Alcanza Clinical Research, LLC v. Diversa Clinical Research LLC

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: June 2, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Alcanza Clinical Research, LLC
v.
Diversa Clinical Research LLC
_____
Opposition No. 91292960
_____
Mark A. Wright and Jeremy T. Walker of McLane Middleton, P.A.,
for Alcanza Clinical Research, LLC.
Diversa Clinical Research LLC, pro se.
_____
Before English, Lebow and Allard,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Diversa Clinical Research LLC, seeks registration of the mark
BREAKING BARRIERS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL, in standard
characters on the Principal Register, for use with “medical and scientific research,
namely, conducting clinical trials for others” in International Class 42.1
1 Application Serial No. 98045332 (“the Application”) was filed on June 15, 2023 under
Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on an allegation of a bona fide
intent to use the mark.

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Opposer, Alcanza Clinical Research, LLC, has opposed registration of Applicant’s
proposed mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the
ground that it is likely to cause confusion with Opposer’s previously used mark,
CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL (with “CLINICAL RESEARCH” disclaimed),
which is registered in standard characters on the Principal Register for “scientific
research in the field of health care; clinical medical research; medical and scientific
research, namely, conducting clinical trials for others; scientific research in the
nature of conducting clinical trials for others; clinical medical and scientific research
in the form of clinical trials of drugs for third party manufacturers; clinical scientific
research in the form of clinical trials of drugs for third party manufacturers;
laboratory research in the field of pharmaceuticals,” in International Class 42.2
Applicant did not respond to the individual allegations of the Notice of Opposition
in its answer. Instead, in several numbered paragraphs, Applicant argues against the
claim of likelihood of confusion for one reason or another, e.g., “No Evidence of Actual
Confusion” or the supposed “Generic Nature of the Opposer’s Mark.”3 And under a
heading titled “Denial of Likelihood of Confusion,” Applicant argues that its mark “is
distinctive and conveys a different message [than Opposer’s mark], emphasizing
action, innovation, and inclusivity” due to the addition of “Breaking Barriers,” which
2 1 TTABVUE (Notice of Opposition). Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other
materials in the case file refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The
number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers
following TTABVUE refer to the page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear.
3 6 TTABVUE 2-3 (Answer, ¶¶ 3, 5). The latter allegation is an impermissible attack against
the validity of Opposer’s registered mark that we give it no consideration.

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“highlights [Applicant’s] commitment to removing obstacles in clinical research,
which is not implied in the opposer’s more generic phrase.”4 We construe Applicant’s
Answer as a general denial of the allegations in the Notice of Opposition.
Both Opposer and Applicant have filed trial briefs and the case is ready for
decision. For the reasons explained below, we sustain the opposition.
I. Preliminary Issues
A. Construed Objections
We first address Applicant’s arguments that Opposer “Failed to Comply With
TTAB Procedure”5 for one reason or another, which we construe as requests to
exclude or strike evidence.
Applicant first contends that “Opposer’s pretrial disclosures were never filed,” and
“[u]nder 37 C.F.R. § 2.121(e) and TBMP § 702.01, this failure bars testimony, renders
the declaration improper, and justifies exclusion of exhibits.”6 But neither Trademark
Rule 2.121(e) nor TBMP § 702.01 require a party to file its initial disclosures. And
TBMP § 702.01 specifically states the opposite: “A party making a pretrial disclosure
is not required to file routinely a copy of such disclosure with the Board.”
Applicant next argues that Opposer “filed its Notice of Reliance two days late,”
and “[u]nder TBMP § 704.02, untimely evidence is inadmissible.”7 Except that
Opposer’s notice of reliance wasn’t late. As Opposer points out, its trial period ended
4 Id. at 1 (¶ 1).
5 14 TTABVUE 7 (Applicant’s Brief).
6 Id. at 7 (¶ 5(I)(A)).
7 Id. at 7 (¶ 5(I)(B)).

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on July 5, 2025, and “[b]ecause the deadline fell on a Saturday, Opposer was entitled
to file its Notice of Reliance on Monday, July 7, 2025, which it did.”8 Trademark Rule
2.196, 37 C.F.R. § 2.196. Opposer’s notice of reliance was thus timely filed.
Applicant next contends that since “Opposer’s discovery responses were served
long after discovery closed, [it] prejudice[ed] [Applicant] and demonstrate[s] lack of
diligence.”9 But the discovery rules in a TTAB proceeding aren’t self-executing. To
the extent Opposer’s discovery responses were late, it was incumbent upon Applicant
to file a timely motion to compel. Applicant did file a motion to compel earlier in the
proceeding, seeking an order compelling Opposer’s responses to its discovery
requests.10 But the Board denied it because (1) Applicant did not include a copy of the
requests with the motion, as required by Trademark Rule 2.120(f)(1), 37 C.F.R. §
2.120(f)(1) (“A motion to compel shall include a copy of . . . the interrogatory with any
answer or objection that was made; or a copy of the request for production, any proffer
of production or objection to production in response to the request, and a list and brief
description of the documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things
that were not produced for inspection and copying”); and (2) the motion was untimely
filed after the deadline for serving pretrial disclosures, also in violation of Trademark
Rule 2.120(f)(1).11 Applicant’s repetition of an argument already rejected by the Board
is not well-taken.
8 15 TTABVUE 6 (Opposer’s Reply Brief).
9 14 TTABVUE 8 (¶ 5(I)(C)) (Applicant’s Brief).
10 7 TTABVUE (Motion to Compel).
11 8 TTABVUE (Order Denying Motion to Compel) (emphasis added).

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Finally, Applicant contends that Opposer failed to follow TTAB procedure by
relying heavily on Applicant’s responses “due to the absence of substantive evidence
of its own.”12 But “[e]vidence made of record by one party is in the record for all
purposes and [an] adverse party need not (and should not) enter the identical
material into the record. See Trademark Rule 2.122(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(a) (“When
evidence has been made of record by one party in accordance with these rules, it may
be referred to by any party for any purpose permitted by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.”).
B. Inadmissible Settlement Discussions
Applicant, in its trial brief, brings up the parties’ settlement discussions during
this proceeding in an attempt to show its alleged good faith in adopting its mark, and
“[t]he inconsistency between Opposer’s sworn statements and its prior negotiations”
regarding geographic markets and the potential for coexistence.13 According to
Applicant, this “weighs against [Opposer’s] confusion theory and demonstrates that
Opposer’s opposition is driven by strategic considerations rather than evidence of
consumer confusion.”14
Opposer replies that it “certainly would dispute Applicant’s contentions about the
context of such discussions,” and that “any such evidence of compromise discussions
is irrelevant to this proceeding, inadmissible and should be disregarded.”15
12 7 TTABVUE 8 (Applicant’s Brief).
13 14 TTABVUE 8-9 (Applicant’s Brief).
14 Id. at 9.
15 15 TTABVUE 7-8 (Opposer’s Reply Brief).

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We agree. Fed. R. Evid. 408 generally prohibits a party from using “statement[s]
made during compromise negotiations” as evidence of liability of a disputed claim.
Applicant offered the statements (or evidence) to support the invalidity of Opposer’s
likelihood of confusion claim. Accordingly, Applicant’s reliance on them is in
contravention of Rule 408. We give no consideration to such argument or evidence.
II. The Record
The record includes the pleadings, the file of the Application by operation of
Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1), and the following additional
evidence submitted by the parties:
Opposer made of record the testimony declaration of its Chief Executive Officer,
Carlos E. Orantes,16 with exhibits that include Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s
interrogatories;17 a printout of an internal email of Opposer;18 printouts of Internet
materials, including current and archival pages from Opposer’s website and social
media accounts;19 printouts of articles and press releases pertaining to Opposer’s
services;20 printouts of pages from Applicant’s website and social media accounts;21
and a copy of the registration certificate for Opposer’s pleaded registration, along
with a printout from the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval
16 10 TTABVUE (“Orantes Test. Dec.”).
17 Id. at 78-81 (Exhibit 21).
18 Id. at 16-17 (Exhibit 2).
19 Id. at 14-15, 24-29, 73-74, 87-88 (Exhibits 1, 5-7, 19, 24).
20 Id. at 30-58 (Exhibits 8-13).
21 Id. at 82-83 (Exhibit 22).

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(“TSDR”) showing its status and title.22
Applicant submitted the testimony declaration of its founder and owner, Dr.
Rachel Andrews,23 with exhibits that include Applicant’s certificate of formation;24
draft website pages for Applicant’s proposed business;25 screenshots from Applicant’s
official social media pages;26 a screenshot of a proposed business email account;27
draft business and marketing materials;28 copies of email correspondence with
Opposer;29 and a screenshot from LinkedIn showing her credentials and a copy of her
diploma for the degree, “Doctor of Health Science.”30
III. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Establishing an entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a threshold
22 Id. at 58-64 (Exhibits 14-15). Opposer also made of record a TSDR status-and-title printout
for its registration as an attachment to the notice of opposition. In addition, Opposer filed a
notice of reliance on several of the documents that were introduced through the declaration
testimony of Mr. Orantes, 9 TTABVUE, but Opposer did not attach them to the notice of
reliance. Opposer explains that they were instead introduced through Mr. Orantes’ testimony
declaration to avoid duplication. Id. To the extent we refer to those documents, we will refer
to the record of his testimony, rather than the notice of reliance.
23 12 TTABVUE.
24 Id. at 8-11 (Exhibit B).
25 Id. at 12-15 (Exhibits C).
26 Id. at 16-18 (Exhibit D).
27 Id. at 19-20 (Exhibit E).
28 Id. at 21-24 (Exhibit F).
29 Id. at 26-30 (Exhibit G).
30 Id. at 30-34 (Exhibit G-H).
Applicant also filed a notice of reliance on its own initial disclosures, which is improper.
Generally, a party may not submit its own written disclosures (or discovery responses) of
record, except to the extent necessary to make not misleading the discovery responses
submitted by the inquiring party, Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(5), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(k)(5), a
situation not applicable here.

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requirement in every inter partes case. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d
1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM,
LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Thus, Opposer, as plaintiff in this
opposition proceeding, must prove its entitlement to a statutory cause of action under
Trademark Act Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 1063. See, e.g., Meenaxi Enter., Inc. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 38 F.4th 1067, 1071-72 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
To establish an entitlement to a statutory cause of action, Opposer must
demonstrate that it has: (1) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected
by the statute, and (2) a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the
registration of the mark. Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118, 129-134 (2014)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (Apr. 20, 2026) (No. 25-435);
Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1304-07.
As noted, Opposer made of record a copy of its pleaded registration for the mark
CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL, as well as a status-and-title printout from the
USPTO’s TSDR database showing Opposer’s ownership of the registration and its
active status. This suffices to show a direct commercial interest in this matter, and a
plausible claim of likely damage to that interest stemming from the registration of
Applicant’s mark. See Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 TTAB LEXIS
494, at *42-43 (status and title copy of pleaded registration demonstrated
entitlement); Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, No. 91263919,
2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *6 (valid and subsisting pleaded registration establishes

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opposer’s direct commercial interest in the proceeding and its belief in damage) (citing
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
IV. Priority and Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.”
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), quoted in In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2023). Proving priority is thus a necessary element of a claim under Section 2(d).
A. Priority
“Because Opposer relies on its asserted [CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL]
registration[] that ha[s] been made of record, and Applicant has not challenged the[]
registration[] by way of any cancellation counterclaim(s), Opposer’s priority . . . is not
at issue with respect to the goods identified” therein. See, e.g., Made in Nature, LLC
v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *20 (citing King Candy
Co. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1402 (CCPA 1974)).
B. Likelihood of confusion
To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion between marks under
Section 2(d), we analyze the evidence and arguments under the factors set forth in In
re E. I. du Pont deNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (the “DuPont
factors”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015).
“Whether a likelihood of confusion exists between an applicant’s mark and a
previously registered mark is determined on a case-by-case basis, aided by

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application of the thirteen DuPont factors.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater
Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
“The likelihood of confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there
is record evidence but ‘may focus . . . on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the
marks and relatedness of the goods.’” In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1126, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). Opposer bears the burden of establishing that there is a likelihood
of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence. Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th
1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“It is well established that, in opposition proceedings, the
burden of proof rests on the opposer.”).
1. The Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services and Trade
Channels
The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration …,” and the third
DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-
continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Here, the Application’s
Medical and scientific research, namely, conducting clinical trials
for others
overlaps with and is legally identical in-part to Opposer’s Registration’s
Scientific research in the field of health care; clinical medical research;
medical and scientific research, namely, conducting clinical
trials for others; scientific research in the nature of conducting
clinical trials for others; clinical medical and scientific research in
the form of clinical trials of drugs for third party manufacturers;
clinical scientific research in the form of clinical trials of drugs for
third party manufacturers; laboratory research in the field of
pharmaceuticals.

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See, e.g. In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 20, at *9-10
(finding services legally identical in part where registrant’s services were
encompassed by applicant’s services).
In addition, under the third DuPont factor, because the services in the Application
and Opposer’s Registration are legally identical in part and there are no limitations
on trade channels or consumers, we must presume that the trade channels and
classes of consumers for those legally identical in part services overlap. See Cai v.
Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018); In re Viterra, 671 F.3d
1358, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was no evidence regarding channels
of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was entitled to rely on this legal
presumption in determining likelihood of confusion).
Applicant nevertheless argues that Opposer’s repeated characterization of the
parties’ services as identical “oversimplifies the record and ignores material
distinctions in the nature, scope, and context of the parties’ respective services.”31
According to Applicant, the parties have different purposes: Applicant is “ a mission-
driven entity focused on expanding access, equity . . . and representation in clinical
research for underserved and underrepresented communities,” while “Opposer . . . by
contrast, operates established corporate clinical research sites with a fundamental
different business model, scale, and organizational services.”32 Applicant further
asserts that its activities include “autism-related initiatives, developmental
31 14 TTABVUE 10 (Applicant’s Brief).
32 Id.

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screenings, community-focused research efforts, and consulting services centered on
diversity and inclusion within clinical trial participation,” whereas Opposer’s
evidence “reflects large-scale site operations with generalized recruitment efforts, not
the targeted, equity-focused initiatives . . . .”33
We fail to see how these purported differences regarding the parties’ business
models (e.g., Applicant’s purported focus on equity-focused initiatives) amount to a
hill of beans in this case. Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371 (“[A]rgument is no substitute for
evidence.”). Regardless, we cannot rely on extrinsic evidence of actual marketplace
use to limit the services identified in the Application or in Opposer’s Registration.
See, e.g., i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1327 (“[T]he Board properly declined to import
restrictions into the identification of goods based on alleged real world conditions.”);
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (“The PTO proceedings are ‘based on the content of the registration
application’ and not upon any specific use of the challenged mark in commerce.”)
(internal quotation omitted). We compare the services as identified.
Applicant also decries the legal presumption that we follow: “Absent evidence of
overlapping customers, marketing channels of real-world marketplace interaction,
Opposer’s claim that the parties’ services and channels of trade are identical rests on
an assumption rather than proof.”34 But no presumption was applied to the services;
they are overlapping on their face. As to the channels of trade, it’s not an assumption
33 Id.
34 Id. at 10-11.

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rather than proof that we follow, but instead “[a] legal inference or assumption that
a fact exists because of the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of
facts. . . . A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing
party.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).35 Applicant provided no
evidence to overcome this presumption.
The second and third DuPont factors strongly support a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
2. The Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We now consider the first DuPont factor, which involves an analysis of the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entirety as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. “[T]he ‘similarity
or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties’ is a predominant inquiry.” Herbko,
308 F.3d at 1165 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
The proper test regarding similarity “is not a side-by-side comparison of the
marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their
commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely
to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai, 901 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Coach
Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The marks must also be considered “in light of the fallibility of memory ....” In re
35 We take judicial notice of “presumption” from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. See In re North
Am. Free Trade Ass’n, No. 77179335, 1997 TTAB LEXIS 19, at *9 n.6 (taking judicial notice
of definition from Black's Law Dictionary).

Opposition No. 91292960
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St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). The focus
is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather
than a specific impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., No.
85826258, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *6 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v.
Morrison Inc., No. 91079317, 1991 TTAB LEXIS 53, at *18, aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d
1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal;
rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA
1981). “On the other hand, in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the
issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons,
more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the
ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties. Indeed,
this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.” In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d
1056, [pinpoint](Fed. Cir. 1985). We keep in mind that “where, as here, the [services]
are identical [in part], ‘the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of
likely confusion declines.” Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362-63, quoting Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
We are comparing Applicant’s mark, BREAKING BARRIERS IN CLINICAL
RESEARCH FOR ALL, to Opposer’s mark, CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL.
The marks are identical in part. Indeed, as Opposer observes, Applicant’s mark

Opposition No. 91292960
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“entirely contains the Registered mark.”36 While prospective consumers may be more
likely to focus on the first portion or word in a trademark, see Palm Bay Imps. v.
Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005), likelihood of confusion is not necessarily avoided between otherwise
confusingly similar marks merely by adding other distinctive matter. If an important
portion of the marks is the same, which we find to be the case here, then the marks
may be confusingly similar notwithstanding peripheral differences. See, e.g., Stone
Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(affirming Board’s finding that confusion likely where applicant's mark STONE
LION CAPITAL incorporated the entirety of the registered marks LION CAPITAL
and LION); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1266 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (finding that, even though applicant’s mark PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES,
with “TECHNOLOGIES” disclaimed, does not incorporate every feature of opposer’s
HEWLETT PACKARD marks, a similar overall commercial impression is created);
In re U.S. Shoe Corp., No. 73444699, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 23, at *6 (holding CAREER
IMAGE (stylized) for clothing and retail women’s clothing store services, and CREST
CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms, likely to cause confusion, noting that
CAREER IMAGE would be perceived by consumers as a shortened form of CREST
CAREER IMAGES).
Applicant nevertheless contends that “BREAKING BARRIERS” is the dominant
portion of its mark because it “fundamentally shapes the meaning and impression of
36 13 TTABVUE 15 (Opposer’s Brief).

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the mark by communicating proactive efforts to remove obstacles and expand access,”
whereas “Opposer’s asserted wording conveys general availability or inclusivity
without the same call to action or advocacy-based message.”37 According to Applicant,
“[w]hen viewed as a whole, Applicant’s mark does not merely describe participation
in clinical research; it communicates a broader purpose centered on equity, access,
and representation.”38
We disagree. Both marks convey the same message of promoting clinical research
FOR ALL, rather than just some. Applicant merely adds the term “BREAKING
BARRIERS,” which is just another way of saying that clinical research shouldn’t be
limited to certain groups. Opposer’s mark, CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL
already communicates that point explicitly. For example, on Applicant’s website,
Applicant explains: “We accelerate the development of new therapies by reducing
barriers to clinical research participation for all.”39 Applicant’s mark simply
provides additional details on how it provides greater access, but it’s not a different
connotation, but one that is indeed similar.
We find that CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL and BREAKING BARRIERS
IN CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL are very similar, particularly in view of the
standard used when comparing marks that identify identical and legally identical
services.
37 14 TTABVUE 9 (Applicant’s Brief).
38 Id.
39 10 TTABVUE 11, 28-29 (Orantes Decl., ¶ 30, Exhibit 8).

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The first DuPont factor strongly supports a finding of likelihood of confusion.
3. No Evidence of Actual Confusion
Applicant argues that “Opposer admits no confusion has occurred, no inquiries
were misdirected, and no confusion evidence was produced during discovery.”
Applicant concludes that “[a]ny alleged confusion is speculative.”40
While the eighth DuPont factor considers “[t]he length of time during and
conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion,” Dupont, 476. F.2d at 1351, actual confusion is not required for confusion
to be likely. Actual confusion just makes it even more likely that confusion will arise.
But here, the Application is based on an intent to use and Applicant provides no
evidence that there has been an opportunity for confusion arise. According to
Applicant’s founder, Dr. Andrews, since Applicant filed the Application, it has
“continuously prepared to use the mark in commerce.” It’s somewhat remarkable that
Applicant claims, as a defense, the lack of actual confusion when Applicant has yet
to use its mark in commerce.
The eighth DuPont factor is neutral in this case.
4. Good Faith Adoption
Applicant argues that it adopted its proposed mark in good faith, but good faith is
not a defense to likelihood of confusion before the Board. Eveready Battery Co. v.
Green Planet Inc., 2009 TTAB LEXIS 490, at *16 (“[I]t is well-settled that while
evidence of bad faith adoption typically will weigh against an applicant, good faith
40 14 TTABVUE 11 (Applicant’s Brief).

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adoption typically does not aid an applicant attempting to establish no likelihood of
confusion). There is “no excuse for even approaching the well-known trademark of a
competitor . . . .” Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 916,
920 (CCPA 1962).
C. Conclusion
The first, second and third DuPont factors strongly support a finding of likelihood
of confusion, the eighth factor is neutral, and good faith is not a defense. We conclude
that under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, Applicant’s mark BREAKING
BARRIERS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL for “medical and scientific
research, namely, conducting clinical trials for others” is likely to be confused with
Opposer’s mark CLINICAL RESEARCH FOR ALL for “scientific research in the
field of health care; clinical medical research; medical and scientific research, namely,
conducting clinical trials for others; scientific research in the nature of conducting
clinical trials for others; clinical medical and scientific research in the form of clinical
trials of drugs for third party manufacturers; clinical scientific research in the form
of clinical trials of drugs for third party manufacturers; laboratory research in the
field of pharmaceuticals.”
Decision: The opposition is sustained.