Leskro Incorporated

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 1, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Leskro Incorporated
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Serial No. 98644460
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Gregory Kenyota, of Bochner PLLC,
for Leskro Incorporated.
Jacquelyn Jones,1 Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 120,
Joshua Toy, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Wellington, English, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Leskro Incorporated (Applicant), appeals the refusal of its application to register
the mark KATIE’S KANDY KORNER in standard-character format on the Principal
Register for goods identified as “Candies; Candy; Chocolate; Chocolate bars; Hard
candies; Milk chocolate; Snack cakes,” in International Class 30.2
1 The Examining Attorney during prosecution was Karl Wert.
2 Application Serial No. 98644460 was filed on July 11, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging a bona fide intent to use the mark for the
identified goods. The word “Candy” is disclaimed.

Serial No. 98644460
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Registration was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with two registered marks owned by different
entities:
• The composite mark , for goods identified as
“Candy,” in Class 30;3 and
• CAROL’S CANDY CORNER (in standard characters; “Candy” disclaimed),
for goods identified as “Candy; Chocolate; Candies; Candy bars; Chocolate
and chocolates; Chocolate bars; Chocolate bunnies; Chocolate truffles;
Confectioneries, namely, snack foods, namely, chocolate; Confectionery,
namely, candy and chocolate; Chocolate candies; Chocolates and chocolate-
based ready to eat candies and snacks; Filled chocolate; Fruit jelly candy;
Gift baskets containing candy; Gummy candies; Hard candies; Milk
chocolate; Rock candy,” in Class 30.4
After final refusal,5 Applicant appealed.6 The appeal has been briefed7 and is now
ready for decision. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal to register.
3 Reg. No. 5054799 issued on October 4, 2016, with a date of first use anywhere and in
commerce of July 31, 2015 (Section 8 Declaration of Continued Use accepted).
4 Reg. No. 7741868 issued on April 1, 2025, with a date of first use anywhere and in
commerce of October 1, 2004. The name shown in the mark identifies Carol Wert, whose
consent to register is of record.
5 See Oct. 8, 2025, Final Office Action. Citations in this opinion to the application record
refer to the version of the documents as downloaded in .pdf format from the Trademark
Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).
6 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and appeal record cite to the Board’s TTABVUE
electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents the docket number
assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE, and any number immediately following
“TTABVUE” identifies any specifically-cited page(s).
7 See 4 TTABVUE (Applicant’s Brief); 6 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s Brief).

Serial No. 98644460
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ANALYSIS
The refusal here is based on two different registrations, so we need to pick one to
begin our analysis. We’ll begin with Registration No. 7741868 for CAROL’S CANDY
CORNER (the “ ’868 Registration”). If we conclude that confusion isn’t likely as to
that registered mark, we’ll then assess whether confusion is likely as to the mark in
the other cited registration.
A. Section 2(d) refusals generally
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). To determine whether confusion
is likely, we use the roadmap set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). du Pont lays out several factors that may be relevant
in a given case. See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2023). Though du Pont lists thirteen numbered factors, we generally address only
those that are relevant and material to the case before us. See, e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v.
Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous.
Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Typically, those are the
factors that the parties address and on which there is relevant evidence in the record.
See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). After
making findings on the relevant factors, we then weigh them together to determine

Serial No. 98644460
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if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64
F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
B. Comparison of the goods
A few of the relevant factors present us with some low-hanging fruit to be picked,
such as the second likelihood of confusion factor listed in du Pont: “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration.” 476 F.2d at 1361. Here, the application lists “Candies; Candy;
Chocolate; Chocolate bars; Hard candies; Milk chocolate; Snack cakes.” The ’868
Registration lists:
Candy; Chocolate; Candies; Candy bars; Chocolate and
chocolates; Chocolate bars; Chocolate bunnies; Chocolate
truffles; Confectioneries, namely, snack foods, namely,
chocolate; Confectionery, namely, candy and chocolate;
Chocolate candies; Chocolates and chocolate-based ready to
eat candies and snacks; Filled chocolate; Fruit jelly candy; Gift
baskets containing candy; Gummy candies; Hard candies;
Milk chocolate; Rock candy.
As can be seen, everything in the application except “snack cakes” is listed in the
registration. As Applicant acknowledges, “the goods are identical or legally
identical,”8 in part. Thus, when we do our final weighing, this factor will weigh in
favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
8 See 4 TTABVUE 16, 17.

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C. Comparison of the trade channels and classes of customers
We see two more varieties of low-hanging fruit. du Pont tells us that we must
assess “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels” and the “buyers to whom sales are made.” Id. Applicant does not address
these factors. But the Examining Attorney does, pointing out that where, as here, the
goods are identical, we must presume that the goods travel in the same channels of
trade to the same classes of purchasers.9 We agree with the Examining Attorney. See,
e.g., Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018); In re Viterra
Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012). When we do our final weighing of the
findings on the factors, these two factors will also weigh in favor of a conclusion that
confusion is likely.
D. Comparison of the marks
We now turn to the first of the two factors that Applicant addresses: “[t]he
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Our primary
reviewing court has termed this a “predominant inquiry” in the likelihood of confusion
analysis. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Because people usually are exposed to marks at “spaced intervals,” Grandpa
Pidgeon’s of Mo., Inc. v. Borgsmiller, 477 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1973), they “ordinarily
9 6 TTABVUE 9-10.

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must depend upon their past recollection” when later exposed to a similar mark.
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981). So when
we compare marks, we don’t do a “side-by-side comparison,” but rather consider the
marks “in light of the fallibility of memory.” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Diamond Alkali Co. v. Dundee Cement Co.,
343 F.2d 781, 784 (CCPA 1965) (the test is whether confusion is likely when “the
marks are compared by separate recall later in time and removed in place”).
We assess marks by looking at their “appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); accord In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Similarity in all aspects is not required, however. This factor
supports refusal “if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to
cause confusion.” Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (citation omitted); see also Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740
(CCPA 1953) (“it is proper to consider [the marks’] appearance, sound and meaning
… but a combination of all three factors need not necessarily exist”) (cleaned up;
citations omitted).
“Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena Hosp., 774
F.3d at 752 (citation omitted). “The proper test is … whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who
encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”
i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.

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Knox Indus. Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) (“The issue is whether the marks
are confusingly similar, not whether they are identical.”) (citation omitted).
Applicant’s mark is KATIE’S KANDY KORNER; the mark in the ’868 Registration
is CAROL’S CANDY CORNER. Both are three words. All three words are two
syllables each and all begin with a “k” / “hard c” sound. They thus are identical in
cadence and alliterative in sound. The first words are the possessive form of female
names. The last two words in each are phonetically identical and, in the context of
the respective (and identical) goods, mean the same thing (a corner store where candy
is sold). The only difference is KATIE’S / CAROL’S. Overall, these marks are highly
similar. See, e.g., Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Société des Produits Nestlé S.A., 685
F.3d 1046, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding BEGGIN’ STRIPS and WAGGIN STRIPS’
similar where they “have the same format, structure, and syntax”); In re Nat’l Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“CASH MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT and
THE CASH MANAGEMENT EXCHANGE are, in large part, identical in sound and
appearance and have a general similarity in cadence.”).
Applicant insists they’re “not similar.”10 Applicant highlights that it spells “candy
corner” with K’s, not C’s. Yes, this technically renders the marks non-identical, but
consumers plainly will see “KANDY KORNER” and understand it as an intentional
and playful misspelling of “CANDY CORNER.” The difference is de minimis. See, e.g.,
St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 750-51 (rejecting argument that TAKETEN and TAKE
10! are dissimilar, saying “the differences in appearance are minimal”); Contour
10 See 4 TTABVUE 14, 16.

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Chair-Lounge Co. v. Englander Co., 324 F.2d 186, 189 (CCPA 1963) (finding that
“‘Contur’ but a slight misspelling of ‘Contour,’” Court held that confusion was likely
as between CONTURFOAM for mattresses and box springs and CONTOUR for
chairs).
Applicant also points to the different female names that are the first words of the
marks. Applicant argues that, because they’re first words, they’re the “dominant
elements” of the marks, and this means the dominant elements differ in sound,
meaning, and commercial impression.11 We don’t see it that way. The two names may
be different, but they still have significant similarities. As noted above, both are two
syllables each, begin with a “k” / “hard c” sound, are in possessive form, and are an
integral part of the alliterative nature and cadence of each mark. Viewing them in
light of the “fallibility of memory” that kicks in when consumers depend on their
recollection of marks to which they’ve previously been exposed, we disagree with
Applicant. The differences Applicant highlights in the female names pale in
comparison to the overall similarities in the marks—and it’s not a close question.
We find the marks to be highly similar when viewed in their entireties. When we
perform the final weighing of the relevant factors, this factor will count in favor of a
conclusion that confusion is likely. Just how much this will weigh in favor of the
refusal may vary depending on the next factor we discuss.
11 See id. at 14-16.

Serial No. 98644460
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E. The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods
du Pont’s sixth-listed factor is “[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use
on similar goods.” 476 F.2d at 1361. The Federal Circuit has explained that:
[t]he purpose of introducing evidence of third-party use is to
show that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora
of such similar marks that customers have been educated to
distinguish between different such marks on the bases of
minute distinctions. Third-party use is relevant to show that
a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope
of protection.
Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (cleaned up; citations omitted).
This is the main theme of Applicant’s brief: that “[t]he shared term ‘CANDY
CORNER and its phonetic variants is a weak and diluted term for candy and related
goods and services.”12 To support this assertion, Applicant points to evidence in the
record that fourteen (14) other businesses around the country use “CANDY
CORNER.”13 According to Applicant, this means “that the term [Candy Corner]
carries a suggestive or descriptive connotation in the relevant industry and is
therefore weak.”14 Applicant also urges that consumers, as a consequence, are
12 4 TTABVUE 3; see also id. at 9-14.
13 See Apr. 30, 2025, Response to First Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 16-17 (Candy
Corner); id. at 18-21 (Yelp review for a different Candy Corner); id. at 22-23 (a third Candy
Corner); id. at 24 (a fourth Candy Corner); id. at 25-26 (The Candy Corner); id. at 27-28
(Sophia’s Candy Corner); id. at 29 (Johnny’s Candy Corner); id. at 30 (Michael’s Candy
Corner); Sept. 9, 2025, Response to Second Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 16-17 (Kandy
Korner); id. at 18 (“Oaks Candy Corner” a/k/a “Oaks Candy”); id. at 19 (Mary Lou’s Candy
Corner); id. at 22-23 (Skip’s Candy Corner); id. at 24-25 (Nancy’s Candy Corner); id. at 26
(The Candy Corner).
14 See 4 TTABVUE 13.

Serial No. 98644460
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unlikely to be confused because of “the distinctive first-word personal names that
precede ‘CANDY CORNER.’”15
We agree with Applicant that the shared component “CANDY CORNER” /
“KANDY KORNER” is weak. “Candy” is generic for candy,16 and the term “corner” in
“Candy Corner” for entities selling candy to the public is suggestive in the sense that
it conjures an image where the candy is sold in a hometown-type establishment with
a friendly, neighborhood vibe. So the term “Candy Corner” (or slightly different
spellings of the term) is conceptually weak in the context of candy sales.17
The fourteen third-party uses also are probative to show that “Candy Corner” is
fairly weak in the marketplace as well (commercial weakness). But most of these
third-party users appear to be small, single-location shops.18 And Applicant does not
15 Id. at 11.
16 “Candy” is disclaimed in both marks for this reason.
17 Conceptual strength or weakness refers to a mark’s “distinctiveness.” See Spireon, Inc. v.
Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Distinctiveness assesses the inherent
relationship between the words in the mark and the goods or services. See, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (“a mark is inherently distinctive
if its intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source”) (cleaned up; citation omitted).
Distinctiveness can range along a whole spectrum, from marks that have no relationship
whatsoever with the goods or services (“arbitrary” or “fanciful” terms, which are inherently
distinctive), to marks that actually name the good or service (“generic” terms—like the word
“candy” for candy—which are not inherently distinctive). In between are marks that are
“suggestive,” i.e., terms that require some thought to be understood to relate to the goods or
services (inherently distinctive, but not as much as arbitrary or fanciful terms) and terms
that are “descriptive,” i.e., they are easily seen to describe an aspect of the goods or services
(not inherently distinctive). See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
768-69 (1992).
18 See also Apr. 30, 2025, Response to First Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 12
(characterizing each as a “store” and listing a location in a specific town); Sept. 9, 2025,
Response to Second Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 12 (same). We note that the retailer
named “Kandy Korner” appears to have five locations on Cape Cod. See id. at 16.

Serial No. 98644460
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give us any more information of the extent of these third-party uses. That tends to
blunt the force of this third-party use evidence a bit. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imports, Inc.
v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The probative
value of third-party trademarks depends entirely upon their usage. … As this court
has previously recognized, where the record includes no evidence about the extent of
[third-party] uses ... [t]he probative value of this evidence is thus minimal.”) (citations
omitted). Without additional evidence, we don’t have much to go on in determining
“the consuming public’s awareness” of these other uses. See id.19
Still, overall, based on the record before us, we find the shared “CANDY
CORNER” / “KANDY KORNER” segment of the respective marks conceptually and
commercially weak. This factor will rest on Applicant’s side of the scale when we
perform our weighing of the factors.
F. The “coexistence” of the two cited registrations
Applicant also argues that “[t]he USPTO allowed [the two registrations cited
against Applicant] to coexist, which demonstrates that the USPTO itself does not
view ‘CANDY CORNER’ as distinctive enough to confer exclusive rights on any one
registrant.”20 But Applicant is not trying to register “CANDY CORNER” by itself. Its
19 Where the sheer number of third-party uses rises to the level of “ubiquitous,”
“considerable,” or extensive, then such evidence can be potent even without additional
evidence showing the extent of the uses. See i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1329 (discussing Jack
Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363,
1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2015)). We do not think the evidence here rises to that level, particularly where, as here,
the evidence shows these third-party users to be small businesses. The modest number of
third-party uses does not convince us that this factor should be given overriding weight.
20 4 TTABVUE 9.

Serial No. 98644460
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mark is KATIE’S KANDY KORNER. And the marks cited against it are more than
just “CANDY CORNER.” The ’868 Registration is for CAROL’S CANDY CORNER,
and the other cited registered mark has a stylized typeface, colors, and a design, so it
too has additional elements. Plus, we already held that the segment “CANDY
CORNER” that Applicant’s mark and the mark in the ’868 Registration have in
common is weak. What, beyond that, might Applicant be arguing?
To the extent that Applicant is going further by arguing that all marks containing
“CANDY CORNER” must be registered because the USPTO allowed two marks with
that wording to be registered, we reject the argument. “Neither the Board nor any
Trademark Examining Attorney is bound by decisions of Examining Attorneys to
register prior marks.” In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., No. 86489116,
2017 WL 2572815, at *4 n.10 (TTAB 2017). “The PTO is required to examine all
trademark applications for compliance with each and every eligibility requirement …
, even if the PTO earlier mistakenly registered a similar or identical mark suffering
the same defect.” In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Or maybe Applicant is arguing that, when comparing marks containing “CANDY
CORNER,” we must give no weight at all to “CANDY CORNER” and compare only
the other elements of the marks. If so, we reject that too. We are required to compare
marks in their entireties. See In re Detroit Athl. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“it would be impermissible to ignore [non-source identifying] words outright”);
Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“Arguments to the effect that one portion of a mark possesses no trademark

Serial No. 98644460
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significance leading to a direct comparison between only what remains is an
erroneous approach.”).
No matter how we look at it, this argument simply is not persuasive.
G. Conclusion as to whether confusion is likely as to the mark in
the ’868 Registration
Having made findings on the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors, our final
step is to assess these findings together to determine if, on balance, they indicate that
confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384. Because the factors
may interact with one another, the weight each factor is given depends on the overall
circumstances in the case. See id. at 1381; In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206
(Fed. Cir. 1993). This step is not a “simple tally of factors.” Swagway, LLC v. ITC,
934 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
We found the goods to be identical. This is not only an important factor by itself,
see, e.g., Pink Lady Corp. v. L.N. Renault & Sons, Inc., 265 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA 1959)
(similarity or dissimilarity of the goods “is logically a factor of considerable
importance to be given much weight in reaching the ultimate conclusion”) (citation
omitted), but it also affects how we factor-in the similarities in the marks: “When
marks would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992); accord Viterra, 671
F.3d at 1363; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Serial No. 98644460
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And because the goods are identical, we also found that the channels of trade and
classes of customers also are presumed to be identical. So these two factors add more
weight in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
The comparison of the marks, of course, is a “predominant” factor in the weighing.
See, e.g., Herbko Int’l, 308 F.3d at 1165; Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1265; see also
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976)
(“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”). Here, we found the marks to be highly similar. But we agreed with
Applicant that the shared “CANDY CORNER / KANDY KORNER segment of the
marks is conceptually and commercially weak. That suggests that the public can
distinguish between various “CANDY CORNER” marks more easily than otherwise,
a factor that weighs in Applicant’s favor.
But we conclude that the marks, as wholes, are just too close, in light of the
identity of the goods, channels of trade, and classes of customers, to persuade us that
these factors are outweighed by the weakness of the shared CANDY CORNER
segment. Despite the weakness of CANDY CORNER, we conclude that, on balance,
confusion is likely in the circumstances presented here. Thus, registration must be
refused under Section 2(d) in view of the ’868 Registration. There is no need to assess
whether refusal is also appropriate in view of the mark of Registration No. 5054799.
See, e.g., In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL 22358, at *7 (TTAB 2010).
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.