Lena West v. CEO Rise

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

THIS OPINION IS NOTA
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed: April 21, 2026

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Lena West
V.
CEO Rise

Cancellation No. 92083680

David H.E. Bursik, Esq.,
for Lena West.

Jamie R. Shelden of Law Office of Jamie Shelden,
for CEO Rise.

Before Lebow, Casagrande, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Lavache, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Petitioner Lena West petitions to cancel Respondent CEO Rise’s registration on
the Principal Register for the standard-character mark CEO RISE for the following
services in International Class 41:

Educational services, namely, developing, arranging, and conducting
educational conferences and programs and providing courses of

instruction in the field of building a successful business and
entrepreneurial skills; Educational services, namely, providing on-line

Cancellation No. 92083680
2
classes, seminars, and workshops in the field of building a successful
business and entrepreneurial skills; Educational services, namely,
providing online non-downloadable videos in the fields of building a
successful business and entrepreneurial skills; providing education
courses in the fields of building a successful business and
entrepreneurial skills offered through online, non-downloadable videos
and instructor assistance; Educational services, namely, providing a
learning and innovation center featuring fully customized leadership,
motivational, educational, and brainstorming training; Educational
services, namely, providing live classes, seminars, and workshops in the
fields of building a successful business and entrepreneurial skills;
Providing training in the field of building a successful business and
entrepreneurial skills; Virtual training services in the field of building
a successful business and entrepreneurial skills.1
The amended petition for cancellation claims two grounds for cancellation. The
first claim is likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d),
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). In support of this claim, Petitioner alleges prior common law
rights in the mark CEO RISING for “entertainment services, namely, providing
podcasts in the field of business planning, networking and formulating business
strategies for start-ups and emerging companies,” in Class 41. The second claim is
fraud under Trademark Act Section 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), based on Petitioner’s
allegation that Respondent falsely claimed use of its CEO RISE mark for its identified
services to fraudulently obtain a registration for the mark.2
Respondent’s answer to the amended petition for cancellation denies most of
Petitioner’s allegations, but admits, in relevant part, that:
1 Registration No. 6632931, issued on February 1, 2022. The registration includes a
disclaimer of “CEO.”
2 See Amended Petition for Cancellation, 11 TTABVUE 3-8.
Citations to the record refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number
preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following
“TTABVUE” refer to the page numbers of the docket entry where the cited materials appear.

Cancellation No. 92083680
3
• Petitioner is the applicant for Application Serial No. 97175232, seeking
registration of the mark CEO RISING;
• Respondent owns Registration No. 6632931 for the mark CEO RISE, used
in connection with the services listed therein, with a claimed first use date
of February 19, 2021;
• The underlying application for Respondent’s registration was filed on
March 11, 2021, was signed by Respondent’s attorney at the time, and
“stated that the CEO RISE trademark was in actual use for conferences,
seminars, workshops, non-downloadable videos, learning and innovation
center, and virtual training”;
• Petitioner made a document request of Respondent for documents sent to
Respondent’s then-attorneys prior to filing the application underlying
Respondent’s registration; and
• Respondent, in response to this document request, indicated that it had no
responsive documents.3
The proceeding is fully briefed. For the reasons explained below, we deny the
petition as to both claims.
I. The Record
The record includes the pleadings, the submissions of the parties during their
respective trial periods, and, by rule, Respondent’s involved registration file. See
Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1). Petitioner also made of record a
copy of its application for the mark CEO RISING,4 and an Office action refusing
3 Respondent’s Answer to Amended Petition for Cancellation, 12 TTABVUE 9-14 (included
in Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss). Respondent’s answer to the amended petition for
cancellation also includes the affirmative defenses of acquiescence, laches, and equitable
estoppel. Id. at 14-15. Because Respondent did not argue any of these affirmative defenses in
its brief, they are waived. See, e.g., Alcatraz Media, Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours, Inc.,
No. 92050879, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 347, at *5 n.6, aff’d mem., 565 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
4 Testimony Declaration of Lena West (West Declaration), 18 TTABVUE 21-28. Application
Serial No. 97175232 was filed on December 16, 2021, based on Petitioner’s allegation of use
in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming September 11,

Cancellation No. 92083680
4
registration of the mark based on a likelihood of confusion with Respondent’s
registered CEO RISE mark.5
It is unnecessary to itemize the rest of the record here, but we have reviewed and
considered it in its entirety, and we have discussed the evidence, as necessary, in our
analysis below. See Quiktrip W., Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed.
Cir. 2021) (“We have held ‘on multiple occasions that failure to explicitly discuss every
issue or every piece of evidence does not alone establish that the tribunal did not
consider it.’” (quoting Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2017))); In re Miracle Tuesday LLC, 695 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
mere fact that the Board did not recite all of the evidence it considered does not mean
the evidence was not, in fact, reviewed.” (citing Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Dekalb
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
II. Petitioner’s Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Establishing an entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a threshold
requirement in every inter partes case. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d
1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM,
LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Thus, Petitioner, as plaintiff in this
cancellation proceeding, must prove its entitlement to a statutory cause of action
under Trademark Act Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064. See, e.g., Meenaxi Enter., Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 38 F.4th 1067, 1071-72 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
2019 as both the date of first use anywhere and the date of first use in commerce. The
application record includes a disclaimer of “CEO.”
5 Id. at 29-88.

Cancellation No. 92083680
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To establish an entitlement to a statutory cause of action, Petitioner must
demonstrate that it has: (1) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected
by the statute, and (2) a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the
registration of the mark. Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118, 129-134 (2014)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (Apr. 20, 2026) (No. 25-435);
Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1304-07.
Here, the record shows that the Office issued a refusal under Trademark Act
Section 2(d) to register the CEO RISING mark in Petitioner’s Application Serial No.
97175232, based on a likelihood of confusion with Respondent’s registered CEO RISE
mark.6 Thus, Petitioner has a real interest in the proceeding and a reasonable belief
that it would be damaged by the continued registration of Respondent’s mark, which
establishes Petitioner’s entitlement to a statutory cause of action. See, e.g., Australian
Therapeutic, 965 F.3d at 1375 (“A petitioner may demonstrate a real interest and
reasonable belief of damage where the petitioner has filed a trademark application
that is refused registration based on a likelihood of confusion with the mark subject
to cancellation.”); see also Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy LP, No. 91170364, 2009
TTAB LEXIS 642, at *21 n.10 (“If an opposer can show standing as to one ground, it
has the right to assert any other ground as well.”).
6 See id. (nonfinal Office action refusing registration of the mark in Petitioner’s Application
Serial No. 97175232 based on likelihood of confusion with Respondent’s registered mark).

Cancellation No. 92083680
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III. Priority and Likelihood of Confusion
Because Petitioner has established that it is entitled to bring this Section 14
cancellation proceeding, we turn now to Petitioner’s likelihood-of-confusion claim
under Trademark Act Section 2(d), which, in relevant part, bars registration of a
mark that “so resembles . . . a mark or trade name previously used in the United
States . . . and not abandoned, as to be likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
To prevail on the Section 2(d) claim, Petitioner must establish: (1) that it has
priority, i.e., that it has proprietary rights in its CEO RISING mark that are prior to
Respondent’s rights in its registered CEO RISE mark; and (2) that there is a
likelihood of confusion between the two marks. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.,
308 F.3d 1156, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
“Petitioner must prove both priority of use of its pleaded mark and a likelihood of
confusion.” Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., No. 92025859, 2022 TTAB
LEXIS 454 at *5 n.7, aff’d, 781 F. Supp. 3d 514 (E.D. Va. May 7, 2025), appeal
docketed, No. 25-1645 (4th Cir. June 9, 2025) (emphasis in original); see also Hornby
v. TJX Cos., No. 92044369, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 19, at *29 (“In order to prevail on her
claim of likelihood of confusion (Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act), petitioner must
prove both the elements of priority of use and likelihood of confusion.”).
We ordinarily address priority first before moving on to the merits of the
likelihood-of-confusion element. In this case, however, that is unnecessary, because
even if Petitioner were to establish priority, it makes no attempt to argue the merits
of the likelihood-of-confusion claim. In fact, Petitioner’s argument is limited to the

Cancellation No. 92083680
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bald assertion that “[t]here is a likelihood of confusion between the Petitioner’s CEO
RISING trademark and the [Respondent’s] CEO Rise name.”7 The brief is otherwise
devoid of any arguments as to the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors. See
generally In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973)
(listing likelihood-of-confusion factors). Nor does the brief point to any evidence in the
record that would support a finding of likelihood of confusion between its mark and
Respondent’s mark.8 Thus, we agree with Respondent that Petitioner has failed to
support its claim of likelihood of confusion.9
In adversary proceedings like this one, it is not the Board’s responsibility to make
the plaintiff’s arguments for them or to marshal the evidence of record, if any, to prove
7 Petitioner’s Main Brief, 25 TTABVUE 10. Petitioner’s reply brief contains no mention of the
likelihood-of-confusion claim at all. See 27 TTABVUE. Even if Petitioner had included
arguments relevant to the claim in its reply brief, they would have been untimely, as
Respondent would have had no opportunity to respond to them. Thus we would not have
considered the arguments. See Rocket Trademarks Pty Ltd. v. Phard S.P.A., No. 91172486,
2011 TTAB LEXIS 39, at *37 (citing TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF
PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 801.03 (2004) (plaintiff’s reply brief “must be confined to rebutting the
defendant’s main brief”) (quoted wording identical in current June 2025 edition)); see also
U.S. v. Ford Motor Co., 463 F.3d 1267, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief are not properly before this court.”); Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1320 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (declining to consider “new
arguments raised for the first time in [a] reply brief”).
8 As mentioned above, the record does contain an Office action in which the assigned
trademark examining attorney issued a refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) to register
the CEO RISING mark in Petitioner’s Application Serial No. 97175232, based on a likelihood
of confusion with Respondent’s registered CEO RISE mark. See West Declaration, 18
TTABVUE 29-88. This Office action may not serve as a substitute for evidence and
arguments in support of Petitioner’s claim where Petitioner has failed to submit its own. Nor
are we bound to rely on the examining attorney’s evidence, arguments, or determination as
to likelihood of confusion. See Cineplex Odeon Corp. v. Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres,
Inc., No. 92028872, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 663, at *10 (noting that the Board is not bound by
decisions of examining attorneys).
9 Respondent’s Brief, 26 TTABVUE 8.

Cancellation No. 92083680
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a claim. See, e.g., DC Comics v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 TTAB LEXIS
453, at *46 n.81 (“It is not the function of the Board to scour the record in search of
facts or evidence to support a party’s position.”). Because Petitioner failed to make
any argument or present any evidence at trial on the second required element of its
Section 2(d) claim—likelihood of confusion—the claim is forfeited and necessarily
fails. See, e.g., WeaponX Performance Prods., No. 91221553, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 72, at
*4-5 (deeming claims not pursued or argued in briefs waived); Alcatraz Media, 2013
TTAB LEXIS 347, at *6 (same); Cf. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364,
1381 (Fed. Cir 2016) (noting, in the context of a patent-related inter partes
proceeding, that the PTAB “must base its decision on arguments that were advanced
by a party, and to which the opposing party was given a chance to respond”); Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, 683 F.3d 1330, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (refusing to consider an issue where the appellant has “failed to
develop an argument”); TBMP § 801.01 (June 2025) (“If a party fails to reference a
pleaded claim or affirmative defense in its brief, the Board will deem the claim or
affirmative defense to have been waived or forfeited.”).
Accordingly, we need not determine whether Petitioner has established the
element of the claim its brief did address: priority. See, e.g., Syngenta Crop Protection,
Inc. v. Bio-Chek, LLC, No. 91175091, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 70, at *18-19 (“We need not
reach the issue of likelihood of confusion because without proof of priority, opposer
cannot prevail.”); Life Zone Inc. v. Middleman Grp., Inc., No. 91160999, 2008 TTAB
LEXIS 37, at *23 (same).

Cancellation No. 92083680
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IV. Fraud
Petitioner’s second claim is fraud under Trademark Act Section 14(3),
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), based on Petitioner’s allegation that Respondent fraudulently
obtained its registration for the mark CEO RISE.10 To prevail on this claim,
Petitioner must show that: (1) “the respondent made a false representation
(misrepresentation) to the USPTO”; (2) “the false representation is material to the
determination of registrability . . . of [the] mark”; (3) “the respondent had knowledge
of the falsity of the representation”; and (4) “the respondent made the representation
with the intent to deceive the USPTO to issue . . . the registration.”
DrDisabilityQuotes.com, LLC v. Krugh, No. 92074232, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 70, at *8.
All of these elements must “be proven ‘to the hilt’ with clear and convincing evidence.”
In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In support of this claim, Petitioner asserts that, during the discovery phase of this
proceeding, Respondent indicated that it “has no responsive documents” in response
to Petitioner’s request for “[e]ach document sent or provided by [Respondent or any
person other than Respondent] to CEO Rise Registration Application Attorneys prior
to the application for [Respondent’s] Trademark being filed.”11 Petitioner also asserts
that it requested from Respondent “production of documents showing the first use of
CEO Rise as a trademark in conjunction with each of the services claimed in the
[Respondent’s] trademark registration application,” but that no documents produced
10 See Petitioner’s Main Brief, 25 TTABVUE 14.
11 Id. at 11.

Cancellation No. 92083680
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by Respondent refer to any “conferences,” “seminars,” “workshops,” “non-
downloadable videos,” “learning and innovation center,” or “virtual training.”12 Thus,
according to Petitioner, we must conclude that there was no actual use of its CEO
RISE mark in connection with Respondent’s services when the underlying application
was filed and that Respondent therefore made a false representation to fraudulently
obtain registration of the mark.13
On this record, however, we cannot find that Petitioner has satisfied its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence any of the required elements for fraud.
First, we have no reason to infer that Respondent’s mark was not in actual use in
commerce simply because Respondent had no documents responsive to Petitioner’s
request for documents sent to Respondent’s then-attorneys before Respondent’s
underlying application was filed. Nor would it be appropriate to make such an
inference. See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1243 (“There is no room for speculation, inference or
surmise and, obviously, any doubt must be resolved against the charging party.”
(citation omitted)).
Second, and more significantly, the record contains the specimen of use submitted
with the application, which is reproduced below and shows “a screen capture of
[Respondent’s] website as it appeared on the date of filing of the application.”14
12 Id. at 11-13.
13 Id. at 14.
14 See Testimony Declaration of Leah Fisch (Fisch Declaration), 22 TTABVUE 25-27.

Cancellation No. 92083680

> CC & ceorecom
CRO
RISE OUR MISSION LEARNWITHUS RESOURCES REVIEWS CONTACT US
OUR PROGRAMS
With a mix of recorded content and live sessions, all CEO Rise
programs work to deliver immediate ead long-term results
Entrepreneers get unstuck and complete their tarks so they
can focus on moving the needis in their Dusinesses.
HOW CEO RISE IS DIFFERENT
Phere are a million programs out there about how to grow your business
They tell you (and maybe even teach you) the acuons you should take:
* Build your website
+ Write your book
-P n social media
. your newsletter
. if mindset
+ ...ddnd the list goes on
WHAT MOST OTHER PROGRAMS DON'T DO JS “hold the space” for you so the steps actually get done
What makes CEO Rise unique is the live accountability our programs provide.
You may know exactly what you need to do- and you may even know how to do it
' ’ P
Now let's get it done.
> Co @ ceorise.com

RISE OCURMISHON LEARN WITHUS RESOURCES REVIEWS CONTACT US

Produgtivity Lab

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atting Masterclass

11

Cancellation No. 92083680
12
This specimen shows the CEO RISE mark in use on Respondent’s website in
connection with educational/training programs for entrepreneurs that include live
sessions, recorded content, recorded video trainings, and a masterclass. We therefore
find it is sufficient to establish use of Respondent’s mark in commerce as of the
underlying application’s filing date for all of the services identified in the application.
In its arguments, Petitioner focuses, in particular, on the terms “conferences,”
“seminars,” “workshops,” “non-downloadable videos,” “learning and innovation
center,” and “virtual training” in the identified fields, and appears to believe that,
because those exact terms are not used in Respondent’s specimen, the specimen does
not show use. But, again, the specimen does refer to “recorded content” and “recorded
video trainings,” which would encompass the identified “non-downloadable videos”

Cancellation No. 92083680
13
and “virtual training.” As to “conferences,” “seminars,” and “workshops,” these terms
refer to meetings, courses of study, or programs for the purpose of discussion and
education on a particular topic.15 The specimen clearly demonstrates that those sorts
of activities are being offered under Respondent’s mark. Likewise, because the
specimen indicates that Respondent provides a number of educational and training
programs and resources for entrepreneurs to achieve their own goals, it is also
sufficient to show use of Respondent’s mark in connection with “a learning and
innovation center featuring fully customized leadership, motivational, educational,
and brainstorming training,” even if the wording “learning and innovation center”
does not explicitly appear. See, e.g., In re Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. 86502157, 2018
TTAB LEXIS 2, at *9-10 (finding applicant’s webpage specimen showed a direct
association of the mark with the identified services in view of the general wording
“Outsourced Mailing Service,” other text on the webpage, and applicant’s explanation
of the services).
While we find the specimen alone sufficient for us to find that Respondent did not
misrepresent its use of the mark in the underlying application, we note that
15 A “conference” is “a meeting of two or more persons for discussing matters of common
concern.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
conference (accessed on April 17, 2026). A “seminar” is “a meeting for giving and discussing
information.” Id., https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seminar (accessed on April
17, 2026). A “workshop” is “a usually brief intensive educational program for a relatively
small group of people that focuses especially on techniques and skills in a particular field.”
Id., https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/workshop (accessed on April 16, 2026). The
Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries that
exist in printed form or regular fixed editions. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet
Food Imps. Co., No. 91061847, 1982 TTAB LEXIS 146, at *7, aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
1983).

Cancellation No. 92083680
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Respondent’s founder and managing member, Leah Fisch, submitted corroborating
testimony that “[u]nder the CEO RISE trademark, [Respondent] ha[s] offered and
continue to offer educational conferences and programs, online classes, seminars and
workshops, in person and online courses and videos and a learning and innovation
center” and that “[t]hese educational and coaching services under the CEO RISE
trademark have been advertised and sold since at least as early as March 2015.”16 In
addition, the record contains corroborating documentary evidence of Respondent’s
identified educational and training services being advertised and sold under the CEO
RISE mark since at least as early as 2015, well prior to the filing date of the
application underlying its registration.17 See Exec. Coach Builders, Inc. v. SPV Coach
16 Fisch Declaration, 22 TTABVUE 4. In Respondent’s brief, Respondent’s counsel states that
February 19, 2021, claimed as both the date of first use anywhere and the date of first use in
commerce, “was, in fact, the earliest date that all of the services listed in the application
were sold, including [Respondent’s] conferences; seminars; workshops; non-downloadable
videos; learning and innovation center; and virtual training,” and that Respondent “had use
of all other services listed in the application much earlier, starting in late 2014.” Respondent’s
Brief, 26 TTABVUE 7 (emphasis in italics in original). We acknowledge that Respondent’s
counsel’s statement regarding when all of the services were “sold” suggests a potential
discrepancy with Ms. Fisch’s testimony as to when the mark was used for all of the services.
However, both counsel’s statement and Ms. Fisch’s testimony are, at a minimum, consistent
in claiming that the mark was in use on all of the services as of the application’s filing date.
17 Fisch Declaration, 22 TTABVUE 40-74. The evidence consists of “representative examples
of use of the CEO RISE trademark in email communications with clients, email blasts to
clients and prospective clients and other promotional materials.” Id. at 4. One example of the
promotional materials, with a copyright date of 2015, explains that Respondent’s CEO RISE
program is for, inter alia, a CEO of a business and includes half-day and phone sessions that
include topics “[f]rom organizing and scheduling to getting a better understanding of your
habits . . . to carefully choose and . . . ACCOMPLISH 3 goals in 3 months.” Id. at 56. And one
of the promotional emails, dated December 15, 2015, explains to one of Respondent’s clients
that “CEO Rise is a customized . . . program geared to help you accomplish . . . specific GOALS
such as . . . [w]orking a 3 day workweek[,] [s]cheduling the entire year[,] [f]ully organizing
your environments and implementing systems for follow-up[,] [and] [d]elegating/training
your support staff to the highest degree.” Id. at 52. The same email goes on to explain that
program sessions are provided in-person, by Skype (i.e., virtually), or by phone, and include

Cancellation No. 92083680
15
Co., No. 91212312, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 201, at *36 (“Oral testimony is strengthened
by corroborative documentary evidence.” (citing Elder Mfg. Co. v. Int’l Shoe Co., 194
F.2d 114, 118 (CCPA 1952)).
Further, we agree with Respondent that “Petitioner has offered no evidence
whatsoever refuting [Respondent’s] use or suggesting that [Respondent’s] claimed
first-use date is inaccurate.”18 As Respondent points out, Petitioner’s only argument
is that “because [Respondent’s] attorney signed the declaration and because
[Respondent] stated during discovery that it had no documents it provided to counsel
prior to filing, this somehow implies fraudulent intent.”19 Of course, we have already
dispensed with that argument above.
In sum, because we find that the record shows that Respondent was using its mark
in connection with all of the identified services as of the underlying application’s filing
date, Petitioner has not established the existence of the false representation it has
claimed here. And, without that, Petitioner cannot establish the remaining three
required fraud elements, all of which require the existence of a false representation:
materiality of the false representation; knowledge of the false representation; and
intent to deceive through the false representation.
email support; time with a corporate sales trainer and technology organizer; and access to in-
person classes. Id. at 52-53. Another promotional email, dated March 8, 2019, explains that
Respondent’s founder “helps entrepreneurs tailor their productivity to their own needs,”
asserts that CEO RISE clients have “massively expanded their business,” and describes the
features of CEO RISE program, including coaching sessions and calls, and “Full Access to the
Joumour Institute.” Id. at 73-74.
18 Respondent’s Brief, 26 TTABVUE 12.
19 Id.

Cancellation No. 92083680
16
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence its
Section 14(3) claim of fraud.
Decision: The petition for cancellation of the mark CEO RISE is denied as to
both the likelihood-of-confusion claim under Trademark Act Section 2(d) and the
fraud claim under Trademark Act Section 14(3).