Naturel Goods LLC

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: May 28, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Naturel Goods LLC
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Serial No. 98702670
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Parviz Ali, pro se, for Naturel Goods LLC.
Matt Einstein, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 115,
Daniel Brody, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Lykos, Elgin, and Bradley, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Naturel Goods LLC seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark B NATUREL and design (“NATUREL” disclaimed), shown below, for “Body and
beauty care cosmetics; Hair care creams; Hair care lotions; Hair care preparations;
Beauty creams for body care; Cosmetic preparations for body care; Cosmetics sold as
an integral component of non-medicated skincare preparations” in International
Class 3:1
1 Ser. No. 98702670 was filed on August 16, 2024 under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark and first use of the mark in
commerce at least as early as February 1, 2023.

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The application includes the following mark description and other statements:
• The mark consists of a stylized letter “B” enclosed in a square
followed by the word “NATUREL” in script font.
• Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
• The English translation of NATUREL in the mark is NATURAL.
• The name(s), portrait(s), and/or signature(s) shown in the mark does
not identify a particular living individual.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Trademark Act
Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used in
connection with the identified goods, so resembles the registered stylized mark B
NATURAL (“NATURAL” disclaimed), shown below, for “Non-medicated cosmetics
and toiletry preparations; perfumery, essential oils; cleaning and abrasive
preparations for human skin” in International Class 32 that it is likely to cause
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive:
2 Registration No. 7088903 issued on the Principal Register on June 27, 2023. The mark is
described as “a stylized letter ‘B’ above the word ‘NATURAL’ in smaller stylized font.”

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After the refusal was made final, Applicant requested reconsideration, which was
denied. The appeal is now fully briefed.3 We have reviewed and considered all of the
arguments in the briefs and evidence of record.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the refusal to register.
I. Applicant’s Briefs
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we comment on Applicant’s briefs,
which violate Board rules in several respects. Even where parties such as Applicant
appear pro se before the Board, strict compliance with all applicable rules is required.
Hole in 1 Drinks, Inc. v. Lajtay, No. 92065860, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 9, at *3.
First, Applicant’s briefs are single-spaced in violation of Board rules. Trademark
Rule 2.126(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.126(b)(1); see also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 1203.01 (June 2025). Because the
Examining Attorney did not object, and it appears the briefs would not violate the
page limits if double-spaced, see Trademark Rule 2.142(b)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(b)(2),
we have exercised our discretion to consider them.
Second, it was unnecessary and unhelpful for Applicant to attach filings from the
prosecution of its application to its appeal brief.4 See In re Allegiance Staffing, No.
85663950, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 180, at *3 (practice of attaching to appeal brief copies
3 Applicant’s brief and reply brief are at 5 TTABVUE and 8 TTABVUE. The Examining
Attorney’s brief is at 7 TTABVUE. Citations to the prosecution record refer to the USPTO
Trademark Status and Document Retrieval system (TSDR) in the downloadable .pdf format by
page number. References to the briefs on appeal refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system.
In re Integra Biosciences Corp., No. 87484450, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *6.
4 See 5 TTABVUE 10-33.

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of the same exhibits submitted with responses is discouraged); In re SL&E Training
Stable Inc., No. 78806669, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 55, at *15 n.9 (attaching exhibits to
brief of material already of record only adds to the bulk of the file, and requires Board
to determine whether attachments had been properly made of record). We have
disregarded these materials.
Finally, Applicant’s submissions appear to have been prepared with the assistance
of an artificial intelligence large language model (such as ChatGPT). Applicant cites
to some cases that do not clearly stand for the propositions for which they are cited.
It is the duty of all parties before the Board to review and verify the contents of each
paper presented for consideration. See generally “Guidance on Use of Artificial
Intelligence-Based Tools in Practice Before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office,” 89 Fed. Reg. 25609 (Apr. 11, 2024) (parties utilizing artificial intelligence to
draft papers must confirm the accuracy of all facts and citations to case law).
Applicant is cautioned that it has a duty to verify all legal authorities in the future,
or face possible sanctions
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d); see also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours

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& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap.
Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
Although we consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument,
In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key considerations
are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods or
services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Herbko
Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Below, we first consider the similarity of the goods and channels of trade; followed
by the similarity of the marks. We conclude by briefly addressing other arguments
raised by Applicant.
A. The Goods and Trade Channels
We start with the second DuPont factor, which “considers the similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods as described in the involved application and
cited registration … and contemplates whether the consuming public may perceive
the respective goods as related enough to cause confusion about their source or

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origin.” In re Samsung Display Co., No. 90502617, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 258, at
*6 (cleaned up; citations omitted).
“We begin with the identifications of … [goods] in the registration and application
under consideration.” In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 TTAB LEXIS
353, at *10 (cleaned up; citation omitted). It is sufficient for a likelihood of confusion
that relatedness is established for any item in the identification of goods within a
particular class in the registration. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85044494, 2015
TTAB LEXIS 369, at *8 (“Likelihood of confusion must be found if there is likely to
be confusion with respect to any item in a class that comes within the identification
of goods in the application and cited registration.”), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2017). The relatedness of goods may be established based on various evidence,
including the language of the involved identifications of goods, which may show, on
the face of the identifications, that they are literally or legally identical, or otherwise
intrinsically related. OSF Healthcare, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 353, at *9.
Applicant’s goods include “Body and beauty care cosmetics” and the goods in the
cited registration include “non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations.” The
Examining Attorney argues that the cited registration’s broad identification for “non-
medicated cosmetics” encompasses Applicant’s more narrowly-identified cosmetics
for body and beauty care, and thus these goods are legally identical.5 We agree. In
addition, the cited registration includes “non-medicated…toiletry preparations.” We
take judicial notice that a “toiletry” is “an article or preparation (such as toothpaste,
5 7 TTABVUE 6.

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shaving cream, or cologne) used in cleaning or grooming oneself.”6 Thus, the broad
“toiletry preparations” includes Applicant’s more narrowly specified goods, all of
which are used in personal cleaning and grooming.
Applicant “recognizes that the identifications contain overlapping Class 003
terminology.”7 Applicant argues that the Board should consider actual differences
between the goods.8 Applicant’s arguments based on actual composition of its and
Registrant’s products9 is not persuasive because we analyze the DuPont factors based
on the identifications present in the application and registration. We cannot read
limitations into identifications of goods based on either argument or evidence of
actual use. See, e.g., In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at
*37-38 (Board may not import restrictions into identification based on real-world
conditions); In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., No. 73448806, 1986 TTAB LEXIS 124,
at *5-6 (applicant may not restrict the scope of the goods identified in the application
or cited registration by argument or extrinsic evidence showing what those goods are).
Thus, we find that the goods in the application and cited registration are legally
identical in part.
6 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/toiletry, accessed
May 28, 2026). The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online
dictionaries, and we elect to do so here. In re Omniome, Inc., No. 87661190, 2019 TTAB
LEXIS 414, at *7 n.17.
7 8 TTABVUE 3; see also id. at 6 (“[E]ven with overlapping goods, confusion is not presumed
unless the marks, taken as a whole, are sufficiently similar”).
8 Id. at 3 (“Even where goods may be related, the Board must consider how purchasers will
perceive the marks as used.”).
9 See 5 TTABVUE 5-6.

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We turn next to the third DuPont factor, which considers the “similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” Samsung Display,
2024 TTAB LEXIS 258, at *17 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). Because the goods
are legally identical in part, we must presume that those goods travel through the
same channels of trade and are offered to the same or overlapping classes of
purchasers. Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). For the same reasons as
above, Applicant’s arguments about real-world conditions of sale and trade channels
are not persuasive, inasmuch as (even if supporting evidence was of record) such
limitations are not included in the application or registration.10 Embiid, 2021 TTAB
LEXIS 168, at *37-38; Bercut-Vandervoort, 1986 TTAB LEXIS 124, at *5-6.
We find that the second and third DuPont factors strongly favor a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
B. The Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 TTAB
LEXIS 412, at *9 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St.
John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (citation omitted), aff’d
10 See id. at 6 (arguing real-world market context shows that the parties’ current trade
channels and consumer bases are distinct).

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per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form,
spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The proper test regarding similarity “is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar
in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai, 901 F.3d at
1373 (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)). “The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally
retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks.” In re St. Julian
Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 196, at *13. We also “keep in mind that
where, as here, the goods are identical in part, “the degree of similarity necessary to
support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025
TTAB LEXIS 412, at *9-10 (quoting Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363).
1. Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents
At the outset, we address the preliminary issue of application of the doctrine of
foreign equivalents to Applicant’s mark, which contains a French word: NATUREL.
Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign words used as a mark are
translated into English and then tested for likelihood of confusion. In re Vetements
Grp. AG, 137 F.4th 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-215, 2026 U.S.
LEXIS 373 (Jan. 12, 2026). Generally, the Board applies the doctrine of foreign

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equivalents when one mark is in the English language and the other is in a foreign
language. Ricardo Media Inc. v. Inventive Software, LLC, No. 91235063, 2019 TTAB
LEXIS 283, at *19. The Federal Circuit has held that “‘[t]he doctrine should be
applied only when it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser would stop and
translate [the foreign-language word] into its English equivalent.’” Vetements, 137
F.4th at 1323-24 (quoting Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and
quotation marks omitted)).36 As noted in Vetements, this depends on the capability of
the U.S. population to translate the word, that is, whether an “appreciable” number
would do so. Id. at 1331. Also, whether a purchaser with “ordinary sensibilities”
would make the translation, as “sometimes even a native speaker would not perform
a literal translation because it would be irrelevant in the context of the specific goods,
services, or market.” Id.
The Examining Attorney made of record a translation of “naturel” as “natural,”
which is consistent with the translation statement Applicant provided with its
application.11 Further, the Examining Attorney argues that the evidence of record
shows that there are 1.3 million French speakers in the United States and that
French is the seventh most commonly spoken language in this country.12 Thus, “the
French language is a common, modern language spoken by an appreciable number of
Americans capable of translating the term [to “natural”]; and there is no evidence of
11 March 11, 2025 Office Action at TSDR 8.
12 7 TTABVUE 4; see August 7, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR
6-18 (evidence of commonness of French language in the United States).

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any contrary meaning.”13 The evidence shows that an appreciable number of
consumers in the United States speak French, a modern, commonplace language.
Moreover, the near identity of the French NATUREL and its corresponding English
word NATURAL make it very likely that consumers would stop and translate the
word from French to English. In the context of the entirety of the literal element of
the mark (B NATUREL), the foreign word is very likely to be translated as the phrase
“BE NATURAL,” the same as the cited mark.
Nonetheless, Applicant argues that application of the doctrine is a “guideline,”
not an automatic rule where it does not reflect marketplace reality.14 Applicant
argued that “[t]he record here does not establish that consumers encountering
Applicant’s stylized mark would stop and translate ‘NATUREL’ rather than perceive
it as part of a source-identifying brand presentation.”15 Applicant has the burden
backwards; it has not demonstrated that it is unlikely that U.S. consumers will stop
and translate the term. See id. at 1331 (“[T]he burden is on the party opposing
translation to show that it is unlikely the ordinary [U.S.] purchaser would stop and
translate the word into its English equivalent. Placing the burden on a party opposing
translation takes into account the well-recognized tenet that ‘words from modern
languages are generally translated into English.’”) (cleaned up). Moreover, Applicant
13 7 TTABVUE 4.
14 8 TTABVUE 3.
15 Id.

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conceded in its brief that its “mark uses the spelling NATUREL, which consumers
recognize as the French form of ‘natural.’”16
Therefore, we find that the doctrine of foreign equivalents applies, and the
terms “NATUREL” and “NATURAL” in each mark would be understood by U.S.
consumers to mean “NATURAL.”
2. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Again, the marks are (NATUREL disclaimed) and (NATURAL
disclaimed). Applicant’s argument centers on the “non-English origin” of the term
NATUREL, which it claims conveys a “sophisticated and boutique positioning, and
often a premium skincare association” and a “French-inspired, boutique herbal
skincare brand.”17 Applicant also points to the logo presentation of its mark as a
distinguishing feature.18
The Examining Attorney counters:
The marks are identical in sound and meaning and create
the same overall commercial impressions. The marks differ
by only a single letter vowel substitution. There is no
correct pronunciation of a mark; thus, consumers may
pronounce a mark differently than intended by the mark
owner …. In the present case, the compared marks could
clearly be pronounced the same. Such similarity in sound
16 5 TTABVUE 4.
17 Id. at 4-5.
18 Id. To the extent Applicant again relies on the real-world use of its mark with “the domain
name WWW.NATURELGOODS.COM placed circularly” and “additional circular design
elements and a QR code,” id. at 4, we can only consider the applied-for mark.

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alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the
compared marks are confusingly similar.19
In reply, Applicant argues that its mark is a stylized/composite mark with
“distinct spelling” that “contribute materially to its overall commercial impression.”20
It then confusingly (and erroneously) argues that “t]he cited registration is a
standard-character mark, and the Board’s analysis must evaluate the marks as
consumers encounter them, not as abstract word strings.”21 The cited registration, of
course, is not a standard character mark; like Applicant’s mark, it is a stylized mark.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that the marks are very similar. Of course,
to begin with the literal elements of the marks are nearly identical in sight and sound:
B NATURAL and B NATUREL. The slight misspelling of NATURAL does not detract
from the visual and phonetic similarity of the marks. See, e.g., Krim-Ko Corp., 390
F.2d at 732 (“Unless both the one speaking and the one hearing the two words are
particularly careful, the sound similarities of ‘V’ and ‘B’ may lead to a confusion in
the recall process, so as to negate the effect of the differences in meaning of the
words.”).
Nor are the visual differences in the presentation of the marks sufficient to
distinguish the marks. As noted above, each mark includes a stylized uppercase B.
The words NATURAL and NATUREL appear in each of the marks directly below the
stylized B. The fonts are different and present a distinction, along with the box
19 7 TTABVUE 3 (citations omitted).
20 8 TTABVUE 3.
21 Id.

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around the letter B in Applicant’s mark, but these differences are eclipsed by the
similarities in the marks as discussed above. The literal terms B NATURAL and B
NATUREL are how consumers would call for the goods. See L.C. Licensing, Inc. v.
Berman, No. 91162330, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 756, at *9 (“In terms of sound, obviously
the design portion of opposer’s mark will be not be spoken, and thus, the marks are
identical in this respect. Further, it is well settled that if a mark comprises both a
word and a design, then the word is normally accorded greater weight because it
would be used by purchasers to request the goods.”) (citing In re Appetito Provisions
Co., No. 73423405, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 47, at *3).
Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, the literal elements of the marks have
identical connotations. But even if the doctrine does not apply and U.S. consumers
would not translate Applicant’s mark into English but instead “take it as it is,” see In
re Tia Maria, Inc., 1975 TTAB LEXIS 130, at *4, the result under this DuPont factor
would still be the same because overall the marks are similar in sound, appearance,
connotation, and commercial impression. In other words, even if the doctrine does not
apply, U.S. consumers would see and pronounce NATURAL and NATUREL in almost
the exact same manner and glean the same meaning from the near identical terms.
We also reject Applicant’s argument that the applied-for mark conveys a different
commercial impression due to the use of the French word NATUREL. Rather,
whether with or without the translation, the marks B NATURAL and B NATUREL
convey the same connotation and overall commercial impression to consumers – the
phrase “Be Natural” – appropriate for cosmetic and skincare products. For example,

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Applicant made of record an Amazon listing for its skincare products indicating that
they are “100% Vegan and Organic,” “plant-based,” and “free from animal derived
elements.”22 A label indicates that Applicant’s product is “100% Natural.”23 Product
reviews confirm that consumers “use this product as a natural cleanser for my face,”
and “aligns with my commitment to natural ingredients,”24 confirming the
connotation of the term NATUREL in the context of Applicant’s cosmetic products.
We find that the marks, considered in their entireties, are similar in sight, sound,
meaning, and overall commercial impression. See Inn at St. John’s, 2018 TTAB
LEXIS 170, at *13 (similarity in any element under the first DuPont factor may be
sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar). Given the fallibility of consumers’
memories, we find that Applicant’s mark and the cited mark are similar. Accordingly,
the first DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. Weakness of the Cited Mark
The sixth DuPont factor “allows Applicant to contract th[e] scope of protection by
adducing evidence of ‘[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
goods.’” Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB LEXIS
251, at *24 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). Applicant argues that the term
NATURAL in the cited mark is weak in that “[t]he term ‘Natural’/’Naturel’ is
extremely common in the cosmetics industry. Numerous products and brands
22 June 9, 2025 Response to Office Action at TSDR 7.
23 Id. at TSDR 14.
24 Id. at TSDR 10.

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incorporate ‘natural’ or ‘naturel’ to signal that items are plant-based, ecofriendly, or
minimally processed,” including brand names incorporating “NATURAL,” “ALL
NATURAL,” or “NATUREL” and “widespread descriptive usage such as ‘100%
natural ingredients,’ ‘natural formula,’ etc.”25 This argument is not supported by
evidence, and argument is not evidence. Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371.
Nonetheless, the term NATURAL has been disclaimed (as is NATUREL in
Applicant’s mark) and thus is conceptually weak. Even allowing that there is
inherent weakness in the common term NATURAL and its equivalent, the differences
between the marks in their entireties are minimal and the weakness of the shared
term has little impact on the analysis. We find that the sixth DuPont factor is neutral.
D. Absence of Actual Confusion
Applicant also argues there is an absence of actual confusion over a meaningful
period of concurrent use, which we construe as relevant to the seventh and eighth
DuPont factors.26 There is no evidence in the record regarding the extent of
Applicant’s or Registrant’s use of the marks at issue, and therefore no evidence
regarding whether there has been a meaningful opportunity for confusion to occur.
Applicant made of record evidence to support the argument that it offers its
product on Amazon.com.27 Even if there were a probative declaration or other
25 5 TTABVUE 6-7.
26 Id. at 7.
27 June 9, 2025 Office Action Response at TSDR 7-10; July 10, 2025 Request for
Reconsideration at TSDR 10-14. The identical printouts from Amazon.com shows that the
product is “currently unavailable.” E.g., June 9, 2025 Office Action Response at TSDR 7.

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evidence in the record to support Applicant’s argument that its “marketplace
presence is limited and that sales have been low”,28 we’d still be getting only “half the
story,” because Registrant is not a party to this case. In re Guild Mortg., No.
86709944, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *23 (“[I]n this ex parte context, there has been
no opportunity to hear from Registrant about whether it is aware of any reported
instances of confusion.”). We have no evidence of Registrant’s use in the record. In
addition, the subject application provides a first use date of February 1, 2023, which
even if true (and there is no evidence in the record to support the claim of use as of
this date)29 is not sufficient time for confusion to develop.
The lack of actual confusion is of little relevance. See Majestic Distilling, 315 F.3d
at 1317 (“Majestic’s uncorroborated statements of no known instances of actual
confusion are of little evidentiary value ... A showing of actual confusion would of
course be highly probative, if not conclusive, of a high likelihood of confusion. The
opposite is not true, however. The lack of evidence of actual confusion carries little
weight ... especially in an ex parte context.”) (citation omitted). We find the seventh
and eighth DuPont factors to be neutral in our analysis.
28 5 TTABVUE 7.
29 See Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(2) (“The allegation in an application
for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant
or registrant; a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence.”)

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E. Equitable and Policy Considerations
Finally, Applicant argues that “Equitable and Policy Considerations Support
Registration,”30 which we construe as relevant to the thirteenth DuPont factor, “[a]ny
other established fact probative of the effect of use.” 476 F.2d at 1361. It is a “catchall”
factor, which “accommodates the need for flexibility in assessing each unique set of
facts….” In re Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381,
at *19 (quoting In re Strategic Partners Inc., No. 77903451, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 80,
at *6).
As noted above, Applicant argues without evidence that its sales are low, it is a
“very small U.S. business operated on a modest budget,” and it supports women’s
health causes and empowerment.31 Although we sympathize with Applicant, this is
not the type of evidence, even if it was of record, that we would consider as relevant
to the thirteenth DuPont factor, which is “rarely invoked.” Id. The thirteenth factor
is neutral.
F. Summary on Likelihood of Confusion
Finally, we must weigh the findings we have made on the DuPont factors for which
there has been evidence and argument in this appeal. Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at
1381 (“[I]t is important...that the Board...weigh the DuPont factors used in its
analysis and explain the results of that weighing.”).
30 Id. at 7-8.
31 Id.

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In this case, the first, second, and third DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of
likelihood of confusion given the similarity of the marks and legally identical nature
of the goods provided in overlapping trade channels to the same classes of consumers.
The other factors are neutral.
We conclude that confusion is likely between and for the legally
identical goods in Class 3.
Decision
The refusal to register application Ser. No. 98702670 is affirmed under
Trademark Act Section 2(d).