The Carlstar Group LLC

98674193TtabAug 18, 2026

Full text

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: August 18, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re The Carlstar Group LLC
_____
Serial No. 98674193
_____
Sean P. Ritchie of Saul Ewing LLP,
for The Carlstar Group LLC.
Christopher Buongiorno, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 102,
Mitchell Front, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Cohen, Elgin, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register of the standard-character
mark SP-Y-KE for the goods ultimately identified as “Tractor towed agricultural
implements, namely, closing wheels; closing wheels for use with agricultural seed
planting machines; tractor towed agricultural implements, namely, spiked closing
wheel” in International Class 7.1
1 Serial No. 98674193 was filed on July 30, 2024 under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b), based upon an allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.
Serial No. 98674193
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The Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark under
Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), on the ground that it is merely
descriptive as applied to the goods identified in the application. Applicant appealed
and filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied. Following resumption of
the appeal, Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs.2 The appeal is now
ready for decision.
I. Applicable Law
Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act excludes from registration any “mark which,
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive
... of them ….” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).3 A mark is “merely descriptive” within the
meaning of Section 2(e)(1) “if it immediately conveys information concerning a
feature, quality, or characteristic of the goods … for which registration is sought.” In
re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also In re Chamber of Com.
of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “A mark need not immediately
convey an idea of each and every specific feature of the goods in order to be considered
merely descriptive; it is enough if it describes one significant attribute, function or
2 Applicant’s brief and reply brief are at 6 and 9 TTABVUE. The Examining Attorney’s brief
is at 8 TTABVUE. Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case
docket refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. Citations to the prosecution
record refer to the .pdf version of the USPTO’s TSDR system. See In re Integra Biosciences
Corp., No. 87484450, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *6.
3 A descriptive mark may be registered if it acquires distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), but Applicant (which filed its mark on an intent to use
basis) has not made a Section 2(f) claim.
Serial No. 98674193
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property of the goods.” In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB
LEXIS 150, at *4 (citing In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Descriptiveness is not considered in the abstract; it is analyzed in relation to an
applicant’s identified goods or services, “the context in which the [term] is being used,
and the possible significance that the term would have to the average purchaser of
the [goods] because of the manner of its use or intended use.” In re NextGen Mgmt.,
LLC, No. 88098031, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *6-8 (quoting In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d
960, 963-64 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also Chamber of Com., 675 F.3d at 1300; Fat Boys,
2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *4. We ask “whether someone who knows what the goods
and services are will understand the mark to convey information about them.” Real
Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 906 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (internal quotation omitted)).
A mark is suggestive, and not merely descriptive, if it requires imagination,
thought, and perception on the part of someone who knows what the goods or services
are to reach a conclusion about their nature from the mark. See, e.g., Fat Boys, 2016
TTAB LEXIS 150, at *11. “So long as any one of the meanings of a word is descriptive,
the word may be merely descriptive.” In re IP Carrier Consulting Grp., No. 78542726,
2007 TTAB LEXIS 66, at *19 (citations omitted). We must “consider the commercial
impression of a mark as a whole … viewed through the eyes of a consumer.” Real
Foods, 906 F.3d at 974 (cleaned up, quoting DuoProSS Meditech, 695 F.3d at 1253)
(emphasis in original omitted).
Serial No. 98674193
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Refusals for mere descriptiveness, like other refusals, are based on evidence
bearing on public perception of the mark. See, e.g., Real Foods, 906 F.3d at
974 (descriptiveness inquiry “consider[s] the commercial impression of a mark as a
whole, viewed through the eyes of a consumer”) (cleaned up, citation and italics
omitted); In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The
perception of the relevant purchasing public sets the standard for determining
descriptiveness.”). Evidence that a term is merely descriptive to the relevant
purchasing public may be obtained from any competent source, Nett Designs,
236 F.3d at 1341, such as dictionaries, newspapers, or surveys. Bayer, 488 F.3d at
964. It also may be obtained from websites and publications, see N.C. Lottery, 866
F.3d at 1368, including an applicant’s own materials, website, or news articles. In re
Promo Ink, No. 76541018, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 138, at *4-5 (examining attorney may
introduce evidence that applicant’s own literature supports descriptiveness of term
even though application was based on intent-to-use under Trademark Act Section
1(b)).
II. Discussion
We start by discussing the nature of Applicant’s goods. We may consider extrinsic
evidence to better understand the nature of the goods. See, e.g., In re Thor Tech, Inc.,
No. 78634024, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 253, at *12 n.10 (although extrinsic evidence may
not be used to limit or restrict the identified goods, it is nonetheless proper to consider
extrinsic evidence in the nature of dictionary entries to define the terminology used
to describe the goods); In re Trackmobile, Inc., No. 73715890, 1990 TTAB LEXIS 20,
Serial No. 98674193
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at *5 (“[W]hen the description of goods for a cited registration is somewhat unclear,
as is the case herein, it is improper to simply consider that description in a vacuum
and attach all possible interpretations to it when the applicant has presented
extrinsic evidence showing that the description of goods has a specific meaning to
members of the trade.”), cited in In re W.W. Henry Co., No. 78401595, 2007 TTAB
LEXIS 7, at *8-9 (evidence accepted to show registrant’s goods would be used by
industrial plastics manufacturers, not handypersons). We have considered the
evidence of record in that light and not to restrict the goods identified in the
application.
Applicant’s goods are various agricultural “closing wheels,” including “spiked”
closing wheels. The evidence of record demonstrates that a “closing wheel” is used in
planting seeds by “fully clos[ing] the seed furrow ….”4 Spike closing wheels “help the
most when planting in wet conditions, reducing the amount of sidewall compaction.”5
A spike cast closing wheel kit sold by Applicant is shown below (this example uses
the mark SPYKE, not the applied-for mark SP-Y-KE):
4 February 18, 2025 Office Action at TSDR 11.
5 Id. at TSDR 14; see also id. at TSDR 22 (“for compaction-free closing of the seed trench in
wet or harsh conditions”); 6 TTABVUE 7 (“[A] closing wheel is used to close a seed in a furrow
and ensure optimal seed-to-soil contact for uniform germination and emergence.”). We note
that the identification uses the word “spiked,” and the materials of record use both the terms
“spike” and “spiked.” Neither Applicant nor the Examining Attorney distinguishes between
“spiked closing wheels” and “spike closing wheels,” nor do we.
Serial No. 98674193
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6
Other spike closing wheels in the record include:
7
6 December 18, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 3. Highlights appear on the original
evidence.
7 February 18, 2025 Office Action at TSDR 10.
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8
9
8 Id. at TSDR 22.
9 Id. at TSDR 25.
Serial No. 98674193
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10
11
We turn next to the ultimate question of whether SP-Y-KE is merely descriptive
of the goods. Applicant does not dispute that the term “spike” is merely descriptive of
a feature or attribute of agricultural closing wheels, particularly “spiked closing
10 December 18, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 14.
11 Id. at TSDR 20.
Serial No. 98674193
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wheel[s].” Instead, Applicant asserts that the deliberate misspelling of the word with
a “Y,” set off by hyphens, creates “a separate commercial impression, such that the
mark as a whole has a double entendre, with one meaning that is not merely
descriptive.”12 Applicant argues:
In this regard, it is noted that the letter “Y” is often used to
represent plant growth, with the base of the Y representing
the stem and the branches of the Y representing the leaves
or branches of the plant. It is also noted that a closing
wheel is used to close a seed in a furrow and ensure optimal
seed-to-soil contact for uniform germination and
emergence. With that in mind, Applicant submits that the
intentional misspelling together with the hyphenation to
isolate the “Y” represents an obvious play on the intended
result of a closing wheel, which is the growth of a plant (the
“Y”) from a furrow (the hyphenation). Therefore, the
misspelling in combination with the hyphenation conveys
a dual meaning, which creates a difference [sic] commercial
impression. Thus, Applicant’s Mark is not merely
descriptive.13
A mark that comprises a double entendre will not be refused registration as
merely descriptive if one of its meanings is not merely descriptive in relation to the
goods or services. In re Leonhardt, No. 78666879, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 46, at
*21 (citing, inter alia, In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549 (CCPA 1968) (SUGAR
& SPICE registrable for bakery products)). As the Examining Attorney argued,14 and
Applicant agreed,15 the multiple interpretations that make an expression a double
entendre must be associations that the public would make fairly readily and must be
12 6 TTABVUE 6 (quoting In re Carlson, No. 78752616, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 438, at *10).
13 Id. at 7.
14 8 TTABVUE 5.
15 9 TTABVUE 7-8.
Serial No. 98674193
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readily apparent from the mark itself without the benefit of the applicant’s trade
dress or advertising. See, e.g., In re Yarnell Ice Cream, LLC, No. 86824279, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 208, at *23-24 (SCOOP not a double entendre for ice cream; applicant
made no showing that public likely to perceive term as indicating a news scoop in
addition to a serving size); In re The Place, Inc., No. 76436826, 2005 TTAB LEXIS
451, at *10 (THE GREATEST BAR held laudatory and merely descriptive of
restaurant and bar services; “If the alleged second meaning of the mark is apparent
to purchasers only after they view the mark in the context of the applicant’s trade
dress, advertising materials or other matter separate from the mark itself, then the
mark is not a double entendre”); In re Wells Fargo & Co., No. 73256714, 1986 TTAB
LEXIS 130, at *13-15 (EXPRESSERVICE found merely descriptive for banking
services, despite applicant’s argument that the term also connoted the Pony Express;
Board found that in the relevant context, the public would not make that association).
If all meanings of a double entendre are merely descriptive in relation to the goods,
then the mark comprising the double entendre must be refused registration as merely
descriptive.
The trouble with Applicant’s argument is it failed to make of record any evidence
showing that consumers of agricultural closing wheels would associate the letter “Y”
in the mark with the leaves and branches of a plant. Our review of the evidence made
of record by the Examining Attorney also does not show any use of the letter “Y” in
this fashion. In short, there is no evidence of record that suggests that potential
purchasers, confronted with Applicant’s mark in the context of the goods, would find
Serial No. 98674193
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ambiguity or a multiplicity of meanings. Unsupported attorney arguments are no
substitute for evidence. In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025
TTAB LEXIS 412, at *13-14 n.15 (citing Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
Thus, we conclude that, to the extent that “spike” is merely descriptive, so too
would be the novel or misspelling SPYKE. See, e.g., In re Calphalon Corp., No.
86356713, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 98, at *34 (holding “SHARPIN”, the phonetic spelling
of “sharpen,” merely descriptive of cutlery knife blocks with built-in sharpeners);
Terry Nazon Inc. v. Ghiorse, No. 91216729, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 262, at *22 (“one
cannot obtain rights in a mark merely by a slight misspelling of a recognized
descriptive term”); see generally 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY § 11:31 (5th ed.
June 2026 update) (“A slight misspelling of a word will not usually turn a descriptive
word into a nondescriptive one …. If the misspelling is a recognizable phonetic
equivalent of the original descriptive term, then the misspelled term is still
‘descriptive.’”).
The setting off of the letter “Y” in the mark SP-Y-KE by hyphens does not alter
this result. “[T]he addition of punctuation marks to a descriptive term would not
ordinarily change the term into a non-descriptive one.” In re Vanilla Gorilla L.P., No.
76561135, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 234, at *11 (3-O’S is merely descriptive of thirty-inch
car rims; “the addition of hyphens to marks, as in this case, has not been successful
in changing the descriptive nature of the term”); see also Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden
Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 846 (CCPA 1961) (“The Hungarian word
Serial No. 98674193
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‘Haluska’ is pronounced as though it were spelled ‘Halushka’ (to an English-speaking
person) and merely to hyphenate the phonetic version [“HA-LUSH-KA” (the quotes
being part of the mark)] does not destroy its identity”); In re Noon Hour Food Prods.,
No. 78618762, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 23, at *2 n.2 (“We note that minor variations in the
display of a generic term (in this case, e.g., ‘bondost,’ ‘Bondost,’ ‘Bond Ost,’ or ‘Bond-
Ost’) typically are legally insignificant”; Board found BOND-OST generic for cheese);
In re S.D. Fabrics, Inc., No. 73343087, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 160, at *5 (finding a slash
between DESIGNERS and FABRIC in the mark a “conventional”
punctuation mark insufficient to create a commercial impression in the mark
separate from the unregistrable components); In re Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 1967
TTAB LEXIS 134, at *2 (no number in original) (“It is equally true that a descriptive
term is not made arbitrary by hyphenating or misspelling it”; Board found TES-TED
to be merely descriptive for detergents that have been subjected to tests).
The two cases relied upon by Applicant in support of its argument are
distinguishable.16 In the case of In re Tea & Sympathy, Inc., No. 77054914, 2008
TTAB LEXIS 31, at *5, the Board found that the mark THE FARMACY
is more than simply a misspelling of ‘the pharmacy.’’
Consumers are not likely to perceive that mark as just a
misspelling, but rather as a play on the natural or farm-
fresh characteristics of applicant’s herbs and organic
products used for medicinal purposes featured in
applicant’s services. Thus, the mark conveys a dual
meaning, that of the natural aspect of the goods sold by
applicant and of a pharmacy. Applicant’s mark is inventive
and just clever enough, being an obvious play on “the
pharmacy” and “farm,” so that the meaning or commercial
16 See 6 TTABVUE 7-8; 9 TTABVUE 6, 8-9.
Serial No. 98674193
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impression of applicant’s mark will be more than simply
“the pharmacy.” Accordingly, applicant’s mark is not
merely descriptive.
This finding was based on the mark itself, as well as evidence of record (including the
applicant’s specimens and advertisements) showing promotion of the applicant’s
connection to “Small, Organic Family Farms,” which helped consumers readily
recognize the “farm-fresh characteristics” of the goods featured in the applicant’s
services. Id. at *4-5. The Board found that the alteration in spelling of the word
FARMACY clearly introduced a second, non-descriptive meaning.
In the case of In re Grand Metropolitan Foodservice Inc., No. 74073517, 1994
TTAB LEXIS 5, the Board found that the applicant’s stylized mark
“does project a dual meaning or suggestiveness – that of muffins and of the ‘fun’
aspect of applicant’s food product.” Id. at *3. Unlike the mark here, MUFFUNS was
not merely a phonetic respelling of “muffins.” The capitalization of the second “F” and
substitution of “U” for “I” introduced the visible and recognizable word “FUN,” which
the applicant promoted as an aspect of its goods. Id.
Unlike these cases, it is not readily apparent on the face of Applicant’s mark that
SP-Y-KE has an alternative connotation beyond that of the descriptive word “spike.”
Nor is there any evidence from third parties or evidence of Applicant’s use that
confirms an alternative understanding.17
17 We acknowledge that, in both cases relied on by Applicant, the Board consulted the
applicant’s marketing materials in analyzing the dual meaning of a mark. In these cases,
however, the dual meaning was evident on the face of the applied-for mark and extrinsic
evidence of the applicant’s use confirmed that meaning. Nonetheless, in this case a dual
Serial No. 98674193
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Finally, Applicant suggests that, to the extent doubt exists as to whether
Applicant’s mark SP-Y-KE is merely descriptive of the identified goods, we must find
that the mark is suggestive.18 We have no such doubt in this case.
We find the applied-for mark SP-Y-KE immediately conveys information
concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of the goods identified in the
application, and thus it is merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1).
Decision
The refusal to register the mark under Section 2(e)(1) is affirmed.
meaning is not evident on the face of Applicant’s mark, nor is there is any evidence that
confirms an alternative meaning of the mark.
18 6 TTABVUE 8-9; 9 TTABVUE 8-9.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

THIS OPINION IS NOTA
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed: August 18, 2026

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

In re The Carlstar Group LLC

Serial No. 98674193

Sean P. Ritchie of Saul Ewing LLP,
for The Carlstar Group LLC.

Christopher Buongiorno, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 102,
Mitchell Front, Managing Attorney.

Before Cohen, Elgin, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register of the standard-character
mark SP-Y-KE for the goods ultimately identified as “Tractor towed agricultural
implements, namely, closing wheels; closing wheels for use with agricultural seed
planting machines; tractor towed agricultural implements, namely, spiked closing

wheel” in International Class 7.1

1 Serial No. 98674193 was filed on July 30, 2024 under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b), based upon an allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.

Serial No. 98674193
- 2 -
The Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark under
Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), on the ground that it is merely
descriptive as applied to the goods identified in the application. Applicant appealed
and filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied. Following resumption of
the appeal, Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs.2 The appeal is now
ready for decision.
I. Applicable Law
Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act excludes from registration any “mark which,
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive
... of them ….” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).3 A mark is “merely descriptive” within the
meaning of Section 2(e)(1) “if it immediately conveys information concerning a
feature, quality, or characteristic of the goods … for which registration is sought.” In
re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also In re Chamber of Com.
of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “A mark need not immediately
convey an idea of each and every specific feature of the goods in order to be considered
merely descriptive; it is enough if it describes one significant attribute, function or
2 Applicant’s brief and reply brief are at 6 and 9 TTABVUE. The Examining Attorney’s brief
is at 8 TTABVUE. Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case
docket refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. Citations to the prosecution
record refer to the .pdf version of the USPTO’s TSDR system. See In re Integra Biosciences
Corp., No. 87484450, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *6.
3 A descriptive mark may be registered if it acquires distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), but Applicant (which filed its mark on an intent to use
basis) has not made a Section 2(f) claim.

Serial No. 98674193
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property of the goods.” In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB
LEXIS 150, at *4 (citing In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Descriptiveness is not considered in the abstract; it is analyzed in relation to an
applicant’s identified goods or services, “the context in which the [term] is being used,
and the possible significance that the term would have to the average purchaser of
the [goods] because of the manner of its use or intended use.” In re NextGen Mgmt.,
LLC, No. 88098031, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *6-8 (quoting In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d
960, 963-64 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also Chamber of Com., 675 F.3d at 1300; Fat Boys,
2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *4. We ask “whether someone who knows what the goods
and services are will understand the mark to convey information about them.” Real
Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 906 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (internal quotation omitted)).
A mark is suggestive, and not merely descriptive, if it requires imagination,
thought, and perception on the part of someone who knows what the goods or services
are to reach a conclusion about their nature from the mark. See, e.g., Fat Boys, 2016
TTAB LEXIS 150, at *11. “So long as any one of the meanings of a word is descriptive,
the word may be merely descriptive.” In re IP Carrier Consulting Grp., No. 78542726,
2007 TTAB LEXIS 66, at *19 (citations omitted). We must “consider the commercial
impression of a mark as a whole … viewed through the eyes of a consumer.” Real
Foods, 906 F.3d at 974 (cleaned up, quoting DuoProSS Meditech, 695 F.3d at 1253)
(emphasis in original omitted).

Serial No. 98674193
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Refusals for mere descriptiveness, like other refusals, are based on evidence
bearing on public perception of the mark. See, e.g., Real Foods, 906 F.3d at
974 (descriptiveness inquiry “consider[s] the commercial impression of a mark as a
whole, viewed through the eyes of a consumer”) (cleaned up, citation and italics
omitted); In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The
perception of the relevant purchasing public sets the standard for determining
descriptiveness.”). Evidence that a term is merely descriptive to the relevant
purchasing public may be obtained from any competent source, Nett Designs,
236 F.3d at 1341, such as dictionaries, newspapers, or surveys. Bayer, 488 F.3d at
964. It also may be obtained from websites and publications, see N.C. Lottery, 866
F.3d at 1368, including an applicant’s own materials, website, or news articles. In re
Promo Ink, No. 76541018, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 138, at *4-5 (examining attorney may
introduce evidence that applicant’s own literature supports descriptiveness of term
even though application was based on intent-to-use under Trademark Act Section
1(b)).
II. Discussion
We start by discussing the nature of Applicant’s goods. We may consider extrinsic
evidence to better understand the nature of the goods. See, e.g., In re Thor Tech, Inc.,
No. 78634024, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 253, at *12 n.10 (although extrinsic evidence may
not be used to limit or restrict the identified goods, it is nonetheless proper to consider
extrinsic evidence in the nature of dictionary entries to define the terminology used
to describe the goods); In re Trackmobile, Inc., No. 73715890, 1990 TTAB LEXIS 20,

Serial No. 98674193
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at *5 (“[W]hen the description of goods for a cited registration is somewhat unclear,
as is the case herein, it is improper to simply consider that description in a vacuum
and attach all possible interpretations to it when the applicant has presented
extrinsic evidence showing that the description of goods has a specific meaning to
members of the trade.”), cited in In re W.W. Henry Co., No. 78401595, 2007 TTAB
LEXIS 7, at *8-9 (evidence accepted to show registrant’s goods would be used by
industrial plastics manufacturers, not handypersons). We have considered the
evidence of record in that light and not to restrict the goods identified in the
application.
Applicant’s goods are various agricultural “closing wheels,” including “spiked”
closing wheels. The evidence of record demonstrates that a “closing wheel” is used in
planting seeds by “fully clos[ing] the seed furrow ….”4 Spike closing wheels “help the
most when planting in wet conditions, reducing the amount of sidewall compaction.”5
A spike cast closing wheel kit sold by Applicant is shown below (this example uses
the mark SPYKE, not the applied-for mark SP-Y-KE):
4 February 18, 2025 Office Action at TSDR 11.
5 Id. at TSDR 14; see also id. at TSDR 22 (“for compaction-free closing of the seed trench in
wet or harsh conditions”); 6 TTABVUE 7 (“[A] closing wheel is used to close a seed in a furrow
and ensure optimal seed-to-soil contact for uniform germination and emergence.”). We note
that the identification uses the word “spiked,” and the materials of record use both the terms
“spike” and “spiked.” Neither Applicant nor the Examining Attorney distinguishes between
“spiked closing wheels” and “spike closing wheels,” nor do we.

Serial No. 98674193
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6
Other spike closing wheels in the record include:
7
6 December 18, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 3. Highlights appear on the original
evidence.
7 February 18, 2025 Office Action at TSDR 10.

Serial No. 98674193

Martin-Till 15-inch Single Spike Closing Wheel

Consider the Martin-Till 15" Single Spike Closing Wheel for compaction-free closing of
the seed trench in wet or harsh conditions.

* 15” spading closing wheel should be paired with a 12” rubber or cast wheel

* Consistently outperforms two solid rubber closing wheels
* 3/8” thick, 15” diameter right and left toothed steel wheels with diamond
shaped points

15" SPIKED CLOSING 15" SPIKED CLOSING

WHEEL, BOLT-ON, 5/8", WHEEL, BOLT-ON, 5/8",
M16, LH M16, RH
Closing Wheels

All the work you put into planter setup and performance can go awry if your seed trench is not properly closed. Yetter has focused on
developing tools that seal the deal in no-till and minimum tillage fields. These closing wheel options, offered by Soil Service, perform in the
toughest diti breaking si I action and setting the stage for even emergence and higher yields.

6200 Cast Spike Closing Wheel

+ Crowned depth band controls spike depth and prevents seed disturbance

* Teeth designed to lift, fracture, and warm soil to enhance seed-to-soil contact
and speed emergence

* Eliminates sidewall compaction

+ Operate as a pair of spikes or in conjunction with factory-style rubber wheel

* Standard wheel is 15° in diameter

+ Available with optional scraper

8 Id. at TSDR 22.
9 Id. at TSDR 25.

Serial No. 98674193
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10
11
We turn next to the ultimate question of whether SP-Y-KE is merely descriptive
of the goods. Applicant does not dispute that the term “spike” is merely descriptive of
a feature or attribute of agricultural closing wheels, particularly “spiked closing
10 December 18, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 14.
11 Id. at TSDR 20.

Serial No. 98674193
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wheel[s].” Instead, Applicant asserts that the deliberate misspelling of the word with
a “Y,” set off by hyphens, creates “a separate commercial impression, such that the
mark as a whole has a double entendre, with one meaning that is not merely
descriptive.”12 Applicant argues:
In this regard, it is noted that the letter “Y” is often used to
represent plant growth, with the base of the Y representing
the stem and the branches of the Y representing the leaves
or branches of the plant. It is also noted that a closing
wheel is used to close a seed in a furrow and ensure optimal
seed-to-soil contact for uniform germination and
emergence. With that in mind, Applicant submits that the
intentional misspelling together with the hyphenation to
isolate the “Y” represents an obvious play on the intended
result of a closing wheel, which is the growth of a plant (the
“Y”) from a furrow (the hyphenation). Therefore, the
misspelling in combination with the hyphenation conveys
a dual meaning, which creates a difference [sic] commercial
impression. Thus, Applicant’s Mark is not merely
descriptive.13
A mark that comprises a double entendre will not be refused registration as
merely descriptive if one of its meanings is not merely descriptive in relation to the
goods or services. In re Leonhardt, No. 78666879, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 46, at
*21 (citing, inter alia, In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549 (CCPA 1968) (SUGAR
& SPICE registrable for bakery products)). As the Examining Attorney argued,14 and
Applicant agreed,15 the multiple interpretations that make an expression a double
entendre must be associations that the public would make fairly readily and must be
12 6 TTABVUE 6 (quoting In re Carlson, No. 78752616, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 438, at *10).
13 Id. at 7.
14 8 TTABVUE 5.
15 9 TTABVUE 7-8.

Serial No. 98674193
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readily apparent from the mark itself without the benefit of the applicant’s trade
dress or advertising. See, e.g., In re Yarnell Ice Cream, LLC, No. 86824279, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 208, at *23-24 (SCOOP not a double entendre for ice cream; applicant
made no showing that public likely to perceive term as indicating a news scoop in
addition to a serving size); In re The Place, Inc., No. 76436826, 2005 TTAB LEXIS
451, at *10 (THE GREATEST BAR held laudatory and merely descriptive of
restaurant and bar services; “If the alleged second meaning of the mark is apparent
to purchasers only after they view the mark in the context of the applicant’s trade
dress, advertising materials or other matter separate from the mark itself, then the
mark is not a double entendre”); In re Wells Fargo & Co., No. 73256714, 1986 TTAB
LEXIS 130, at *13-15 (EXPRESSERVICE found merely descriptive for banking
services, despite applicant’s argument that the term also connoted the Pony Express;
Board found that in the relevant context, the public would not make that association).
If all meanings of a double entendre are merely descriptive in relation to the goods,
then the mark comprising the double entendre must be refused registration as merely
descriptive.
The trouble with Applicant’s argument is it failed to make of record any evidence
showing that consumers of agricultural closing wheels would associate the letter “Y”
in the mark with the leaves and branches of a plant. Our review of the evidence made
of record by the Examining Attorney also does not show any use of the letter “Y” in
this fashion. In short, there is no evidence of record that suggests that potential
purchasers, confronted with Applicant’s mark in the context of the goods, would find

Serial No. 98674193
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ambiguity or a multiplicity of meanings. Unsupported attorney arguments are no
substitute for evidence. In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025
TTAB LEXIS 412, at *13-14 n.15 (citing Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
Thus, we conclude that, to the extent that “spike” is merely descriptive, so too
would be the novel or misspelling SPYKE. See, e.g., In re Calphalon Corp., No.
86356713, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 98, at *34 (holding “SHARPIN”, the phonetic spelling
of “sharpen,” merely descriptive of cutlery knife blocks with built-in sharpeners);
Terry Nazon Inc. v. Ghiorse, No. 91216729, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 262, at *22 (“one
cannot obtain rights in a mark merely by a slight misspelling of a recognized
descriptive term”); see generally 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY § 11:31 (5th ed.
June 2026 update) (“A slight misspelling of a word will not usually turn a descriptive
word into a nondescriptive one …. If the misspelling is a recognizable phonetic
equivalent of the original descriptive term, then the misspelled term is still
‘descriptive.’”).
The setting off of the letter “Y” in the mark SP-Y-KE by hyphens does not alter
this result. “[T]he addition of punctuation marks to a descriptive term would not
ordinarily change the term into a non-descriptive one.” In re Vanilla Gorilla L.P., No.
76561135, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 234, at *11 (3-O’S is merely descriptive of thirty-inch
car rims; “the addition of hyphens to marks, as in this case, has not been successful
in changing the descriptive nature of the term”); see also Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden
Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 846 (CCPA 1961) (“The Hungarian word

Serial No. 98674193
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‘Haluska’ is pronounced as though it were spelled ‘Halushka’ (to an English-speaking
person) and merely to hyphenate the phonetic version [“HA-LUSH-KA” (the quotes
being part of the mark)] does not destroy its identity”); In re Noon Hour Food Prods.,
No. 78618762, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 23, at *2 n.2 (“We note that minor variations in the
display of a generic term (in this case, e.g., ‘bondost,’ ‘Bondost,’ ‘Bond Ost,’ or ‘Bond-
Ost’) typically are legally insignificant”; Board found BOND-OST generic for cheese);
In re S.D. Fabrics, Inc., No. 73343087, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 160, at *5 (finding a slash
between DESIGNERS and FABRIC in the mark a “conventional”
punctuation mark insufficient to create a commercial impression in the mark
separate from the unregistrable components); In re Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 1967
TTAB LEXIS 134, at *2 (no number in original) (“It is equally true that a descriptive
term is not made arbitrary by hyphenating or misspelling it”; Board found TES-TED
to be merely descriptive for detergents that have been subjected to tests).
The two cases relied upon by Applicant in support of its argument are
distinguishable.16 In the case of In re Tea & Sympathy, Inc., No. 77054914, 2008
TTAB LEXIS 31, at *5, the Board found that the mark THE FARMACY
is more than simply a misspelling of ‘the pharmacy.’’
Consumers are not likely to perceive that mark as just a
misspelling, but rather as a play on the natural or farm-
fresh characteristics of applicant’s herbs and organic
products used for medicinal purposes featured in
applicant’s services. Thus, the mark conveys a dual
meaning, that of the natural aspect of the goods sold by
applicant and of a pharmacy. Applicant’s mark is inventive
and just clever enough, being an obvious play on “the
pharmacy” and “farm,” so that the meaning or commercial
16 See 6 TTABVUE 7-8; 9 TTABVUE 6, 8-9.

Serial No. 98674193
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impression of applicant’s mark will be more than simply
“the pharmacy.” Accordingly, applicant’s mark is not
merely descriptive.
This finding was based on the mark itself, as well as evidence of record (including the
applicant’s specimens and advertisements) showing promotion of the applicant’s
connection to “Small, Organic Family Farms,” which helped consumers readily
recognize the “farm-fresh characteristics” of the goods featured in the applicant’s
services. Id. at *4-5. The Board found that the alteration in spelling of the word
FARMACY clearly introduced a second, non-descriptive meaning.
In the case of In re Grand Metropolitan Foodservice Inc., No. 74073517, 1994
TTAB LEXIS 5, the Board found that the applicant’s stylized mark
“does project a dual meaning or suggestiveness – that of muffins and of the ‘fun’
aspect of applicant’s food product.” Id. at *3. Unlike the mark here, MUFFUNS was
not merely a phonetic respelling of “muffins.” The capitalization of the second “F” and
substitution of “U” for “I” introduced the visible and recognizable word “FUN,” which
the applicant promoted as an aspect of its goods. Id.
Unlike these cases, it is not readily apparent on the face of Applicant’s mark that
SP-Y-KE has an alternative connotation beyond that of the descriptive word “spike.”
Nor is there any evidence from third parties or evidence of Applicant’s use that
confirms an alternative understanding.17
17 We acknowledge that, in both cases relied on by Applicant, the Board consulted the
applicant’s marketing materials in analyzing the dual meaning of a mark. In these cases,
however, the dual meaning was evident on the face of the applied-for mark and extrinsic
evidence of the applicant’s use confirmed that meaning. Nonetheless, in this case a dual

Serial No. 98674193
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Finally, Applicant suggests that, to the extent doubt exists as to whether
Applicant’s mark SP-Y-KE is merely descriptive of the identified goods, we must find
that the mark is suggestive.18 We have no such doubt in this case.
We find the applied-for mark SP-Y-KE immediately conveys information
concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of the goods identified in the
application, and thus it is merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1).
Decision
The refusal to register the mark under Section 2(e)(1) is affirmed.
meaning is not evident on the face of Applicant’s mark, nor is there is any evidence that
confirms an alternative meaning of the mark.
18 6 TTABVUE 8-9; 9 TTABVUE 8-9.

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