Heavenly Daze Limited

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: August 14, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Heavenly Daze Limited
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Serial No. 98209106
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Heavenly Daze Limited, pro se.
Edward Payabyab, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 128,
Travis Wheatley, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Allard, and Stanley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Heavenly Daze Limited (“Applicant”), appearing pro se, seeks registration on the
Principal Register of the standard-character mark HVNLYDAZE for
Clothing jackets for men, women and children; Bottoms as
clothing for men, women and children; Coats for men,
women and children; Headwear for men, women and
children; Hooded sweatshirts for men, women and
children; Pants for men, women and children; Shirts for
men, women and children; Shorts for men, women and
children; Sweaters for men, women and children;
Sweatpants for men, women and children; Sweatshirts for
men, women and children; T-shirts for men, women and

Serial No. 98209106
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children; Tops as clothing for men, women and children in
International Class 25.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration under Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark so
resembles the standard-character mark HVNLYFIT, registered on the Principal
Register for “Leggings; Sports bras; Sweaters; T-shirts; Gym shorts” in International
Class 25,2 as to be likely to cause confusion when used in connection with the goods
identified in the application.
When the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant requested
reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed. The case is fully briefed.3 We
affirm the refusal to register.
I. Prosecution History and Record on Appeal4
We briefly summarize below the prosecution history of the application because it
provides useful background to our disposition of the appeal.
Applicant applied to register its mark based on the specimen shown below:
1 Application Serial No. 98209106 was filed on October 4, 2023 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark
anywhere at least as early as February 20, 2023 and first use of the mark in commerce at
least as early as September 15, 2023.
2 The cited Registration No. 7604362 (the “’362 Registration”) issued on December 17, 2024.
3 Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case docket refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding TTABVUE
corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the
page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear. Applicant’s appeal brief appears
at 4 TTABVUE and its reply brief appears at 7 TTABVUE. The Examining Attorney’s brief
appears at 6 TTABVUE.
4 Citations in this opinion to the application record are to pages in the downloadable .pdf
version of the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).

Serial No. 98209106
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5
The Examining Attorney issued an Office Action refusing registration based on
the inconsistency between the mark shown in Applicant’s specimen and the standard-
character mark shown in its drawing,6 and noting the pendency of the application to
register HVNLYFIT that ultimately matured into the cited ’362 Registration, which
the Examining Attorney cited as a prospective Section 2(d) bar to registration.7 The
Examining Attorney made of record USPTO electronic records regarding the
application.8
Applicant responded by arguing against the prospective citation of the mark
shown in the pending application.9 The Examining Attorney then suspended further
5 October 4, 2023 Application at 7.
6 May 23, 2024 Office Action at 2-3.
7 Id. at 2.
8 Id. at 5.
9 July 3, 2024 Response to Office Action at 1-4.

Serial No. 98209106
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examination of the involved application pending the disposition of the noted prior-
pending application.10 The Examining Attorney also withdrew the specimen refusal.11
The application then sat dormant for a little more than a year until the Examining
Attorney issued a non-final Office Action refusing registration based on the newly-
issued ’362 Registration.12 The Examining Attorney made of record USPTO electronic
records regarding the ’362 Registration.13 Applicant responded to this Office Action
by arguing against the refusal.14
The Examining Attorney then issued an Office Action making final the refusal to
register based on the ’362 Registration.15 The Examining Attorney made of record
third-party webpages displaying goods identified in the application and the ’362
Registration, which the Examining Attorney claimed “establish[ ] that the same
entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides a variety of clothing goods, and
markets the goods and/or services under the same mark.”16
Applicant requested reconsideration of the final refusal. In its Request for
Reconsideration, Applicant made of record what it described as the Instagram profile
10 August 3, 2024 Suspension Notice at 1-3.
11 Id. at 2.
12 September 6, 2025 Office Action at 1-5.
13 Id. at 7.
14 October 23, 2025 Response to Office Action at 4-12.
15 December 6, 2025 Final Office Action at 2-7.
16 Id. at 5, 9-103.

Serial No. 98209106
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of the owner of the ’362 Registration.17 The Examining Attorney denied the Request
for Reconsideration,18 and Applicant then appealed.
II. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Our determination
of the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“Two key factors in every Section 2(d) case are the first two factors regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods or services, because the
fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” DC Comics
v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *10 (TTAB 2022)
17 February 10, 2026 Request for Reconsideration at 5.
18 February 18, 2026 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at 1-2.

Serial No. 98209106
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(internal quotations and quotation marks omitted). In its appeal brief, Applicant
discusses only the first DuPont factor. 4 TTABVUE 2-5.19
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods, Channels of Trade, and
Classes of Consumers
We begin with the second DuPont factor, which “considers ‘[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration . . . .” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
“This factor considers whether ‘the consuming public may perceive [the goods or
services] as related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of the goods
or services.’” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “In
analyzing the [goods], the Board considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and
nature of the [goods] as described in an application or registration.’” In re OSF
Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 WL 6140427, at *4 (TTAB 2023) (quoting In re
Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, at *10 (TTAB 2021)).
The goods “need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of
confusion.” Id. (quoting In re Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 WL 6170483, at
*2 (TTAB 2019)). “They need only be ‘related in some manner and/or if the
circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the
mistaken belief that [they] emanate from the same source.” Id. (quoting Country
19 Applicant’s appeal brief “acknowledges that the goods may be legally identical.” 4
TTABVUE 5. In its reply brief, Applicant acknowledges that “overlap exists in the identified
clothing items. That point is not disputed.” 7 TTABVUE 8.

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Oven, 2019 WL 6170483, at *2 (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,
668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted)).
The relatedness of goods or services may be established based on (1) the language
of the involved identifications of goods or services, which may show, on the face of the
identifications, that the goods or services are literally or legally identical, or are
otherwise intrinsically related, and (2) extrinsic evidence, such as third-party uses or
registrations, which may show that the identified goods or services are commonly
offered by the same entity under the same mark. See, e.g., id. at *4.
The “Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity as to
each [good] listed in the description of [goods]” in Class 25 in the application. Id. at
*5 (citation omitted). “It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if
relatedness is established for any item encompassed in the identification of goods in
a particular class in an application.” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No.
90522364, 2025 WL 2953731, at *3 (TTAB 2025) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen.
Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981)). “[R]egistration must be
refused in a particular class if Applicant’s mark for any of its identified goods or
services in that class is likely to cause confusion with the Registrant’s mark for any
of its identified goods or services.” In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL
2094122, at *3 (TTAB 2020). As noted above, Applicant does not dispute that the
goods are legally identical. 4 TTABVUE 5; 7 TTABVUE 8.
The goods identified in the ’362 Registration as “T-shirts” encompass the goods
identified in the application as “T-shirts for men, women and children,” and the goods

Serial No. 98209106
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identified in the ’362 Registration as “Sweaters” encompass the goods identified in
the application as “Sweaters for men, women and children.” The goods identified in
the application as “Shorts for men, women and children” encompass the goods
identified in the ’362 Registration as “Gym shorts.” The ’362 Registration covers goods
identified as “Leggings,” which are a type of pants that are encompassed within the
“Pants for men, women and children” identified in the application.20 These four sets
of goods are legally identical.
Because the goods identified in the application and the ’362 Registration are
legally identical in part, the second DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that
confusion is likely. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9.
The third DuPont factor “considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.’” Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1308 (quoting
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Because the [goods] described in the application and the
[’362] [R]egistration are legally identical in part, we must presume that the channels
of trade and classes of purchasers are the same as to those . . . identical [goods].” OSF
Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9 (quoting Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050,
2023 WL 417620, at *8 (TTAB 2023) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2012)). We are entitled to “rely on this legal presumption in determining
20 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including definitions from
online dictionaries that exist in printed format or have fixed regular editions. See, e.g., In re
Nursecon, LLC, No. 88052194, 2024 WL 5265079, at *10 n.64 (TTAB 2024) (citation omitted).
We take judicial notice that “leggings” are “pants that are made of a material that stretches
to fit tightly around the legs —usually used in plural.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
(merriam-webster.com, last accessed on August 12, 2026).

Serial No. 98209106
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likelihood of confusion,” Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362, in the absence of evidence
regarding the channels of trade and classes of purchasers for the identified goods.
The third DuPont factor also strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely.
OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 WL 2953731, at *4
(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be
sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sageforth
Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (TTAB 2024) (finding that
the marks SAGEFORTH and SAGE CENTRAL were confusingly similar) (quoting In
re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5 (TTAB 2018), aff’d
per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either
form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting Coach
Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368). “The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser,
who normally ‘retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.’” Id.

Serial No. 98209106
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(quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 WL 3993582, at *4 (TTAB 2018)
(citations omitted)). Because clothing items of the sort identified in the application
“are purchased or used in some form by virtually everyone,” Embiid, 2021 WL
2285576, at *15, the “average purchaser” here is an ordinary member of the general
public.
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor, but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d at 752 (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2003)). Where, as here, the involved goods are legally identical, a lesser degree of
similarity between the marks is required for confusion to be likely. Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“When marks
would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.”).
The marks here are HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE, both in standard characters.
Applicant argues that “HVNLY is a vowel-deleted phonetic equivalent of the common
laudatory term ‘heavenly’,” and, “[a]s such, it is conceptually weak and entitled to a
narrow scope of protection.” 4 TTABVUE 2. Applicant further argues that “[w]here a
shared element is weak, consumers rely on additional wording to distinguish marks.”
Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
According to Applicant, its mark “HVNLYDAZE suggests a relaxed, lifestyle-
oriented or dreamy state,” while the cited mark “HVNLYFIT suggests athletic
performance or physical fitness.” Id. at 5. Applicant concludes that “[b]ecause HVNLY
is a phonetic equivalent of the common laudatory term ‘heavenly,’ it is conceptually

Serial No. 98209106
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weak and entitled to narrow protection,” and that “[t]he additional elements DAZE
and FIT meaningfully distinguish the marks.” Id.
The Examining Attorney responds that the marks are similar because they “share
the dominant and unique wording HVNLY,” 6 TTABVUE 3, and “DAZE and FIT do
little to distinguish the marks.” Id. According to the Examining Attorney, “[b]ased
[on] their placements within their respective marks, the words DAZE and FIT would
appear to consumers as a line of products by the HVNLY entity.” Id. at 4. The
Examining Attorney concludes that “because the marks share the dominant wording
HVNLY, and have no other elements that significantly differentiate the marks, the
marks are confusingly similar.” Id.
With respect to Applicant’s argument regarding the conceptual weakness of
“HVNLY,” the Examining Attorney argues that “Registrant’s fanciful misspelling of
the word ‘heavenly’ is unlike any other registered trademark for clothing.” Id. at 5.
The Examining Attorney further argues that “registrant’s visual presentation of
‘heavenly’ is highly fanciful and unique,” and that “[c]ombined with the fact that it
appears first in the marks, HVNLY is the most memorable portion of applicant’s and
registrant’s marks.” Id. With respect to the significance of the words DAZE and FIT,
the Examining Attorney argues that “these words appear last in the marks, and are
therefore less memorable than the misspelled HVNLY portion of the marks,” and that
“[s]hould applicant’s mark register, consumers would believe that DAZE and FIT
signify a line of products by the HVNLY entity.” Id. The Examining Attorney
concludes that

Serial No. 98209106
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HVNLY is the dominant portion of the marks because it is
spelled uniquely and appears first in the marks. The words
[sic] DAZE in applicant’s mark and the word FIT in
registrant’s mark are thus the less dominant portion of the
marks, and consumers would be less likely to remember
them when recalling the source of the goods at issue.
Id.
In its reply brief, Applicant reiterates that its “argument is one of conceptual
weakness” because “HVNLY is a phonetic rendering of ‘heavenly,’ a word that
conveys a general sense of quality, comfort, or aspiration rather than identifying a
specific commercial source.” 7 TTABVUE 3. Applicant argues that the HVNLY
portion of the cited mark is not “a rare or fanciful coined term,” id. at 5, but rather
“the word ‘heavenly’ written without vowels.” Id. at 4. Applicant rejects the
Examining Attorney’s argument regarding the absence of other registrations of
HVNLY marks because such absence “does not transform a phonetic rendering of a
common word into a highly distinctive coined mark.” Id. at 6.
Because Applicant’s core “argument is one of conceptual weakness,” id. at 3, we
begin by noting that the cited ’362 Registration of HVNLYFIT issued on the Principal
Register without the requirement of a showing of acquired distinctiveness under
Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).21 Because the mark is
“registered on the Principal Register, with no claim of acquired distinctiveness under
Section 2(f), we presume it is inherently distinctive, i.e., that it is at worst suggestive
21 September 6, 2025 Office Action at 7.

Serial No. 98209106
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of the goods.” Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, at *18
(TTAB 2024) (citing, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)).
Applicant did not make of record any third-party uses or registrations of HVNLY-
formative marks for clothing under the sixth DuPont factor, the “number and nature
of similar marks in use on similar goods,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, to try to “contract
the scope of protection of [HVNLYFIT] by adducing evidence of . . . conceptual
weakness.” Heil Co., 2024 WL 4925901, at *18 (citing Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71
F.4th 1355, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). Instead, Applicant merely argues that “HVNLY
is a vowel-deleted phonetic equivalent of the common laudatory term ‘heavenly’,” and
“[a]s such, it is conceptually weak and entitled to a narrow scope of protection.” 4
TTABVUE 2. Assertions in briefs are not evidence, whether they are made by a pro
se party or an attorney. Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
We take judicial notice that the word “heavenly,” the acknowledged “phonetic
equivalent” of HVNLY, has a colloquial meaning of “completely delightful” in addition
to religious meanings such as “of or relating to heaven or the heavens” and
“suggesting the blessed state of heaven.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-
webster.com, last accessed on August 13, 2026). We find that in the context of the
clothing identified in the cited ’362 Registration, the prefix HVNLY- makes the cited
mark HVNLYFIT as a whole merely mildly suggestive of “completely delightful”
garments, and “we find the cited mark is entitled to ‘the normal scope of protection
to which inherently distinctive marks are entitled.’” In re Textnow Inc., No. 98231457,

Serial No. 98209106
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2026 WL 1920576, at *10 (TTAB 2026) (quoting Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Innovation
Brewing, No. 91215896, 2017 WL 6525233, at *9 (TTAB 2017)).
“The [HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE] marks are visually similar, as both begin
with the [disemvoweled contraction HVNLY].” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376,
at *6. “We have noted in other decisions that consumers are more likely to notice and
remember the first elements of a trademark, and we find that the common [‘HVNLY’]
element of these marks is dominant in both of them.” Id. (citing In re Denisi, No.
73324883, 1985 WL 72008, at *1 (TTAB 1985); Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1303-
04; Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396
F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., No.
74797, 1988 WL 252340, at *3 (TTAB 1988)).
“The second elements of the [HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE] marks are different,
and some consumers may notice and recall the difference.” Id. “But the marks share
the same structure, starting with the dominant [‘HVNLY’] element and then add a
second word to create a [HVNLY]-formative mark. This structure results in marks
that look like variations on a [‘heavenly’] theme.” Id. “This is important because
consumers familiar with the [HVNLYFIT] mark and the [goods] provided under that
mark may view the [HVNLYDAZE] mark as an extension of the [HVNLYFIT] mark
or as an affiliated branch of the business that provides [clothing] under the
[HVNLYFIT] mark.” Id. “The common [‘HVNLY’] element of the marks anchors them
in a way to the same theme and creates a risk that consumers will mistakenly assume
connections between the [clothing] provided under the marks.” Id. “This type of

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similarity increases the likelihood of confusion.” Id. (citing Detroit Athletic Co., 903
F.3d at 1303-04). We find that the HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE marks are similar
in appearance from the standpoint of a consumer with a general rather than specific
recollection of the cited HVNLYFIT mark for clothing who separately sees the
HVNLYDAZE mark used for legally-identical goods.
Applicant acknowledges that “HVNLY is a phonetic equivalent of ‘heavenly,’” 4
TTABVUE 3, and we find that the “marks are also similar in sound, as the first and
dominant [‘HVNLY’] elements of each mark will sound identical.” Sage Therapeutics,
2024 WL 1638376, at *6. “The [HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE] marks as a whole
sound partially different, but the shared [‘HVNLY’] element will have the same
impact when spoken or heard as it does when seen.” Id. “The risk here is that
consumers will believe that [Applicant and the registrant] are connected because of
their shared use of the word [‘HVNLY’], featured so prominently in their marks used
for” legally-identical goods. Id. We find that the HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE
marks are similar in sound from the standpoint of a consumer with a general rather
than specific recollection of the cited HVNLYFIT mark for clothing who separately
hears the HVNLYDAZE mark verbalized in connection with legally-identical goods.
Finally, the HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE “marks are also similar in meaning
and are likely to create the same commercial impressions” because the prefix
HVNLY- “dominates the meaning of the marks, as the first element” of both marks.
Id. The HVNLY-prefix imbues both marks with the same celestial aura of “complete
delight,” and the respective -FIT and -DAZE suffixes “do[ ] not add more distinctive

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or striking content to the mark[s].” Id. at *7. We find that the HVNLYFIT and
HVNLYDAZE marks are similar in meaning from the standpoint of a consumer with
a general rather than specific recollection of the cited HVNLYFIT mark for clothing
who separately encounters the HVNLYDAZE mark used in connection with legally-
identical goods. Such a consumer could readily “believe that Applicant’s mark is a
variant of [the cited] mark . . . identifying companion products emanating from the
same source.” Conopco, Inc. v. Transom Symphony Opco, LLC, No. 91256368, 2022
WL 874335, at *6 (TTAB 2022).
The HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE marks are similar in appearance, sound,
connotation, and commercial impression, and the first DuPont factor strongly
supports a conclusion that confusion is likely. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th
1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
C. Summary
The key first two DuPont factors, and the third factor, support a conclusion that
confusion is likely. The HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE marks are similar, and the
involved goods, channels of trade, and classes of consumers are legally identical. We
conclude that a consumer with a general rather than specific recollection of the cited
HVNLYFIT mark for clothing who separately encounters the HVNLYDAZE mark
used in connection with the identical goods is likely to believe mistakenly that the
goods have a common source.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.