AWGI, LLC v. Équipement Max-Atlas International Inc.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: April 7, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
AWGI, LLC
v.
Équipement Max-Atlas International Inc.
_____
Opposition No. 91291227
_____
Mark F. Warzecha of Widerman Malek P.L., for AWGI, LLC.
N. Alexander Nolte and Jeffrey Rollings of Nolte Lackenbach Siegel,
for Équipement Max-Atlas International Inc.
_____
Before Goodman, Elgin and Bradley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bradley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Équipement Max-Atlas International Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks to register the
standard-character mark MAX-ATLAS on the Principal Register for “intermodal
chassis for the land-based transport of intermodal containers,” in International Class
12.1
1 Application Serial No. 97774811, filed January 31, 2023, claiming first use and first use in
commerce of December 31, 1999 under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
Applicant claimed priority under Trademark Act Section 44(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1026(d), based on
Canadian Application No. 2234783 filed on January 20, 2023.

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AWGI, LLC (“Opposer”) opposes registration of Applicant’s mark on the grounds
of likelihood of confusion and dilution under Sections 2(d) and 43(c) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d) and 1125(c).2 In its Notice of Opposition, Opposer alleges
ownership of the following previously-used and registered marks:
• ATLAS in standard characters for “freight forwarding services;
transportation of household goods of others” in International Class 39;3
• ATLAS in standard characters for “storage of goods of others” in
International Class 39;4 and
• ATLAS LOGISTICS in standard characters (with “LOGISTICS”
disclaimed) which includes the following services:
o “Business management consultancy in the field of transport and
delivery; providing electronic tracking of freight information to
others for business administration purposes; providing tracking
services and information concerning tracking of assets in transit,
namely, vehicles, trailers, drivers, cargo and delivery containers for
business inventory purposes; transportation logistics services,
namely, arranging the transportation of goods for others” in
International Class 35; and
o “Distribution services, namely, delivery of restaurant equipment,
namely, tables, chairs, booths and shelving; distribution services,
namely, delivery of healthcare facility furniture and equipment,
namely, hospital beds, overhead tables, lockers, office furniture and
shelving; distribution services, namely, delivery of fine arts;
transport of general commodities and special products by truck
and/or motor van, train, air and ocean; transportation and storage
2 1 TTABVUE.
Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case docket refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding TTABVUE
corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the
page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear.
3 Registration No. 3718117, registered on the Principal Register on December 1, 2009, and
renewed.
4 Registration No. 4229378, registered on the Principal Register on October 23, 2012, and
renewed.

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of goods; warehousing information; warehousing services” in
International Class 39.5
Applicant denied the salient allegations of Opposer’s Notice of Opposition in its
Answer.6
Only Opposer filed a brief.7 Applicant did not file a brief, take testimony, or
introduce any other evidence during its testimony period, but it is not required to do
so. See Yazhong Investing Ltd. v. Multi-Media Tech. Ventures, Ltd., No. 92056548,
2018 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *12 n.13 (TTAB 2018) (“Because Respondent, as defendant
herein, is under no obligation to submit evidence or a brief, we do not construe
Respondent’s failure to do so as a concession of the case.”); see also Trademark Rule
2.128(a)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.128(a)(1).
We dismiss the Opposition on both grounds as explained below.
I. Trial Record and Evidentiary Issues
The record consists of the pleadings, and, by operation of Trademark Rule
2.122(b), the file of Applicant’s involved application. Opposer also introduced the
evidence summarized below.
5 Registration No. 4737616, registered on the Principal Register on May 19, 2015, and
renewed. The registration also includes services in International Classes 37 and 40.
6 4 TTABVUE. Applicant asserted six affirmative defenses (id. at 4-5), but as noted above did
not file a brief or otherwise pursue these defenses at trial, and thus they are deemed impliedly
waived or forfeited. See In re Google Techs. Holdings, LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862-63 (Fed. Cir.
2020); Peterson v. Awshucks SC, LLC, No. 92066957, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 520, at *2 n.3 (TTAB
2020) (affirmative defenses waived where “[r]espondent did not present any evidence or
argument with respect to these asserted defenses at trial”).
7 Opposer’s Brief, 12 TTABVUE.

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A. Opposer’s Evidence
Opposer submitted the following evidence during its trial period:
1. Opposer’s Notice of Reliance on Trademark Registration(s) under 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.122(d)(2) (7 TTABVUE);
2. Testimony Declaration of Lauren Piekos, Vice President of Business
Development at Atlas Van Lines, Inc., an affiliate corporation of Opposer
(“Piekos Decl.”), with Exhibits A-K (8 TTABVUE (public); 10 TTABVUE
(confidential Exhibits B, F, G, J, and K));8 and
3. Testimony Declaration of Phillip Wahl, President and Chief Operating
Officer at Atlas Logistics Inc., an affiliate corporation of Opposer (“Wahl
Decl.”) with Exhibits A-R (11 TTABVUE (public); 9 TTABVUE (confidential
Exhibits G, K, and L)).
B. Evidentiary Issues
Opposer’s evidentiary submissions present several issues. First, as indicated,
Opposer pleaded ownership of three registrations but at trial seeks to rely on twenty-
three registrations. None of the twenty-three trademark registrations Opposer filed
with its Notice of Reliance “to show its ownership of rights in the marks identified in
each of the registrations” are properly of record.9 Opposer states that its submission
is pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(2), but fails to follow this rule.10 Specifically,
8 Opposer designated portions its evidence in the record as confidential under the Board’s
Standard Protective Order and filed the unredacted versions under seal. Except as otherwise
indicated, all TTABVUE citations in this opinion are to the redacted publicly accessible
versions of materials. We have discussed all evidence designated as confidential in general
terms in this opinion.
9 7 TTABVUE. Opposer’s submission also includes foreign trademark registrations from
China and Mexico (id. at 5) which are not “evidence of use or ownership of the mark in [the
United States].” Societe Anonyme Marne et Champagne v. Myers, 250 F.2d 374, 377 (CCPA
1957).
10 The Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) printouts Opposer attached to
its Notice of Opposition from the USPTO’s electronic database also are not properly of record
because Opposer did not expand all the categories of information listed in the record. 1

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Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(2) requires that a party wishing to make its own federal
registrations of record must file either:
• a copy of the registration prepared and issued by the Office showing both
the current status of and current title (i.e., owner) to the
registration; or
• a current printout or copy of information from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) TSDR electronic database showing the
current status and title (i.e., owner) of the registration.
See TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP)
§ 704.03(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Opposer submitted only plain copies11 of its twenty-three registrations with the
Notice of Reliance which is not sufficient to make them of record. See Sterling
Jewelers Inc. v. Romance & Co., No. 91207312, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 103, at *7 (TTAB
TTABVUE 10-18. In particular, the “mark information” and “current owner(s) information”
categories are not visible.
11 7 TTABVUE 8-60. Opposer states in the Notice of Reliance that it attached “current status
and title copies of the foregoing printouts of the registration records from the USPTO’s
electronic database.” Id. at 6. However, these plain copies do not constitute printouts from
the Office’s electronic databases (e.g., TSDR) under the Trademark Rule nor are these status
and title copies prepared by the Office. As contemplated by Trademark Rule 2.122(d):
[R]egistration copies ‘prepared and issued by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office showing both the current status of
and current title to the registration,’ . . . are printed copies of the
registration on which the [USPTO] has entered the information
it has in its records, at the time it prepares and issues the status
and title copies, about the current status and title of the
registration. That information includes information about the
renewal, cancellation, publication under Trademark Act § 12(c),
15 U.S.C. § 1062(c); affidavits or declarations under Trademark
Act § 8, Trademark Act § 15, and Trademark Act § 71, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1058, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 and 15 U.S.C. § 1141; and recorded
documents transferring title.
TBMP § 704.03(b)(1)(A).

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2014) (“The Board has routinely held that the submission of a photocopy of a . . .
registration, by itself, is insufficient for purposes of establishing a party’s current
ownership, or the current status, of the registration, and therefore does not suffice to
make the registration of record.”); Life Zone Inc. v. Middleman Grp., Inc., No.
91160999, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 37, at *9 (TTAB 2008) (not considering “plain copies of
[opposer’s] registrations [filed] under its notice of reliance . . . [i]nasmuch as the
submitted documents are not copies ‘prepared and issued by the [USPTO] showing
both the current status of and current title to the registration’”).12 Additionally, for
all but three of the twenty-three registrations, Opposer did not plead ownership of
the registrations in the Notice of Opposition or seek to amend its pleading to add
these registrations so it may not rely upon them as a basis for its claims. See Harry
Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., No. 91153147, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 284, at
*9 n.14 (TTAB 2014) (“opposers may not rely upon these unpleaded registrations as
bases for their § 2(d) claims”); see also Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Franklin Inv.
Corp., No. 92066927, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 290, at *14 (TTAB 2024) (“giv[ing] no further
consideration to the six unpleaded registrations” submitted under a notice of reliance
12 For almost all of the registrations, the plain copies are also not competent evidence because
they did not “issue[] ‘substantially’ or ‘reasonably’ contemporaneous with the filing of the
notice of opposition.” Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, No. 91263919,
2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *15 (TTAB 2022) (accepting plain copy of registration issued a
month and a half before the filing of the opposition). Here, the issue dates for most of
registrations range from 1990 to 2023, which is well before the May 1, 2024 filing of Opposer’s
Notice of Opposition. 7 TTABVUE 8-38, 47-54, 59; 1 TTABVUE. See United Global Media
Group, Inc. v. Tseng, No. 91200786, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 348, at *13 (TTAB 2014) (to be
“substantially contemporaneous with the filing of the notice of opposition” the issue date for
the registration must be “very near the date the opposition was filed”). And the two
registrations that have an issue date of January 23, 2024 (7 TTABVUE 55-58) were not
pleaded in the Notice of Opposition, so as discussed above, Opposer may not rely on them.

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at trial). As such, we do not consider any of the plain copy registrations attached to
Opposer’s Notice of Reliance. Nonetheless, the three pleaded registrations
(Registration Nos. 3718117, 4229378, and 4737616) were properly made of record
under Trademark Rule 2.122(d) through the Wahl Declaration and accompanying
exhibits and we consider them.13 In sum, the twenty unpleaded registrations have
not been considered.
Second, Opposer attached to its trial brief a Declaration of Opposer’s counsel of
record, Mark F. Warzecha (“Warzecha Decl.”), that was not previously filed during
its trial period.14 “[A] party may introduce testimony and evidence only during its
assigned testimony period.” Hole in 1 Drinks, Inc. v. Lajtay, No. 92065860, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 9, at *4 (TTAB 2020); see also Trademark Rule 2.121(a) (“No testimony
shall be taken or evidence presented except during the times assigned . . .”).
Accordingly, we will not consider this untimely declaration or the exhibit attached
thereto.
Third, Opposer also appears to have attached to its trial brief all of the evidence
it previously submitted during its trial period15 and then only cites in the brief to
these exhibits to its trial brief. “[E]vidence which was timely filed during the parties’
trial periods need not and should not be resubmitted.” Life Zone, 2008 TTAB LEXIS
13 As discussed herein, Opposer separately filed, as exhibits to the Wahl Decl., full TSDR
printouts showing current status and title for pleaded Registration Nos. 3718117, 4229378,
and 4737616. 11 TTABVUE 10, 100-112 (Exhibits O-Q). We consider only these exhibits to
the Wahl Decl. as they comply with Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(2), providing both current
status and title information.
14 12 TTABVUE 325-347.
15 Id. at 23-324.

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37, at *3 and n.4 (“attaching previously-filed evidence to a brief (and citing to the
attachments, rather than to the original testimony or notices of reliance) is [neither]
a courtesy or a convenience to the Board”). Additionally, when citing to the
evidentiary record, parties should use the following format:
For each significant fact recited, the recitation of facts
should include a citation to the portion of the evidentiary
record where supporting evidence may be found. When
referring to the record in an inter partes proceeding before
the Board, parties should include a citation to the
TTABVUE entry and page number (e.g., 1 TTABVUE 2) to
allow the reader to easily locate the cited materials.
TBMP § 801.03; see also NT-MDT LLC v. Kozodaeva, No. 92071349, 2021 TTAB
LEXIS 112, at *2 n.2 (TTAB 2021) (“Citations in [Board] opinion[s] are to the
TTABVUE docket entry number and the electronic page number where the document
or testimony appears.”). We will only rely upon and cite to the evidence Opposer
properly submitted during its trial period.16
Third, Opposer duplicated testimony and exhibits in the Wahl and Piekos
declarations. Specifically, nine of the eleven exhibits to the Piekos declaration are
identical to exhibits to the Wahl declaration,17 and twenty-one of the thirty-one
paragraphs in the Piekos declaration are identical or nearly identical to testimony in
the Wahl declaration including testimony about the duplicated exhibits.18 “The Board
views the practice of introducing cumulative evidence at trial with disfavor.” Made in
16 8-11 TTABVUE.
17 Compare Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 40-99 (Exhibits F-N) with Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE
11-70 (Exhibits A-I).
18 Compare Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 5-10, 12 ¶¶ 11-13, 18, 14-17, 21-24, 26-31, 41-43 with
Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 3-9 ¶¶ 6-15, 17-18, 20-22, 24-26, 29-31.

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Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *13 (TTAB
2022) (noting that parties “elected to file duplicative evidence by different methods of
introduction; for example, once by Notice of Reliance and again by way of an exhibit
to a testimony declaration or testimony deposition”). There is no need for a party to
resubmit the same exhibit multiple times with different declarations, especially when
the declarants provide identical testimony about the documents. Cf. Flame & Wax,
Inc. v. Laguna Candles, LLC, No. 92072343, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 272, at *7 n.14 (TTAB
2022) (no need for party to resubmit evidence attached to a declaration with a notice
of reliance). Opposer should endeavor to streamline future filings to avoid such
cumulative material.
C. Family of Marks
Opposer attempts to rely on a family of trademarks in its trial brief which it
defines by referring to the trademark registrations it submitted with its Notice of
Reliance.19 “A family of marks is a group of marks having a recognizable common
characteristic, wherein the marks are composed and used in such a way that the
public associates not only the individual marks, but the common characteristic of the
family, with the trademark owner.” J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp.,
932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “A plaintiff must plead ownership of a family of
marks in its complaint in order to rely on the marks as a family as a basis for
sustaining the opposition at trial.” Wise F&I, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 91226028,
19 12 TTABVUE 7 (“The ATLAS trademark is used in a family of trademarks owned by
Opposer.” (citing Exhibit C, Notice of Reliance).); see also 12 TTABVUE 9, 11-12, 15, 20.

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2016 TTAB LEXIS 473, at *12 (TTAB 2016). Specifically, Opposer must allege and
ultimately prove at trial:
(1) prior use of marks sharing a recognizable common
characteristic; (2) that the common characteristic is
distinctive (i.e., not descriptive or highly suggestive or so
commonly used in the trade that it cannot function as the
distinguishing feature of any party’s mark); and (3) that
prior to [Applicant’s] first use (or constructive first use) of
its involved mark, [Opposer’s] marks have been used and
advertised in promotional material or in everyday sales
activities in such a manner as to create common exposure
and thereafter recognition among the purchasing public
such that the common characteristic is itself indicative of a
common origin of the goods or services.
Id., at *19-20.
Opposer’s Notice of Opposition contains only two passing references to a family of
trademarks:
• Opposer has expended substantial time, money, and resources marketing,
advertising, and promoting their services, sold under the “ATLAS” family
of trademarks, including through its marketing efforts, its extensive
website, and its over 70 years of experience in its respective industry;20 and
• Sales of Opposer’s services under the ATLAS family of Trademarks have
continuously increased since its launch in 1949. ATLAS-branded websites
owned and operated by the Plaintiffs have had more than 9 million
(9,000,000) sessions opened by internet users between 2013 and 2023.
Meanwhile, online advertising by Plaintiffs on Google, Microsoft Bing,
Reddit, Instagram, and Facebook resulted in over 26.6 million (26,600,000)
commercial impressions between April 1, 2021 and March 31, 2023.21
These cursory references do not adequately plead the elements required to allege
a family of trademarks. At trial, Opposer clarified that its family of trademarks
20 1 TTABVUE 6 ¶ 10.
21 Id. at 7 ¶ 11.

Opposition No. 91291227
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included “variations of the ATLAS mark which includes other words before or after
the ATLAS term.”22 However, Opposer does not address or submit evidence
establishing the required elements of a family of trademarks. As the Federal Circuit
has explained, “[s]imply using a series of similar marks does not of itself establish
the existence of a family.” J & J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d at 1462. Additionally, mere
“ownership of multiple registrations containing the family term, is [in]sufficient in
and of itself to establish that a party owns a family of marks.” New Era Cap Co. v.
Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at 20-21 (TTAB 2020); Shenzhen
IVPS Tech., 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *22 (an opposer’s ownership of a registration
“does not constitute evidence that the public recognizes SMOK as a family feature”).
As discussed supra in Section I.B, almost all of the trademark registrations that
Opposer asserts in its trial brief form its “family” were neither pleaded in its Notice
of Opposition23 nor properly made of record at trial, and therefore cannot be
considered. Moreover, Opposer has not made of record any evidence of the use of these
alleged trademarks sufficient to establish a family of marks.
Given that Opposer insufficiently plead family of marks, has not properly made of
record evidence of the alleged family, and has not addressed the requirements for a
family of marks in its trial brief, we do not consider Opposer’s alleged family of
trademarks in the analysis of likelihood of confusion. See Keystone Consol., 2024
TTAB LEXIS 290, at *26 n.36 (“a family of marks is unpleaded in the petition to
22 12 TTABVUE 11.
23 Opposer’s Notice of Reliance that it used to submit its trademark registrations also makes
no reference to the family of marks doctrine. See 7 TTABVUE.

Opposition No. 91291227
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cancel [and] [t]herefore, we need not consider the family of marks issue”); Std.
Knitting, Ltd. v. Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha, No. 91116242, 2006 TTAB LEXIS
9, at *41 n.17 (TTAB 2006) (“Opposer’s reference to a family of marks in its brief, will
not be considered as this claim was neither pleaded nor tried by the parties.”).
II. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action is an element of the plaintiff’s case in
every inter partes proceeding. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298,
1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM,
LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014)). Opposer, as the plaintiff in the
action, must establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action by demonstrating
(i) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by the statute, and (ii) a
reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the registration of the mark.
Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1305-06.
Here, Opposer established its entitlement to oppose Applicant’s marks by
attaching TSDR printouts of its pleaded registrations to the Wahl Declaration which
form the basis for a plausible Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion claim.24 See Conopco,
Inc. v. Transom Symphony OpCo, LLC, No. 91256368, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 194, at *10
(TTAB 2022); Made in Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *19 (opposer’s pleaded
registrations established its “interest in marks similar to the mark sought for
24 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 10, 100-112 (Exhibits O-Q).

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registration by [a]pplicant, and thus [o]pposer’s entitlement to bring a colorable claim
under Trademark Act Section 2(d)”).
III. Priority
Opposer’s pleaded registrations for the two ATLAS marks and the ATLAS
LOGISTICS mark are of record showing active status and Opposer’s ownership
thereof,25 and Applicant has not filed any counterclaims to cancel the registrations.
Accordingly, priority is not at issue with respect to the marks and services covered by
the pleaded registrations. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d
1400, 1402 (CCPA 1974); Nkanginieme v. Appleton, No. 91256464, 2023 TTAB LEXIS
64, at *11-12 (TTAB 2023) (“unless there is a counterclaim against the opposer’s
pleaded and proven registration[s], priority is not at issue in a likelihood of confusion
dispute”).
Opposer also attempts to rely on common law use of the mark ATLAS in
connection with other services beyond those listed in its pleaded registrations, as well
as goods.26 However, the supporting testimony from Mr. Wahl only provides a date in
connection with the registered services, and then states that Opposer “has expanded
its use of the [ATLAS] mark to include” a variety of other services and goods.27
Opposer provides no date or time period for when it “expanded” its use. We find Mr.
Wahl’s testimony does not support a claim of priority based on common law use
inasmuch as it is too vague and nonspecific to associate expanded use of any ATLAS
25 Id.
26 12 TTABVUE 12.
27 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 4 ¶ 7.

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marks with any particular goods or services or any particular date. B.R. Baker Co. v.
Lebow Bros., 150 F.2d 580, 583 (CCPA 1945) (testimony to establish prior use of a
mark “should not be characterized by contradictions, inconsistencies, and
indefiniteness but should carry with it conviction of its accuracy and applicability”).
Accordingly, Opposer has not established priority for its alleged common law use of
the mark ATLAS in connection with these other services and goods.
Opposer’s attempts to rely on common law use of the marks ATLAS and ATLAS
LOGISTICS by its affiliate, Atlas Terminal Company, has similar deficiencies.28
Opposer makes no effort to identify the specific nature of its relationship with Atlas
Terminal Company beyond identifying it as an “affiliate,”29 (e.g., subsidiary, sister
company, etc.), and as such we are unable to determine if Opposer may rely on Atlas
Terminal Company’s use. See, e.g., In re Pharmacia, Inc., No. 73523579, 1987 TTAB
LEXIS 93, at *6 (TTAB 1987) (“mere fact that two sister companies are both
controlled by a third company [does not] mean[] that use by one of the sister
companies automatically inures to the benefit of the other sister”). And while
Opposer’s witnesses testified regarding the services Atlas Terminal Company
offers,30 they provide no testimony on when Atlas Terminal Company began offering
such services in connection with the marks ATLAS or ATLAS LOGISTICS.31 The only
28 12 TTABVUE 8, 12-14.
29 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 7, 12 ¶¶ 18, 41, 43.
30 Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 4, 8-9 ¶¶ 9, 28-29, 31; Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 7, 12 ¶¶ 18-20,
41, 43.
31 For example, Mr. Wahl only provides testimony regarding the year in which Atlas Terminal
Company was founded. 11 TTABVUE 7 ¶ 19.

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documentary evidence regarding Atlas Terminal Company’s use of the mark ATLAS
is dated March 26, 202532 which is after Applicant’s January 20, 2023 constructive
use date based on its Canadian application. See Kemi Organics, LLC v. Gupta, No.
92065613, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 149, at *10-11 (TTAB 2018) (“For priority purposes, . . .
a [party] may assert and rely upon an earlier priority filing date based on a foreign
application under Section 44(d).”). We find Opposer has not established common law
priority of the marks ATLAS and ATLAS LOGISTICS through their affiliate’s use.
Accordingly, Opposer has established priority only with respect to the marks and
services reflected in its three pleaded registrations. As such, we consider only these
registered marks and services in our analysis of likelihood of confusion.
IV. Likelihood of Confusion
To prevail on its Section 2(d) claim, Opposer must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that “use of Applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deception as to the source or sponsorship of Opposer’s [services].” DC Comics v.
Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 453, at *23-24 (TTAB 2022)
(citing Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Our
determination under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act involves an analysis of all of
the probative evidence of record that is relevant to the factors bearing on a likelihood
of confusion. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA
32 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 7 ¶ 18, 84-85 (Exhibit J); Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 5 ¶ 13, 55-
56 (Exhibit E).

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1973) (“DuPont”); see also Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
We must consider “each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument.”
Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). “Not all of the DuPont factors are
necessarily relevant or of equal weight in a given case, and any one of the factors may
control a particular case.” Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th
1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In any likelihood of
confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks
and the similarities between the goods.” Keystone Consol., 2024 TTAB LEXIS 290, at
*32 (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976)) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”). These factors, and the other DuPont factors argued by Opposer, are
discussed below.
We focus our likelihood of confusion analysis on the standard-character mark
ATLAS in Opposer’s pleaded Registration No. 3718117 for “freight forwarding
services; transportation of household goods of others.” This registration is the closest
of Opposer’s pleaded registrations to Applicant’s MAX-ATLAS mark. Monster Energy
Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *16-17 (TTAB 2023) (focusing
analysis on “the pleaded registration[] that has the most points in common with
[a]pplicant’s mark”). “If we do not find a likelihood of confusion with respect to th[is]

Opposition No. 91291227
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mark[] and [its services], then there would be no likelihood of confusion with the
marks and goods [and services] in [Opposer’s] other registrations.” Look Cycle Int’l v.
Kunshan Qiyue Outdoor Sports Goods Co., No. 92079409, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 289, at
*10-11 (TTAB 2024).
A. Strength and Fame of Opposer’s ATLAS Mark
Before we compare the parties’ marks, we consider the strength, including any
fame, of Opposer’s mark ATLAS, as that may affect its scope of protection. Analysis
of the fifth and sixth DuPont factors determines the strength of a mark. Spireon, 71
F.4th at 1362 (“Two of the DuPont factors (the fifth and sixth) consider strength.”).
Under the fifth DuPont factor the Opposer may expand the scope of protection for its
marks by providing evidence of the “fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length
of use),” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. And under the sixth DuPont factor Applicant may
narrow the scope of protection for Opposer’s marks by submitting evidence of the
“number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” Id. See also Monster
Energy, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *26. “[T]he strength of a mark is not a binary factor”
and “varies along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.” Juice Generation, Inc.
v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
In evaluating the strength of a mark, we consider both its conceptual strength,
based on the nature of the mark itself, and if there is probative evidence in the record,
its commercial strength based on marketplace recognition of the mark. In re
Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength
is measured both by its conceptual strength … and its marketplace strength …”.);
New Era, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *28-29 (considering “inherent strength, based on

Opposition No. 91291227
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the nature of the mark itself, and, if there is evidence in the record of marketplace
recognition of the mark, its commercial strength”).
1. Conceptual Strength of Opposer’s Marks
Beginning with conceptual strength, Opposer’s mark ATLAS is inherently
distinctive, i.e., at least suggestive, “as evidenced by its registration on the Principal
Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the
Trademark Act.” New Era, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *29. See also Chippendales, 622
F.3d at 1351 (“marks that are arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive are inherently
distinctive”); 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (“registration of a mark upon the principal register
. . . shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark”). Opposer’s
sole statement that touches on conceptual strength is that “[t]he term ATLAS is also
totally arbitrary in relation to the relevant class of goods.”33 Opposer provides no
further explanation and no evidence in support of its assertion. Yet, one definition of
an atlas is a “book of maps”34 which is not arbitrary when considered in relation to
Opposer’s services which include the transportation of household goods of others. See
QuikTrip W., Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1035-36 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
33 12 TTABVUE 11. Opposer includes this statement in its discussion of the similarity of the
marks, but we consider it here because it relates to the conceptual strength of its mark.
Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1363 (conceptual strength analyzed under the sixth DuPont factor rather
than the first DuPont factor)
34 COLLINS DICTIONARY (2026) (https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/atlas)
accessed April 6, 2026; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2026)
(https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/atlas) accessed April 6, 2026, defining “atlas”
as “a bound collection of maps often including illustrations, informative tables, or textual
matter”. We take judicial notice of both definitions. See Shenzhen IVPS Tech., 2022 TTAB
LEXIS 383, at *38 n.41 (“The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions,
including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or regular fixed editions.”) (citations
omitted).

Opposition No. 91291227
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(“substantial evidence” including “dictionary entries” as to meaning of the marks
supported the Board’s factual findings). Applicant has not submitted any evidence,
so there is no evidence of record that weakens the conceptual strength of Opposer’s
mark ATLAS. Accordingly, we find that Opposer’s mark ATLAS is entitled to “the
normal scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks are entitled.” Bell’s
Brewery, Inc. v. Innovation Brewing, No. 91215896, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 452, at *20
(TTAB 2017).
2. Commercial Strength/Fame of Opposer’s ATLAS Mark
Opposer asserts that its mark ATLAS is famous.35 “Commercial strength or fame
may be measured indirectly by the volume of sales and advertising expenditures in
connection with the goods or services sold under the mark,” and may be “supported
by other indicia such as length of time of use of the mark; widespread critical
assessments; notice by independent sources of the goods or services identified by the
marks; and the general reputation of the goods or services.” New Era, 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 199, at *31 (citations omitted).
“A famous mark is one that has extensive public recognition and renown.” Coach
Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted). “While dilution fame is an either/or proposition - fame either does or does
not exist - likelihood of confusion fame ‘varies along a spectrum from very strong to
very weak.’” Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1375 (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343
35 12 TTABVUE 15.

Opposition No. 91291227
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F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).36 Given the “extreme deference that we accord a
famous mark in terms of the wide latitude of legal protection it receives, and the
dominant role fame plays in the likelihood of confusion analysis, it is the duty of the
party asserting that its mark is famous to clearly prove it.” Made in Nature, 2022
TTAB LEXIS 228, at *36 (citing Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1367). Opposer must
establish that “a significant portion of the relevant consuming public,” here
purchasers and potential purchasers of freight forwarding services and
transportation of household goods, recognize the mark ATLAS as a source indicator.
Monster Energy, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *30 (citing Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at
1375 (“proper legal standard for evaluating the fame of a mark under the fifth DuPont
factor is the class of customers and potential customers of a product or service, and
not the general public”)). We evaluate Opposer’s proffered evidence of fame under this
standard.
First, Opposer points to its ownership of incontestable trademark registrations for
the mark ATLAS.37 But, “the fact that [O]pposer’s federally-registered trademark has
achieved incontestable status means that it is conclusively considered to be valid, but
it does not dictate that the mark is ‘strong’ for purposes of determining likelihood of
confusion.” Safer, Inc. v. Oms Invs., No. 91176445, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 51, at *12-13
36 Opposer asserts that its mark ATLAS is a “famous trademark[] within the meaning of
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)”. 12 TTABVUE 16. However, the fame
standard in Section 43(c) is for dilution which is different than that applicable to likelihood
of confusion. See Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1373 (“Fame for likelihood of confusion and fame
for dilution are distinct concepts . . . .”).
37 12 TTABVUE 15.

Opposition No. 91291227
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(TTAB 2010); see also In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB
LEXIS 150, at *23 n.25 (TTAB 2016) (citation omitted) (“registrations alone are
incompetent to establish any facts with regard to . . . any reputation [the registered
marks] enjoy or what purchasers’ reactions to them may be”).
Second, Opposer states that it has used the ATLAS mark in interstate commerce
in the United States continuously since as early as 1949, in connection with freight
forwarding services and the transportation of household goods of others.38 While over
75 years of use of the mark ATLAS supports some public exposure, in the absence of
other probative evidence of fame, “[l]ong use is not sufficient by itself to prove fame
or commercial strength.” Keystone Consol., 2024 TTAB LEXIS 290, at *53-54 (“over a
hundred years of use” alone was insufficient “evidence of the extent of consumer
exposure to or recognition of the . . . [m]ark”).
Third, Opposer asserts that “[s]ales of Opposer’s services under the ATLAS family
of Trademarks have continuously increased since its launch in 1949,”39 and Mr. Wahl
testified that “[s]ince 2015, Opposer’s sales of the goods and services under the
ATLAS Marks in the United States have generated more than seven billion dollars
($7,000,000,000) in total revenue (citing a confidential Comparative Statement of
Operations from 2015 through 2024).40 However, the sales figures are aggregated for
ATLAS and ATLAS-formative marks, and includes sales from unidentified “ATLAS-
38 12 TTABVUE 15; Wahl Decl. 11 TTABVUE 3-4 ¶¶ 6-7.
39 12 TTABVUE 16.
40 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 6-7 ¶ 15; 9 TTABVUE 2-3 (Confidential Exhibit G to Wahl Decl.).

Opposition No. 91291227
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branded companies” without any explanation of their relationship to Opposer.41 None
of the sales information is specific to the mark ATLAS and the services at issue in
this opposition. See N. Face Apparel Corp. v. Sanyang Indus. Co., No. 91187593, 2015
TTAB LEXIS 328, at *21-22 (TTAB 2015) (“[sales] figures do not reflect what amount
is for goods on which the [opposer’s] mark is used without [other marks], nor do they
indicate how the sales are broken down by goods”).
Additionally, the Federal Circuit explains, “raw numbers alone in today’s world
may be misleading,” and “some context in which to place raw statistics is reasonable”
such as sales for comparable types or products or market share. Bose Corp. v. QSC
Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Opposer does not provide
such context for its sales figures. See Rocket Trademarks Pty Ltd. v. Phard S.p.A., No.
91172486, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 39, at *37-38 (TTAB 2011) (although sales figures
“appear impressive on their face, opposer has offered no context for these figures
[making] it . . . nearly impossible to gauge the level of success of goods bearing the
mark or the degree of exposure the general public has had to the mark”).
Fourth, Opposer asserts that:
• “ATLAS-branded websites owned and operated by the Opposers have had
more than 9 million (9,000,000) sessions opened by internet users between
2013 and 2023.”;42 and
• “Opposer’s extensive online advertising campaigns on Google, Microsoft
Bing, Reddit, Instagram, and Facebook have resulted in over 26.6 million
41 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 6-7 ¶ 15.
42 12 TTABVUE 15; Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 5 ¶ 14; 10 TTABVUE 4-5 (confidential Ex. F
to Piekos Decl.); Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 7-8 ¶ 21; 9 TTABVUE 4-5 (confidential Ex. K to
Wahl Decl.).

Opposition No. 91291227
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(26,600,000) commercial impressions between April 1, 2021 and March 31,
2023.”43
The problem with both statements is that Opposer has failed to provide context for
these figures, and has not even defined what it is measuring as a “session” and a
“commercial impression.” For example, Opposer does not identify in its testimony or
in the accompanying confidential exhibit what the “ATLAS-branded websites” are
that it is referencing or even how many websites are encompassed within that figure.
Nor does Opposer identify whether the “sessions” and “commercial impressions” it is
referencing represent “unique” viewers, or multiple sessions or impressions by the
same user. Cf. Christian Broad. Network, Inc. v. ABS-CBN Int’l, No. 92044366, 2007
TTAB LEXIS 72, at *21 (TTAB 2007) (crediting testimony regarding the
“approximately 1.5 million unique user sessions per month” at petitioner’s identified
website as supporting fame). Further, Opposer does not identify what type of “online
advertising” it is referencing (or provide any samples) that appeared on Google,
Microsoft Bing, Reddit, Instagram, and Facebook, or represent that the advertising
featured the mark ATLAS. See Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 TTAB
LEXIS 494, at *54-55 (TTAB 2024) (Opposer’s limited evidence of its “presence on
various social media platforms, including Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Twitter”
not probative of fame where it “did not provide any testimony regarding the number
of people that ‘follow’ [o]pposer on its social media accounts or how its number of
43 12 TTABVUE 16; Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 5 ¶ 15; 10 TTABVUE 4-5 (confidential Ex. F
to Piekos Decl.); Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 8 ¶ 22; 9 TTABVUE 4-5 (confidential Ex. K to
Wahl Decl.).

Opposition No. 91291227
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followers compare to others in its industry”) Lacking context, this evidence has less
probative value and does not move the needle in establishing commercial strength or
fame of the mark ATLAS.
Fifth, Opposer states that from 2015 through 2024 it “spent more than eleven
million dollars ($11,000,000.00) in advertising the goods and services under the
ATLAS Marks. All advertisements and promotions prominently featured the ATLAS
Marks.”44 Yet, the $11 million dollar figure for a ten-year period does not indicate any
wide level of exposure. See Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., No.
91154210, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 84, at *31 (TTAB 2010) (“With respect to the
advertising figures, they are not particularly impressive . . . [and] there is no
testimony or evidence regarding whether opposer’s advertising expenditures are
large or small vis-a-vis other comparable medical products”). Also, similar to the sales
figures, Opposer aggregates its advertising expenditures for ATLAS and ATLAS-
formative marks and does not separate out the amount spent on the mark ATLAS
alone. Context is again lacking because “there is no testimony about the frequency,
extent of distribution or reach of such advertising.” Keystone Consol., 2024 TTAB
LEXIS 290, at *49.
Finally, Opposer contends that its “goods and services have garnered substantial
unsolicited media coverage throughout the United States, including numerous films,
such as Poltergeist (MGM 1982), F/X (Orion Pictures 1986), Falling Down (Le Studio
44 12 TTABVUE 16; Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 6 ¶ 17; 10 TTABVUE 6-7 (confidential Ex. G
to Piekos Decl.); Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 8 ¶ 23; 9 TTABVUE 6-7 (confidential Ex. L to
Wahl Decl.).

Opposition No. 91291227
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Canal+ 1993), Enough (Columbia Pictures 2002), and Punch Drunk Love (Columbia
Pictures 2002).”45 While we recognize the referenced titles as nationally distributed
films, there are issues with the cited evidence that limit its probative value. Some of
the images are blurry such that the mark ATLAS is not visible.46 Alcatraz Media, Inc.
v. Chesapeake Marine Tours, Inc., No. 92050879, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 347, at *25 n.16
(TTAB 2013) (“onus is on the party making the submissions to ensure that, at a
minimum, all materials are clearly readable by the adverse party and the Board”).47
Additionally, Opposer provides no context regarding the appearance of the mark
ATLAS in the film such as how long the mark was visible on the screen, or whether
the mark ATLAS was highlighted vis-à-vis the content of the film or just a fleeting
background image.
Ultimately, Opposer’s evidence falls short of establishing that its mark ATLAS
falls on the upper end of the fame spectrum. Considering the evidence of record,
including the flaws we identified above, we find Opposer’s mark ATLAS has moderate
commercial strength.
Accordingly, the fifth and sixth DuPont factor weigh slightly in favor of likelihood
of confusion.
45 12 TTABVUE 16; Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 6 ¶ 20, 61-66 (Composite Ex. H); Wahl Decl.,
11 TTABVUE 8 ¶ 26, 90-95.
46 Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 64, 66; Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 93, 95.
47 See also Trademark Rule 2.126(a)(2) (“Exhibits pertaining to an electronic submission . . .
must be clear and legible.”).

Opposition No. 91291227
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B. Similarity of the Marks
We now turn to the analysis of “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in
their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.”
Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1371 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “The proper test
is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who
encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”
Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368 (citation omitted). Additionally, the marks “must be
considered … in light of the fallibility of memory ….” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d
747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “The focus is on the recollection of the
average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a specific impression
of trademarks.” Shenzhen IVPS Tech., 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *52 (citation
omitted).
“It is well-established that it is improper to dissect a mark, and that marks must
be viewed in their entireties.” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368; Juice Generation, 794
F.3d at 1341 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361) (“It is the mark in its ‘entiret[y]’ that
must be assessed.”). However, “[t]here is nothing improper in stating that, for
rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark,
provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
entireties.” In re Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Opposer’s mark is ATLAS, and Applicant’s mark is MAX-ATLAS. Where, as here,
“one mark incorporates the entirety of another mark, it has been found to be similar.”
Bureau Nat’l Interprofessionnel DU Cognac v. Cologne, 110 F.4th 1356, 1370 (Fed.

Opposition No. 91291227
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Cir. 2024) (citing TiVo Brands LLC v. Tivoli, LLC, No. 91221632, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
439, at *51-52 (TTAB 2018) (Applicant’s marks TIVOTAPE and TIVOBAR “are
similar to [o]pposer’s TIVO mark in appearance and pronunciation due to the shared
term ‘TIVO’ in each mark.”)).
Additionally, we find that “ATLAS” is the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark,
and is identical to Opposer’s mark ATLAS. MAX is an abbreviation for “maximum”48
and is a laudatory and descriptive term signifying something that is the greatest or
highest.49 See Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., No. 91163534, 2010 TTAB
LEXIS 322, at *37 (TTAB 2010) (“the MAX portion of Brinkmann’s mark may be
understood as an abbreviation of ‘maximum’”). As such MAX merely modifies the
dominant term ATLAS and does not distinguish the parties’ marks. See Palm Bay
Imps., 396 F.3d at 1372-73 (“largely laudatory (and hence non-source identifying)
significance of the word ROYALE” did not distinguish marks); Conopco, 2022 TTAB
LEXIS 194, at *14 (laudatory term ENHANCER was “subordinate to the term LUX
in [a]pplicant’s mark and unlikely to change the overall commercial impression of the
mark”).
48 COLLINS DICTIONARY (2026) (https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/max)
accessed April 6, 2026 defining “max” as “an abbreviation for maximum”; MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (2026) (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/max) accessed April 6,
2026, defining “max” as “maximum”. We take judicial notice of these definitions. See supra
n.34. See also In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *5-7 (TTAB
2020) (taking judicial notice of dictionary definition in analysis of similarity of the marks).
49 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2026) (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
maximum) accessed April 6, 2026, defining “maximum” as “the greatest quantity or value
attainable or attained” and “the period of highest, greatest, or utmost development”. We take
judicial notice of this definition. See supra n.34.

Opposition No. 91291227
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Given the identity between Opposer’s mark and the dominant term in Applicant’s
mark, we find the parties’ marks to be similar in appearance, sound, meaning, and
commercial impression. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746
F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming “finding that [applicant’s] ‘STONE LION
CAPITAL’ is ‘similar in sight, sound, meaning, and overall commercial impression’ to
[opposer’s] ‘LION CAPITAL’ and ‘LION’”).
C. Similarity of the Goods and Services
We next assess the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. We must base our analysis on “the applicant’s goods as set
forth in its application, and the opposer’s [services] as set forth in its registration.”
M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Under
this factor we “consider[ ] whether the consuming public may perceive the respective
goods and services of the parties as related enough to cause confusion about the
source or origin of the goods and services.” Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th
1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).
Applicant’s goods are “intermodal chassis for the land-based transport of
intermodal containers.” According to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (“FMSCA”),50 an “intermodal chassis” is “a cargo body type used for a
50 The FMCSA is part of the United States Department of Transportation and its activities
include “collect[ing] and disseminat[ing] data on motor carrier safety” and “support[ing] the
development of unified motor carrier safety requirements and procedures throughout North
America.” See https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/mission/about-us, accessed April 6, 2026. We take
judicial notice of publicly available facts on this page on FMCSA’s website and of publicly
available information about intermodal chassis on FMCSA’s website as discussed herein. See
M/S R.M. Dhariwal (HUF) 100% EOU v. Zarda King Ltd., No. 91231033, 2019 TTAB LEXIS

Opposition No. 91291227
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trailer specifically designed to have a rail or ship container mounted directly on the
chassis. . . . Intermodal containers may also be mounted on a flatbed trailer” (with
accompanying depiction below):51
See Edwards Lifesciences, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 84, at *39 (“Where, as here, applicant’s
description of goods provides basic information, and the goods are of a technical
nature, it is entirely appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the
specific meaning of the description of goods.”); In re Thor Tech, Inc., No. 78634024,
2009 TTAB LEXIS 253, at *12 (TTAB 2009) (“We properly used the dictionary
definitions (i.e., extrinsic evidence) to determine the definitions for the type of trailers
. . . listed in the description of goods.”). Opposer’s services are “freight forwarding
services; transportation of household goods of others.”
95, at *4 n.7 (TTAB 2019) (taking judicial notice of information on a federal government
website as “[t]he Board may take judicial notice of official United States government
publications”); In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, No. 85179263, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 12, at *7-8
(TTAB 2015) (taking judicial notice of “official U.S. government data” from “recent official
U.S. government publications”).
51 FMCSA website (identifying the “web-based materials” as “an educational resource”),
https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/DataQuality/CrashCollectionTraining/lesson3/log.html, accessed
April 6, 2026.

Opposition No. 91291227
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Opposer argues that “[b]oth parties operate within the transportation and storage
of goods industry, which increases the likelihood of consumer confusion.”52 But “a
finding that the [services] are similar is not based on whether a general term or
overarching relationship can be found to encompass them both.” Edwards
Lifesciences, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 84, at *37-38 (fact that parties’ goods were “both used
in the medical field, specifically in hospitals, albeit in different places within those
hospitals, and they are both used to monitor aspects of patient care” insufficient to
establish relatedness); Calypso Tech., Inc. v. Calypso Cap. Mgmt., LP, No. 91184576,
2011 TTAB LEXIS 259, at *27 (TTAB 2011) (“in order to find that goods and services
are related, there must be more of a connection than that a single term, in this case
‘financial field,’ may be used to generally describe them”).
Similarly, here Opposer’s services are focused on providing transportation and
freight services to consumers and businesses. In contrast, Applicant’s goods are used
by companies in providing transportation services, two separate and distinct portions
of the broad transportation and storage goods industry. Accordingly, it is not enough
to show relatedness where the most that can be said about Applicant’s goods and
Opposer’s services is that they operate within the broad transportation and storage
of goods industry. See In re N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing
refusal to register where “[t]he most that can be said is that [applicant’s goods] and
[registrant’s] services are both in the medical field”); Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec.
Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“it is error to deny registration
52 12 TTABVUE 12.

Opposition No. 91291227
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simply because applicant sells some of its goods in some of the same fields in which
opposer provides its services”).
Ultimately, “[t]here is no evidence of record showing that applicant’s goods and
opposer’s services are related in such a manner that they could, because of the
similarity of the marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from the
same source.” Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Kronholm, No. 91181806, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 207,
at *14-15 (TTAB 2011).53 Accordingly, this factor weighs against a likelihood of
confusion.
D. Channels of Trade and Classes of Consumers
Under the third DuPont factor we examine the similarity or dissimilarity of the
trade channels in which, and the classes of purchasers to whom, the parties’
respective goods and services are marketed. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; Stone Lion
Cap. Partners, 746 F.3d at 1322-23. Just as with our analysis of the relatedness of
Opposer’s services and Applicant’s goods, we must base our analysis on the
identifications in Opposer’s registration and Applicant’s application. Stone Lion Cap.
Partners, 746 F.3d at 1323; In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (factor “must be evaluated with an eye toward the channels specified in the
application and registration”).
53 Opposer has not submitted any of the types of evidence the Board typically considers in
assessing the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and services. See In re Country Oven,
Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *5 (TTAB 2019) (“Evidence of relatedness may
include news articles or evidence from computer databases showing that the relevant goods
and services are used together or used by the same purchasers; advertisements showing that
the relevant goods and services are advertised together or sold by the same manufacturer or
dealer; or copies of use-based registrations of the same mark for both the applicant's services
and the goods listed in the [pleaded] registration.”).

Opposition No. 91291227
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Opposer’s arguments on trade channels mainly addresses only where Opposer
sells and advertises its services (i.e., through its family of companies, independent
Atlas agencies, authorized partners, its websites, and at industry trade shows).54 But
Opposer does not show that any of these trade channels overlap with any of the trade
channels for Applicant’s goods. The limited evidence Opposer references about
Applicant’s trade channels is not properly of record because, as explained above in
Section I.B, Opposer untimely filed the evidence with its brief, but it also does not
show any overlap.55
Beyond that, Opposer only points again to the fact that Applicant’s goods and
Opposer’s services are offered in the “moving and logistics industry.”56 As discussed
with the relatedness of the parties’ goods and services, the mere fact that both
Opposer and Applicant operate in the broad moving and logistics industry alone is
insufficient to find the parties’ trade channels similar. As the Federal Circuit
explained:
The tenuous connection between applicant’s and opposer’s
trade channels becomes clearer when one considers the
uses of their respective marks within the medical field.
Opposer supplies data processing services for medical
insurers, whereas applicant sells batteries and power
supplies to makers of medical equipment such as bedside
alert systems and crib monitors.
Elec. Design, 954 F.2d at 717. Similarly, here, Opposer supplies moving services to
individuals and businesses while the trade channels for Applicant’s goods are those
54 12 TTABVUE 13-14.
55 See id. at 14 (citing the Warzecha Decl.).
56 Id.

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through which equipment for use in the moving and logistics industry move. The
goods and services on their face do not establish any overlap in trade channels. See
Edwards Lifesciences, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 84, at *43 (even where both products were
used in hospitals no overlap in trade channels found where “[t]here is no testimony
or evidence demonstrating that the two products would be bought and/or used
together by the same personnel in the hospital”).
With regards to the parties’ consumers, the evidence of record shows that the
parties’ respective consumers are different and do not overlap. Opposer’s witnesses
testified that Applicant’s goods are “typically sold to members of the logistics industry
looking to purchase new equipment.”57 In contrast, Opposer’s witnesses testified that
Opposer’s services are “are targeted towards and purchased by consumers of all
demographics who require logistic, shipping, moving, and storage services. The target
consumer ranges from the single-family home moves to expansive government
contracts.”58 So Opposer’s consumers are the general public and businesses who need
moving services, but Applicant’s goods are only purchased by providers in the moving
industry who need the truck chassis to perform their services.
Opposer has not established, and the evidence of record does not support, that the
parties’ respective goods and services travel in similar trade channels, or that there
57 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 12 ¶ 43; Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 9 ¶ 31. See also 12 TTABVUE
14. While Opposer contends that these are also the consumers of its services, it again relies
on the use by its affiliate Atlas Terminal Company, for which Opposer has not established
priority, and as such cannot be considered in the analysis here.
58 Wahl Decl., 11 TTABVUE 6 ¶ 13; Piekos Decl., 8 TTABVUE 4 ¶ 8.

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is overlap in customers of the parties’ goods and services. Accordingly, we find that
this DuPont factor weighs against a likelihood of confusion.
E. Purchaser Care
The fourth DuPont factor considers the “conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ v. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. Opposer’s arguments submitted under this factor do not address
purchaser care, and instead are directed to issues we already considered under the
third DuPont factor above.59 As Opposer has not submitted any arguments or
identified any evidence regarding this factor, we do not consider it.60
F. Right to Exclude
Opposer appears to be asserting its right to exclude others based on its use of the
mark ATLAS over the past 76 years during which “ATLAS has become an
international brand which provides comprehensive global goods and services to
people and businesses who seek assistance with moving and storage.”61 However, the
eleventh DuPont factor requires consideration of an applicant’s right to exclude
others from use of its mark, not the opposer’s right to exclude others. See DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361 (“(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from
use of its mark on its goods.”) (emphasis added); see also KME Ger. GmbH v. Zhejiang
59 See 12 TTABVUE 14.
60 To the extent Opposer attempts to rely on the Warzecha Decl. in support of this factor, as
discussed supra in Section I.B, we do not consider this untimely submitted declaration. In
any event, the statement Opposer cites to therein also does not address the fourth DuPont
factor. Id.
61 12 TTABVUE 18.

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Hailiang Co., No. 91267675, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 379, at *55-56 (TTAB 2023) (“The
eleventh DuPont factor considers any evidence that an applicant has a right to
exclude third parties from using its mark . . . [and] assesses whether the applicant
has achieved an appreciable level of consumer recognition and whether the
applicant could demonstrate having successfully asserted its [trademark] rights.”)
(emphasis added; citations and quotations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, No. 1:23-
cv-01606, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25637 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2025).
Here, Applicant has not submitted any evidence, and there is no evidence of record
regarding consumer recognition of, or enforcement efforts regarding Applicant’s mark
MAX-ATLAS. Accordingly, we do not consider this factor.
G. Other Factors
For the seventh DuPont factor, Opposer states “there are no reported instances of
actual confusion,” but we agree with Opposer that “actual confusion is not necessary
to show a likelihood of confusion.” 62 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281
F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This factor is neutral.
We also agree with Opposer that there is no evidence of record regarding the
eighth, ninth, or tenth DuPont factors.63 Accordingly we need not consider these
factors. Heil, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 494, at *94 (no need to consider factors where the
“parties did not present any evidence”).
62 Id. at 16.
63 Id. at 17.

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For the twelfth DuPont factor, Opposer argues that “[t]he extent of possible
confusion is enormous” because “Applicant’s mark is nearly identical to Opposer’s and
is used to sell identical goods to identical consumers via identical trade channels.”64
But Opposer’s arguments “concerning the extent of potential confusion under this
factor essentially repeat arguments under the other DuPont factors, and have been
duly considered.” Id. Accordingly, we find this factor neutral.
H. Conclusion as to Likelihood of Confusion
After reviewing the evidence of record, and Opposer’s arguments relating thereto,
we conclude that confusion is not likely. The marks are similar which weighs in favor
of confusion and we have accorded a slightly broader protection to Opposer’s mark
ATLAS in our analysis due to its moderate commercial strength which weighs
slightly in favor of confusion. However, the other factors demonstrating confusion is
not likely outweigh these factors. Specifically, Opposer failed to establish that the
parties’ goods and services, trade channels or customers are similar. We therefore
weigh these DuPont factors heavily against a finding of likely confusion. See M2
Software, 450 F.3d at 1384 (“unrelated nature of the [services] and their different
purchasers and channels of trade are factors that weigh heavily against [confusion]”).
The remaining factors for which Opposer submitted relevant arguments and evidence
(i.e., the seventh and twelfth DuPont factors) are neutral.
64 Id. at 19.

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In view thereof, we find that Opposer has failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Applicant’s mark is likely to be confused with Opposer’s pleaded
marks.
V. Dilution
Apart from a discussion of fame, Opposer’s entire argument on dilution by
blurring and tarnishment consists of two conclusory sentences:
Registration of the ‘MAX-ATLAS’ mark would impair the
distinctiveness and cause dilution by blurring of Opposer’s
famous marks. Additionally, it would tarnish the
reputation of Opposer’s marks, further violating 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c).65
We find that Opposer waived its dilution claim by submitting only a perfunctory,
skeletal argument that does not even address the statutory requirements of blurring
or tarnishment.66 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by
some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”) (citation omitted); In
65 Id. at 21.
66 Opposer did not submit any argument regarding relevant statutory factors we consider in
determining whether a mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring including: (i) The degree
of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark; (ii) The degree of
inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) The extent to which the owner
of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark; (iv) The degree of
recognition of the famous mark; (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to
create an association with the famous mark; and (vi) Any actual association between the
mark or trade name and the famous mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
For dilution by tarnishment, Opposer did not submit any argument proving an “association
arising from the similarity between a mark . . . and a famous mark that harms the reputation
of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).

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re Killian, 45 F.4th 1373, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (party “forfeited any argument on
appeal . . . by failing to present anything more than a conclusory, skeletal argument”).
Even if we considered Opposer’s dilution claim, it would fail because, as discussed
herein, Opposer has not established fame for likelihood of confusion and where “a
mark is not proven famous for purposes of likelihood of confusion, it will certainly not
meet the higher threshold for fame required to prove dilution.” See ProMark Brands,
Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., No. 91194974, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 67, at *63-64 (TTAB
2015). See also Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1373 (“Fame for likelihood of confusion and
fame for dilution are distinct concepts, and dilution fame requires a more stringent
showing.”).
Decision: The opposition is dismissed on both the grounds of likelihood of
confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d) and dilution by blurring and
tarnishment under Trademark Act Section 43(c).