Summit Behavioral Healthcare, LLC

Mailed: April 17, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Summit Behavioral Healthcare, LLC
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Serial No. 97865095
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Elizabeth M. Fox and Liat S. Martinez of Bass, Berry & Sims PLC,
for Summit Behavioral Healthcare, LLC.
Cameron Rocha, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 118,
Michael Baird, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Pologeorgis, Stanley, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Pologeorgis, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Summit Behavioral Healthcare, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the
Principal Register of the composite mark SAFE HARBOR RECOVERY CENTER and
design, as displayed below, for “Addiction treatment services; behavioral healthcare
services” in International Class 44.1
1 Application Serial No. 97865095, filed on March 30, 2023, based on an allegation of use in
commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming January 1,
2019 as both the date of first use and the date of first use in commerce. The application
includes the following description of the mark: “The mark consists of the words ‘Safe Harbor’
above the words ‘Recovery Center’ all next to a circle with a lighthouse and outline of water
in the center of the circle.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Serial No. 97865095
2
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of
likelihood of confusion with the following two marks, registered on the Principal
Register, and both owned by the same registrant, National Academy of Recording
Arts & Sciences, Inc. (“Registrant”):
• SAFE HARBOR ROOM2 (in typed drawing;3 ROOM disclaimed) for
“providing convention facilities, namely, hospitality rooms, at
award shows, music events, and musical festivals for people
recovering from addictive disorder” in International Class 43; and
“psychological counseling in the field of addictive disorders;
counseling in the field of drug rehabilitation” in International
Class 44;
• SAFE HARBOR ROOM4 (in standard characters; ROOM disclaimed) for
“Charitable services, namely, providing hospitality rooms for
food, drink, and relaxation at awards shows, music events, and
music festivals for individuals, including artists and production
staff, who are recovering from addictive disorders” in
International Class 43; and
2 Registration. No. 2996309, issued on September 20, 2005; renewed.
3 “Prior to November 2, 2003, ‘standard character’ drawings were known as ‘typed’ drawings.
A typed or typeset mark is the legal equivalent of a standard character mark.” Heil Co. v.
Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, at *26 n.121 (TTAB 2024) (citing In re
Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
4 Registration. No. 3115600, issued on July 18, 2006; renewed.

Serial No. 97865095
3
“Psychological counseling services at awards shows, music
events, and music festivals for individuals, including artists and
production staff, who are recovering from addictive disorders;
Psychological counseling services at awards shows, music events,
and music festivals for individuals, including artists and
production staff, who are recovering from addictive disorders;
Charitable services, namely, providing hospitality rooms for
psychological counseling and the provision of information
regarding resources for recovery from addictive disorders at
awards shows, music events, and music festivals for individuals,
including artists and production staff, who are recovering from
addictive disorders” in International Class 44.
Additionally, the Examining Attorney refused registration absent a disclaimer of
the purportedly merely descriptive wording RECOVERY CENTER in Applicant’s
mark under Section 6(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a).
When the refusals were made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. When the request for reconsideration was denied, this appeal
resumed. The appeal is fully briefed.5 For the reasons explained below, the refusal
based on the disclaimer requirement is now moot, but we affirm the Section 2(d)
refusal.
I. Disclaimer Requirement
As noted above, the Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 6(a)
of the Trademark Act absent of a disclaimer of the wording RECOVERY CENTER.
In its Appeal Brief, Applicant conceded that the term “RECOVERY CENTER” is
descriptive of the services offered in connection with Applicant’s mark and consented
5 The TTABVUE and Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) citations refer to
the docket and electronic file database for the involved application. All citations to the TSDR
database are to the downloadable .PDF version of the documents.

Serial No. 97865095
4
to a disclaimer of the same.6
Accordingly, the following disclaimer is entered: “No claim is made to the exclusive
right to use RECOVERY CENTER apart from the mark as shown.” See Trademark
Rule 2.142(g), 37 C.F. R. § 2.142(g) (The Board may only reopen prosecution to enter
a disclaimer).
The refusal under Section 6(a) of the Trademark Act is now moot.
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). See also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co.,
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays
Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
6 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 2, 8 TTABVUE 3.

Serial No. 97865095
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factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also In re Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1381. While we consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and
argument, In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods or services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
We focus our analysis on the cited standard character mark SAFE HARBIR
ROOM that is subject to Registration No. 2996309, because the Class 44 services
recited in Registration No. 2996309 are most similar to the recited services in
Applicant’s application, and if Applicant’s composite mark is likely
to cause confusion with this particular cited mark for the respective identified
services, there is no need for us to consider whether there is a likelihood of confusion
with the other cited registered standard character mark (subject to Registration No.
3115600), which has additional points of difference in the recitation of Class 44
services; conversely, if there is no likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark
and the cited registered standard character SAFE HARBOR ROOM subject to
Registration No. 2996309, then there would be no likelihood of confusion with the
other cited registered standard character mark that is subject to Registration No.
3115600. See Sock It To Me, Inc. v. Fan, No. 91230554, 2020 WL 3027605, at *9 (TTAB
2020) (confining Section 2(d) analysis to most similar pleaded mark); In re Max

Serial No. 97865095
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Capital Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL 22358, at *2 (TTAB 2010) (confining
Section 2(d) analysis to cited typed drawing).
A. Similarity of the Services
We first turn to the comparison of the services, the second DuPont factor. In
making our determination regarding the similarity of the services, we must look to
the services as identified in Applicant’s application and those listed in cited
Registration No. 2996309. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746
F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs.
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of
registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification
of goods [or services] set forth in the application regardless of what the record may
reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods [or services], the particular
channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods [or services]
are directed.”).
It is settled that it is not necessary that the respective services be identical or
even competitive in order to find that they are related for purposes of our likelihood
of confusion analysis. The respective services need only be “related in some manner
and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could
give rise to the mistaken belief that the [services] emanate from the same source.”
Coach Servs. Inc., 668 F.3d at 1369 (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739,
2007 WL 1431084, at *10 (TTAB 2007)). The issue is not whether consumers would
confuse Applicant’s services with Registrant’s services, but rather whether there is a
likelihood of confusion as to the source of these services. L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, No.

Serial No. 97865095
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91184456, 2012 WL 1267956, at *6 (TTAB 2012); In re Rexel Inc., No. 24142), 1984
WL 63591, at *1 (TTAB 1984).
To reiterate, Applicant’s services are “Addiction treatment services; behavioral
healthcare services” in International Class 44. Registrant’s services listed in
Registration No. 2996309 include “psychological counseling in the field of addictive
disorders; counseling in the field of drug rehabilitation” in International Class 44.
Applicant’s broadly-worded “Addiction treatment services” encompasses Registrant’s
more narrowly defined services. See, e.g., Look Cycle Int'l v. Kunshan Qiyue Outdoor
Sports Goods Co., No. 92079409, 2024 WL 3739358, at *5 (TTAB 2024); Conopco, Inc.
v. Transom Symphony Opco, LLC, No. 91256368, 2022 WL 874335, at *7 (TTAB 2022)
(quoting In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379, 2015 WL 1734918, at *3
(TTAB 2015) (“Applicant's broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily
encompasses Registrant's narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial
furniture.”’)). Thus, the services are legally identical in part. It is sufficient for a
finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any item
encompassed by the identification of goods or services within a particular class in the
registration. SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
that a single good from among several may sustain a finding of likelihood of
confusion); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA
1981) (likelihood of confusion must be found if there is likely to be confusion with
respect to any item that comes within the identification of goods or services in the
application); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, Opposition No. 91196527, 2014 WL

Serial No. 97865095
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1827031 at *12 (TTAB 2014).
Relying on extrinsic evidence, Applicant argues that the services offered by
Applicant are distinct from the services offered by Registrant.7 Specifically, Applicant
maintains that it provides residential and intensive outpatient addiction treatment
services at a facility in Portsmouth, Virginia, to adult men and women diagnosed with
substance abuse disorders.8 In contrast, Applicant contends that Registrant is a
musical professional society, best known for hosting the Grammy Awards, and whose
services under the cited SAFE HARBOR ROOM mark are provided to music artists
and crew members only “while they are participating in the production of televised
music shows and other major music events.”9
We are not persuaded by Applicant’s arguments. As previously noted, we must
determine the relatedness of the services based on the identifications in Applicant’s
application and the cited registration, and not “extrinsic evidence concerning the
actual uses of the marks” where “the restrictions are not reflected in the four corners
of the application and registration[].” In re i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323. Here, the
restrictions advanced by Applicant do not appear in either Applicant’s application or
for the International Class 44 services listed in Registration No. 2996309. As such,
we cannot consider this extrinsic evidence.
Applicant, while acknowledging that a likelihood of confusion between marks is
7 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 1, 8 TTABVUE 7.
8 Id.
9 Id. at p. 2, 8 TTABVUE 8.

Serial No. 97865095
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determined on the basis of the services as they are identified in the application and
the registration, nevertheless argues that the use of extrinsic evidence is appropriate
in this case in order to determine the meaning of the description of services.10 We
disagree. The recitation of services in both Applicant’s application and the cited
registration are clearly and specifically identified without any ambiguity or
vagueness. Therefore, there is no need to rely on extrinsic evidence to determine what
services are being offered by each party. See In re RSI System, LLC, No. 78848532,
2008 WL 4419360, at *4 (TTAB 2008) (“This is not a case where the term[s] in
[Applicant’s or] registrant’s identification of [services] [are] so vague that we need
extrinsic evidence to determine if the term has a specific meaning in the trade.”).
Finally, Applicant argues that just because its identification includes a broadly
worded service does not necessarily mean that Applicant’s services are related to
Registrant’s services.11 In support of its argument, Applicant relies on two decisions:
(1) Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc., 293 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“a broad
general market category is not a generally reliable test of relatedness of products”);
and (2) Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Repcoparts USA, Inc., No. 91064343, 1983 WL 51945
(TTAB 1983) (“the mere fact that the products involved in this case (or any products
with significant differences in character) are sold in the same industry does not of
itself provide an adequate basis to find the required ‘relatedness’”.).
Applicant’s argument is unavailing. While we acknowledge that a broadly-worded
10 Id. at p. 3, 8 TTABVUE 9.
11 January 2, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR p. 13.

Serial No. 97865095
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service may not necessarily be reliable for determining “relatedness,” that is not the
case here. Applicant provides “Addiction treatment services.” Registrant also
provides addiction treatment services in the nature of “psychological counseling in
the field of addictive disorders” and “counseling in the field of drug rehabilitation.”
Here, Applicant’s services and Registrant’s services are not so widely disparate in
character that we cannot rely on Applicant’s broadly-worded “Addiction treatment
services” to determine the relatedness of the parties’ services.
Because we have found that Applicant’s broadly-worded “Addiction treatment
services” are legally identical in part to Registrant’s more narrowly defined services,
i.e., “psychological counseling in the field of addictive disorders” and “counseling in
the field of drug rehabilitation,” the second DuPont factor strongly favors a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity of Trade Channels and Classes of Purchasers
We next consider the third DuPont factor involving the established, likely-to-
continue channels of trade of the services. Because we have found that Applicant’s
and Registrants’ services are legally identical in part and there are no restrictions as
to trade channels or classes of purchasers with regard to Applicant’s “Addiction
treatment services” or Registrant’s “psychological counseling in the field of addictive
disorders; counseling in the field of drug rehabilitation,” we must presume that these
legally identical in part services are provided in the same trade channels and are
offered to the same classes of purchasers. Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050,
2023 WL 417620, at *8 (TTAB 2023) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1362
(finding Board entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of

Serial No. 97865095
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confusion)); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 771 (CCPA 1968) (where
there are legally identical goods, the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are
considered to be the same).
Thus, the third DuPont factor also weighs heavily in favor of finding a likelihood
of confusion.
C. Strength of the Cited SAFE HARBOR ROOM Mark
Before we compare the marks at issue, we consider, under the sixth DuPont
factor, Applicant’s argument that the terms “SAFE” and “HARBOR” are inherently
weak as used in connection with addiction services and counseling.12 We do so
because a determination of the strength or weakness of the cited mark helps inform
us as to its scope of protection. See In re Morinaga Nyugyo Kabushiki Kaisha, No.
86338392, 2016 WL 5219811, at *6 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]he strength of the cited mark
is--as always--relevant to assessing the likelihood of confusion under the du Pont
framework.”).
1. Conceptual Strength of the Cited SAFE HARBOR ROOM Mark
Conceptual strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness and may be placed
“in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
Because Registrant’s SAFE HARBOR ROOM mark in Registration No. 2996309
issued on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, the mark
12 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 8, 4 TTABVUE 9.

Serial No. 97865095
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is presumed to be inherently distinctive for the services listed in the cited
registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., No.
91118587, 2006 WL 24060188, at *21 (TTAB 2006) (“A mark that is registered on the
Principal Register is entitled to all Section 7(b) presumptions including the
presumption that the mark is distinctive and moreover, in the absence of a Section
2(f) claim in the registration, that the mark is inherently distinctive for the goods.”).
However, the Federal Circuit has held that if there is evidence that a mark, or an
element of a mark, is commonly adopted by many different registrants, that may
indicate that the mark or a common element thereof has some conceptual weakness
as an indicator of a single source. See Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH
& Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“[E]vidence of third-party registrations is relevant to ‘show the sense in which a
mark is used in ordinary parlance,’ . . . that is, some segment that is common to both
parties’ marks may have ‘a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or
suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that segment is relatively weak.”’)
(quoting Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2015)).
Here, Applicant submitted the following third-party registrations registered on
the Principal Register, unless otherwise indicated, to demonstrate the weakness of
the terms SAFE and HARBOR when used in connection with services to assist those

Serial No. 97865095
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who are facing addiction:13
Reg. No. Mark Relevant services
7233448 TALKHARBOR
(in standard characters)
Class 44: Mental health services;
Mental health therapy services,
namely, the providing of mental
health therapy, addiction treatment
services; mental and emotional health
counseling; emotional health and
wellness counseling, relationship
counseling, child counseling,
psychiatry services, medication
management counseling, and
psychological counseling services;
psychotherapy counseling; mental
health therapy counseling services
provided via telemedicine cloud
application, mobile application,
computer, telephone, or other
electronic means
3398418 HARBORVIEW
(in standard characters)
Class 44: healthcare services, namely,
hospital services, inpatient and
outpatient healthcare services, medical
clinical services and physician services
6767554 TALAS HARBOR
(in standard characters)
Class 44: Healthcare; mental health
services; psychiatric services;
behavioral health services
6071263 SAFE STATION
(in standard characters)
Class 44: Addiction treatment services
in the field of substance abuse;
medical evaluation services, namely,
arranging for or providing medical
assessments to victims of substance
abuse
7341380
Supplemental
SAFE RECOVERY
(in standard characters)
Class 41: Providing mentoring and
educational training to coaches,
educators, mentors and instructors in
13 Applicant also submitted a copy of Registration No. 4816630 for the mark HARBOR
VILLAGE DETOX for providing various addiction treatment services. This registration,
however, is cancelled. A cancelled registration has no probative value in our analysis. In re
Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *3 (TTAB 2018), aff’d mem., 777
F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

Serial No. 97865095
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Reg. No. Mark Relevant services
Register the field of addiction and recovery
services, self-help, personal
development, mindfulness, wellness,
meditation, EFT tapping, reflective
listening and healthy living rendered
through video conference; Providing
mentoring and educational classes,
workshops and seminars in the field of
addiction and recovery, self-help,
personal development, mindfulness
7366241 S.A.F.E. Class 44: Addiction treatment
services; Substance abuse treatment
services; Addiction treatment services
in the field of alcohol and narcotic
abuse; Information in the field of
parenting concerning drug and alcohol
abuse and addiction; Rehabilitation
for substance abuse patients
We do not find that the third-party registration evidence submitted by Applicant
is sufficient to demonstrate that either the term SAFE or HARBOR has been so
widely and commonly registered by third parties to render either term conceptually
weak when used in marks for addiction type treatments or counseling. Moreover,
none of the third-party registrations submitted by Applicant are as similar to the
cited mark SAFE HARBOR ROOM as Applicant’s mark, nor do they share a
comparable connotation or overall commercial impression. See, e.g., Sabhnani v.
Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 WL 6072822, at *13 (TTAB 2021) (third-
party registration evidence discounted where they contained “additional elements
that cause many of them to be less similar to Petitioner’s mark than Respondent’s
marks are”).

Serial No. 97865095
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2. Commercial Strength or Weakness of the Cited Marks14
To assess commercial strength of the cited mark, we consider the number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; see
Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC, No. 91217095, 2016
WL 765551, at *4 (TTAB 2016). If the evidence establishes that the consuming public
is exposed to widespread third-party use of similar marks for similar goods, it “is
relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope
of protection.” See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee
En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Here, Applicant has not submitted any evidence of third-party marketplace uses
of marks identical or similar to the cited SAFE HARBOR ROOM mark. And the third-
party registrations discussed above do not establish that the relevant consuming
public has been exposed to widespread use of similar marks in connection with
addiction treatment services. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d
1403, 1406 (CCPA 1973) (holding that “[t]he existence of these [third-party]
registrations is not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers
are familiar with them”). Accordingly, the record does not establish that the wording
SAFE HARBOR ROOM is commercially weak when used in connection with the
services listed in the cited registration.
14 As is normally the case in ex parte proceedings, the fifth DuPont factor is neutral because
the owners of the cited registrations are not parties to this proceeding, and the Examining
Attorney is under no obligation to demonstrate exposure to or recognition of the cited marks
in the marketplace. In re Integrated Embedded, No. 86140341, 2016 WL 7368696, at *9
(TTAB 2016); In re Thomas, No. 78334625, 2006 WL 1258862, at *6 n.11 (TTAB 2006).

Serial No. 97865095
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3. Conclusion as to the Strength of the Cited SAFE HARBOR
ROOM Mark
In short, the evidence of record does not establish that the cited mark SAFE
HARBOR ROOM, as a whole, or the terms SAFE and HARBOR individually, are
either conceptually or commercially weak when used in connection with the services
at issue. Accordingly, we accord the cited SAFE HARBOR ROOM mark the normal
scope of protection afforded inherently distinctive marks registered on the Principal
Register.
Thus, we find that the sixth DuPont factor to be neutral.
D. Similarity of the Marks
We next consider the first DuPont factor focusing on the similarity or dissimilarity
of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. See Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1371 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361). Similarity as to any one of these factors may be sufficient to support a finding
that the marks are confusingly similar. See Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 390 F.2d
728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or
sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”); In re Inn at St. John’s, 2018 WL 2734893,
at *5 (“Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.”) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 WL 2531200, at *2
(TTAB 2014)).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection

Serial No. 97865095
17
between the parties.” In re i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Coach Servs.
Inc., 668 F.3d at 1368) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, where the
services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” as
is the case here, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a
finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse services. See
Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re J.M.
Originals Inc., No. 75530739, 1987 WL 124026, at *1 (TTAB 1987).
Our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various
components; that is, the decision must be based on a comparison of the entire marks,
not just part of the marks. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1985). See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA
1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal;
rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”).
However, “in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion,
there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight
has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion
rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data, 753 F.3d at
1058.
Applicant’s mark is . The cited mark is SAFE
HARBOR ROOM in standard characters.
In challenging the refusal, Applicant argues that the marks must be considered

Serial No. 97865095
18
as a whole in a likelihood of confusion analysis, and that the marks in this case are
distinguishable, particularly because (1) they evoke different and distinct overall
commercial impressions, (2) the marks differ in sound and appearance, (3) Applicant’s
mark includes a design element that provides a strong visual impact, dominating the
composite mark over any wording, and (4) the terms SAFE and HARBOR are
sufficiently diluted when used in connection with addiction treatment services so that
both marks may co-exist.15
We are not persuaded by Applicant’s arguments for the following reasons. First,
we find the marks similar because they both share the dominant wording SAFE
HARBOR, which connotes the identical meaning. The wording SAFE HARBOR is
defined as “any place or situation that offers refuge or protection.”16
Second, the inclusion of the disclaimed wording RECOVERY CENTER in
Applicant’s mark and the presence of the disclaimed wording ROOM in the cited
mark does not detract from the overall similarities between the marks due to the
shared and dominant wording SAFE HARBOR. Disclaimed or descriptive matter
generally has less source-indicating weight in the analysis. Cunningham v. Laser
Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Regarding descriptive terms, this
15 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, pp. 8-13, 8 TTABVUE 14-19.
16 See https://www.dictionary.com/browse/safeharbor (accessed April 14, 2026).
Dictionary.com is based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary. See
https://www.dictionary.com/e/about/. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary
definitions. See, e.g., In re Nextgen Mgmt., LLC, No. 88098031, 2023 WL 111145, at *4 n.5
(TTAB 2023) (“The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online
dictionaries which exist in printed format or have fixed regular editions.”); see also .DeVivo
v. Ortiz, No. 91242863, 2020 WL 1227592, at *7 n.26 (TTAB 2020).

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court has noted that the ‘descriptive component of a mark may be given little weight
in reaching a conclusion on the likelihood of confusion.’”) (quoting In re Nat’l Data,
753 F.2d at 1060).
Third, it is often the first part of the literal portion a mark which is most likely
to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered when making
purchasing decisions. Palm Bay Imps., Inc., 396 F.3d at 1372; see also Presto Prods.,
Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 WL 252340, at *3 (TTAB 1988). As
such, consumers will focus more on the SAFE HARBOR portion of Applicant’s mark
than the wording RECOVERY CENTER as the source-indicator for Applicant’s
services, especially since the wording RECOVERY CENTER is merely descriptive, if
not the generic name, of Applicant’s identified services, and appears under the
wording SAFE HARBOR in smaller font.
Fourth, Applicant’s addition of a design element does not significantly
differentiate the marks. The wording SAFE HARBOR in Applicant’s mark is more
significant than the design element because when evaluating a composite mark
consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater
weight. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1362; Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite
LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 WL 2188890, at *22 (TTAB 2022) (quoting Sabhnani, 2021
WL 6072822, at *16). The wording SAFE HARBOR in Applicant’s mark, particularly
because it appears in larger lettering and is more prominent than the descriptive
wording RECOVERY CENTER, is likely to make a greater impression upon
purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the

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services. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71 Fed. Cir. 1983)).
In any event, the nature of the design element (a lighthouse) merely emphasizes
and augments the commercial impression of the wording SAFE HARBOR in
Applicant’s mark. Even Applicant concedes as much by stating that the design
element of its mark prominently features a lighthouse situated atop a hill that emits
beams of light radiating outward, symbolizing the guidance, safety, and direction that
Applicant offers to consumers in connection with its services.17 In other words,
Applicant maintains that its overall design conveys a sense of security and support
such as a lighthouse provides a harbor.
As to stylization, we note that a standard character mark like Registrant’s may
be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal
element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d
at 1363; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, the
inclusion of a design element in Applicant’s mark does not avoid a likelihood of
confusion with Registrant’s standard character mark because Registrant’s mark
could be presented in the same manner of display as Applicant’s mark, e.g., the
wording SAFE HARBOR in Registrant’s mark may appear larger and bolder and
above the term ROOM. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363; Squirtco, 697
F.2d at 1041 (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not
viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
17 Applicant’s Appeal Brief p. 9, 8 TTABVUE 15.

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Finally, with regard to Applicant’s argument regarding the weakness of the terms
SAFE and HARBOR when used in connection with addiction treatment services, we
have already determined above, based on the evidence of record, that neither of these
terms, individually or used collectively, are conceptually or commercially weak in the
context of providing addiction treatments and recovery support.
Quite simply, Applicant’s and Registrant’s mark include the identical dominant
wording that conveys the same meaning, i.e., SAFE HARBOR. We find the other
matter in the marks less significant. For the reasons discussed above, consumers are
more likely to remember the wording SAFE HARBOR than the other elements of
Applicant’s or Registrant’s mark. In re Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d at 1058. While we have
not overlooked (1) the disclaimed wording RECOVERY CENTER in Applicant’s mark
or the presence of the disclaimed term ROOM in the cited mark, or (2) the design
element in Applicant’s mark, we nonetheless conclude that Applicant’s and
Registrant’s marks, when considered in their entireties, are similar in appearance,
connotation and overall commercial impression in light of the shared, dominant
wording SAFE HARBOR.
Thus, the first DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
E. Sophistication of Consumers
The fourth DuPont factor considers the “conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ v. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. Applicant argues that the services offered under its mark are selected

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22
with a high degree of care from consumers.18 More specifically, Applicant contends
that consumers seeking addiction treatment services, behavioral healthcare services,
or any sort of inpatient treatment exercise an extremely high degree of care in
selecting a provider and managing the healthcare they receive, particularly in light
of the considerable costs associated with such services.19
Applicant did not submit any evidence regarding how the relevant consumers
make their purchasing decisions with respect to the services at issue. Nevertheless,
inasmuch as individuals seeking addiction recovery and their families are the
relevant purchasers who will encounter the parties’ services and because of the
nature of the services, it is logical that the relevant purchasers will exercise a higher
degree of purchasing care when seeking treatment and rehab for substance abuse
and other addictions.
Overall, we find the fourth DuPont factor weighs against a finding that confusion
is likely.
III. Balancing the DuPont Factors
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record and all relevant
DuPont factors. We find that (1) the marks at issue are similar, (2) Applicant’s and
Registrant’s services are legally identical in part, and (3) the parties’ legally identical
in part services are presumed to be provided in identical trade channels and offered
to the same classes of purchasers. The fifth and sixth DuPont factors are neutral.
18 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 5, 8 TTABVUE 11.
19 Id.

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As such, we conclude that Applicant’s mark, as
used in connection with the identified services, so resembles the cited mark SAFE
HARBOR ROOM (in standard characters) for the listed services in cited Registration
No. 2996309 as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act, notwithstanding any sophistication on the part of
potential and actual relevant consumers of the parties’ respective services.
In the final analysis, in weighing the relative importance of the conflicting fourth
DuPont factor, we must take into account that “even sophisticated purchasers are not
immune from source confusion, especially in cases such as the instant one involving
similar marks and [legally identical in part services],” In re Cook Med. Techs., LLC,
No. 77882876, 2012 WL 8254584, at *7 (TTAB 2012), and that there is no reason to
believe that any expertise in addiction treatment will obviate confusion as to source
or affiliation or other factors affecting goodwill. Id. (quoting Kos Pharms. Inc. v. Andrx
Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 717 (3d Cir. 2004)). See also HRL Assocs., Inc. v. Weiss Assocs.,
Inc., No. 91076632, 1989 WL 274391, at *4 (TTAB 1989) (similarities of goods and
marks outweigh sophisticated purchasers, careful purchasing decision, and expensive
goods), aff'd, Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
We find that confusion is likely because the first, second, and third DuPont factors
outweigh the fourth DuPont factor regarding the purchase conditions and
sophistication of the purchasers. Cook Med. Techs., 2012 WL 8254584, at *7; In re
Cynosure, Inc., No. 76653359, 2009 WL 1268438, at *5 (TTAB 2009).

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Decision: The refusal based on the disclaimer requirement is moot. The refusal
to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act is affirmed.