of acquired
distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f).2
• Registration No. 3626358 for the mark MOMS CLUB, in standard
characters, for “Newsletters for providing support to at home mothers in
the field of parental education,” in International Class 16; “Management
and business consulting services in the field of parental education,” in
International Class 35; “Educational services, namely, providing classes,
on-line programs, on-line non-downloadable electronic newsletters,
seminars and workshops in the field of parental education,” in
International Class 41; and “Organizing and conducting support groups in
the Supplemental Register obviated the mere descriptiveness refusal. See August 28, 2025
Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 2.
Citations to the prosecution file are to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system.
2 Registration No. 1935326 issued on the Principal Register on November 14, 1995 and has
been renewed. Before November 2, 2003, “standard character” drawings were known as
“typed” or “typeset” drawings. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
A typed or typeset mark is the legal equivalent of a standard-character mark. TRADEMARK
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 807.03(i) (May 2026).

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the field of all at home mothers,” in International Class 45. Registration
No. 3626358 also issued pursuant to a claim of acquired distinctiveness
under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act.3
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed. The appeal is fully briefed.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal to register as to both
International Classes 25 and 41.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d); see also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). When analyzing the likelihood of confusion
factors, the overriding concerns are not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the
source of the goods and services, but also to protect registrants from adverse
commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil
Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role, and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
3 Registration No. 3626358 issued on the Principal Register on May 26, 2009 and has been
renewed. Both cited registrations are owned by MOMS Club, a California corporation
(hereafter, “Registrant”).

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92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap.
Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). Varying weight may be assigned to each
factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the factors may control
a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381. Although we
consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument, In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods and services.
In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l,
Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). These factors, and
others, are discussed below.
As noted above, the refusal covers two separate classes. “Because each class in
Applicant’s multi-class application is, in effect, a separate application, we consider
each class separately, and determine whether [the Examining Attorney] has shown
a likelihood of confusion with respect to each.” In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No.
88706809, 2023 WL 6140427, at *4 (TTAB 2023) (“On the appeal of a refusal to
register directed to all classes in a multi-class application such as this one, examining
attorneys and applicants should facilitate the Board’s review by discussing the
evidence of relatedness on a class-by-class basis.”).
Our analysis focuses on the Class 45 services in the cited registrations—
“Organizing and conducting support groups in the field of all at home mothers” in
Registration No. 3626358 and “providing a support group for at home mothers” in
Registration No. 1935326—which we find to be the services most closely related to

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the goods and services identified in Applicant’s application. If we find confusion likely
between Applicant’s mark and either of the cited registrations with respect to the
Class 45 services, we need not consider the likelihood of confusion as to the remaining
goods and services in the cited registrations. See SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d
1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a single good from among several may
sustain a finding of likelihood of confusion); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun
Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981) (indicating that likelihood of confusion must
be found if there is likely to be confusion with respect to any item that comes within
the identification of goods or services in the application).
A. The Marks
The first DuPont factor requires us to compare the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v.
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see also Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2014). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the
marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL
2734893, at *5 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 WL 2531200,
at *2 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko
Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”).
“Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340,

Serial No. 98837930
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1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks,
but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a
connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2012)). “The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks.” In re St.
Julian Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 WL 2788005, at *6 (TTAB 2020).
We must base our comparison on the marks in their entireties, not on a dissection
of their individual components. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1985). “No element of a mark is ignored simply because it is less dominant, or would
not have trademark significance if used alone.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d
645, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d
1293 (CCPA 1974)). Nonetheless, “‘in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion
on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational
reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided
the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.’” In re
Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Nat’l Data, 753
F.2d at 1058).
With these principles in mind, we compare Applicant’s mark THE MOM CLUB
with the cited mark MOMS CLUB.4
4 Applicant makes much of the fact that, in the first Office action, the Examining Attorney at
times inadvertently referred to Applicant’s mark as “MOM CLUB” (omitting the article

Serial No. 98837930
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The marks are virtually identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and
commercial impression. Both marks combine the term MOM (or its plural, MOMS)
with the identical term CLUB. The marks differ only in that Applicant’s mark begins
with the article THE and presents MOM in the singular form, whereas the cited mark
presents MOMS in the plural form. Neither difference is significant.
First, the addition of the article THE at the beginning of Applicant’s mark has no
source-identifying significance and does not distinguish the marks. See In re Thor
Tech Inc., No. 78634024, 2009 WL 1098997, at *2 (TTAB 2009) (finding WAVE and
THE WAVE “virtually identical”; “[t]he addition of the word ‘The’ at the beginning of
the registered mark does not have any trademark significance”); In re Narwood
Prods. Inc., No. 73329339, 1984 WL 63599, at *1 (TTAB 1984) (the inclusion of the
definite article “the” is “insignificant in determining the likelihood of confusion”). If
anything, the article THE “simply emphasizes” the word that immediately follows
it—MOM. See Thor Tech, 2009 WL 1098997, at *2.
Second, the presentation of MOM in the singular form in Applicant’s mark, rather
than the plural MOMS in the cited mark, is a distinction without a difference. An
applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially
identical to the registered mark in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial
impression. See Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878 (CCPA 1957) (“[T]here is no
“THE”) and, in one instance, transposed Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks. See Applicant’s
Br., 4 TTABVUE 7. The Examining Attorney acknowledged and apologized for this error. See
November 18, 2025 Final Office Action, TSDR at 4; Examining Attorney’s Br., 6 TTABVUE
6. While an examining attorney must take care to correctly identify the marks at issue, the
error here does not affect our analysis, which is based on a comparison of the marks as they
appear in the application and the cited registrations, considered in their entireties.

Serial No. 98837930
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material difference, in a trademark sense, between the singular and plural forms of
the word ‘Zombie’ and they will therefore be regarded here as the same mark.”); Swiss
Grill Ltd. v. Wolf Steel Ltd., No. 85336644, 2015 WL 5675642, at *11 n.17 (TTAB
2015) (“[I]t is obvious that the virtually identical marks [SWISS GRILLS and SWISS
GRILL] are confusingly similar ....”).
Applicant argues that the marks differ in sound because Applicant’s mark is
“three syllables as compared to MOMS Club having two,” and that this auditory
difference, together with the visual differences, distinguishes the marks.5 We are not
persuaded. The single added syllable created by the article THE does not
meaningfully alter the overall sound of the marks, which is dominated by the
phonetically similar wording MOM CLUB and MOMS CLUB. See Thor Tech, 2009
WL 1098997, at *2. The average purchaser, who retains only a general rather than a
specific impression of the marks, is unlikely to distinguish the marks on the basis of
this minor difference. See St. Julian Wine, 2020 WL 2788005, at *6.
Applicant further argues that the marks differ in connotation and commercial
impression because THE MOM CLUB, with MOM expressed in the singular and
preceded by the definite article THE, “connotes a new idea … [that] sounds fresh and
modern” and is “suggestive of a particular lifestyle-oriented social organization[,]”
while MOMS CLUB “connotes something more staid, where ‘MOMS’ can be
5 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 9.

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interpreted as plural or possessive form” and “conveys a descriptive or collective
reference to clubs for mothers generally.”6
Applicant’s argument is unavailing. As an initial matter, Applicant submitted no
evidence—no dictionary definitions, survey evidence, or other support—
demonstrating that consumers would perceive these virtually identical phrases to
convey different meanings. “Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.” Cai,
901 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). In any event, the word MOM (or MOMS) means the same thing in
both marks—namely, a mother—and both marks convey the same meaning and
commercial impression: a club for mothers.7 Nor is the cited mark presented in the
possessive form (i.e., “MOM’S”). Both marks describe a “CLUB” for “MOM[S]” and
thus create the same commercial impression. Cf. In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021
WL 2285576, at *9 (TTAB 2021) (“[T]here is no evidence here, or other reason to find,
that the mark TRUST THE PROCESS has one meaning when used with shoes, and
a second and different meaning when used with shirts and sweatshirts, based on the
nature of the respective goods.”).
Finally, Applicant’s arguments premised on the way the marks appear in actual
use—for example, that Applicant’s mark “appears everywhere in prominent capital
block letters” while Registrant uses its mark as “International MOMS Club”—are
6 Id.; Applicant’s Reply Br., 7 TTABVUE 4.
7 May 12, 2025 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 12 (definition of “mother” from THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY), 15 (definition of “mom” from THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY).

Serial No. 98837930
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unavailing.8 Both Applicant’s mark and the cited mark are in standard-character
form (or the legally equivalent typeset form), and are therefore not limited to any
particular font, style, size, or color. See Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363 & n.2; i.am.symbolic,
866 F.3d at 1324; Trademark Rule 2.52(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a). Accordingly, we must
consider that Applicant’s mark and the cited mark could be displayed in the same
manner, including in identical lettering, further heightening the similarity between
them.9 Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363. To the extent Applicant contends that Registrant is
not using “MOMS CLUB” but rather uses a different mark—“International MOMS
Club”10—that argument constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the cited
registrations, which are prima facie evidence of the validity of the registrations and
Registrant’s exclusive right to use the marks as registered. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b);
In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We compare Applicant’s
mark to the marks as registered, not as they are used in the marketplace.
8 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 8, 12.
9 Applicant’s argument that the cited mark is “MOMS Club” not “MOMS CLUB” based on
the drawing in the underlying application file is misplaced. See Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE
7. To start, Registration No. 1935326 identifies the mark as “MOMS CLUB.” Applicant is
correct that the drawing for the mark subject to Registration No. 3626358 depicts “MOMS
Club,” but as noted previously, the mark subject to Registration No. 3626358 is in standard
characters. The presentation of the mark on the drawing page does not change the nature of
the mark from a standard-character mark to a special-form mark. See Trademark Rule
2.52(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a) (setting forth requirements for standard character mark). Our
references to the cited mark in this opinion in all uppercase letters reflect the fact that a term
registered as a mark in standard character format (or typeset form) is not limited to any
particular font style, size, or color. See In re White Rock Distilleries Inc., No. 77093221, 2009
WL 3401827, at *1 (TTAB 2009) (“[R]ights associated with a word mark in standard character
(or typed) form reside in the wording and not in any particular display of the word.”).
10 See Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 12, 15.

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Considering the marks in their entireties, we find that THE MOM CLUB and
MOMS CLUB are virtually identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and
commercial impression. The first DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of finding a
likelihood of confusion.
B. The Goods and Services
We next consider the relatedness of the goods and services, assessed based on the
identifications in the application and cited registrations. See Detroit Athletic, 903
F.3d at 1307 (“The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the goods
and services described in the application and registration, and not on real-
world conditions.”) (emphasis in italics in original); Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323;
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Because Applicant’s mark and the cited mark are virtually identical, the degree of
similarity between the goods and services that is required to support a finding of
likelihood of confusion is reduced. Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1207; Time Warner Entm’t
Co. L.P. v. Jones, No. 91112409, 2002 WL 1628168, at *8 (TTAB 2002) (“the greater
the degree of similarity between the applicant’s mark and the cited registered mark,
the lesser the degree of similarity between the applicant’s goods or services and the
registrant’s goods or services that is required to support a finding of likelihood of
confusion”).
“‘[I]t is not necessary that the products [or services] be similar or even competitive
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.’” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369
(quoting 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 WL 1431084, at *10 (TTAB

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2007)). Nor is the question whether the goods or services themselves will be confused
with each other; rather, it is whether consumers would be confused as to their source.
See Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). It is sufficient that the
goods and services “are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief
that they emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369.
Evidence of relatedness may include news articles and/or evidence from online
databases showing that the relevant goods and services are used together or used by
the same purchasers; advertisements showing that the relevant goods and services
are advertised together or sold by the same manufacturer or dealer; and/or copies of
prior use-based registrations of the same mark for both an applicant’s goods and
services (or similar goods and services) and the goods and services listed in the cited
registration (or similar goods and services). See, e.g., In re Country Oven, Inc., No.
87354443, 2019 WL 6170483, at *2 (TTAB 2019); Davia, 2014 WL 2531200, at *6-8
(finding pepper sauce and agave related where evidence showed both were used for
the same purpose in the same recipes and thus consumers were likely to purchase
the products at the same time and in the same stores).
1. Applicant’s International Class 41 Services
We consider first Applicant’s Class 41 “Social club services, arranging, organizing
and hosting social events, get-togethers, and parties for hosts and their guests” in
relation to Registrant’s Class 45 support-group services. We begin, as we must, with
the identifications themselves. Registrant’s Class 45 services are broadly worded and
unrestricted: “providing a support group for at home mothers” (Registration No.

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1935326) and “Organizing and conducting support groups in the field of all at home
mothers” (Registration No. 3626358). Applicant’s Class 41 services are similarly
unrestricted. Neither identification contains any limitation confining the parties’
services to separate spheres, and we must construe each to encompass all services of
the type described. See Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323. So construed, the two
identifications reach the same audience—mothers—and describe activities of the
same general kind: bringing mothers together in a group setting, the one to provide
support, the other to provide social engagement. The record evidence confirms as
much. As shown below, entities providing support-group services for mothers
commonly organize and host social events, and both types of services are frequently
offered under the same mark and marketed to the same consumers.
Most significantly, Registrant provides both support-group services and organizes
and hosts social gatherings under the MOMS CLUB mark. Evidence from
Registrant’s own website and the websites of several MOMS CLUB chapters
demonstrates that the organization and hosting of social events is a core component
of Registrant’s support-group services. For example:
• Registrant’s website describes its chapters as follows: “Our chapters plan
all sorts of activities for their mothers and children. There are playgroups,
babysitting coops, and holiday parties … Activity groups share interests
like cooking, couponing, crafts, outings, books, and exercise.”11
11 August 7, 2025 Response to Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 6 (screenshot from
momsclub.org/about).

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• The MOMS Club of McLean, Virginia, is described as “a local mother’s
group offering support, playgroups, outings, casual gatherings, and service
projects to enhance the lives of moms and children.”12
• The MOMS Club of Potomac, Maryland, lists its chapter activities as
including “Monthly social meetings with speakers,” “Book Club,” “Craft
Club,” “Foodie Club,” “Moms’ Night Out,” and “K.A.M.P. (Kids Away Moms
Play!),” and identifies among its goals “[t]o provide a support group for
mothers who choose [to] stay at home to raise their children.”13
• The MOMS Club of Bethesda, Maryland, lists its activities as including
“playgroups,” described as “a great way for both moms and kids to
socialize”; “Moms Night Out (MNO),” described as “a great chance to catch
up with friends and mingle”; “special events,” including a “Back to School
Party,” a “Halloween Party,” a “Holiday Party,” a “Valentine’s Day Party,”
and a “Spring Party”; and a “Monthly book club.”14
• The MOMS Club of Lebanon, Ohio, lists its activities as including “Play
groups/Potlucks,” “Moms Night Out,” “Monthly Mommy Mixers,” “Cooking
Club,” “Book Club,” and “Nature Club.”15
This evidence establishes that a key mode by which Registrant provides support
to at-home mothers is through the organization of social activities—the very services
listed in Applicant’s application. Consumers who encounter a social gathering
advertised under Applicant’s mark THE MOM CLUB, being familiar with
Registrant’s MOMS CLUB support-group services that include the organization and
hosting of social events, would be likely to assume that the two emanate from the
same source.
12 May 12, 2025 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 17 (screenshot from
memberplanet.com/momsofmclean).
13 November 18, 2025 Final Office Action, TSDR at 8-10 (screenshot from
momsclubpotomac.weebly.com/about.html).
14 Id. at 12-15 (screenshot from momsclubofbethesda.com/membership/activities).
15 Id. at 16-17 (screenshot from momsclublebanon.info/events.php).

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The relatedness of these services is not limited to Registrant’s own organization.
The Examining Attorney submitted evidence from third-party entities showing that
providers of support-group services for mothers also organize and host social events
and market both types of services under the same mark. For example:
• MONA describes itself as “A Local Support And Social Group For Parents
Who Reside In Arlington, Virginia” that “[o]ffers an active calendar of
member socials, outings, ticketed shows, speakers, workshops, special
events, school fairs, and much more,” along with a “[n]etwork of support
and advice to parents from all walks of life.”16
• HRP Mamas describes itself as “Downtown Manhattan’s Mothers Support
Group and Parenting Resource,” offering “a calendar of lectures and
workshops,” “expectant mom meetups,” “playgroups and mothers circles,”
and “select social events,” along with “email blasts about local events and
activities.”17
• Mesh Moms offers “year-round activities, including regular playdates,
parent education, and adults-only social gatherings.”18
Collectively, this evidence demonstrates that support-group services for mothers
and the organization and hosting of social events for mothers are commonly offered
under the same mark and marketed to the same consumers, such that consumers
encountering these services under the highly similar marks at issue would be likely
to believe that they emanate from a single source.
Tellingly, Applicant’s own materials confirm the relatedness of the services, as
Applicant likewise promotes its social club as providing “support” to mothers.
Applicant’s website states that its events are “where connection, support, and
16 Id. at 18 (screenshot from monamoms.org/about_mona.php).
17 Id. at 19-21 (screenshot from hrpmamas.com).
18 Id. at 22-23 (screenshot from meshmoms.com/membership).

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inspiration come together in one vibrant community,” and describes its events as
opportunities to “connect, and gain valuable insights through engaging workshops,
guest speakers, and experiences,” inviting consumers to “meet other amazing
parents, find support, and have a great time.”19 Applicant’s own description of its
services as a “supportive space” and “community” for parents underscores the close
relationship between its services and Registrant’s support-group services.
Applicant’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Applicant’s central
contention is that Registrant’s services are “fundamentally different in nature and
purpose” because Registrant is “an International organization functioning as an
educational organizer specifically directed to and for stay-at-home mothers,” focused
on “parental education” and “homeschooling,” whereas Applicant provides “social-
recreational” services.20 This argument mischaracterizes Registrant’s services.
Registration No. 1935326 identifies “providing a support group for at home mothers,”
and Registration No. 3626358 identifies, among other things, “Organizing and
conducting support groups in the field of all at home mothers.”21 Neither
identification is restricted to parental education, and neither mentions
homeschooling. We may not read limitations into an identification of services that are
not there. See Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323; Thor Tech, 2009 WL 1098997, at *5 (“We
19 August 6, 2025 Amendment to Allege Use, TSDR at 6; see also October 22, 2025 Response
to Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 30 (Applicant’s website describing The Mom Club as
providing “a supportive space where moms can connect, share advice and access resources”).
20 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 5, 10-12.
21 Registrant’s website at momsclub.org defines an “at-home mother” as “one who is taking
care of her children, herself.” August 7, 2025 Response to Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at
6.

Serial No. 98837930
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have no authority to read any restrictions or limitations into the registrant’s
description of goods.”). Moreover, as the record evidence demonstrates, Registrant’s
support-group services are not, in fact, limited to education or homeschooling;
instead, they include a wide array of social activities directed to at-home mothers
generally. Applicant’s attempt to narrow Registrant’s services to homeschooling-
related education is contrary to both the identifications in the cited registrations and
the evidence of record.
Applicant further argues that “occasional social interaction alone” is insufficient
to establish relatedness, and that if it were, “virtually every civic organization,
educational association, alumni organization, church group, parenting organization,
or professional society would become commercially related to social event clubs.”22
But the record here does not reflect merely “occasional” or incidental social
interaction. Rather, it demonstrates that the organization and hosting of social events
is a central and recurring component of the support-group services provided by
Registrant, its chapters, and several third parties. The relatedness we find here is
grounded in specific evidence showing that the same entities commonly provide both
support-group services and social event services for mothers under the same mark.
2. Applicant’s International Class 25 Goods
We turn to Applicant’s Class 25 goods—“Clothing, namely, hats, shirts.” It is well
established that clothing items such as t-shirts and hats are commonly used as
promotional or “collateral” products to advertise services and to identify a group’s
22 Applicant’s Reply Br., 7 TTABVUE 5.

Serial No. 98837930
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members, such that clothing may be found related to the services it promotes. See,
e.g., L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, No. 91162330, 2008 WL 835278, at *6 (TTAB
2008) (“It is common knowledge … that the licensing of commercial trademarks on
‘collateral products’ has become a part of everyday life.”); Turner Entm’t Co. v. Nelson,
No. 91094200, 1996 WL 335214, at *4 (TTAB 1996) (“It is common knowledge … that
video games, t-shirts, beach towels, caps and other logo-imprinted products are used
as promotional items for a diverse range of goods and services.”).
Consistent with this principle, the Examining Attorney submitted evidence
showing that providers of support-group services for mothers commonly sell clothing
items to promote their services and to identify members. Third-party providers such
as The Womb Room and Embrace Grace offer clothing alongside their support-group
services.23 Applicant does not dispute that both it and these third parties sell clothing
under their respective marks and has not presented any arguments concerning the
relatedness of its Class 25 goods and the Class 45 services identified in the cited
registrations in any of its Office action responses or its briefs. On this record, the sale
of promotional clothing in connection with support-group services for mothers
supports a finding that Applicant’s Class 25 goods are related to Registrant’s Class
45 services.
23 May 12, 2025 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 30-35 (screenshot of Womb Room webpage,
wombroom.mom/shop-1, listing for sale, inter alia, WOMB ROOM branded clothing), 41-43
(screenshot of Embrace Grace webpage, shop.embracegrace.com, listing for sale, inter alia,
EMBRACE GRACE branded clothing). Registrant’s own website includes a link to
“Merchandise,” but no evidence is in the record concerning what type of merchandise
Registrant lists on its website. See August 7, 2025 Response to Non-Final Office Action, TSDR
at 6 (screenshot of Registrant’s website, momsclub.org).

Serial No. 98837930
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Accordingly, the second DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion as to both Classes 25 and 41.
C. The Trade Channels, Classes of Consumers, and Purchasing
Conditions
We next consider the third DuPont factor, “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of
established, likely-to-continue trade channels,” and the fourth DuPont factor, “[t]he
conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361. As with the comparison of the goods and services, we base our comparison of
the trade channels and customers on what is set forth in the involved application and
cited registrations. See, e.g., i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1325.
Applicant contends that its goods and services are promoted through “social media
and lifestyle-oriented platforms,” “event-based gatherings,” “local editorial coverage,”
“community and social networking environments,” and “[m]erchandise sales,” while
Registrant’s services are promoted through “educational platforms,” “newsletters,”
“homeschooling networks,” and “parent-focused educational resources.”24 Applicant’s
characterization of the parties’ respective trade channels improperly reads
limitations into the identifications, which contain none. See i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d
at 1327. In any event, the record contradicts Applicant’s premise.
Because neither the application nor the cited registrations contain any restriction
as to trade channels, we begin with the presumption that the parties’ respective goods
and services move through all channels of trade that are normal and usual for such
24 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 14; see also Applicant’s Reply Br., 7 TTABVUE 6.

Serial No. 98837930
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goods and services and are available to all normal potential purchasers. See In re FCA
US LLC, No. 85650654, 2018 WL 1756431, at *4 (TTAB 2018), aff’d mem., 778 F.
App’x 962 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Given the closely related nature of the goods and services,
those normal channels overlap. The record evidence independently confirms this. The
same website evidence discussed under the second DuPont factor shows that
Applicant, Registrant, its chapters, and multiple third parties offer these related
services—and, in the case of the clothing, related goods—through their own websites,
accessible to the same consumers through the same site navigation. See Charger
Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1382 (third-party website evidence showed that services and
channels of trade were similar); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., No. 77029776, 2009 WL
2420527, at *6 (TTAB 2009) (website evidence of third parties offering goods of both
applicant and registrant showed same or overlapping channels of trade and
purchasers). Indeed, Applicant identifies its own trade channels as including “social
media,” “event promotion,” and “merchandise branding,”25 and the record reflects
that Registrant, its chapters, and these third parties use those same channels.26
Accordingly, the trade channels are not merely theoretically overlapping based on the
breadth of the identifications; they overlap in the actual marketplace as well.
25 Applicant’s Reply Br., 7 TTABVUE 6; see also Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 14.
26 See, e.g., May 12, 2025 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 30-35 (Womb Room merchandise),
41-43 (Embrace Grace merchandise), 52-54 (social media posts from Registrant’s chapters
promoting chapter events, including social events); November 18, 2025 Final Office Action,
TSDR at 12 (website for MOMS Club of Bethesda includes link to Facebook), 22 (website for
Mesh Moms includes links to Facebook and Instagram).

Serial No. 98837930
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Having established that the trade channels overlap, we turn to the related
question of whether the classes of consumers also overlap—and, if so, the degree of
care those consumers exercise when purchasing the goods and services. Applicant
argues that its consumers are “mothers seeking social interaction, celebrations, and
recreational gatherings,” whereas Registrant’s consumers are “parents whose
motivation is educational planning and academic instruction in homeschooling their
children.”27 This argument again impermissibly narrows both parties’ consumers
based on Applicant’s mischaracterization of Registrant’s services. See i.am.symbolic,
866 F.3d at 1327 (“[T]he Board properly declined to import restrictions into the
identification of goods based on alleged real-world conditions.”). Registrant’s services
are not limited to education or homeschooling, and its consumers—at-home
mothers—overlap with the mothers to whom Applicant markets its social club
services.
An overlap in the classes of consumers, however, does not, by itself, resolve the
fourth DuPont factor. We also consider the conditions under which purchases are
made—specifically, whether they are impulse purchases or the product of careful
deliberation. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. A heightened degree of care in making a
purchasing decision may tend to minimize likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re
N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no likelihood of confusion
between NARCO and NARKOMED because the relevant goods would be purchased
only by sophisticated buyers exercising great care). Conversely, impulse purchases of
27 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 13.

Serial No. 98837930
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inexpensive goods or services may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm Bay, 396
F.3d at 1376. However, “that the relevant class of buyers may exercise care does not
necessarily impose on that class the responsibility of distinguishing between similar
trademarks for similar goods [or services].” In re Rsch. & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d
1276, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Neither Applicant nor the Examining Attorney directly addresses this aspect of
the fourth DuPont factor. Applicant did not present any evidence regarding the
degree of care exercised by purchasers of the involved goods or services. Because the
goods and services are not restricted as to price and appear to be relatively
inexpensive, we find that the consumers of these goods and services include ordinary
members of the general public who may not exercise a heightened degree of care. See
Recot, 214 F.3d at 1329 (“When products are relatively low-priced and subject to
impulse buying, the risk of likelihood of confusion is increased because purchasers of
such products are held to a lesser standard of purchasing care.”). In any event, we
must base our decision on the least sophisticated potential purchasers. Stone Lion,
746 F.3d at 1325.
In view of the foregoing, the third DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a
likelihood of confusion, and the fourth DuPont factor is, at most, neutral.
D. The Strength of the Cited Mark
Finally, we address the strength of the cited mark under the sixth DuPont factor,
which considers “[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods
[or services].” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

Serial No. 98837930
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Applicant argues that the shared terms “MOMS” and “CLUB” are “highly
suggestive and commercially weak in connection with organizations directed to
mothers,” and that “[c]onsumers are accustomed to encountering ‘mom’-formative
and ‘club’-formative terminology from many different sources in different commercial
contexts.”28 Applicant contends that the scope of protection afforded to the cited mark
is therefore narrow, such that the differences between the marks are sufficient to
avoid confusion.29
There is no doubt that the term “CLUB” standing alone is weak as a source
indicator for services designed to bring people together.30 Nor is there any doubt that
the phrase (or marks) “THE MOM CLUB” and “MOMS CLUB” are descriptive of a
club for mothers. Indeed, the descriptiveness of the shared wording is not in dispute:
Applicant seeks registration on the Supplemental Register, and both cited
registrations issued pursuant to a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section
2(f), which constitutes a concession that the cited marks are not inherently
distinctive. See Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A]n applicant’s reliance on Section 2(f) during prosecution
28 Applicant’s Reply Br., 7 TTABVUE 6-7.
29 Id.
30 We take judicial notice that the dictionary definition of “club” from THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY includes: “A group of people organized for a common purpose,
especially a group that meets regularly.” See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY,
ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=club (last visited September 15, 2026). The Board may
take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet
Food Imp. Co., No. 91061847, 1982 WL 52012, at *3 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or have regular fixed
editions. In re Red Bull GmbH, No. 75788830, 2006 WL 936983, at *3 (TTAB 2006).

Serial No. 98837930
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presumes that the mark is descriptive.”); In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 308 (CCPA
1978) (application for Supplemental Registration is an admission of descriptiveness).
However, the conceptual weakness of the shared wording does not, on this record,
warrant a finding that the cited mark is entitled to such a narrow scope of protection
that the highly similar marks at issue may coexist for related goods and services.
Applicant introduced no evidence of any third-party having registered or having used
a mark comprising the terms MOM or MOMS together with CLUB. See, e.g., Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding
the Board gave “inadequate consideration to the strength or weakness of [Opposer’s]
marks” by failing to properly consider “the extensive evidence of third-party use and
registrations”); Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1373 (“Evidence of third-party use of similar
marks on similar goods is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled
to only a narrow scope of protection.”). While the record contains evidence of third
parties providing support services and social services to mothers (submitted by the
Examining Attorney to demonstrate relatedness), that evidence does not reflect third-
party use of marks containing the wording MOM(S) CLUB. Applicant’s unsupported
assertion that consumers are “accustomed to encountering ‘mom’-formative and
‘club’-formative terminology from many different sources” is mere attorney argument.
See Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371.
Furthermore, that the marks subject to the cited registrations are registered
under Section 2(f) does not, without more, establish that they are “entitled to such a
narrow scope of protection as to permit registration of a confusingly similar mark for

Serial No. 98837930
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related” goods and services. In re Integrated Embedded, No. 86140341, 2016 WL
7368696, at *10 (TTAB 2016). Although we recognize that the cited mark is not
conceptually strong, by virtue of registration pursuant to Section 2(f), it has acquired
distinctiveness and, pursuant to Trademark Act Section 7(b), it is entitled to the same
statutory presumptions, and corresponding scope of protection, as other marks
registered on the Principal Register. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
On this record, we treat the sixth DuPont factor as neutral in our likelihood of
confusion analysis, and accord the cited mark the normal scope of protection to which
distinctive marks are entitled.31
II. Conclusion
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there is evidence and argument, “explain the results of that weighing,” and
address “the weight [we] assigned to the relevant factors.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1384. “No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and each case
requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.” In re Mighty
31 Although Applicant does not press the point extensively in its briefs, we note for
completeness that, to the extent Applicant relies on evidence of coexisting third-party
registrations of identical or similar marks for different goods and services (see Applicant’s
Br., 4 TTABVUE 10 (citing October 22, 2025 Response to Non-Final Office Action, where
Applicant submitted six third-party registrations for the identical mark QUANTUM and five
third-party registrations for the identical mark GOAT)), such evidence does not aid Applicant
here. Prior decisions and actions of other examining attorneys in registering marks are not
binding on the Board, and each case must be decided on its own merits. See In re Cordua
Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The existence on the register of coexisting marks (different from those before
us) for goods and services unrelated to those at issue here does not compel a different result.
See Omaha Steaks Int’l v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(error to rely on third-party evidence of similar marks for dissimilar goods, as Board must
focus “on goods shown to be similar”).

Serial No. 98837930
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Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Naterra Int’l, 92 F.4th at
1116-17 (“Only the DuPont factors of significance to the particular mark need be
considered in the likelihood of confusion analysis.”).
We have carefully considered all evidence of record and all arguments related
thereto. The marks THE MOM CLUB and MOMS CLUB are virtually identical in
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression, differing only in the
addition of the article THE and the singular/plural form of MOM, neither of which is
significant. The first DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of a likelihood of
confusion. Applicant’s Class 41 social club services are related to Registrant’s Class
45 support-group services—both broadly worded and directed to mothers—as
confirmed by evidence that the same entities—including Registrant itself, its
chapters, and third parties—commonly provide both support-group and social
services for mothers under the same mark. Applicant’s Class 25 clothing is likewise
related to Registrant’s Class 45 services, as the record shows that providers of such
services sell promotional clothing under the same mark. The second DuPont factor
weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion as to both classes. The goods and services
are marketed through overlapping trade channels to the same class of consumers—
mothers. The third DuPont factor therefore also weighs in favor of a likelihood of
confusion. The fourth and sixth DuPont factors are neutral. No DuPont factor weighs
against a finding of likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, we find that confusion is
likely between Applicant’s mark for the goods in Class 25 and the services in Class

Serial No. 98837930
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41, on the one hand, and the cited MOMS CLUB registrations for the services in Class
45, on the other.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is affirmed with respect to the goods identified
in International Class 25 and the services identified in International Class 41.