Nuqul Brothers Company Limited v. FB International Inc

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: April 10, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Nuqul Brothers Company Limited
v.
FB International Inc.
_____
Opposition Nos. 91288958 (parent) and 91290934
Mohammad S. Rahman, of Rahman LLC, for Nuqul Brothers Company Limited.
Abdul Farhat, for FB International Inc.
_____
Before Thurmon, Allard and Bradley, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Thurmon, Administrative Trademark Judge:
FB International Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the two marks shown below:
for “Kitchen towels made of paper; Kitchen towels of
paper; Kitchen paper towels; Paper towels; Tissue paper; Toilet
paper; Bathroom tissue; Facial tissue; Hygienic paper; Napkin

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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paper; Paper kitchen towels; Paper tissues; Toilet tissue,” in
International Class 16;1 and
for “Diapers for incontinence;
Feminine hygiene pads; Babies’ diapers; Disposable baby diapers,”
in International Class 5, and “Facial tissue; Kitchen paper towels;
Paper tissues; Paper towels; Toilet paper; Hygienic paper; Paper
kitchen towels; Scented facial tissue; Tissue paper; Toilet tissue,” in
International Class 16.2
Nuqul Brothers Company Limited (“Opposer”) separately filed oppositions against
both applications under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act (the “Act”), alleging
priority and a likelihood of confusion with two registered marks owned by Opposer,3
namely:
1 Application Serial No. 97617839, was filed on October 3, 2022 under Trademark Act Section
1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), and alleging September 1, 2014, and January 1, 2015, respectively,
as the date of first use and first use in commerce. The mark is described as follows: “The
mark consists of a teardrop shape containing the stylized wording ‘fine’ with a stylized circle
over the letter ‘i’.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
2 Application Serial No. 97629843, was filed on October 12, 2022 under Trademark Act
Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), but Applicant amended the basis in its September 8, 2023
response to the nonfinal office action and currently alleges a bona fide intent to use the mark
in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). The mark is described
as follows: “The mark consists of the wording ‘Fine’ and non-Latin characters.” The
Application further states: “The non-Latin characters in the mark transliterate to ‘fine’ and
this means ‘fine’ in English.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
3 Opposer also asserted a fraud claim in the ’958 proceeding, but did not bring such a claim
in the ’034 proceeding. Opposer argued the fraud claim in its Trial Brief for the consolidated
cases, but we do not reach the fraud claim (whether properly pleaded or not) because we are
sustaining the opposition on the ground of likelihood of confusion as discussed herein.
On the Cover Sheet accompanying the Notice of Opposition in the ’958 proceeding, Opposer
also listed a lack of ownership claim under Section 1 and a deceptiveness claim under Section
2(a) of the Act. These claims were not set forth in the Notice and therefore were not
sufficiently pleaded. See Norris v. PAVE: Promoting Awareness, Victim Empowerment, No.
91234909, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 345, at *1 n.2 (“Although the content of the ESTTA cover sheet
is read in conjunction with an attached notice of opposition as an integral component thereof,
the mere mention of a ground on the ESTTA cover sheet generally is insufficient to constitute

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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• for, among other things, “Babies’ diapers,” in
International Class 5;4 and
• for goods in International Classes 3, 10, and
25.5
In addition, Opposer asserts common law rights in the same mark for, among
other things, “tissues and paper towels.”6 We consolidated the two oppositions
because they involve common questions of law and fact.7
a claim.”). In addition, these additional claims were not pursued at trial or mentioned in
Opposer’s Trial Brief. These two claims, therefore, are waived or forfeited. See Time Warner
Entm’t Co. L.P. v. Jones, No. 91112409, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 462, at *2 n.3 (“In the notice of
opposition, opposer also alleged claims of ‘deceptiveness’ and ‘disparagement’ under Section
2(a), but has presented no evidence or argument in support of those grounds. Accordingly,
opposer is deemed to have waived those claims.”).
Only the Section 2(d) claim was pleaded in the ’034 proceeding.
4 Registration No. 6643921, issued on February 15, 2022. The mark is described as follows:
“The mark consists of a substantially tear-drop shape containing the word ‘Fine’ with an
enlarged circle as the dot in the letter ‘i’, a curved arc contoured with the tear-drop shape,
and with the word ‘Guard’ overlapping a portion of the curved arc with an image of a shield
behind the letter ‘A’.”
5 Registration No. 6603777, issued on December 28, 2021. No description of the mark was
provided.
6 1 TTABVUE 6, 8. See also 10 TTABVUE 3, 6 (Declaration of Ronnie M. Rifai referencing
Opposer’s common law rights). When we cite to the record, we refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s
docketing system, by docket entry and page number of the downloaded document (e.g., 18
TTABVUE 14).
7 7 TTABVUE. Opposition No. 91288958 was designated the parent proceeding. The same
evidence was submitted in both proceedings, but we will refer to the parent file unless
otherwise noted.

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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Applicant filed answers denying the salient allegations of each Notice of
Opposition, but did not file a Trial Brief. That is Applicant’s right, as Opposer bears
the burden of proving its claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Trademark Rule
2.128(a)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.128(a)(1); Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods.,
LLC, No. 91263919, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *5; see also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 801.02(b) and authorities cited
therein. The cases are now ready for final decision. Opposer has proven its Section
2(d) claims, so we sustain the oppositions.
The records include the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of the opposed Applications. In addition, Opposer
submitted documentary and testimonial evidence in support of its claims.8 Applicant
submitted no evidence and no brief.
Finally, we note that these parties were involved in a recent opposition proceeding
involving the same or similar marks used on some of the same goods. See Nuqul Bros.
Co. v. FB Int’l Inc., No. 91283695, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 215. In that case, the Board
sustained Opposer’s Section 2(d) claim. Opposer makes no argument for estoppel and
we will not invoke this doctrine on our own here. We simply note that these parties
have been here before, and Opposer prevailed in that instance, too.
I. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action must be established in every inter
partes case. Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d
8 8, 9, 10 TTABVUE.

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1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 n.4 (2014)). A party in the position of plaintiff may oppose
an application where such opposition is within the zone of interests protected by the
statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1063, and the opposer must have a reasonable belief in damage
that is proximately caused by registration of the mark. See Peterson v. Awshucks SC,
LLC, No. 92066957, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 520, at *17 (citing Corcamore, LLC v. SFM,
LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
Opposer has made of record its two pleaded registrations, which are active and
owned by Opposer.9 This establishes Opposer’s entitlement to bring its Section 2(d)
claims against Applicant. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (pleaded registrations “suffice to establish … direct commercial interest”);
Barbara’s Bakery, Inc. v. Landesman, No. 91157982, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 9, at *5-6
(opposer’s entitlement to opposition established by pleaded registration and non-
frivolous likelihood of confusion claim).
II. Law and Analysis – Section 2(d)
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), prohibits registration of a
mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in
the Patent or Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the
United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive.” To prevail on its Section 2(d) claim, Opposer must show by a
9 1 TTABVUE 16-28.

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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preponderance of the evidence that it has either a prior registration of or common law
priority in its marks, and that Applicant’s use of each of its marks is likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or deception regarding the source of the goods identified in its
Applications. New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS
199, at *2-3.
A. Priority
Because Opposer’s pleaded Registrations are properly of record and because
Applicant did not counterclaim to cancel any of them, priority is not at issue with
respect to the marks and the goods identified in the Registrations. Nkanginieme v.
Appleton, No. 91256464, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 64, at *11-12. We further find that
Opposer has established common law use for additional goods, including paper towels
since at least 2014,10 and as such Opposer’s common law use has priority over
Applicant’s constructive use priority dates of October 3, 2022 and October 12, 2022.
See Moreno v. Pro Boxing Supplies, Inc., No. 91214580, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 299, at
*19 (party “may rely without further proof upon the filing date of its application as a
‘constructive use’ date for purposes of priority”).
B. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B
10 10 TTABVUE 6 ¶ 35(unrebutted testimony regarding use of Opposer’s marks on paper
towels and other goods in the United States); 8 TTABVUE 26, 75-76; see also 10 TTABVUE
2-3, 5, 7.

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138 (2015); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We must consider each DuPont
factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912
F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Whether a likelihood of confusion exists between
an applicant’s mark and a previously registered mark is determined on a case-by-case
basis, aided by application of the thirteen DuPont factors.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc.
v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When analyzing
these factors, the overriding concerns are not only to prevent buyer confusion as to
the source of the goods or services, but also to protect the registrant from adverse
commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil
Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
“Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle
ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973). Varying
weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented.
See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1206 (“the various evidentiary factors may play more or less
weighty roles in any particular determination”). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d
1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d
1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”).
1. Similarity of the Marks
To evaluate the similarity of the marks under the first DuPont factor, we consider
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
170, at *13 (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4), aff’d
mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form,
spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally “retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.” In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *11.

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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a. Applicant’s Mark
This mark appears identical to the teardrop portion of Opposer’s marks, a copy of
which is provided below.
The only difference is the stylized version of the word “GUARD” in Opposer’s mark.
We find the dominant element of both marks is the word “FINE,” with a larger-than-
usual circle in place of the typical dot used in the lowercase “i”. This element is
identical in the parties’ marks. In addition, the background design, which is described
as a teardrop shape in the Application and one of the Registrations. These two
elements together constitute the dominant part of Opposer’s marks. Because
Applicant’s mark also has these elements, the marks are similar in appearance.
The marks are also similar in sound, meaning and commercial impression. The
“Guard” element of Opposer’s marks is a point of distinction, but it is less prominent
in Opposer’s marks than the shared parts of those marks. “[W]e also keep in mind
the penchant of consumers to shorten marks.” In re Bay State Brewing Co., No.
85826258, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *9. It is likely that many consumers familiar
with Opposer’s marks may refer to the marks as simply FINE when asking for the
goods. We find the marks are similar in sound.

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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There is no evidence showing that the word FINE means something different in
the two marks and no evidence that these marks create different commercial
impressions. In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *20-21 (finding
no reason to believe the same term means something different in the parties’ marks).
Given that both marks use the same teardrop shape and the same presentation of the
word “FINE,” the marks are similar. This fact increases the likelihood of confusion as
to this applied-for mark.
b. Applicant’s Mark
This mark is not as similar to Opposer’s marks because it lacks the teardrop shape
and the stylized presentation of the word FINE. But this mark, which consists of the
word “fine” presented in English and in Arabic, emphasizes the word FINE even more
than the other marks do. The word FINE is the dominant element of Opposer’s marks,
and Applicant uses the same word (twice for consumers literate in English and
Arabic) as the entire mark. We find these marks are also similar in appearance,
sound, meaning and commercial impression. The first DuPont factor also supports
the Section 2(d) claim as to this applied-for mark.
2. Similarity of the Goods, Trade Channels and Classes of
Customers
The second, third and fourth DuPont factors consider the similarity of the goods,
the trade channels and the classes of consumers who buy and use the goods. We
evaluate the second DuPont factor based on the goods identified in the Applications,
the relied-upon Registrations and the evidence of common law use. See Stone Lion

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom
Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is
sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion as to a class of goods in the
Applications if relatedness is established between any of the goods identified in that
class and either Opposer’s Registrations or its evidence of common law use. Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981); see also
Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 347, at *18;
In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178, at *9 n.5. In addition, the
goods need only be sufficiently related that a relevant consumer would be likely to
assume, upon encountering goods marketed under the marks at issue, that the goods
originate from, are sponsored or authorized by, or are otherwise connected to the
same source. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., Nos. 91158891 and
91158941, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 50, at *25-26.
The Application for the mark identifies, among other things,
“Paper towels.” In a declaration, Mr. Ronnie M. Rifai, Chief Legal and Compliance
Officer of Opposer, testified “Nuqul’s FINE-related marks have gained recognition in
the U.S. market as well as in the Middle East and elsewhere for personal care and
hygiene products, particularly baby care products including diapers as well as for

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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tissues and paper towels.”11 In other words, Opposer has established common law
rights in its marks for paper towels, which are also identified in the Application for
this mark. The goods are identical in part and this fact increases the likelihood of
confusion as to Applicant’s mark.
The Application for the mark identifies goods in two
classes, and we find there are goods in both classes that are identical to goods sold
under Opposer’s marks. First, both this Application and Opposer’s common law use
include paper towels, as we explained above for the other opposed Application. That
shows the goods identified in International Class 16 in this Application are identical
in part to Opposer’s goods. Second, this Application and one of Opposer’s
Registrations both identify “Babies’ diapers,” in International Class 5, showing that
the goods in this class are also identical in part.
The fact that both Applications identify goods that are identical in part to the
goods of Opposer increases the likelihood of confusion. The second DuPont factor
strongly supports the Section 2(d) refusal as to all classes of goods in both
Applications.
With respect to similarity of the established trade channels through which the
goods reach customers (i.e., the third DuPont factor), we presume identical goods
11 10 TTABVUE 7. Other statements in this Declaration confirm that Opposer has sold paper
towels under its marks for many years in the United States. Id. at 2-3, 5.

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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move in the same channels of trade and are available to the same classes of customers
for such goods—here, consumers who buy babies’ diapers. See In re Viterra Inc., 671
F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is well established that,
absent restrictions in the application and registration, [identical] goods and services
are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of
purchasers.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); In re FabFitFun, Inc.,
No. 86847381, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 297, at *6-7.
The presumption just discussed, however, applies to goods identified in the
Applications and one of the relied-upon Registrations. Opposer has common law
rights in its marks for paper towels, but these goods are not identified in either of its
Registrations. The logic behind the presumption—that identical goods are likely to
travel through the same trade channels—still applies to common law rights acquired
through use. We find that Opposer’s paper towels and Applicant’s paper towels are
very likely to travel through at least some of the same trade channels. The third
DuPont factor, therefore, supports Opposer’s Section 2(d) claims as to both
Applications.
The fourth DuPont factor considers the conditions under which and the classes of
consumers who buy and use the goods. Because the goods are identical in part and
neither the Applications nor the relied upon Registrations contain any limitations, it
follows that these goods are consumed by at least some of the same class of
consumers. Opposer argues that the goods at issue here are impulse items that are

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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purchased without much care or planning.12 While Opposer cites to testimony in
support of this argument, there is no testimony concerning the price points or the
care exercised by consumers when purchasing these goods. We make no finding
concerning the typical level of care of consumers of “babies’ diapers” or “paper towels.”
The classes of consumers likely overlap, but these are very common consumer goods
likely purchased by almost all consumers. Some overlap in the classes of consumers,
therefore, is not likely to impact the overall likelihood of confusion. We find the fourth
DuPont factor neutral.
3. Remaining DuPont Factors
Opposer presented arguments under other DuPont factors, but we find the
evidence is insufficient to show that these factors have an impact on the likelihood of
confusion. Opposer, for example, argues that its marks are famous and conceptually
strong, but the evidence fails to show the level of consumer awareness necessary to
find a mark famous. We find Opposer’s marks suggestive of good or quality products,
due to the well-established meaning of the word “fine.” As Opposer correctly notes,
its marks were registered on the Principal Register without a showing of acquired
distinctiveness, which means we must presume its marks are inherently distinctive.13
As to market strength, Opposer submitted evidence that it promotes its goods
through social media and other channels.14 Opposer has sold goods under its marks
12 11 TTABVUE 28-29.
13 11 TTABVUE 29.
14 8 TTABVUE. This submission includes screenshots from Opposer’s websites and social
media. There is no direct evidence of consumer recognition of Opposer’s marks in this
evidence. It shows that Opposer offers a wide range of consumer products, but does not show

Opposition Nos. 91288958 and 91290934
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in the United States since 2020.15 This evidence was not rebutted, but it does not
provide context for Opposer’s sales and promotion of its goods. These are common
consumer goods, and we find that Opposer’s evidence shows some degree of market
recognition, but falls short of showing fame or even a high degree of consumer
recognition. We find DuPont factors five and six, which deal with the strength of
Opposer’s marks, are neutral.
As to the remaining DuPont factors, Opposer submitted no evidence, only attorney
argument. Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (attorney
argument is not evidence). For example, the lack of actual confusion evidence does
not show that confusion is unlikely, and we lack sufficient evidence of the
marketplace to determine whether the lack of actual confusion means that confusion
is not likely. We have given consideration to every DuPont factor addressed in
Opposer’s Trial Brief, but we find that only factors one, two, and three are probative
given the record before us.16 We treat all other factors as neutral.
sales volume or any recognition within the trade or from the public. It is not possible to
determine from this evidence whether many consumers in the United States are familiar
with Opposer’s marks.
There are also questions about whether this evidence is probative of market strength in the
United States. Opposer is located outside the United States and sells its goods both within
the United States and outside the United States. Some of the evidence Opposer submitted
involves sales and promotion outside the United States and, therefore, has no direct probative
value concerning the market strength of Opposer’s marks in the United States. See, e.g., id.
at 27-34 (blog post by a consumer in Pakistan reviewing Opposer’s diapers); 178-80
(Instagram pages with non-English text). The sales figures Opposer provided are not limited
to the United States. 10 TTABVUE 3 (referring to sales “in various countries”).
15 10 TTABVUE 3-4.
16 Under the tenth DuPont factor, Opposer argues that the parties’ prior market interface,
specifically a prior distribution relationship, “provides decisive evidence of Applicant’s
knowledge of Opposer’s rights and bad faith.” 11 TTABVUE 32. As a prior distributor of
Opposer’s goods, Applicant was familiar with Opposer’s marks. 8 TTABVUE 198-206. There

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4. Conclusion – Weighing the Factors
The marks are similar and the goods are identical in part. The first two DuPont
factors weigh heavily in this proceeding and both point toward a likelihood of
confusion. The trade channels overlap and the goods are sold to the same classes of
consumers. The remaining DuPont factors are neutral. Accordingly, confusion is
likely.
Decision: The opposition is sustained as to all classes in both Applications on the
ground of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
is, however, no evidence that consumers were aware of this relationship, when or how the
relationship ended, or what Applicant’s intentions were when it began using the applied-for
marks. Opposer submitted no testimony or other evidence from Applicant to support its bad
faith arguments. We find the record before us is insufficient to make a finding as to
Applicant’s intentions or the likely impact of those intentions on the likelihood of confusion.
We treat the tenth DuPont factor as neutral.