Jeremiah C Jones

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: February 27, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Jeremiah C Jones
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Serial No. 98668832
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Jeremiah C Jones, pro se.
Jacob Magit, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 111,
Chris Doninger, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Goodman, Casagrande and O’Connor,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by O’Connor, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Jeremiah C Jones (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark DUODISH in standard characters for “plates; bowls,” in International Class
21.1
1 Application Serial No. 98668832 was filed on July 26, 2024 pursuant to Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s averment of a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce.
Citations to the prosecution file are to entries in the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system.

Serial No. 98668832
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The Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that the mark, when used in connection with
the identified goods, is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception with the
standard character mark DUO COVER, with COVER disclaimed, registered on the
Principal Register for “dishware covers for use with microwave ovens; non-electric
cookware, namely, pans, pots, plates, dishes, bowls, for use in microwave ovens; heat-
resistant dish holders; insulated containers for food and beverages,” in International
Class 21 (the “Cited Registration” or “Cited Mark”).2
The appeal has been briefed and is ready for decision. We affirm the refusal to
register.
I. Preliminary Matter
Applicant contends that the Examining Attorney’s Final Office Action
maintaining the refusal to register was “arbitrary and capricious, and therefore
invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)),” because it
purportedly did not specifically respond to each of the arguments Applicant made in
its response to the Nonfinal Office Action.3 The only authority Applicant cites in
support of such a requirement governs patent examination, not trademark
examination.4 Trademark examination guidelines state “[w]hen the applicant
submits arguments attempting to overcome a refusal or requirement, the examining
2 Registration No. 6960322 issued on January 24, 2023.
3 5 TTABVUE 6.
4 See id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) and MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 707.07(f)).

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attorney must respond to the applicant’s arguments,” but there is no recommendation
to do so with a particular degree of specificity. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“TMEP”) § 713.03 (Nov. 2025).
After receiving Applicant’s response to the Nonfinal Office Action, the Examining
Attorney issued a Final Office Action maintaining the refusal to register.5 The Final
Office Action noted that it was issued “in response to applicant’s communication filed
on March 30, 2025.”6 It noted that Applicant’s response “submitted a list of
registrations” and advised Applicant how to make third-party registrations of record.7
That the Final Office Action contained similar or even identical language to the
Nonfinal Office Action does not mean it failed to respond to Applicant’s arguments;
“[w]hen making an action final, the examining attorney must restate any substantive
refusals” that remain outstanding. TMEP § 714.04.
The specific arguments that Applicant’s brief contends were not properly
addressed all involved the Examining Attorney’s determinations that the marks were
similar, the goods related, and that the Application and Cited Registration lack
restrictions. Applicant’s brief does not identify any new issues that were not raised
in either the Nonfinal Office Action or the Final Office Action. The Final Office Action
maintained the initial determinations from the Nonfinal Office Action (and added
more evidence relating to some of them). While the Final Office Action did not
5 See April 28, 2025 Final Office Action, TSDR 2.
6 See id.
7 See id. at 5. It further included additional evidence of the descriptive or generic meaning of
“DISH” in Applicant’s mark. See id. at 4; 7-11.

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specifically say “Applicant’s arguments to the contrary are noted but found
unpersuasive” or words to that effect, that is the clear import of reiterating the
previous determinations, maintaining the refusal, and making it final. Although the
Final Office Action could have acknowledged certain of Applicant’s points explicitly,
there was no requirement to do so when the basis of the refusal and reasoning in
support were clearly set forth. Applicant’s disagreement with that reasoning and the
refusal to register does not render the action arbitrary and capricious. See Japanese
Found. for Cancer Rsch. v. Lee, 773 F.3d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Circ. 2014) (“[A]n agency
acts arbitrarily or capriciously only if the decision was not based on the relevant
factors or it fails to ‘examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.’”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)). Applicant was provided—as are all applicants—the
opportunity to respond to the Nonfinal Office Action, and Applicant took advantage
of that opportunity, but by making the refusal final it is apparent that the Examining
Attorney simply was not persuaded by Applicant’s arguments.
Finally, we note that the entirety of Applicant’s arguments on appeal consist of
listing the arguments Applicant contends were not addressed specifically enough in
the Final Office Action. In the next section, we address the substantive merits of those
arguments directly.

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II. Likelihood of Confusion
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that ‘so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.’” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Trademark Act Section
2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)). Our determination of the issue of likelihood of confusion is
based on analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA
1973) (the “DuPont factors”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575
U.S. 138, 145 (2015)). We consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and
argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381 (“In any given case, different
DuPont factors may play a dominant role and some factors may not be relevant to the
analysis.”) (citation omitted). In determining likelihood of confusion, two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods or services. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA
1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”).

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A. The Goods, Channels of Trade and Consumers
The second and third DuPont factors concern the relatedness of the goods and the
“established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. We also
consider the classes of consumers. In analyzing these factors, we must look to the
identifications in the Application and Cited Registration. In re Detroit Athletic Co.,
903 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding
focuses on the goods and services described in the application and registration,
and not on real-world conditions.”) (italics in original shown here in bold) (citing In
re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Registration may be
refused if Applicant’s mark for any of its identified goods is likely to cause confusion
with the Cited Mark for any of the goods listed in the Cited Registration. See Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Chisena, No. 91240180, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 117, at
*63-64 (“It is sufficient for a finding on likelihood of confusion that relatedness is
established for any item encompassed by the identification of goods in the
application.”), aff’d unpub’d, No. 23-2073, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 395 (Fed. Cir. 2026);
see also, e.g., Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336
(CCPA 1981).
Applicant’s goods are “plates; bowls.” Registrant’s goods are “dishware covers for
use with microwave ovens; non-electric cookware, namely, pans, pots, plates, dishes,
bowls, for use in microwave ovens; heat-resistant dish holders; insulated containers
for food and beverages.”

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As explained by the Examining Attorney, the “plates; bowls” identified in the
Application are broadly worded and do not contain any limitations, so they encompass
all types of plates and bowls. See S.W. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., No. 94002242,
2015 TTAB LEXIS 176, at *60-61 (where the services in an application or registration
are broadly identified, they are presumed to encompass all services of the type
identified), aff’d mem., 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Paula Payne Prods. Co. v.
Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901, 902 (CCPA 1973) (Board must “give full sweep” to
an identification of goods regardless of registrant’s actual business). Applicant’s
“plates; bowls” therefore encompass Registrant’s “non-electric cookware, namely, …
plates, … bowls, for use in microwave ovens,” making the goods legally identical in
part. See In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 65,
at *10 (“Applicant’s broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily
encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial
furniture.’”).
In addition, because neither the Application nor the Registration contains any
restrictions on the channels of trade or classes of consumers, to the extent the goods
identified are legally identical, we presume that they travel in the same channels of
trade to the same consumers. See In re Viterra, Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Board was entitled to rely on presumption that, absent restrictions, legally
identical goods travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers);
In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 771 (CCPA 1968) (where there are legally
identical goods, class of purchasers is considered to be the same).

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Nonetheless, Applicant argues that the goods and purchasers differ because he
sells a “‘tableware unit’ - described as a plate and bowl combo made as one item, for
serving food” whereas Registrant sells a “kitchen accessory.”8 According to Applicant,
DUODISH and DUO COVER occupy different roles in the
kitchen ecosystem and are marketed in different
directions. … Within the two marks alone, “DISH” and
“COVER” proclaim a sufficient distinction to consumers as
to what the goods exactly are. … A consumer seeking a
hybrid plate-bowl unit is unlikely to mistake it for a cover.
These preceding distinctions between both marks mitigate
the idea of relatedness, demonstrating their marketplace
demarcations.9
However, as noted by the Examining Attorney, these arguments run counter to
the governing principle stated above that in deciding likelihood of confusion we must
consider the goods as they are identified in the Application and Cited Registration.
We cannot read limitations into the type of goods or target purchasers based on what
Applicant states is the hybrid nature of his product or on the words DISH or COVER
in the respective marks. In re Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS
381, at *6 (“‘It is well established that the Board may not read limitations into an
unrestricted registration or application.’”) (quoting i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323).
This is the case regardless of alleged real world conditions. See, e.g., In re Embiid,
No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *37-38 (Board “may not import restrictions
into the identification[s] based on alleged real world conditions of the sort argued by
8 5 TTABVUE 9.
9 Id. (repeating arguments made during prosecution; internal quotation marks omitted).

Serial No. 98668832
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Applicant ... or consider extrinsic evidence regarding Applicant and Registrant
themselves.”) (cleaned up).
The Application simply lists “plates; bowls,” saying nothing about them being
combined into a single unit. The Cited Registration lists goods that go beyond covers,
including, “non-electric cookware, namely, … plates, … bowls, for use in microwave
ovens,” which fall squarely within Applicant’s “plates; bowls.” It is enough for
likelihood of confusion if Applicant’s mark for its identified goods is likely to cause
confusion with Registrant’s mark for any of the goods listed in the Cited Registration.
See, e.g., Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 TTAB LEXIS
347, at *18 (“it is sufficient if likelihood of confusion is found with respect to any
product recited in [the opposer’s] registration”).
When we consider these factors based on the identifications found in the
Application and Registration, as we must, it is clear that the goods are of the same
type, at least in part. To this extent, the goods would travel in the same channels of
trade and be purchased by the same consumers, those looking for plates and bowls,
including plates and bowls in the nature of cookware that may be used in a microwave
oven. These DuPont factors thus weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion.10
10 Without mentioning the fourth DuPont factor (“[t]he conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing”), Applicant states
that “buyers seeking an eating dish and a cover generally require consumer discernment.” 5
TTABVUE 9. Nothing in the record supports a finding that consumers of the goods would
exercise more than normal care in purchasing. To the extent Applicant invokes the fourth
DuPont factor, it does not weigh against likelihood of confusion in this case.

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B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Turning to the first DuPont factor, we compare the marks “in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.” Detroit Athletic, 903
F.3d at 1302-03 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St.
John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13, aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x
516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “The proper test is not a side-by-side
comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong,
Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
Because similarity is determined based on the marks in their entireties, our
analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various
components. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
see also In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d 645, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“No element
of a mark is ignored simply because it is less dominant, or would not have trademark
significance if used alone.”). Nonetheless, “in articulating reasons for reaching a
conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for
rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark,
provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
entireties.” Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at
1058).

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“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Marks must be considered
in light of the fallibility of memory, id. at 751, and “[t]he focus is on the recollection
of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a specific
impression of trademarks.” In re St. Julian Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 196, at *13 (citations omitted).
Applicant’s mark is DUODISH and the Cited Mark is DUO COVER, both in
standard characters.
The Examining Attorney argues that the marks are confusingly similar because
they both start with the identical distinctive portion DUO combined with descriptive
wording.11 The Examining Attorney notes that the descriptive word COVER is
disclaimed in the Cited Mark and DISH is descriptive in Applicant’s mark because it
means “a more or less concave vessel from which food is served,”12 which includes
Applicant’s “plates” and “bowls.”
Applicant argues that the shared element DUO is weak and therefore insufficient
to cause a likelihood of confusion because it is in widespread use, with over 900 active
registered marks featuring DUO, including a number for kitchenware.13 In its
response to the Nonfinal Office Action, Applicant listed several such registered
11 6 TTABVUE 4.
12 Id. at 5-6 (citing February 4, 2025 Nonfinal Office Action, TSDR 8 (Merriam-Webster
Dictionary definition 1(a); April 28 Final Office Action, TSDR 7-11 (third party websites using
the word “dish” to refer to plates and bowls)).
13 5 TTABVUE 10.

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marks14 but did not provide copies of the registrations. Applicant was advised of the
need to do so,15 but did not thereafter request reconsideration or to suspend the
appeal and remand the application so he could submit copies of the registrations. See
Trademark Rule 2.63(b)(1)(i), 37 C.F.R. § 2.63(b)(1)(i) (permitting applicants to
request reconsideration after issuance of a final refusal); Trademark Rule 2.142(d)(1),
37 C.F.R. 2.142(d)(1) (permitting applicants who wish to introduce additional
evidence after an appeal is filed to request suspension of the appeal and remand of
the application for further examination). It is well settled that providing a list is not
sufficient to make third-party registrations of record, and we therefore do not
consider the list included in Applicant’s office action response. In re Fiesta Palms,
LLC, No. 76595049, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 51, at *17 (“a list of registrations does not
make the registrations of record”) (citing In re Duofold, Inc., 1974 TTAB LEXIS 271,
at *6)); see also In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., No. 85247730, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 451,
at *16.
Applicant also argues that DUODISH and DUO COVER differ in appearance,
sound and commercial impression.16 Although the different second terms DISH and
COVER introduce some distinctions in each of these respects, we agree with the
Examining Attorney that it is more significant that both marks begin with the
identical term DUO. As the first term in each mark, DUO is most likely to be noticed
14 March 30, 2025 Response to Office Action, TSDR 5-6.
15 See April 28, 2025 Final Office Action, TSDR 5 (advising Applicant of need to provide copies
of the registrations and stating that the listed registrations would not be considered).
16 5 TTABVUE 10-11.

Serial No. 98668832
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and remembered by the consumer. See, e.g., Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1303 (“The
identity of the marks’ initial two words is particularly significant because consumers
typically notice those words first.”); Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., No.
91074797, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *8 (“it is often the first part of a mark which is
most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered”); see also
Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d
1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two
VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent
feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Sage
Therapeutics, Inc. v. SageForth Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 TTAB LEXIS
139, at *14-15 (finding similarity between SAGEFORTH and SAGE CENTRAL, in
part because the “common ‘sage’ element” was dominant in both marks). We do not
ignore the second terms DISH and COVER. But each of these terms merely describes
a feature or characteristic of the goods. DISH and COVER are therefore not source-
identifying elements, which is a rational reason to give them less weight than DUO
in the likelihood of confusion analysis. Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1305.
Considering the marks in their entireties, we do not find that the differences are
as great as Applicant submits. Applicant argues that the marks are pronounced
differently, with its mark DUODISH having a “smooth, ‘roll off the tongue’
pronunciation with a unitary flow” and DUO COVER having a clear pause between
the terms.17 We have considered these points, but are not persuaded that they
17 Id.

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overcome the general impression of the same source conveyed by the identical,
dominant term DUO. The presence or absence of a space does not significantly alter
the appearance, sound or commercial impression of the marks, each of which would
be readily understood as combining DUO with a common word that describes a
feature or characteristic of the goods. See, e.g., Chutter, Inc. v. Great Mgmt. Grp.,
LLC, No. 91223018, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 365, at *48 (“The presence or absence of a
space between two terms is usually an inconsequential difference that even if noticed
by consumers would not serve to distinguish these marks.”), rev’d on other grounds,
90 F.4th 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2024); see also Giersch v. Scripps Networks Inc., No.
92045576, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 72, at *18-19 (DESIGNED2SELL and DESIGNED TO
SELL phonetically equivalent); cf. St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (“Regarding
differences in sound, St. Helena argues that the exclamation mark in ‘TAKE 10!’
alters the pronunciation of the marks because the registered mark must be uttered
emphatically, whereas ‘TAKETEN’ would be spoken in a relaxed fashion. The PTO,
quoting Viterra, responds that ‘there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark, and
consumers may pronounce a mark differently than intended by the brand owner.’ 671
F.3d at 1367. We are not persuaded that the exclamation mark alters the
pronunciation of the cited mark in any significant way ….”).
Applicant argues that “based on the matter ‘DISH’ and ‘COVER’, this creates
different commercial impressions - tableware vs an accessory.”18 It is true that DISH
and COVER are different words with distinct meanings. However, for the reasons
18 Id. at 11.

Serial No. 98668832
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stated above, they do not lend significantly different commercial impressions to the
two marks. Consumers could easily perceive DUODISH for “plates; bowls” as a brand
extension of DUO COVER for “dishware covers for use with microwave ovens; non-
electric cookware, namely, pans, pots, plates, dishes, bowls, for use in microwave
ovens; heat-resistant dish holders; insulated containers for food and beverages.” See,
e.g., In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 447, at *15
(VANTAGE TITAN “more likely to be considered another product from the previously
anonymous source of TITAN medical diagnostic apparatus, namely, medical
ultrasound devices”).
The first DuPont factor also weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
III. Balancing the DuPont Factors
The final step is to consider the findings we have made on the relevant likelihood-
of-confusion factors to determine if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely
between the respective marks. Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384. Here, the goods
are legally identical in-part and the channels of trade and classes of consumers are
presumed to overlap to this extent. These DuPont factors therefore weigh in favor of
likelihood of confusion. Comparing the DUODISH and DUO COVER marks in their
entireties, we find that the marks are similar, due to the identical leading and source-
identifying term DUO combined with a descriptive secondary term in each mark. We
are also mindful that where the goods are identical or virtually identical, “the degree
of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Cai, 901
F.3d at 1373 (citing Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.

Serial No. 98668832
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Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); see also Alfacell Corp. v.
Anticancer, Inc., No. 92032202, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 441, at *12 (lesser degree of
similarity required “when marks are applied to legally identical goods”). The first
DuPont factor also weighs in favor of likelihood of confusion. Applicant has not shown
that any DuPont factors weigh against a likelihood of confusion.
Balancing the factors, we conclude that confusion is likely between Applicant’s
mark and the Cited Mark for their respective identified goods.
Decision:
The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is
affirmed.