Ideal Capital Group Holdings, LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Hearing: February 11, 2026 Mailed: February 24, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Ideal Capital Group Holdings, LLC
_____
Serial No. 98352828
Serial No. 98353045
Serial No. 98355188
(Consolidated)
_____
Sarjun S. Bal of Kahn, Soares & Conway, LLP for Ideal Capital Group Holdings,
LLC.
Akin Adejunmobi, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 105,
Jennifer L. Williston, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Allard, and O’Connor,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Ideal Capital Group Holdings, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the
Principal Register of the standard-character marks IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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(GROUP disclaimed)1 and IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT (CLIENT disclaimed),2 and the
stylized IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP mark shown below,
3
all for services identified as “Real estate investment consultancy; Real estate
investment services; Financial investment in the field of Real Estate” in International
Class 36.
The Trademark Examining Attorney assigned to Applicant’s three applications
has refused registration of Applicant’s marks on two grounds: (1) under Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that each of Applicant’s
marks so resembles the standard-character marks IDEAL FUTURES, registered on
the Principal Register for “Investment management services, financial retirement
planning, financial planning, financial investment planning and estate planning
1 Application Serial No. 98352828 was filed on January 11, 2024 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark and
first use of the mark in commerce at least as early as January 1, 2018.
2 Application Serial No. 98353045 was filed on January 11, 2024 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark and
first use of the mark in commerce at least as early as January 1, 2018.
3 Application Serial No. 98355188 was filed on January 12, 2024 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark and
first use of the mark in commerce at least as early as January 1, 2018. Applicant describes
its mark as follows: “The mark consists of the word ‘IDEAL’ in dark blue stylized lettering
with the letter ‘E’ being replaced by a design of three bars. The top bar is in dark blue, the
middle bar is in blue, and the bottom bar is in light blue. The top and bottom bars are both
longer than the middle bar and in between each of the bars is white space. Below the word
‘IDEAL’ is the wording ‘CAPITAL GROUP’ in light blue lettering. All the foregoing appears
on a white background.” The colors blue, dark blue, light blue, and white are claimed as a
feature of the mark.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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services” in International Class 36,4 and IDEAL SALE, registered on the Principal
Register for “Real estate investment services” in International Class 36,5 as to be
likely, when used in connection with the services identified in Applicant’s three
applications, to cause confusion; and (2) under Sections (2)(e)(1) and 6(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(1) and 1056(a), on the ground that the words
CAPITAL GROUP in two of Applicant’s marks and the words PRIVATE CLIENT in
Applicant’s third mark are merely descriptive of the identified services, and must be
disclaimed.
Applicant appealed when the Examining Attorney made the refusals final. As
discussed below, the three appeals were subsequently consolidated, and are fully
briefed,6 and counsel for Applicant and the Examining Attorney appeared at an oral
4 Registration No. 6284538 issued on March 2, 2021. The registrant has disclaimed the
exclusive right to use FUTURES apart from the mark as shown.
5 Registration No. 7088065 issued on June 20, 2023. The registrant has disclaimed the
exclusive right to use SALE apart from the mark as shown.
6 Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case dockets refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding TTABVUE
corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the
page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear. Applicant’s substantially
similar appeal briefs appear at 4 TTABVUE in each appeal, and its reply briefs appear at 13
TTABVUE in each appeal. Except where otherwise indicated, we will cite Applicant’s appeal
brief in the appeal in Serial No. 98352828. The Examining Attorney’s briefs are identical in
the three consolidated cases and appear at 12 TTABVUE in each appeal.
Applicant’s three reply briefs are each considerably longer than ten pages and thus violate
Trademark Rule 2.142(b)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(b)(2), which provides that “[w]ithout prior
leave of the Board . . . [a] reply brief . . . shall not exceed ten pages in length in its entirety,”
because Applicant did not obtain prior leave of the Board to file overlong reply briefs. Section
1203.01 of the TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”)
(June 2025) warns that “[i]f an applicant files . . . a reply brief that exceeds the ten-page limit
without prior leave of the Board, the brief will not be considered.” We have not considered
Applicant’s three reply briefs, and we so advised Applicant’s counsel at the outset of the oral
hearing. We invited him to address any points made in the reply briefs during his argument.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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hearing before the panel on February 11, 2026. We affirm the Section 2(d) likelihood
of confusion refusals to register, and do not reach the refusals based on the disclaimer
requirements.7
I. Prosecution and Procedural Histories, and Records on Appeal8
Applicant’s three applications were assigned to the same Examining Attorney,
and were examined in parallel.9 We summarize below their prosecution histories, and
their procedural histories on appeal, to provide background to our decisions in the
appeals.
A. Prosecution Histories
1. Serial Nos. 98352828 and 98355188
Applicant filed these two applications to register the standard-character and
stylized IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP marks based on the same specimen of use, which
we reproduce below:
7 At the oral hearing, Applicant’s counsel offered to enter the requested disclaimers, but we
interpret his offer to be contingent on reversal of the Section 2(d) refusals to register
inasmuch as accepting the disclaimers without also reversing the Section 2(d) refusals would
not result in a reversal of those refusals.
8 Citations in this opinion to the application records are to pages in the downloadable .pdf
version of the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
9 The records in Serial Nos. 98352828 and 98355188 involving the IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP
marks are substantially identical. The record in Serial No. 98353045 involving the standard-
character IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT mark differs slightly from the records in the other cases
due to the different suffix elements of Applicant’s mark.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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10
The Examining Attorney issued initial non-final Office Actions in both cases. In
Serial No. 98352828, the Examining Attorney refused registration based on the cited
registrations of the IDEAL FUTURES and IDEAL SALES marks, required Applicant
to disclaim the exclusive right to use CAPITAL GROUP apart from the mark as
shown, and required Applicant to submit an appropriate specimen of use.11 The
Examining Attorney made of record USPTO electronic records regarding the cited
registrations;12 third-party webpages that the Examining Attorney claimed showed
the relatedness of the involved services;13 dictionary definitions of the words “capital”
and “group;”14 and USPTO electronic records regarding third-party registrations of
marks in which the words CAPITAL GROUP have been disclaimed.15
In Serial No. 98355188, the Examining Attorney refused registration based on the
cited registrations of the IDEAL FUTURES and IDEAL SALES marks, required
Applicant to disclaim the exclusive right to use CAPITAL GROUP apart from the
10 Applicant stated in Application Serial No. 98352828 that the “[s]pecimen is a picture of the
logo of the Company” apparently taken from Applicant’s website at idealcapgroup.com.
January 11, 2024 Application at TSDR 2. Applicant states in Application Serial No. 98355188
that the specimen was taken from its website. January 12, 2024 Application at TSDR 2.
11 August 13, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 1-7 (Ser. No. 98352828).
12 Id. at TSDR 8-11.
13 Id. at TSDR 12-24.
14 Id. at TSDR 25-50 (COLLINS DICTIONARY).
15 Id. at TSDR 51-68.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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mark as shown, and required Applicant to clarify whether it claimed color as a feature
of the mark.16 The Examining Attorney made of record the same evidence as in the
initial Office Action in Serial No. 98352828.17
Applicant responded to the non-final Office Actions in both cases, argued against
the refusals and requirements, and offered disclaimers of GROUP apart from the
marks as shown. Applicant made no evidence of record in its responses.18
The Examining Attorney then issued Office Actions in both cases making final the
refusals to register based on Section 2(d) and the requirement of a disclaimer of
CAPITAL GROUP. In Serial No. 98352828, the Examining Attorney made of record
additional third-party webpages that he claimed showed the relatedness of the
involved services,19 a dictionary definition of the phrase “capital investment,”20 and
USPTO electronic records regarding Applicant’s Application Serial No. 98353068 to
register IDEAL CAPITAL for “Real estate investment consultancy; Real estate
investment services; Financial investment in the field of Real Estate,” in which
Applicant disclaimed the exclusive right to use CAPITAL apart from the mark as
16 August 13, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 2-7 (Ser. No. 98355188).
17 Id. at TSDR 8-68.
18 November 13, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 6-18 (Ser. No. 98352828); November
13, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 5-17 (Ser. No. 98355188). In Serial No. 98352828,
Applicant submitted a declaration of its counsel purporting to “specify[ ] that the URL of the
original webpage specimen is https://idealcapgroup.com/, and it was accessed personally by
me on January 12, 2024 and November 13, 2024.” November 13, 2024 Response to Office
Action at TSDR 19 (Ser. No. 98352828). No such declaration was submitted in the response
in Serial No. 98355188.
19 December 12, 2024 Final Office Action at TSDR 11-75 (Ser. No. 98352828).
20 Id. at TSDR 77-81 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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shown.21 In Serial No. 98355188, the Examining Attorney’s Final Office Action made
of record the same evidence submitted in his Final Office Action in Serial No.
98352828.22
2. Serial No. 98353045
Applicant filed its application to register IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT in standard
characters based on the specimen of use reproduced below:
23
The Examining Attorney initially refused registration based on the cited
registrations of the IDEAL FUTURES and IDEAL SALES marks, and required
Applicant to disclaim the exclusive right to use PRIVATE CLIENT apart from the
mark as shown and to submit an appropriate specimen of use.24 The Examining
Attorney made of record USPTO electronic records regarding the cited
21 Id. at TSDR 82.
22 December 12, 2024 Final Office Action at TSDR 9-80 (Ser. No. 98355188).
23 January 11, 2024 Application at TSDR 8 (Ser. No. 98353045).
24 August 13, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 1-7.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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registrations,25 third-party webpages that the Examining Attorney claimed showed
the relatedness of the involved services,26 and third-party webpages displaying the
terms “private client” and “private clients.”27
Applicant responded to the Office Action, argued against the refusals and
requirements, and offered a disclaimer of CLIENT apart from the mark as shown.
Applicant made no evidence of record in its responses, but submitted a declaration of
its counsel purporting to “specify[ ] that the URL of the original webpage specimen is
Private Client | Ideal Capital Group/, and it was accessed personally by me on
January 12, 2024 and November 13, 2024.”28
The Examining Attorney then issued an Office Action making final the refusals to
register and the other requirements.29 The Examining Attorney made of record
additional third-party webpages that he claimed showed the relatedness of the
involved services.30
B. Procedural History of Appeals
Applicant appealed the three final refusals to register, and filed its appeal briefs
in each case. The Examining Attorney then moved to consolidate the three appeals,
6 TTABVUE 1 (Ser. Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188), and the Board granted
25 Id. at TSDR 8-11.
26 Id. at TSDR 12-24.
27 Id. at TSDR 25-51.
28 November 13, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 18.
29 December 12, 2024 Final Office Action at TSDR 1-10.
30 Id. at TSDR 11-78.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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the motion, designating the appeal in Serial No. 98352828 as the “parent” case. 7
TTABVUE 1 (Ser. Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188).
The Examining Attorney then requested a suspension of the consolidated cases
and a remand of the applications to allow him to address the claimed insufficiency of
the specimens of record in two of the cases, 8 TTABVUE 1-2 (Ser. Nos. 98352828,
98353045, and 98355188), and the Board granted the request. 9 TTABVUE 1 (Ser.
Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188).
On remand, Applicant provided properly verified specimens regarding the marks
in Serial Nos. 98352828 and 98353045, obviating those requirements. 10 TTABVUE
1-2 (Ser. Nos. 98352828 and 98353045). The consolidated appeals were then resumed,
11 TTABVUE, the Examining Attorney filed his identical briefs in the three cases,
and Applicant filed its non-conforming reply briefs in the three cases. Following the
February 11, 2026 oral hearing, the consolidated cases are now ready for decision.
II. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusals
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Our determination
of the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We consider each

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“Two key factors in every Section 2(d) case are the first two factors regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods or services, because the
fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the
marks.” DC Comics v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *10
(TTAB 2022) (internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).
Applicant argues in each case that
the Examining Attorney’s refusal was improper because (1)
Applicant’s mark, as a stylized design mark using “IDEAL”
as an acronym, creates a distinct commercial impression;
(2) the services offered under the respective marks target
different market segments, operate through different
channels of trade, and serve different consumer bases; (3)
the term “IDEAL” is weak and diluted in the relevant
industry; and (4) the sophisticated nature of Applicant’s
customers makes confusion unlikely.
4 TTABVUE 3. These arguments invoke the key first two DuPont factors, as well as
the third factor, the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, the fourth factor, the “conditions under
which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing,” id., and the sixth factor, the “number and nature of similar marks in use
on similar goods.” Id. Elsewhere in its appeal briefs, Applicant also mentions the fifth
factor, the “fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use),” id., 4
TTABVUE 17, alludes to the eighth factor, the “length of time during and conditions
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion,”

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 4 TTABVUE 18,31 and purports to discuss some of the
remaining factors. Id. at 18-19.32
In our analysis under Section 2(d), we will focus on the standard-character mark
IDEAL SALE for “Real estate investment services” shown in cited Registration No.
7088065 (the “’065 Registration”), which we find to be the cited mark that is most
similar to Applicant’s marks and which is used in connection with services that are
identical to certain services identified in Applicant’s three applications. If we find a
31 With respect to the eighth DuPont factor, Applicant does not cite DuPont itself, but rather
an Eighth Circuit decision, Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d
598, 603 (8th Cir. 1999). 4 TTABVUE 18. Applicant’s appeal briefs are replete with citations
of decisions of regional circuit courts of appeals and some federal district courts. We are, of
course, required to apply Federal Circuit law, not the law of regional circuit courts. See
generally TBMP Section 101.03 (discussing the decisional law that applies in Board cases).
32 Applicant also argues in each appeal that “geographic distinctions further diminish the
likelihood of confusion.” 4 TTABVUE 19. Applicant claims that confusion is unlikely because
“Applicant primarily operates in the Western United States, focusing its real estate
investment advisory services on markets such as California, Arizona, and Nevada,” while
“the cited marks — IDEAL FUTURES and IDEAL SALE — originate from entirely different
geographic regions, namely Illinois and Florida, respectively, and focus on local markets,
clientele, and service offerings.” Id. According to Applicant, “[g]eographic distance matters,
particularly in service industries that are often localized or regional in character,” and “[t]he
absence of overlapping customer exposure due to these geographic differences further reduces
the likelihood that consumers would encounter both services or assume a connection between
them.” Id. at 19-20. Applicant’s reliance on such “geographic distance” is misplaced because
Applicant
seeks a geographically unrestricted registration under which it
might expand throughout the United States. Under these facts,
it is not proper . . . to limit our consideration to the likelihood of
confusion in the areas presently occupied by the parties. Section
7(b) of the Trademark Act . . . creates a presumption that the
registrant has the exclusive right to use its mark throughout the
United States. Therefore, the geographical distance between the
present locations of the respective businesses of the two parties
has little relevance in this case.
Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted). “Geographic distance” is relevant here only with respect to the eighth
DuPont factor, which we discuss below.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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likelihood of confusion as to that mark and the services for which it is registered, we
need not find a likelihood of confusion as to the other cited mark and the services for
which it is registered. In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL 22358, at *2
(TTAB 2010).
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services, Channels of Trade,
and Classes of Consumers33
We begin with the second DuPont factor, which “considers ‘[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration . . . .” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
“This factor considers whether ‘the consuming public may perceive [the services] as
related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of the . . . services.’” In
re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “In analyzing the . . .
services, the Board considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the . . .
services as described in an application or registration.’” In re OSF Healthcare Sys.,
No. 88706809, 2023 WL 6140427, at *4 (TTAB 2023) (quoting In re Embiid, No.
88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, at *10 (TTAB 2021)).
The relatedness of goods or services may be established based on various evidence,
including (1) the language of the involved identifications of goods or services, which
may show, on the face of the identifications, that the goods or services are literally or
33 The identifications of services on which our analysis under the second, third, and fourth
factors turns are identical in Applicant’s three applications, and our analysis of the fifth,
sixth, and eighth factors involves the same issues in each appeal. Accordingly, our discussion
of these factors will apply to all three appeals.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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legally identical, or are otherwise intrinsically related, and (2) evidence of third-party
uses or registrations, which may show that the identified goods or services are
commonly offered by the same entity under the same mark, or are otherwise related.
Id.
The “Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity as to
each [service] listed in the description of [services]” in Applicant’s application. Id. at
*5 (citation omitted). “[I]t is sufficient for finding a likelihood of confusion if
relatedness is established for any [service] encompassed by the identification of
[services] within a particular class in the application.” Id. (citations omitted).
The services identified in Applicant’s three applications are “Real estate
investment consultancy; Real estate investment services; Financial investment in the
field of Real Estate.” The services identified in the cited ’065 Registration are “Real
estate investment services.” The “real estate investment services” identified in the
applications and in the ’065 Registration are identical.34 The second DuPont factor
strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely with respect to each of the
marks shown in Applicant’s three applications. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427,
at *9.
The third DuPont factor considers the “similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Because the involved
34 The Examining Attorney also cites Internet evidence to show that the same entities
commonly provide the various identified services under the same mark. Because we have
found the involved “real estate investment services” to be identical based on the language of
the respective identifications, we need not consider the Examining Attorney’s other evidence
of relatedness.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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services are identical, and the respective identifications do not contain any
restrictions regarding channels of trade or classes of consumers, “we must presume
that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same as to those . . .
identical services.” OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9 (citation omitted). The
third DuPont factor also strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely with
respect to each of the marks shown in Applicant’s three applications. Id.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks35
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 WL 2953731,
at *4 (TTAB 2025) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” Sage Therapeutics,
Inc. v. Sageforth Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (TTAB
2024) (quoting In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5
(TTAB 2018) (citation omitted), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); accord
Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is
sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause
confusion.”) (citation omitted).
35 Because Applicant’s three applications show different marks, we will compare each mark
to the cited IDEAL SALE mark in separate subsections of this section of the opinion after
first determining the dominant portions of the involved marks. Most of the arguments made
by Applicant and the Examining Attorney under the first DuPont factor are same in each
appeal. We will not repeat those arguments to the extent possible, but will instead cross-
reference and summarize them where appropriate.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting Coach
Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “The
focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally ‘retains a general
rather than a specific impression of marks.’” Id. (quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No.
85916778, 2018 WL 3993582, at *4 (TTAB 2018) (citations omitted)). The average
purchaser here is an investor in real estate.
Where, as here, “the services are identical, the degree of similarity between the
marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is likely declines.” In re
Jimenez, No. 97551823, 2025 WL 3126703, at *4 (TTAB 2025) (citing Bridgestone
Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Marks must be considered in their entireties, but “in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.” Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305 (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp.,
753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Before comparing the involved marks in their
entireties, we will determine whether more or less weight should be given to any
portions of Applicant’s three marks and the cited mark.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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We begin with Applicant’s standard-character marks IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP
and IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT. Applicant suggests in the appeals in Serial Nos.
98352828 and 98355188 that the words CAPITAL GROUP and PRIVATE CLIENT
should be given equal weight with the lead word IDEAL because CAPITAL GROUP
and PRIVATE CLIENT are “important phrase[s],” 4 TTABVUE 10 (Ser. No.
98352828); 4 TTABVUE 11 (Ser. No. 98355188), and “meaningful composite[s]” that
“convey[ ] a distinct corporate and institutional identity.” 4 TTABVUE 12 (Ser. No.
98352828); 4 TTABVUE 13 (Ser. No. 98355188). At the oral hearing, Applicant’s
counsel cited the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493 (Fed.
Cir. 1992), which was not cited in Applicant’s appeal briefs, in arguing that in
Applicant’s marks, the phrases CAPITAL GROUP and PRIVATE CLIENT are as
significant as the word IDEAL, and transform the meaning of Applicant’s three
marks when they are considered in their entireties.
The Examining Attorney argues that consumers are likely to “perceive the term
IDEAL as the dominant feature of all five marks because it is the first and only term
in each of the marks that is distinctive,” 12 TTABVUE 4, and rejects Applicant’s
arguments regarding the significance of CAPITAL GROUP and PRIVATE CLIENT
because the “descriptive nature of the wording renders its impact on purchasers less
significant than the word ‘IDEAL’.” Id. He concludes that “in the case of IDEAL
CAPITAL GROUP, consumers will simply understand that applicant is an
investment group that raises capital for real estate investments,” and that “in the
case of IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT, consumers will simply understand that the

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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intended users of applicant’s investment services are private clients,” id., because
“these additional words are too descriptive in nature to have the level of impact on
the commercial impression that applicant alludes to.” Id. at 4-5. He reiterated these
arguments at the oral hearing.
We find that the word IDEAL is the dominant portion of Applicant’s standard-
character marks IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP and IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT. The
word IDEAL is the first word in the marks and “consumers are more likely to notice
and remember the first elements of a trademark . . . .” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL
1638376, at *6 (finding SAGE to be the dominant portion of the marks SAGE
CENTRAL and SAGEFORTH) (citations omitted). Applicant has disclaimed the
words GROUP and CLIENT and the record shows that in the context of the involved
services, the phrases CAPITAL GROUP36 and PRIVATE CLIENT37 have no source-
identifying significance.38 In addition, Applicant’s specimens of use of its standard-
36 August 13, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 26, 42 (dictionary definitions showing that “capital”
means a “large sum of money . . . which you invest to make more money” and “group” means
“a number of persons . . . classified together because of common characteristics, community
of interests, etc.” (COLLINS DICTIONARY)), 51-68 (third-party registrations of marks for
various investment services, including real estate investment services, in which the phrase
CAPITAL GROUP has been disclaimed) (Ser. Nos. 98352828 and 98355188).
37 August 13, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 25 (webpage stating that “private clients typically
refer to individuals and families looking to invest their wealth” while “institutional clients
encompass companies or organizations that pool funds to achieve specific goals on behalf of
owners and potentially other stakeholders” (analystprep.com)), 30 (webpage defining “private
clients” as “[i]ndividual private investors as opposed to institutions as customers of a stock
broker or fund manager” (THE FINANCE TALKING ONLINE FINANCIAL GLOSSARY
(financetalking.com)), 31-51 (webpages discussing “private client services” provided by
Charles Schwab, J.P. Morgan, and Zacks) (Ser. No. 98353045).
38 Our finding that IDEAL is the dominant portion of Applicant’s standard-character marks
is entirely consistent with the Federal Circuit’s Hearst Corp. decision cited by Applicant’s
counsel at the oral hearing. In that case, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision
affirming a refusal to register VARGA GIRL for calendars over a registration of VARGAS for

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 18 -
character marks shown above display the marks in a manner that emphasizes the
word IDEAL as the identifier of the source of the services, and deemphasizes the non-
source identifying suffix phrases CAPITAL GROUP and PRIVATE CLIENT.
With respect to Applicant’s stylized IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP mark, which we
reproduce again below,
“because of the position, size and bolding of the term [IDEAL], this single term
dominates the commercial impression of Applicant’s mark.” In re Aquitaine Wine
USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, at *3 (TTAB 2018).
Finally, with respect to the cited IDEAL SALE mark, the word IDEAL is the first
portion of the mark and the registrant has disclaimed the exclusive right to use SALE
apart from the mark as shown. We find that the word IDEAL is the dominant portion
of the cited mark.
the same goods. The Board had found that VARGA was the dominant element of the
applicant’s mark, but the Federal Circuit held that the Board had given inadequate weight
to the word GIRL because “the appearance, sound, sight, and commercial impression of
VARGA GIRL derive significant contribution from the component ‘girl’.” Hearst Corp., 982
F.2d at 494. Nothing in the Federal Circuit’s decision indicates that the word GIRL had been
disclaimed by the applicant, or that it otherwise had any descriptive or other non-source
identifying significance in the context of the involved goods. Here, by contrast, the record
shows that the suffix phrases CAPITAL GROUP and PRIVATE CLIENT have no source-
identifying significance in the context of “real estate investment services,” and “the
appearance, sound, sight, and commercial impression of” Applicant’s marks do not “derive
significant contribution from the component[s]” CAPITAL GROUP and PRIVATE CLIENT.
Id.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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We turn now to the required comparisons of the marks in their entireties, giving
greater weight in those comparisons to the word IDEAL than to the other elements
of the respective marks.
1. Serial No. 98352828
The compared marks in the appeal in Serial No. 98352828 are IDEAL CAPITAL
GROUP and IDEAL SALE, both in standard characters. Both marks contain the
identical word IDEAL as their lead and dominant element.
Applicant argues that its mark “adds the important phrase ‘CAPITAL GROUP,’
and uniquely uses ‘IDEAL’ as an acronym (Income, Depreciation, Equity,
Appreciation, Leverage), reinforcing a proprietary investment philosophy that sets it
apart.” 4 TTABVUE 10-11.39 Applicant further argues that
[t]he combination of Applicant’s distinctive stylization,
acronym meaning, and the additional phrase “CAPITAL
GROUP” further differentiates it from the cited marks,
both visually and conceptually. Accordingly, the USPTO’s
analysis must look beyond the superficial presence of the
shared word “IDEAL” and assess whether the totality of
the marks — including their visual presentation,
embedded meaning, suffixes, and commercial context —
creates a distinct and separate commercial impression.
Here, it clearly does. Consumers encountering IDEAL
CAPITAL GROUP’s standard characters mark would not
reasonably believe it comes from the same source as IDEAL
FUTURES or IDEAL SALE, which lack any comparable
layered meaning.
39 Applicant’s arguments for dissimilarity in each appeal are made against the backdrop of
what Applicant claims is the coexistence on the Register of multiple IDEAL-formative marks
in “the same general industry space without evidence of marketplace confusion, precisely
because consumers rely on the additional distinguishing words, suffixes, stylization, and
commercial context to tell them apart.” 4 TTABVUE 10. Third-party marks should be
discussed under the sixth DuPont factor, not under the first factor. Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd.,
71 F.4th 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2023). We address Applicant’s arguments regarding third-
party marks below in our discussion of the sixth DuPont factor.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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. . .
Applicant’s mark goes well beyond merely appending a
generic or descriptive phrase. It introduces the meaningful
composite “CAPITAL GROUP,” which conveys a distinct
corporate and institutional identity. Additionally,
Applicant has submitted evidence showing that “IDEAL”
in its mark operates not merely as a common adjective but
as an acronym representing its unique investment
philosophy — Income, Depreciation, Equity, Appreciation,
Leverage — further strengthening its distinctiveness.
Id. at 11-12.
The Examining Attorney responds that Applicant’s mark and the cited marks
“contain the identical first word IDEAL,” 12 TTABVUE 3, that “[t]he only differences
between the literal components of the marks is that applicant’s marks contain the
additional descriptive wording ‘CAPITAL GROUP’ . . . and the registrants’ marks
contain the additional descriptive wording ‘FUTURES’ and ‘SALE,’” id.,40 and that
“these differences do not significantly affect the likelihood of confusion analysis”
because “[c]onsumers are generally more inclined to focus on and remember the first
word, prefix, or syllable in a mark.” Id. (citation omitted).
According to the Examining Attorney, “[i]t is reasonable . . . to conclude that
consumers will look more to the identical first terms, the only distinctive terms in
each of the compared marks, IDEAL, as identifiers of the commercial source of the
services,” and Applicant’s “assertion that the wording ‘CAPITAL GROUP’ . . .
significantly changes the commercial impression of the mark is unpersuasive as the
40 As noted above, the Examining Attorney submitted identical briefs in the three appeals
following their consolidation, and addressed all three of Applicant’s marks and both of the
cited marks.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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descriptive nature of the wording renders its impact on purchasers less significant
than the word ‘IDEAL.’” Id. The Examining Attorney concludes that “in the case of
IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP, consumers will simply understand that applicant is an
investment group that raises capital for real estate investments . . . .” Id.
With respect to the alleged status of IDEAL as an acronym, the Examining
Attorney argues that “the mark itself does not include the acronym meaning, nor was
evidence provided to show that IDEAL is commonly understood as an acronym in
relation to applicant’s services” and that “there are not even full stops present in
between each letter of the mark to stimulate the thought of IDEAL being an
acronym.” Id. at 5.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that there is nothing on the face of the
mark to suggest that the word IDEAL is an acronym for “Income, Depreciation,
Equity, Appreciation, Leverage,” 4 TTABVUE 12, rather than the English adjective
meaning “exactly right for a particular purpose, person, or situation,”41 and the first
word in Applicant’s trade name “Ideal Capital Group Holdings, LLC,” because in each
of Applicant’s three marks, IDEAL “is not depicted with periods or anything that
would indicate that” IDEAL abbreviates something. Max Cap. Grp., 2010 WL 22358,
at *5. Applicant claims that the acronym significance of the word IDEAL “is explained
on Applicant’s website,” 4 TTABVUE 7, but there is no evidence that Applicant
41 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com, last accessed on February 17,
2026). The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including definitions
from online dictionaries that exist in printed format or have fixed regular editions. See, e.g.,
In re Nursecon, LLC, No. 88052194, 2024 WL 5265079, at *10 n.64 (TTAB 2024) (citation
omitted).

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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promotes the understanding of IDEAL as an acronym because with the limited
exception of Applicant’s specimens, Applicant’s website and other materials are not
in the record, and the argument of its counsel “is no substitute for evidence.” Ye Mystic
Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 WL 2953731, at *6 n.15 (quoting Cai v. Diamond Hong,
Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted)).
The marks IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP and IDEAL SALE “are visually similar, as
both begin with the word” IDEAL. Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *6. “The
second elements of the marks are different, and some consumers may notice and
recall the difference,” but “the marks share the same structure, starting with the
dominant [IDEAL] element and then add a second [element] to create a[n] [IDEAL-]
formative mark. This structure results in marks that look like variations on a[n]
[IDEAL] theme.” Id. “The common [IDEAL] element of the marks anchors them in a
way to the same theme and creates a risk that consumers will mistakenly assume
connections between the services provided under the marks.” Id. “This type of
similarity increases the likelihood of confusion.” Id. We find that IDEAL CAPITAL
GROUP and IDEAL SALE are similar in appearance.
With respect to sound, as noted above, “ideal” is a known word in English and thus
has an established pronunciation and, as a result, “the first and dominant . . . element
of each mark will sound identical. The marks as a whole sound partially different,
but the shared . . . element will have the same impact when spoken or heard as it
does when seen.” Id. “The risk here is that consumers will believe that [Applicant and
the registrant] are connected because of their shared use of the word [IDEAL],

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 23 -
featured so prominently in their marks used for [identical] services.” Id. We find that
IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP and IDEAL SALE are similar in sound.
Finally, with respect to meaning, as discussed above, there is nothing on the face
of the mark or in record evidence to show that the word IDEAL has one meaning as
an acronym when used in Applicant’s mark, and “a separate and different meaning”
when used in the cited mark in connection with identical services. Embiid, 2021 WL
2285576, at *9. We find that the word IDEAL has the same mildly laudatory meaning
in both marks when used in connection with identical services, and the marks as a
whole, when considered in connection with the involved services, both conjure up the
idea of “exactly right” real estate investment services.
The IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP and IDEAL SALE marks are similar in all means
of comparison, and the first DuPont factor supports a conclusion that confusion is
likely with respect to these marks.
2. Serial No. 98353045
The compared marks in the appeal in Serial No. 98353045 are IDEAL PRIVATE
CLIENT and IDEAL SALE, both in standard characters. Both of these marks also
contain the identical word IDEAL as their lead and dominant element.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney make essentially the same substantive
arguments in this appeal as they make in the appeal in Serial No. 98352828. 4
TTABVUE 9-12, 12 TTABVUE 3-6. Our analysis of the similarity of the marks in this
appeal closely tracks our analysis of the similarity of the marks in that case.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 24 -
There is again no evidence on the face of Applicant’s IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT
mark or in the file history of the application that in Applicant’s mark, the word
IDEAL is an acronym or has any meaning other than its ordinary meaning in English.
With respect to appearance, IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT and IDEAL SALE also
“are visually similar, as both begin with the word” IDEAL. Sage Therapeutics, 2024
WL 1638376, at *6. The second elements of the marks are again different, and “some
consumers may notice and recall the difference,” but “the marks share the same
structure, starting with the dominant [IDEAL] element and then add a second
[element] to create a[n] [IDEAL-] formative mark.” Id. This structure again results
in marks that look like variations on an IDEAL theme when used in connection with
identical services. Id. The common IDEAL element of the marks again “anchors them
in a way to the same theme and creates a risk that consumers will mistakenly assume
connections between the services provided under the marks.” Id. We find that IDEAL
PRIVATE CLIENT and IDEAL SALE are similar in appearance.
With respect to sound, the known word “IDEAL” will be pronounced the same way
in both marks, and while the marks as a whole may sound partially different due to
their different suffixes, the dominant word IDEAL has a significant impact on the
sound of the marks when they are verbalized. Once again, consumers are likely to
believe that Applicant and the registrant “are connected because of their shared use
of the word [‘ideal’], featured so prominently in their marks used for [identical]
services.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *6.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 25 -
As to meaning, we find again that the word IDEAL will have the same mildly
laudatory meaning in both marks, and that in Applicant’s mark, the suffix words
PRIVATE CLIENT will indicate that Applicant’s “exactly right” real estate
investment services are directed to individual, not institutional, investors.
The IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT and IDEAL SALE marks are similar in all means
of comparison, and the first DuPont factor supports a conclusion that confusion is
likely with respect to these marks.
3. Serial No. 98355188
The mark in Application Serial No. 98355188 is the stylized version of Applicant’s
IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP mark reproduced again below:
This mark also shares the word IDEAL with the cited mark IDEAL SALE.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney make essentially the same substantive
arguments in this appeal as they make in the appeal in Serial No. 98352828, 4
TTABVUE 9-12, 12 TTABVUE 3-6, but in this appeal, they both also address what
Applicant calls the “distinctive stylization” of its mark, 4 TTABVUE 11, which
Applicant claims consists of “a stylized design containing distinctive visual elements,
including a stylized rendering of the word ‘IDEAL’ with color features and graphic
components.”42 Id. Applicant contrasts this stylization with the appearance of both of
42 As noted above, the colors blue, dark blue, light blue, and white are claimed as a feature of
the mark.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 26 -
the cited marks, which Applicant argues are “registered as standard character marks,
covering only plain word usage without any stylization, logo, or visual presentation.”
Id. at 12. According to Applicant, the “law is clear that special form marks can create
significantly different commercial impressions from standard character marks, even
when the wording overlaps.” Id. (citing TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“TMEP”) Section 1207.01(c)(iii)).
The Examining Attorney responds that “the stylization and design elements of
[Applicant’s] mark does [sic] not obviate the likelihood of confusion because both
registrants’ marks are in standard characters and can appear with a similar design
and stylization,” 12 TTABVUE 5 (citations omitted), and that “an applicant cannot,
by presenting its mark in special form, avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark that
is registered in standard characters because the registered mark presumably could
be used in the same manner of display.” Id. (citations omitted). The Examining
Attorney concludes that
given the lesser impact design elements and stylization
generally have on the commercial impression of a mark,
along with the minimal stylization or design elements
found in applicant’s mark, it is clear that the design or
stylization in applicant’s mark does not significantly
change the commercial impression of the mark to help
avoid confusion.
Id.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that the stylization of Applicant’s mark
does not make confusion unlikely. The cited IDEAL SALE mark is registered in
standard characters and “could be used in any typeface, color, or size, including the
same stylization actually used or intended to be used by [Applicant], or one that

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 27 -
minimizes the differences or emphasizes the similarities between the
marks.” Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., No. 91194148, 2015 WL
5316485, at *8 (TTAB 2015) (citing Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637
F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (the “registrant is entitled to depictions of the
standard character mark regardless of font style, size, or color, not merely ‘reasonable
manners’ of depicting its standard character mark.”)). Accordingly, we must assume
that the cited IDEAL SALE mark could be displayed in the same font style, size, and
colors in which the word IDEAL appears in Applicant’s mark, which identical display
would “minimize[ ] the differences or emphasize[ ] the similarities between the
marks.” Id. Particularly in that visualized display, but also when the cited mark
IDEAL SALE appears in block letters, the marks are similar in appearance due to
the common presence of the word IDEAL, and the far less prominent display of the
non-source identifying words CAPITAL GROUP in Applicant’s mark.
The marks are also similar in sound because of the common presence of the word
IDEAL, especially given the display of the words in Applicant’s mark, which
emphasizes IDEAL over CAPITAL GROUP and encourages consumers to verbalize
Applicant’s mark simply as “Ideal” by engaging in the “‘penchant of consumers to
shorten marks.’” Iron Balls Int’l Ltd. v. Bull Creek Brewing, LLC, No. 92079099, 2024
WL 2844425, at *25 (TTAB 2024) (quoting In re Bay State Brewing Co., No. 85826258,
2016 WL 1045677, at *3 (TTAB 2016) (citing In Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 815
(CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring) (“the users of language have a universal habit of
shortening full names from haste or laziness or just economy of words.”)).

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 28 -
Finally, with respect to meaning, the stylization of the letter “E” in the word
IDEAL in Applicant mark does nothing to show that the word as a whole would be
understood to be an acronym, or to have any meaning other than as a mildly
laudatory term touting Applicant’s services and the first word in Applicant’s trade
name. We find that the marks as a whole both conjure up the idea of “exactly right”
real estate investment services.
The stylized IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP mark and the IDEAL SALE mark are
similar in all means of comparison, and the first DuPont factor supports a conclusion
that confusion is likely with respect to these marks.
C. The Fourth DuPont Factor
The fourth DuPont factor considers the “conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i. e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361. According to Applicant, “[t]he applicable legal standard evaluates
the ‘degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers’ under the standard of the
‘reasonably prudent consumer.’” 4 TTABVUE 16 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc.
v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)).
Applicant misidentifies the applicable legal standard. As explained above, we
must apply the law of the Federal Circuit, not the law of regional circuit courts, and
the applicable standard under Federal Circuit law is that of the “least sophisticated
potential purchasers” of the services identified in the application. Stone Lion Cap.
Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal
Circuit has made clear that we must determine the degree of care likely to be

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 29 -
exercised by the “least sophisticated potential purchasers” of the involved “real estate
investment services” based on the language of the identification of services in the
application, not based on the possible sophistication of Applicant’s actual current
consumers, id. at 1323-24, “because the services recited in the application determine
the scope of the post-grant benefit of registration.” Id. at 1324.
Without citing any record evidence, Applicant argues in each appeal that
“[c]onsumers of Applicant’s services — high-net-worth individuals and institutional
investors — exercise a high degree of care in selecting financial and investment
partners,” 4 TTABVUE 16, and that its “clientele are expected to exercise
considerable caution, conduct due diligence, and have industry knowledge — sharply
reducing the possibility that they would mistake IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP for
IDEAL FUTURES or IDEAL SALE.” Id. at 16-17.
Although “the [real estate investment] services recited in the application also
encompass sophisticated investors,” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325, they are not limited
on the face of the identification to what Applicant calls “high-net-worth individuals
and institutional investors,” 4 TTABVUE 16, and they must be deemed to encompass
ordinary investors. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325 (holding that “the Board properly
considered all potential investors for the recited [investment advisory, management
of investment funds, and fund investment] services, including ordinary consumers
seeking to invest in services with no minimum investment requirement”) (emphasis
in bold here in italics in Stone Lion). Ordinary consumers “will exercise care when
making financial decisions,” but “are not immune from source confusion where

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 30 -
similar marks are used in connection with [identical] services.” Id. (citation omitted).
The fourth DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis of the likelihood of confusion in
all three appeals.
D. The Fifth DuPont Factor
The fifth DuPont factor considers the “fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising,
length of use).” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Applicant argues in each appeal that
Here, the record contains no evidence whatsoever that the
cited marks — such as IDEAL FUTURES or IDEAL SALE
— possess any degree of fame or marketplace renown.
There is no evidence of widespread advertising, no evidence
of unsolicited media attention, no evidence of significant
sales or market share, no evidence of general consumer
recognition, and no surveys or other consumer perception
data demonstrating fame. Indeed, Applicant is unaware of
any material use or reputation for these marks beyond
their registration entries.
Without the elevated protective shield granted to truly
famous marks, the cited registrations — all of which
contain the common and diluted term “IDEAL” — are
entitled to only ordinary, narrow protection, consistent
with their actual marketplace footprint.
4 TTABVUE 17.
Applicant’s argument is meritless. “Because of the nature of the evidence required
to establish the fame of a registered mark, the Board does not expect Trademark
Examining Attorneys to submit evidence as to the fame of the cited mark in an ex
parte proceeding, and they do not usually do so.” In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, No. 86040643,
2016 WL 1380730, at *2 (TTAB 2016) (citation omitted). “Rather, in an ex
parte appeal the ‘fame of the mark’ factor is normally treated as neutral because the

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 31 -
record generally includes no evidence as to fame.” Id. We will treat the fifth DuPont
factor as neutral in all three appeals.
E. The Sixth DuPont Factor
Because the IDEAL SALE mark shown in the cited ’065 Registration “is registered
on the Principal Register, with no claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f),
we presume it is inherently distinctive, i.e., that it is at worst suggestive of the
[services].” Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, at *18
(TTAB 2024) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)). The sixth DuPont factor considers the
“number and nature of similar marks in use with similar goods,” DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361, and the “existence of third-party registrations on similar goods [or services]
can bear on a mark’s conceptual strength,” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1363 (citing Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), because
“third-party registrations containing an element that is common to both . . . marks
can show that that element has ‘a normally understood and well-recognized
descriptive or suggestive meaning.’” Id. (quoting Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur
Draussen GmbH v. New Millenium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2015)).
Applicant argues in each appeal that “the widespread coexistence of similar
‘IDEAL’ marks within the financial and real estate sectors demonstrates that the
shared term is a weak and diluted element, entitled to only narrow protection” and
that “[n]umerous third-party uses and registrations containing ‘IDEAL’ reflect the
reality that consumers are accustomed to encountering similar terms in this crowded

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 32 -
field without assuming common source or affiliation.” 4 TTABVUE 17-18. Applicant
claims that “there are at least 17 live ‘IDEAL’ marks currently operating in the real
estate and financial sectors, including IDEAL HOMES, IDEAL LENDING, IDEAL
TITLE, IDEAL OFFER, IDEAL SALE, IDEAL LIVING, IDEAL AGENT, IDEAL
SPACES, IDEAL RATE, IDEAL WEALTH GROWER, and others.” Id. at 10.
The Examining Attorney responds in each appeal that “applicant has not provided
evidence to support this claim” and that “to make third-party registrations part of the
record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete
electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.” 12
TTABVUE 8 (citations omitted). The Examining Attorney states that “the
registrations applicant has alluded to will not be considered and applicant’s
argument of dilution is unpersuasive.” Id. The Examining Attorney repeated his
objection to the third-party registrations at the oral hearing.
Applicant did not make any of the referenced third-party registrations of record
during prosecution of any of its three applications, and the “Board does not take
judicial notice of registrations and a list of registrations does not make those
registrations of record.” In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, No. 86705287, 2018 WL
3570240, at *6 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citation omitted). At the oral hearing, Applicant’s
counsel acknowledged that the third-party registrations were not in the record, and
stated that Applicant was relying solely on the coexistence of the two cited
registrations inter se. Even assuming that the cited registrations could be considered
“third-party registrations,” cf. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No.

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
- 33 -
91223352, 2022 WL 2188890, at *15 (TTAB 2022) (the opposer’s own registrations
“are not ‘third-party registrations’” under the sixth DuPont factor), the coexistence of
the two cited registrations is “a far cry from the large quantum of evidence of third-
party use and third-party registrations that was held to be significant” in Jack
Wolfskin and Juice Generation. Inn at St. John’s, 2018 WL 2734893, at *4.
Whether adequate proof of the conceptual weakness of the cited IDEAL SALE
mark “was in fact available but simply was not gathered and proffered by [Applicant]
is not a subject on which we can, should or do speculate. Rather, we must take the
record as [Applicant] made it.” T.A.B. Sys. v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). The record as Applicant made it does not show the conceptual weakness
of the cited IDEAL SALE mark, and the sixth DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis
of the likelihood of confusion in all three appeals. We will accord the cited IDEAL
SALE mark “the normal scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks
are entitled.” Iron Balls, 2024 WL 2844425, at *15 (citation omitted).
F. The Eighth DuPont Factor
The eighth DuPont factor considers “[t]he length of time during and conditions
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Generally, this factor is “not that important in ex parte
cases unless the applicant provides us with contextual evidence that allows us to
meaningfully assess the length of time and degree to which the applicant’s and
registrant’s commercial activities would have provided an opportunity for confusion
to have manifested itself if it were likely.” Embiid, 2021 WL 2285576, at *19 (citing

Serial Nos. 98352828, 98353045, and 98355188 (Consolidated)
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In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020 WL 1639916, at *8 (TTAB 2020) (“our
analysis as to the second, third, and fourth du Pont factors, discussing the similarity
or dissimilarity of the services, channels of trade, and relevant consumers, is based,
as dictated by precedent from the Federal Circuit, on the identifications as set
forth in the application and the cited registration . . . [but] the eighth duPont factor,
by contrast . . . requires us to look at actual market conditions, to the extent there
is evidence of such conditions of record.”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted)).
In Guild Mortg., the applicant provided evidence of those “actual market
conditions” in the form of a declaration from a corporate executive establishing facts
regarding the applicant’s use of its mark, as well as evidence regarding the use of the
cited registered mark. Guild Mortg., 2020 WL 1639916, at *8-9. The record here is
devoid of such evidence. Instead, Applicant’s counsel simply argues that
[h]ere, the parties’ services have coexisted in the real estate
and financial services marketplace without any known
incidents of consumer confusion. This absence is
particularly meaningful because it demonstrates that even
where consumers encounter multiple “IDEAL” marks in
the same broad industry, they are readily able to
distinguish between providers based on additional brand
elements, visual presentation, and service context.
While evidence of actual confusion is not a prerequisite to
finding likelihood of confusion, the complete absence of
such evidence over time supports the conclusion that the
relevant consumers are not confused. Therefore, this factor
weighs strongly in favor of registration.
4 TTABVUE 18.
Applicant’s argument is not evidence of peaceful coexistence, but it is also belied
by Applicant’s argument elsewhere in its appeal briefs that it and the cited registrant

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are separated geographically and that “[t]he absence of overlapping customer
exposure due to these geographic differences further reduces the likelihood that
consumers would encounter both services or assume a connection between them.” Id.
at 19-20. Accepting Applicant’s argument regarding “geographic differences” at face
value for purposes of the eighth DuPont factor only, there has not been “a
significant opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred.” Keystone Consol.
Indus., Inc. v. Franklin Inv. Corp., No. 92066927, 2024 WL 3771168, at *24 (TTAB
2024). The eighth DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis of the likelihood of
confusion in all three appeals.
G. Other DuPont Factors
Under the argument heading “8-13: Remaining Factors,” 4 TTABVUE 18
(emphasis supplied by Applicant), Applicant argues in each appeal that “[t]here is no
evidence of marketplace interaction, bad faith, or expansion plans that would
increase the potential for confusion,” and that the “extent of potential confusion is
minimal, especially given the specific market segments, consumer care levels, and
branding distinctions outlined above.” Id. at 19. These arguments appear to allude to
the tenth DuPont factor, the “market interface between applicant and the owner of a
prior mark,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, the twelfth factor, the “extent of potential
confusion, i. e., whether de minimis or substantial,” id., and possibly the thirteenth
factor, “[a]ny other established fact probative of the effect of use.” Id. Applicant offers
no evidence or developed arguments directed to these factors, and we “need not
consider these factors.” Heil Co., 2024 WL 4925901, at *37.

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H. Summary
The key first and second DuPont factors, and the third factor, support a conclusion
that confusion is likely in all three appeals, and the other applicable DuPont factors
are neutral in all three appeals. The services identified in each of Applicant’s
applications and in the cited ’065 Registration are identical, and the channels of trade
and classes of consumers for those services are thus identical as well, and the fact
that the services are identical reduces the degree of similarity between the marks
necessary for confusion to be likely. Each of Applicant’s three marks is sufficiently
similar to the cited IDEAL SALE mark for confusion to be likely. We conclude that
consumers with a general recollection of the cited IDEAL SALE mark for real estate
investment services who separately encounter Applicant’s standard-character and
stylized IDEAL CAPITAL GROUP marks and Applicant’s IDEAL PRIVATE CLIENT
mark for the identical real estate investment services are likely to conclude
mistakenly that the services have a common source.
Decision: The Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion refusals to register are affirmed
in each of the three consolidated appeals.43
43 Because we have affirmed the Section 2(d) refusals in each appeal, we need not and do not
reach the refusals in each appeal based on the disclaimer requirements. See, e.g., In re Sheet
Pile, LLC, No. 97010763, 2024 WL 1175785, at *6 (TTAB 2024).