Brenda Core

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 8, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Brenda Core
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Serial No. 97608134
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Scott L. Nielson of Law Office of Scott L. Nielson,
for Brenda Core.
Robert Clark, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 101,
Zachary Sparer, Managing Attorney.
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Before Goodman, Pologeorgis and Allard,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Brenda Core (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark
KARDASHIAN-JENNER (in standard characters) for “Providing information, news,
and commentary in the field of current events via the Internet; Providing current
event news via a global computer network” in International Class 41.1
1 Application Serial No. 97608134 was filed on September 27, 2022, based upon Applicant’s
assertion of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).

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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood
of confusion with the mark KARDASHIAN JENNER PRODUCTIONS (in standard
characters, PRODUCTIONS disclaimed) for “Entertainment services, namely,
multimedia production services; production of audio and video recordings; creation,
development and production of entertainment and pop culture content” in
International Class 41.2
Registration also was refused under Trademark Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), on
the basis that the mark falsely suggests a connection with the Kardashian-Jenner
family.
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. Both Applicant and the Examining
Attorney filed briefs.3 We affirm the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
Page references to the application record are to the online database of the USPTO’s
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. References to the briefs on appeal
refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system.
2 Registration No. 7219751 issued November 14, 2023.
3 Applicant’s brief is at 12 TTABVUE; the Examining Attorney’s brief is at 14 TTABVUE.

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goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination of
likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See
also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We consider
each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re Country Oven, Inc., No.
87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *2.
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165
(Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098,
1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or
services] and differences in the marks.”). These factors, and others, are discussed
below.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services, Channels of Trade, and
Classes of Purchasers
The second DuPont factor considers “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods [or services] as described in an application or registration.” DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. The third DuPont factor concerns the similarity or dissimilarity of
established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” Id.

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In determining the similarity or dissimilarity of the services, we must focus on the
services as they are identified in the involved application and the cited registration.4
See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1327; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press
Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comp. Servs.
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established
for any service encompassed by the identification of services within a particular class
in the application or registration. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp.,
648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981).
To reiterate, Applicant’s services are “providing information, news, and
commentary in the field of current events via the Internet; providing current event
news via a global computer network” and Registrant’s services are “entertainment
services, namely, multimedia production services; production of audio and video
recordings; creation, development and production of entertainment and pop culture
content.”
The Examining Attorney argues that the services are related, relying on the
evidence in the record. 14 TTABVUE 7.
Applicant argues that her services and the cited registration’s entertainment
services “do not intersect and are not directly overlapping or related.” 12 TTABVUE
4 Applicant agrees with this statement, 12 TTABVUE 9, but then argues “[i]n addition to the
description of goods constraint, it is just as important to consider the services as they are
presented in the marketplace.” 12 TTABVUE 10. However, our assessment is not based on
“real world conditions” but evaluated solely based on the identifications in the application
and the cited registration. Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

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10. Applicant submits that her services are “specific and limited,” “distinctive from
those of the cited registration,” and that the cited registration’s multimedia content
“cannot be mistaken with providing current event news information and content.”12
TTABVUE 6-7. Applicant also points out that there is no per se rule that holds that
Class 41 services are related merely because they are connected by the same
classification type.5 12 TTABVUE 10.
Although Applicant argues that her services are specific and not overlapping with
the cited registration, the services need not be identical or even competitive to find a
likelihood of confusion. On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). They need
only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their
marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate
from the same source.” Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 TTAB LEXIS
58, at *28-29).
The Examining Attorney provided use-based third-party registration evidence to
show relatedness of the cited registration’s multimedia production services and
Applicant’s services of providing information, news, and commentary in the field of
5 Applicant also mentions that the classification of Applicant’s and Registrant’s services in
International Class 41 is not a basis for finding relatedness. 12 TTABVUE 10. As our cases
have stated, the classification system was established for the convenience of the Office rather
than to indicate that goods or services in the same class are necessarily related or that
classification in different classes indicates that they are not related. NFL v. Jasper Alliance
Corp., No. 91077966, 1990 TTAB LEXIS 37, at *10.

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current events.6 The Examining Attorney also provided internet evidence from
Buzzfeed and Vice Media showing the offering of information on current events as
well as information relating to culture under the same mark.7 August 8, 2024 Office
Action at TSDR 13-16.
Evidence that a single company offers the services of both parties is relevant to a
relatedness analysis.” Hewlett-Packard Co., 281 F.3d at 1267; see also In re Embiid,
No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *39 (evidence of third-parties offering goods
of both applicant and registrant pertinent to relatedness of the goods). Third-party
registrations are relevant to our relatedness determination to the extent that they
suggest the listed services are of a type that may emanate from a single source. In re
Albert Trostel & Sons Co., No. 74186695, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 36, at *7. Internet
evidence showing goods or services emanating from the same source under the same
mark is relevant evidence of relatedness. In re Davey Prods. Pty, No. 77029776, 2009
TTAB LEXIS 524, at *14-15.
We find the third-party registration evidence supports a finding of relatedness in
connection with Applicant’s current event information and news services and the
6 Registration Nos. 6941115, 7177418, 6376007, 7009145, 4861228, 6643534. April 19, 2024
Office Action at TSDR 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
7 Applicant provided third-party registrations that covered current events information
services but did not cover multimedia production services. July 19, 2024 Response to Office
Action at TSDR 23-48. However, this evidence does not negate the third-party registrations’
probative value that shows some registrants do offer both the multimedia services of the cited
registration and Applicant’s services under the same mark. In re G.B.I. Tile and Stone Inc.,
No. 77369073, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 647, at *14-15 (“evidence showing only that the source of
one product may not be the source of another product does not aid applicant in its attempt to
rebut the evidence of the examining attorney”).

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cited registration’s multimedia production services. The BuzzFeed and Vice Media
internet evidence shows that current news and pop culture information and content
are offered under the same mark on the same website.8 The relatedness of the services
favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Turning to the trade channels, there are no restrictions in Applicant’s
identification or the cited registration as to trade channels or classes of consumer.
Absent an explicit restriction in the application or registration, the identified services
must be presumed to move in all channels of trade that would be normal for such
services and to be offered to all usual prospective consumers for services of that type.
DeVivo v. Ortiz, Opp. No. 91242863, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 15, at *40.
The consumer of Applicant’s and Registrant’s services are those consumers who
consume news and pop culture information and media and are interested in news and
entertainment.
Although the Examining Attorney included a section heading stating that the
trade channels overlapped, he provided no specific argument nor did he reference any
particular evidence to support this position. Because the services are related and not
legally identical, there is no presumption of trade channel overlap. We find this
DuPont factor is neutral.
8 To the extent the internet evidence is meant to support relatedness with audio, video and
multimedia production services, the webpages are unclear because the information and
stories provided appear to be offered in print format and not offered in audio, video, or
multimedia formats.

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B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar. In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4.
The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the marks in
their entireties; the analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their
various components. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985). On
the other hand, different features may be analyzed to determine whether the marks
are similar. Id. There is nothing improper in giving more or less weight to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the
marks in their entireties. Id.
The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a
general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks. See Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v.
Akea, LLC, No. 91196527, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 166, at *17; Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott
Paper Co., No. 91055167, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 236, at *6. The test, under the first
DuPont factor, is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a
side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the

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services offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Coach Servs., 668 F.3d
at 1368.
Applicant’s mark is KARDASHIAN-JENNER and the cited mark is
KARDASHIAN JENNER PRODUCTIONS.
Applicant argues that “the use of identical words or lettering does not
automatically mean the marks are similar enough to cause confusion – even if the
identical words are also dominant elements.” 12 TTABVUE 9. Applicant submits that
the overall impression of her mark and the cited mark is different, especially when
used with what she submits are dissimilar services. 12 TTABVUE 7.
As to the cited mark, the dominant portion is KARDASHIAN JENNER because
the disclaimed wording PRODUCTIONS is at least descriptive of the services and
subordinate in nature. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“descriptive component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a
conclusion on likelihood of confusion”) (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at
1058); In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (dominant portion
of THE DELTA CAFÉ and design mark is DELTA as the generic term CAFÉ has
been disclaimed). In addition, KARDASHIAN JENNER are the first two terms in the
cited mark and most likely to be impressed on consumers and remembered. See In re
Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The identity of the marks’
initial two words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those
words first.”); Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 TTAB

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LEXIS 60 at *8 (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be
impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered”).
While there is no rule that marks are automatically considered similar where one
mark encompasses the entirety of another, the fact that Applicant’s KARDASHIAN-
JENNER mark is subsumed within the cited mark KARDASHIAN JENNER
PRODUCTIONS increases the similarity between them. See, e.g., In re Mighty Leaf
Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applicant’s mark ML is similar to
registrant’s mark ML MARK LEES); DowntownDC Bus. Improvement Dist. v. Clarke,
No. 91275100, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 412, at *67-68 (DOWNTOWNDC DISTRICT OF
FASHION similar to DISTRICT OF FASHION); Hunter Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., No.
91203612, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 105, at *33 (PRECISION mark confusingly similar to
PRECISION DISTRIBUTION CONTROL mark) (citations omitted).
Applicant’s mark and the dominant portion of the cited mark are nearly identical,
and the hyphen in Applicant’s mark does not distinguish them. Mag Instrument, Inc.
v. Brinkmann Corp., No. 91163534, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 322, at *29.
We recognize that the marks ultimately must be compared in their entireties,
including any disclaimed words. When this comparison is made, we find that
Applicant’s mark is very similar to Registrant’s mark in sound, appearance and
meaning. Because of these similarities, Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks engender
similar overall commercial impressions.
This DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.

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C. Conditions of Sale
Under the fourth DuPont factor we consider “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
Purchaser sophistication or degree of care may tend to minimize likelihood of
confusion. Conversely, impulse purchases of inexpensive items may tend to have the
opposite effect. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. 396 F.3d at 1376. We must make our
determination based on the least sophisticated consumer. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at
1325.
Applicant argues “that the average consumer when seeking entertainment
services will not accidently[sic] get their news from the cited registration and they
will not think they are getting a pop culture reality show experience from Applicant.”
12 TTABVUE 10. The Examining Attorney argues that “[e]ven if consumers of the
compared services could be considered sophisticated and discriminating, ‘even
sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.’” 14 TTABVUE 9.
Because there is no evidence in the record regarding purchasing conditions, and
this is mere argument by Applicant and the Examining Attorney, we find this factor
neutral. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
(“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”).
II. Conclusion as to Likelihood of Confusion
As a final step, we “weigh the DuPont factors used in [our] analysis and explain
the results of that weighing.” In re Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir.

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2023) (emphasis omitted). The similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the
services weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. The trade channels and
conditions of sale are neutral. We find confusion likely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal to register Applicant’s mark KARDASHIAN-
JENNER is affirmed.9
9 Because we have found a likelihood of confusion, we need not address the false suggestion
of a connection refusal. See Multisorb Techs. Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., No. 92054730, 2013 TTAB
LEXIS 616, at *3.
.