Eco Lips, Inc.

This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: April 7, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Eco Lips, Inc.
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Serial No. 98801492
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Vernon P. Squires and Tanner J. Krob, of Bradley & Riley PC, for Eco Lips, Inc.
Sarah Frizalone, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 112,
Matthew Cuccias, Managing Attorney.
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Before Lykos, Thurmon and O’Connor, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Thurmon, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Eco Lips, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark SPREAD THE GOOD, in standard characters, for “Non-medicated body care
products, namely, soaps, shampoos, hair conditioners, body lotions, body balms, and
body scrubs,” in International Class 3.1 The Trademark Examining Attorney issued
a final refusal of registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
1 Application Serial No. 98801492 was filed on October 15, 2024, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging a first use of the mark in commerce on October
5, 2020.
Citations to the prosecution file are to entries in the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system.

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§ 1052(d), finding a likelihood of confusion, based on a Registration of the mark
SPREAD GOODNESS, in standard characters, for “Deodorant for personal use;
Personal deodorants; Antiperspirants and deodorants for personal use,” in
International Class 3.2
The appeal is briefed and ready for final decision. We affirm the refusal to register.
Section 2(d) – Applicable Law
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138 (2015); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We must consider each DuPont
factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912
F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Whether a likelihood of confusion exists between
an applicant’s mark and a previously registered mark is determined on a case-by-case
basis, aided by application of the thirteen DuPont factors.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc.
v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When analyzing
these factors, the overriding concerns are not only to prevent buyer confusion as to
the source of the goods or services, but also to protect the registrant from adverse
commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil
Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
2 Registration No. 6796885, issued July 19, 2022 on the Principal Register.

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“Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle
ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973). Varying
weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented.
See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1206 (“the various evidentiary factors may play more or less
weighty roles in any particular determination”). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d
1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d
1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”).
Likelihood of Confusion – Analysis
The Applicant and the Trademark Examining Attorney focused on the first two
DuPont factors, with some additional argument submitted under factors three and
four. Applicant presented brief arguments, with no supporting evidence, under all
other DuPont factors. We find there is insufficient evidence upon which to base a
finding under DuPont factors five through thirteen, and for that reason, we treat
these factors as neutral in our analysis.

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A. Similarity of the Marks
To evaluate the similarity of the marks under the first DuPont factor, we consider
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
170, *13 (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4), aff’d
mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form,
spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally “retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.” In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *11.
The applied-for mark SPREAD THE GOOD and the cited mark SPREAD
GOODNESS are similar in appearance. The first term in both marks is “SPREAD.”
See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the
identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers

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typically notice those words first”); Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1372-73; Presto
Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *8 (“it is
often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a
purchaser and remembered”). The last words in the marks are GOOD and
GOODNESS, which also look similar. The marks, considered in their entireties, look
similar.
The marks also sound similar. While the two marks have distinct
pronunciations—that is, “spread the good” and “spread goodness” do not sound
identical—they share so many elements that the marks sound similar. Indeed,
consumers familiar with the cited SPREAD GOODNESS mark may hear the
SPREAD THE GOOD mark and believe it is the same mark or simply a small
variation of the SPREAD GOODNESS mark. The similar sound of the marks
increases the likelihood of confusion.
Considered in their entireties, the marks have effectively identical meanings and
similar commercial impressions. Whether the mark connotes spreading the good or
spreading goodness, it is difficult to find any difference in the meaning of these two
marks. Both convey nearly identical uplifting messages, which likely connote to
consumers that the products sold under these marks are good or that the businesses
selling these goods promote good outcomes. The marks have similar meanings and
are likely to create similar commercial impressions.
The marks are similar. The first DuPont factor supports the refusal.

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B. Similarity or Relatedness of the Goods
We evaluate the second DuPont factor based on the goods identified in the
Application and the Cited Registration. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap.
LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs.
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of
confusion as to a class of goods in the Application if relatedness is established between
any of the goods identified in that class and those identified in the Cited Registration.
Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981); see
also Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 347, at
*18; In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178, at *9 n.5. In addition,
the goods need only be sufficiently related that a relevant consumer would be likely
to assume, upon encountering goods marketed under the marks at issue, that the
goods originate from, are sponsored or authorized by, or are otherwise connected to
the same source. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., Nos. 91158891 and
91158941, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 50, at *25-26.
The Cited Registration identifies “Deodorant for personal use; Personal
deodorants; Antiperspirants and deodorants for personal use,” in International Class
3. The Application identifies “Non-medicated body care products, namely, soaps,
shampoos, hair conditioners, body lotions, body balms, and body scrubs,” in
International Class 3. The identified goods are distinct. There is no obvious overlap
in the goods.
But that does not end the analysis, because we are interested in whether there is
some connection between the goods that would increase the likelihood of confusion.

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In particular, we look for evidence showing that these two groups of products, though
not identical, are often sold under a single trademark. The more often consumers see
other trademarks used with both types of goods, the more consumers will become
conditioned to expect to find such goods sold under a single mark. That is the key
inquiry under DuPont factor two in this appeal.
The Trademark Examining Attorney submitted internet evidence showing that
third parties sell both types of goods under a single mark. For example, there is
evidence that Native sells both deodorant, body wash and shampoo under its NATIVE
mark.3 The mark METHOD is used on body wash, deodorant, lotion and shampoo.4
The SUAVE mark is used on deodorant, body wash, shampoo and conditioner.5 The
OLD SPICE mark is used on deodorant, shampoo and body wash.6 The DOVE mark
is used on deodorant, shampoo, conditioner and bar soap.7 Similar evidence was
presented showing that the mark DRUNKEN ELEPHANT is also used on deodorant
and shampoo.8
The Trademark Examining Attorney also submitted evidence of use-based third-
party registrations that identify both deodorant (as identified in the Cited
Registration) and shampoo, conditioner or body wash (as identified in the appealed
3 Office Action dated March 24, 2025, at 34-35 (deodorant), 41-42 (body wash), 47-48
(shampoo).
4 Id. at 64-67.
5 Id. at 68-91.
6 Final Office Action dated June 10, 2025, at 39-52.
7 Id. at 54-83.
8 Id. at 112-13, 130-31.

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Application).9 This is further evidence that third parties sell both types of goods under
a single mark and shows that consumers are likely to be familiar with this practice.
See In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., No. 603019, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 11, at *9 n.6, aff’d
per curiam, 864 F.2d 149 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The evidence shows that the goods are
related. The second DuPont factor also supports the refusal.
C. Trade Channels and Customer Care – The Third and Fourth
DuPont Factors
The third DuPont factor asks whether the established, likely to continue trade
channels overlap or are similar. This consideration is important because when goods
travel through the same trade channels, consumers will see the goods together in
those channels, thus increasing consumers’ exposure to the marks in proximity to one
another and the chance that they will be confused. The fourth DuPont factor considers
the likely care exercised by relevant consumers. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361
(considering “[t]he conditions under which … sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs.
careful, sophisticated purchasing”).
Because there are no limitations or restrictions as to trade channels or classes of
purchasers in the respective identifications of goods, we must presume that
Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods would be marketed in all normal trade channels
for such goods and to all normal classes of purchasers of such goods. See Packard
Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (language in
the identifications controls, regardless of any actual marketplace evidence of “the
9 Id. at 9-38. Fifteen registrations were submitted, but two were for the same mark.

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particular channels of trade, or the class of purchasers to which sales of the goods or
services are directed”). The Trademark Examining Attorney submitted evidence
showing that the normal trade channels for deodorants and other personal care
products like shampoo, conditioner, and body wash are pharmacy, grocery and big-
box online or brick and mortar stores as well as the websites of manufacturers such
as Native, Method and Suave. For example, there is evidence that Target, CVS and
Wegmans sell all of these types of goods on their websites under the personal care
category.10 We find the third DuPont factor supports the refusal because the trade
channels overlap.
Applicant argues that the consumers of these goods “are likely to be more
discerning that the standard consumer purchasing conventional consumer goods
….”11 No evidence was submitted in support of this argument and we do not find it
persuasive. See, e.g., Sock It To Me, Inc. v. Fan, No. 91230554, 2020 TTAB LEXIS
201, at *24-25 (where there are no limitations in the identification, goods encompass
“all goods of the type identified, without limitation as to their nature or price”)
(citation omitted). From the evidence of record, it appears that deodorants, shampoos
and body washes are “conventional consumer goods,” purchased at some point by
almost every consumer. Applicant’s counsel argues that its personal care goods are
different and more expensive, but we have no evidence in the record concerning the
specific nature or cost of Applicant’s goods. We find the fourth DuPont factor neutral.
10 Id. at 145-53. We also note that Applicant presented no arguments concerning the trade
channels through which these goods move.
11 4 TTABVUE 13.

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D. Other Considerations
As we noted above, Applicant presented arguments under all the other DuPont
factors. There is no evidence supporting any of those arguments and we find the other
factors are all neutral.
Applicant also argues that the owner of the cited Registration once owned a
registration that identified deodorants, but that this registration was abandoned.12
We consider this argument under the thirteenth DuPont factor, but see no relevance
to the argument. Indeed, if anything, it shows that the owner of the cited mark at one
time sold both deodorants and shampoos, conditioners and other personal care goods,
all under its SPREAD GOODNESS mark. This is consistent with the third-party
evidence showing that this practice is common.
E. Conclusion: Weighing the Factors
We have reviewed and evaluated all the evidence of record and all the arguments
presented. Only the first three DuPont factors are probative in this appeal, and all
three support the Section 2(d) refusal. The marks are similar and the goods are
related. The trade channels overlap. The record supports the refusal. Confusion is
likely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is affirmed.
12 Id. at 14.