Kampura LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: April 13, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Kampura LLC
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Serial No. 98752082
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Ducal L. Hayden of Kampura LLC, pro se.
Stephen Ramos, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 134,
Sophia Kim, Managing Attorney.1
_____
Before Lykos, English, and Stanley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Stanley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Kampura LLC (“Applicant”) seeks to register on the Principal Register the
standard-character mark STREET VYBZ for the following goods:
Clothing jackets; Motorcycle jackets; Denim jackets; Sweat
pants; Sweat shorts; Sweat shirts; Hats; Gym shorts;
Denim shorts; Clothing jerseys; Short-sleeved or long-
sleeved t-shirts; Clothing headwraps; Athletic shorts;
1 The application was reassigned from Daniel Wood, the original Examining Attorney, to
Stephen Ramos for purposes of appeal. We refer to both Examining Attorneys as “the
Examining Attorney.”

Serial No. 98752082
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Hooded sweat shirts; Graphic T-shirts; Shorts; Fashion
hats; Athletic jackets, in International Class 25.2
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used
in connection with the identified goods, so resembles the registered standard-
character mark STREET VIBES for the goods listed below, that it is likely to cause
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive:
Shirts; Sweatshirts; Bottoms as clothing; Sweatshirts for
men and women; Tops as clothing; Women’s clothing,
namely, shirts, dresses, skirts, blouses; Button down
shirts; Graphic T-shirts; Open-necked shirts; Short-sleeved
shirts; Sport shirts; Sports shirts; Sports shirts with short
sleeves; Sweaters for men and women; Sweatpants for men
and women; T-shirts; T-shirts for men and women; Tops as
clothing for men and women; Turtle neck shirts, in
International Class 25.3
In an attempt to circumvent the refusal, Applicant filed a proposed amendment to
its mark from STREET VYBZ to STR33T VYBZ. When the refusal was made final,
the Examining Attorney rejected Applicant’s proposed amendment to its drawing as
a material alteration and maintained the refusal based on the mark as originally
filed.
2 Application Serial No. 98752082 was filed on September 16, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce.
3 Registration No. 6881316 issued on the Principal Register on October 18, 2022. The cited
registration is owned by Jodi Miles (“Registrant”).

Serial No. 98752082
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Applicant then requested reconsideration and appealed.4 After the Examining
Attorney denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. The case is
fully briefed and ready for decision.5 We affirm the refusal to register Applicant’s
mark.
Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). See also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
4 In its Request for Reconsideration, Applicant noted that it “is willing to maintain the
original drawing and rely on the other arguments herein to support registration.” May 28,
2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 31.
Citations to the prosecution file are to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system.
5 After the Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration and the
Board resumed the appeal, the Board set a September 23, 2025 deadline for Applicant’s
appeal brief. 5 TTABVUE. When Applicant did not meet that deadline, the Board dismissed
the appeal on October 6, 2025. 6 TTABVUE. Applicant filed its brief on October 19, 2025. 7
TTABVUE. On October 21, 2025, the Board noted the late filing and directed Applicant to
explain the delay. 8 TTABVUE. That same day, Applicant responded that the untimely filing
was inadvertent and due to exigent military obligations. 9 TTABVUE. On October 22, 2025,
the Board set aside the dismissal and accepted the October 19, 2025 filing as Applicant’s
brief. 10 TTABVUE.

Serial No. 98752082
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In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays
Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
Although we consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument,
In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key considerations
are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods. In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v.
Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). These factors, and
others, are discussed below.
A. The Goods and Trade Channels
We begin our analysis with the second DuPont factor, which considers the
“similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an
application or registration,” and the third DuPont factor, which considers “[t]he
similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” In re
Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361). In analyzing the relatedness of the goods and trade channels under the
second and third DuPont factors, we look to the identifications in the application and
cited registration. See id. at 1306 (“The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding
focuses on the goods and services described in the application and registration, and

Serial No. 98752082
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not on real-world conditions.”); Stone Lion Cap. Partners v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d
1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs.
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“the question of registrability of an
applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth
in the application”)).
It is “not necessary that the products … be similar or even competitive to support
a finding of a likelihood of confusion.” Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668
F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739,
2007 WL 1431084, at *6 (TTAB 2007)). “[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the
respective products are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief
that they emanate from the same source.’” Id. “[I]t is sufficient for a finding of
likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any item encompassed by the
identification of goods within a particular class in the application.” In re Aquamar,
Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 WL 4269973, at *4 n.5 (TTAB 2015); see also Gen. Mills, Inc.
v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. S.A., No. 91118482, 2011 WL 6001095, at *1 n.1
(TTAB 2011), judgment set aside on other grounds, 2014 WL 343267 (TTAB 2014)
(“likelihood of confusion will be found as to the entire class if there is likely to be
confusion with respect to any item that comes within the identification of goods in
that class”).
As noted above, the goods in the subject application are:
Clothing jackets; Motorcycle jackets; Denim jackets; Sweat
pants; Sweat shorts; Sweat shirts; Hats; Gym shorts;

Serial No. 98752082
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Denim shorts; Clothing jerseys; Short-sleeved or long-
sleeved t-shirts; Clothing headwraps; Athletic shorts;
Hooded sweat shirts; Graphic T-shirts; Shorts; Fashion
hats; Athletic jackets,
and the goods in the cited registration are:
Shirts; Sweatshirts; Bottoms as clothing; Sweatshirts for
men and women; Tops as clothing; Women’s clothing,
namely, shirts, dresses, skirts, blouses; Button down
shirts; Graphic T-shirts; Open-necked shirts; Short-sleeved
shirts; Sport shirts; Sports shirts; Sports shirts with short
sleeves; Sweaters for men and women; Sweatpants for men
and women; T-shirts; T-shirts for men and women; Tops as
clothing for men and women; Turtle neck shirts.
The goods are identical in part because both the involved application and the cited
registration identify “sweatshirts” (or “sweat shirts”) and “graphic t‑shirts.” The
goods are also legally identical in part because, inter alia: (1) Registrant’s “bottoms
as clothing” encompass Applicant’s narrower identifications of “sweat pants,” “sweat
shorts,” “gym shorts,” “denim shorts,” “athletic shorts,” and “shorts”; and
(2) Registrant’s “tops as clothing” encompass Applicant’s narrower identifications of
“sweat shirts,” “clothing jerseys,” “short‑sleeved or long‑sleeved t‑shirts,” “hooded
sweat shirts,” and “graphic t‑shirts.” See In re Medline Indus., Inc., No. 87680078,
2020 WL 1485709, at *5 (TTAB 2020) (goods legally identical in part where “gloves
for medical use” and “protective gloves for medical use” encompass “medical
examination gloves”); In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379, 2015 WL
1734918, at *3 (TTAB 2015) (“Applicant’s broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’

Serial No. 98752082
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necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial
furniture.’”).6
Turning to the trade channels, because Applicant’s goods are identical in part and
legally identical in part to the goods in the cited registration, and the identifications
contain no restrictions on channels of trade or purchasers, we presume they travel in
the same trade channels to the same classes of purchasers. See In re Viterra Inc., 671
F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding Board entitled to rely on this legal
presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); In re Fat Boys Water Sports
LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 WL 3915986, at *10 (TTAB 2016) (“Because the goods at
issue are legally identical, we must presume that the goods of Applicant and
Registrant move in the same channels of trade and are offered to the same classes of
consumers.”).
Applicant contends that: (1) there is no evidence of “actual marketplace overlap”;
(2) Applicant “targets a niche market influenced by Caribbean culture, differing from
the Registrant’s broader appeal”; and (3) Applicant’s “cultural positioning mitigates
[any] overlap” in trade channels.7
6 Because the goods are identical in part and legally identical in part based on the
identifications, we need not reach the Examining Attorney’s relatedness evidence for the
remaining goods. See Examining Attorney’s Br., 11 TTABVUE at 5 (citing the April 23, 2025
Final Office Action and July 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration Denial, identifying
screenshots from Nike, American Eagle, and Old Navy, as well as approximately twenty
third‑party registrations, as evidence that a single source may offer shirts, shorts, jackets,
hats, and headwraps under one mark).
7 Applicant’s Br., 7 TTABVUE 4.

Serial No. 98752082
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These arguments are unpersuasive. As we have explained in innumerable
decisions, the Board may not consider arguments “about how the parties’ actual
goods, services, customers, trade channels, and conditions of sale are narrower or
different from the goods and services identified in the applications and registrations.”
In re FCA US LLC, No. 85650654, 2018 WL 1756431, at *4 n.18 (TTAB 2018)
(emphasis in italics in original; in bold here); see also, e.g., i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at
1327 (“[T]he Board properly declined to import restrictions into the identification of
goods based on alleged real-world conditions.”). It is the manner in which Applicant
and Registrant have identified their goods in their respective identifications that is
controlling. See Nat’l Football League v. Jasper Alliance Corp., No. 91077966, 1990
WL 354523, at *4 & n.5 (TTAB 1990).
The Examining Attorney has demonstrated that Applicant’s and Registrant’s
goods are identical in part and legally identical in part, meaning that we may
presume that the trade channels and classes of consumers are the same for the
identical goods. Accordingly, the second and third DuPont factors favor a likelihood
of confusion.
B. The Marks
We turn now to the first DuPont factor, which involves an analysis of the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation, and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also
Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1319. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be

Serial No. 98752082
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sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No.
87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617,
2014 WL 2531200, at *2 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It
is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause
confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The proper test regarding similarity “‘is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar
in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.’” Cai v. Diamond Hong,
Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368).
“The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a
general rather than a specific impression of trademarks.” In re St. Julian Wine Co.,
No. 87834973, 2020 WL 2788005, at *6 (TTAB 2020).
Our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various
components; that is, our finding must be based on the entire marks, not just part of
the marks. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981) (“It is
axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it
must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”).

Serial No. 98752082
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Where the goods are identical in part, as is the case here, the degree of similarity
between the marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is likely
declines. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Intrastate Distribs., Inc., 144 F.4th 1376, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2025) (quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368) (“‘[I]f the parties’ goods are closely
related, a lesser degree of similarity between the marks may be sufficient to give rise
to a likelihood of confusion.’”).
With these principles in mind, we compare Applicant’s standard-character mark
STREET VYBZ with the cited standard-character mark STREET VIBES.
Applicant argues that confusion is not likely between its mark and the cited mark
because the marks “differ significantly in appearance and connotation, creating
distinct overall impressions.”8 More specifically Applicant contends that, “[w]hile the
marks share ‘STREET’ and are phonetically similar, the substitution of ‘VYBZ’ for
‘VIBES’ creates meaningful visual and conceptual distinctions that outweigh any
auditory overlap” because “‘VYBZ’ is a deliberate variant spelling derived from
Jamaican Patois and Caribbean Street slang, where it connotes mood, atmosphere,
or energy, often linked to dancehall culture, music, dance, food, and community
gatherings.”9 Applicant points to other brands “using ‘VYBZ’ [to] illustrate its ties to
Caribbean culture and lack of confusion in the marketplace.”10 Applicant also
8 Applicant’s Br., 7 TTABVUE 3.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 3-4 (identifying “Vybz Kartel World,” “Vybz Wear,” “Vybz Apparel”/”Vybz
Entertainment,” and “Vybz Ware”).

Serial No. 98752082
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submitted evidence of its own purported use of the STREET VYBZ mark on apparel
items.11
Applicant’s arguments are again not persuasive. The marks are similar in
appearance and are phonetic equivalents. Both marks are two-word marks, beginning
with “STREET” and ending with the phonetically identical “VIBES”/“VYBZ.”
Applicant concedes that the marks are “phonetically similar,”12 and “[s]imilarity in
sound alone may be sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion.” In re 1st USA
Realty Prof’ls, Inc., No. 78553715, 2007 WL 2315610, at *5 (TTAB 2007) (citing Krim-
Ko, 390 F.2d at 732) (finding stylized mark FIRST USA and composite mark 1ST
USA “identical in pronunciation and connotation”); see also Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co.
v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, No. 91263919, 2022 WL 16646840, at *13 (TTAB 2022)
(finding Opposer’s SMOK mark and the literal portion of Applicant’s mark, SMOKES,
similar in sound; “consumers are likely to view and verbalize the term SMOK as the
phonetic equivalent and a misspelling of ‘smoke’”); cf. In re Carlson, No. 78752616,
2009 WL 1719596, at *3 (TTAB 2009) (finding URBANHOUZING merely descriptive;
“HOUZING will be recognized as a misspelling of the descriptive word HOUSING. It
is, as we have stated, a phonetic equivalent.”).
The marks also convey the same connotation and overall commercial impression.
As discussed, the parties’ goods are identical in part and legally identical in part. In
that context, there is no reason to believe STREET VIBES would carry one meaning
11 May 28, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 7-28 (screenshots of Applicant’s
apparel items from Applicant’s online store).
12 Id. at 3.

Serial No. 98752082
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on Registrant’s goods while STREET VYBZ would carry a different meaning on
Applicant’s identical goods. In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, at *9
(TTAB 2021) (“[T]here is no evidence here, or other reason to find, that the mark
TRUST THE PROCESS has one meaning when used with shoes, and a second and
different meaning when used with shirts and sweatshirts, based on the nature of the
respective goods.”).
Applicant asserts that “VYBZ” is recognized as Caribbean slang, and Applicant
identifies brands said to use “VYBZ”;13 but these assertions are not supported by
evidence, and “argument is no substitute for evidence.”14 Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371
(quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
The only record evidence as to the meaning of “vybz” is from Urban Dictionary, which
defines “vybz” as “vibes, but cooler.”15 The Urban Dictionary entry does not tie the
13 Applicant’s Br., 7 TTABVUE 2-3.
14 Contrary to Applicant’s assertion that its “prior submissions (including exhibits attached
to the Request for Reconsideration) include marketplace evidence of ‘VYBZ’ formative brands
coexisting in commerce without confusion” (Applicant’s Reply Br., 12 TTABVUE 2), Applicant
did not attach examples of third-party use (or third-party registrations) to its Request for
Reconsideration; the exhibits attached to its Request for Reconsideration appear to be
screenshots from Applicant’s own online retail store, not third-party uses of VYBZ-formative
marks. See May 28, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 7-28.
15 July 21, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 30. The Urban Dictionary is
“‘a slang dictionary with definitions submitted by visitors to the website.’” In re Lizzo LLC,
No. 88466264, 2023 WL 1507238, at *5 (TTAB 2023) (quoting In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc.,
No. 85247730, 2013 WL 4635976, at *4 n.3 (TTAB 2013)). While “we recognize the inherent
problems regarding the reliability of Urban Dictionary because it is a collaborative website
that permits anyone to submit or edit a definition,” we “will consider dictionary definitions
taken from Urban Dictionary so long as the non-offering party has an opportunity to rebut
that evidence by submitting other definitions that may call into question the accuracy of the
particular Urban Dictionary definitions.” Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 2013 WL 4635976, at *4
n.3.

Serial No. 98752082
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term “vybz” to Caribbean culture; if anything, it reinforces that “vybz” is merely a
variant of its phonetic equivalent “vibes.”16
Likewise, Applicant’s evidence of its purported use of the STREET VYBZ mark on
its apparel items is irrelevant to whether Applicant’s mark is, for example, “geared
towards Caribbean culture.”17 Consistent with established precedent, the relevant
comparison is between the marks as they are shown in the application and
registration drawings, not based on extrinsic uses in commerce. Fuente Mktg. Ltd. v.
Vaporous Techs., LLC, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 950251, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (“The
correct inquiry requires comparison only of the applied-for mark … to Fuente’s
registered X marks.”); Embiid, 2021 WL 2285576, at *6 (quoting i.am.symbolic, llc,
866 F.3d at 1323) (“We compare the applicant’s and registrant’s ‘marks
themselves.’”); In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, at
*4 (TTAB 2018) (“[W]e do not consider how Applicant and Registrant actually use
their marks in the marketplace, but rather how they appear in the registration and
the application. We must compare the marks as they appear in the drawings, and not
[based] on any [extrinsic materials] that may have additional wording or
information.”).
16 The Urban Dictionary separately defines “vybz kartel” as “the most lyrically gifted
dancehall artiste in jamaica [sic].” July 21, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration, TSDR
at 30. While “Vybz Kartel” plainly refers to a Jamaican dancehall artist, the current record
does not establish that “vybz,” standing alone, has any connection to Jamaica specifically or
Caribbean culture generally.
17 Applicant’s Br., 7 TTABVUE 3. See also May 28, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR
at 7-28 (screenshots of Applicant’s apparel items from Applicant’s online store).

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Lastly, Applicant relies on In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493 (Fed. Cir. 1992) for
the proposition that “[p]recedents support distinguishing marks based on variant
spellings that alter connotation.”18 In Hearst, the court found VARGA GIRL and
VARGAS distinct because the additional term “GIRL” altered the appearance, sound,
and commercial impression, even though “VARGA” was shared. Here, the marks
share the identical first word “STREET,” have highly similar/phonetic‑equivalent
second words (“VIBES” and “VYBZ”), and neither mark includes an additional term
that would change the commercial impression.
In short, “[s]light differences in marks do not normally create dissimilar marks,”
In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, No. 86705287, 2018 WL 3570240, at *8 (TTAB
2018), particularly where the marks are phonetic equivalents. See, e.g., RE/MAX of
Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 1980 WL 30159, at *5 (REMACS and RE/MAX
“indistinguishable in sound” and confusingly similar) (proceeding number not
available); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 1963 WL 7838, at *1 (TTAB 1963) (CRESCO and
KRESSCO “are phonetically indistinguishable” such that there would be a likelihood
of confusion) (proceeding number not available). We find that the marks are identical
in sound, meaning, and commercial impression, and very similar in appearance,
particularly taking into account that they “‘must be considered … in light of the
fallibility of memory’ and ‘not on the basis of side-by-side comparison.’” St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (quoting San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs.
Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 685 (CCPA 1977)).
18 Applicant’s Br., 7 TTABVUE 4.

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Accordingly, the first DuPont factor favors a likelihood of confusion.
C. Actual Confusion or the Lack Thereof
Under the seventh and eighth DuPont factors, we consider the nature and extent
of actual confusion, if any, in light of the length of time and conditions under which
there has been contemporaneous use of the subject marks. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
Applicant contends that an “[a]bsence of actual confusion is probative, especially
with concurrent use via Applicant’s website” and that the seventh and eighth Dupont
factors “support no likelihood [of confusion]” because there have been “no reported
instances [of confusion] despite market presence.”19
Applicant’s argument regarding the absence of actual confusion is misplaced. To
begin, “a showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of
confusion.” Herbko Int’l, 308 F.3d at 1165 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Moreover, “uncorroborated
statements of no known instances of actual confusion are of little evidentiary value.”
Majestic Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1317. We also have no evidence of whether the extent
and circumstances of Applicant’s and Registrant’s uses of their respective marks have
been such as to give rise to meaningful opportunities for actual confusion to occur. In
re Kangaroos U.S.A., No. 319021, 1984 WL 63596, at *2 (TTAB 1984); see also Guild
Mortg., 912 F.3d at 1380-81 (suggesting that “evidence of concurrent use of the two
marks for a particularly long period of time—over 40 years—in which the two
19 Applicant’s Br., 7 TTABVUE 4.

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businesses operated in the same geographic market—southern California—without
any evidence of actual confusion” may be probative under the eighth DuPont factor).
In view thereof, the seventh and eighth DuPont factors are neutral.
D. Other DuPont Factors
In addition to the DuPont factors discussed above, Applicant references the fourth,
sixth, and thirteenth factors in its brief.20 Applicant, however, submitted no evidence
directed to these factors, and the arguments offered largely duplicate points
addressed elsewhere (e.g., niche‑market positioning and the asserted absence of
actual confusion). Because Applicant’s overlapping arguments on these additional
factors have been duly considered in connection with other factors, we treat the
fourth, sixth, and thirteenth factors as neutral.21
20 Applicant’s Br., 7 TTABVUE 4. The fourth DuPont factor considers “[t]he conditions under
which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. The sixth DuPont factor considers “[t]he number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” Id. The thirteenth DuPont factor considers
“[a]ny other established fact probative of the effect of use.” Id.
21 In its reply brief, Applicant improperly attempts to augment the record by invoking alleged
third-party uses of “VYBZ” (e.g., “Vybz Kartel,” “Island Vybz/Vybwear,” and “Cool Calm
Collective Vybz”) and purported “USPTO records” (“Reg. No. 6342707 for apps/social
services,” “Reg. No. 6837050 for tobacco,” and “pending Serial No. 99347083 for clothing”) to
argue that “VYBZ” is weak. See Applicant’s Reply Br., 12 TTABVUE 3. As already noted,
there are no third-party uses of “VYBZ” in the record; nor are there any third-party
registrations. And as previously stated, argument is no substitute for evidence. Moreover,
under the sixth DuPont factor, the cited mark, which is registered on the Principal Register
without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, is presumed inherently distinctive and nothing
in the record shows it to be conceptually or commercially weak in the apparel context. See,
e.g., Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 WL 2460188, at *21 (TTAB
2006) (“A mark that is registered on the Principal Register is entitled to all Section 7(b)
presumptions including the presumption that the mark is distinctive and moreover, in the
absence of a Section 2(f) claim in the registration, that the mark is inherently distinctive for
the goods.”). We therefore accord the cited mark “the normal scope of protection to which [an]
inherently distinctive mark[] [is] entitled.” In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL
2094122, at *10 (TTAB 2020).

Serial No. 98752082
- 17 -
Conclusion – Summary of the DuPont Factors
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there is evidence and argument, “explain the results of that weighing,” and
address “the weight [we] assigned to the relevant factors.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1384. “No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and each case
requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.” In re Mighty
Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d. 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Naterra Int’l, 92 F.4th at
1116-17 (“Only the DuPont factors of significance to the particular mark need be
considered in the likelihood of confusion analysis.”).
We have carefully considered all of the evidence and arguments. The goods of
Applicant’s application and the cited registration are identical in part and legally
identical in part, and for those goods we presume the same channels of trade and
classes of purchasers. Accordingly, the second and third DuPont factors weigh in favor
of a likelihood of confusion. The marks are identical in sound, meaning, and
commercial impression, and very similar in appearance; thus, the first DuPont factor
also weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion. The fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth,
and thirteenth factors are neutral in our likelihood of confusion analysis. No DuPont
factor weighs against a likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, we conclude that
confusion is likely between Applicant’s mark and the cited mark.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.