Magdalena Bauza

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: January 30, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Magdalena Bauza
_____
Serial No. 98593407
_____
Magdalena Bauza, pro se.1
Janice McMorrow, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 115,
Daniel Brody, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Pologeorgis, Larkin, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Magdalena Bauza (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard-character mark LEGAL PEACEMAKERS for “Attorney services; Attorney
services, namely, representation of clients in Family Law matters” in International
Class 45.2
1 Ms. Bauza is an attorney. Her address of record in the application is in New York, but her
specimen of use refers to legal services provided in Florida.
2 Application Serial No. 98593407 was filed on June 10, 2024 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark and
first use of the mark in commerce in 2024. Applicant has disclaimed the exclusive right to
use LEGAL apart from the mark as shown.

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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that it
so resembles the mark PEACEMAKER in a typed drawing,3 registered on the
Principal Register for “conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration services” in
International Class 42,4 as to be likely, when used in connection with the services
identified in the application, to cause confusion.
Applicant appealed when the Examining Attorney made the refusal final.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed briefs.5 We affirm the refusal to
register.
I. Record on Appeal6
The record on appeal includes (1) Applicant’s specimen of use;7 (2) dictionary
definitions of the words “legal,” “arbitration,” and “mediation;”8 (3) USPTO electronic
3 “Prior to November 2, 2003, ‘standard character’ drawings were known as ‘typed’ drawings.
A typed or typeset mark is the legal equivalent of a standard character mark.” Heil Co. v.
Tripleye GmbH, Opp. No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, at *26 n.121 (TTAB 2024) (citing In
re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
4 The cited Registration No. 2196942 issued on October 20, 1998 and was most recently
renewed in 2018.
5 Citations in this opinion to the briefs refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing
system. The number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any
numbers following TTABVUE refer to the page(s) of the docket entry where the cited
materials appear. Applicant’s brief appears at 4 TTABVUE and the Examining Attorney’s
brief appears at 6 TTABVUE. Applicant’s filing gives literal meaning to the word “brief,” as
it consists of a little more than four pages of text.
6 Citations in this opinion to the application record are to pages in the downloadable .pdf
version of the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
7 June 10, 2024 Application at TSDR 7.
8 December 18, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 16-25 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY); March
18, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 6-19 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).

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records regarding the cited registration;9 (4) pages from third-party websites at
reselawoffice.com captioned “What Happens When An Attorney Is On Your Side In
Mediation;”10 divorcefirm.net captioned “Virginia Arbitration Lawyer;”11
varnumlaw.com captioned “Arbitration vs. Mediation in Family Law Cases;”12
aaml.org captioned “The Use of Mediation and Arbitration for Resolving Family Law
Conflicts: What Lawyers Think About Them;”13 and peoples-law.org discussing
“Family Mediation;”14 (5) pages from Applicant’s website at legalpeacemakers.com;15
and (6) Applicant’s application in Florida for the fictitious business name “Legal
Peacemakers.”16
II. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Our determination
of the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
9 December 18, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 26-27.
10 Id. at TSDR 28-30.
11 Id. at TSDR 31-34.
12 March 18, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 20-26.
13 Id. at TSDR 27-28.
14 Id. at TSDR 29-32.
15 March 15, 2025 Response to Office Action at TSDR 8-10.
16 Id. at TSDR 11.

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confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“Two key factors in every Section 2(d) case are the first two factors regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods or services, because the
fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” DC Comics
v. Cellular Nerd LLC, Opp. No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *10 (TTAB 2022)
(internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).
Applicant’s brief focuses primarily on these two key factors. 4 TTABVUE 2-3. In
three section headings, Applicant also refers to “DuPont factor[ ] 3,” the “similarity
or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels,” DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361, 4 TTABVUE 3 (emphasis supplied by Applicant), “DuPont factor 4,” the
“conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i. e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful,
sophisticated purchasing,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 4 TTABVUE 4 (emphasis
supplied by Applicant), and “DuPont factor 6,” the “number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 4 TTABVUE 4 (emphasis
supplied by Applicant). We address the first, second, and fourth factors, but we find
immediately below that the third and sixth factors are inapplicable on this record.
Applicant does not discuss the third factor, or even mention trade channels, in the
argument section beneath the section heading quoted above. “Because there is no

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argument or record evidence directed to [this factor], we have not considered [it] in
our analysis of the likelihood of confusion.” In re Embiid, Ser. No. 88202890, 2021
WL 2285576, at *3 n.26 (TTAB 2021).
Applicant’s reference to the sixth factor in her one-paragraph argument is a
misnomer. Applicant does not identify any “similar marks in use on similar goods [or
services],” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361,17 but instead argues that the Board may take
judicial notice that “Merriam-Webster defines ‘peacemaker’ as ‘a person who settles
an argument,’ synonymous with ‘mediator/conciliator,’”18 which according to
Applicant “makes PEACEMAKER at best suggestive for mediation and arbitration
services.” 4 TTABVUE 4.19 Applicant further argues that “the added, leading term
17 Applicant argues that the Federal Circuit has held that “where third-party use showed a
‘considerable number of sources’ employing the shared term, . . . ‘the addition of a house mark
or other material to a common weak term is often sufficient to avoid confusion,’” 4 TTABVUE
4 (quoting Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2015)),
and that “‘extensive evidence of third-party use’ of paw prints rendered the shared element
conceptually weak, giving greater weight to differences in the marks,” id. (quoting Jack
Wolfskin Ausrustung fur Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), but she does not provide evidence of a single third-party use or
registration of a PEACEMAKER-formative mark.
18 We construe Applicant’s argument that “[t]he TTAB may take judicial notice of dictionary
definitions,” 4 TTABVUE 4, as a request that we take judicial notice of the cited meaning of
the word “peacemaker” from the MERRIAM-WEBSTER dictionary as “a person who settles an
argument.” Applicant did not attach the referenced definition to her brief, but we grant her
request. In re Jimmy Moore LLC, Ser. No. 86353015, 2016 WL 6819242, at *3 (TTAB 2016).
We note, however, that the meaning cited by Applicant appears in the “Kids Definition”
portion of the cited online MERRIAM-WEBSTER dictionary. The first MERRIAM-WEBSTER
definition of “peacemaker” is “one who makes peace especially by reconciling parties at
variance” (merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peacemaker, last accessed on January 27, 2026).
19 The cited registration issued on the Principal Register without a showing of acquired
distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), and we must
presume that the cited mark is inherently distinctive. Heil Co., 2024 WL 4925901, at *14. In
the absence of any evidence of the conceptual weakness of the cited mark, we accord it “the
normal scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks are entitled.” Iron Balls

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LEGAL—together with pluralization—meaningfully changes the commercial
impression, tipping the balance against likely confusion,” id., an argument that we
will consider under the first DuPont factor. Because Applicant made no third-party
marks of record, the sixth DuPont factor is inapplicable.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, Ser. No. 90522364, 2025
WL 2953731, at *4 (TTAB 2025) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in
any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”
Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sageforth Psych. Servs., LLC, Opp. No. 91270181, 2024 WL
1638376, at *5 (TTAB 2024) (quoting In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, Ser. No. 87075988,
2018 WL 2734893, at *5 (TTAB 2018) (citation omitted), aff’d per curiam, 777 F.
App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d
728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or
sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting Coach
Int’l Ltd. v. Bull Creek Brewing, LLC, Canc. No. 92079099, 2024 WL 2844425, at *15 (TTAB
2024) (citation omitted).

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Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “The
focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally ‘retains a general
rather than a specific impression of marks.’” Id. (quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, Ser.
No. 85916778, 2018 WL 3993582, at *4 (TTAB 2018) (citations omitted)). The
“average purchasers” here include purchasers of the services identified in the
application and in the cited registration, which by their nature may include both
businesses and individuals requiring legal advice and representation, conflict
counseling, and mediation and arbitration services.
The involved marks are PEACEMAKER and LEGAL PEACEMAKERS, both in
standard characters. Applicant argues that “[t]he Examining Attorney’s ‘shared
dominant term’ approach over-weights the common word PEACEMAKER and under-
weights the leading word LEGAL and the plural construction in Applicant’s mark.” 4
TTABVUE 2. According to Applicant, her mark “LEGAL PEACEMAKERS
communicates a team of legal professionals who actively resolve disputes,” while the
cited mark “PEACEMAKER (singular) evokes a neutral conciliator,” and “[t]hose
distinct connotations matter in the legal and ADR context, where consumers weigh
nuance in choosing between advocacy and neutrality.” Id. at 3.
The Examining Attorney responds that “[i]n this case, the dominant wording,
‘PEACEMAKERS’ and ‘PEACEMAKER’ are [sic] nearly identical,” that the
“registrant’s mark consists solely of the word ‘PEACEMAKER,’” and that Applicant’s
mark “simply adds the descriptive adjective ‘LEGAL’, which has been disclaimed, to
the registrant’s mark.” 6 TTABVUE 3. According to the Examining Attorney, “[t]he

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mere addition of a term to a registered mark does not obviate the similarity between
the marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).” Id.
(citation omitted). She further argues that “an applied-for mark that is the singular
or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance,
meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Marks must be considered in their entireties, but “in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.2d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). As discussed
above, Applicant suggests that the first word LEGAL in her mark, which is an
adjective that modifies the second word PEACEMAKERS, is the dominant portion of
the mark, and should be given more weight in the comparison of the marks in their
entireties. 4 TTABVUE 2. We disagree.
“[T]he first of the literal terms in [a] mark typically is the one which creates the
strongest impression,” but “this is not always the case, and disclaimed or descriptive
terms may be considered less significant features of the mark, even when they appear
first.” Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, Opp. No. 91225050, 2023 WL 417620, at *15 (TTAB
2023) (finding that the word MONSTER was the dominant portion of the applicant’s
stylized mark ICE MONSTER for restaurant services) (citations omitted). During

Serial No. 98593407
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prosecution, Applicant disclaimed the exclusive right to use the lead word LEGAL,20
which in its adjective form means “of or relating to law,”21 thus conceding that LEGAL
is at least merely descriptive of the identified services. Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla,
2025 WL 2953731, at *4 (citation omitted). We find that the noun PEACEMAKERS
is the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark. We turn now to the required comparison
of the marks in their entireties, giving greater weight in that comparison to the word
PEACEMAKERS in Applicant’s mark than to the word LEGAL.
Applicant’s mark LEGAL PEACEMAKERS contains the entirety of the cited
PEACEMAKER mark in its plural form,22 and while there is no absolute rule that a
likelihood of confusion exists where an applicant’s mark contains the entirety of a
registered mark, the fact that Applicant’s mark includes the entirety of the cited
registered mark in the plural form increases their similarity. See, e.g., Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Memphis, Tenn., Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556,
557 (CCPA 1975) (BENGAL LANCER for club soda, quinine water and ginger ale
found to be similar to BENGAL for gin); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., Ser. No.
79046106, 2009 WL 1896059, at *3 (TTAB 2009) (VANTAGE TITAN for medical
magnetic resonance imaging diagnostic apparatus found to be similar to TITAN for
20 March 15, 2025 Response to Office Action at TSDR 7.
21 December 18, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 16 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).
22 The fact that a word appears in one mark in the singular and in the other compared mark
in the plural is generally immaterial in the analysis of the marks’ similarity. See, e.g., State
Permits, Inc. v. Fieldvine, Inc., Canc. No. 92075095, 2024 WL 3825297, at *9 (TTAB
2024); Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, Opp. No. 91263919, 2022 WL
16646840, at *20 (TTAB 2022) (“there is no material difference, in a trademark sense,
between the singular and plural forms of a word”) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877,
878 (CCPA 1957)).

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medical ultrasound diagnostic apparatus); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., Ser. No.
597060, 1988 WL 252343, at *2 (TTAB 1988) (MACHO COMBOS for food items found
to be similar to MACHO for restaurant entrees); In re Riddle, Ser. No. 377365, 1985
WL 72011, at *2 (TTAB 1985) (RICHARD PETTY’S ACCU TUNE for automotive
service centers found to be similar to ACCU-TUNE for automotive testing
equipment).
The involved marks PEACEMAKER and LEGAL PEACEMAKERS are both
standard-character marks, and “each could be used in any typeface, color, or size,
including the same stylization actually used or intended to be used by the other party,
or one that minimizes the differences or emphasizes the similarities between the
marks.” Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., Opp. No. 91194148, 2015
WL 5316485, at *8 (TTAB 2015) (citing Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc.,
637 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (the owner of a standard-character mark “is
entitled to depictions of the standard character mark regardless of font style, size, or
color, not merely ‘reasonable manners’ of depicting its standard character mark.”)).
“[I]llustrations of the mark as actually used may assist the T.T.A.B. in visualizing
other forms in which the mark might appear.” Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1353.
Applicant made of record pages from her website at legalpeacemakers.com. On
the masthead of her website, Applicant displayed her standard-character mark as
follows:

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23
This stacked display of the mark is one example of how Applicant’s standard-
character mark might appear, Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1353, in a manner that
“minimizes the differences or emphasizes the similarities between the
marks,” Anheuser-Busch, 2015 WL 5316485, at *8, by emphasizing the word
“Peacemakers,” and the notion of lawyers making “peace,” through the highlighting
of the word “Peace” in blue font.
The PEACEMAKER and LEGAL PEACEMAKERS marks appear and sound alike
because of the common presence in the marks of the word PEACEMAKER in the
singular or plural. Consumers with a general recollection of one of the involved marks
who separately see or hear the other involved mark are unlikely to distinguish the
marks because the word PEACEMAKER appears in the singular in the cited mark
and in the plural in Applicant’s mark. We find that the marks are quite similar in
appearance and sound.
With respect to meaning, both marks connote a service provider in a field of
conflict resolution who “makes peace especially by reconciling parties at variance.”24
Applicant’s argument that “LEGAL PEACEMAKERS communicates a team of legal
professionals who actively resolve disputes, whereas PEACEMAKER (singular)
evokes a neutral conciliator,” 4 TTABVUE 3, is illusory. The marks do not connote
23 March 15, 2025 Response to Office Action at TSDR 8-10.
24 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com, last accessed on January 27,
2026).

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such an “active/passive” or “advocate/neutral” distinction. As Applicant puts it on her
website, “[o]ur attorneys are trained in collaborative law and are committed to
helping clients navigate the legal aspects of divorce without the adversarial approach
typical in traditional litigation.”25 The record shows that both attorneys and
mediators (who may themselves be practicing or retired attorneys, or retired judges)
work actively to resolve disputes through mediation.26 We find that the marks are
quite similar in connotation and commercial impression.
The PEACEMAKER and LEGAL PEACEMAKERS marks are quite similar in
appearance, sound, and meaning. The first DuPont factor strongly supports a
conclusion that confusion is likely. Naterra, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1119
(Fed. Cir. 2024).
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services
“The second DuPont factor considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration . . . .” Detroit
Athletic Co., 903 F.2d at 1306. “This factor considers whether ‘the consuming public
may perceive [the goods or services] as related enough to cause confusion about the
25 March 15, 2025 Response to Office Action at TSDR 9.
26 December 18, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 28 (discussing the roles of attorneys and
mediators, including retired judges, in resolving disputes through the process of mediation),
29-30 (discussing the roles of attorneys and mediators, including retired judges and
“experienced family law attorney mediator[s] who [have] a mediation practice,” in the process
of mediation); March 18, 2025 Final Office Action at 14 (defining “mediation” as “intervention
between conflicting parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or compromise” and “a
means of resolving disputes outside of the judicial system by voluntary participation in
negotiations structured by agreement of the parties and usually conducted under the
guidance and supervision of a trained intermediary” (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY)).

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source or origin of the goods or services.’” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261,
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “In analyzing the services, the Board considers [t]he similarity
or dissimilarity and nature of the services as described in an application or
registration.” In re OSF Healthcare Sys., 2023 WL 6140427, at *4 (TTAB 2023)
(quoting Embiid, 2021 WL 2285576, at *10).
The “‘services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of
confusion.’” Id. (quoting In re Country Oven, Inc., Ser. No. 87354443, 2019 WL
6170483, at *2 (TTAB 2019)).27 “They need only be ‘related in some manner and/or if
the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to
the mistaken belief that [they] emanate from the same source.” Id. (quoting Country
Oven, 2019 WL 6170483, at *2 (quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369 (internal
quotation omitted)).
The relatedness of goods or services may be established based on several types of
evidence, including (1) the language of the involved identifications of goods or
services, which may show, on the face of the identifications, that the goods or services
are literally or legally identical, or otherwise intrinsically related, and (2) evidence of
third-party uses or registrations, which may show that the identified goods or services
27 The “Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity as to each
[service] listed in the description of [services]” in the application. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL
6140427, at *5 (citation omitted). “‘[I]t is sufficient for finding a likelihood of confusion if
relatedness is established for any [service] encompassed by the identification of [services]
within a particular class in the application.” Id. (citations omitted).

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are commonly offered by the same entity under the same mark, or are otherwise
related. Id. at *4 (quotations and citations omitted).
“[W]e must construe the services identified in the cited registration as broadly as
reasonably possible ‘to include all [services] of the nature and type described
therein,’” id. at *5 (quoting In re Solid State Design Inc., Ser. No. 87269041, 2018 WL
287909, at *6 (TTAB 2018) (internal quotation omitted)), and “we must resolve any
ambiguities regarding their coverage in favor of the cited registrant ‘given the
presumptions afforded the registration under Section 7(b)’ of the Trademark Act.” Id.
(quoting In re C.H. Hanson Co., Ser. No. 77983232, 2015 WL 6121759, at *5 (TTAB
2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)). “[W]e must also give the services identified in the
application their full scope in our analysis of the second DuPont factor.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Applicant argues that
[t]he Final Action deems the parties’ services “legally
identical” because the registration is “broad.” That
conclusion does not fit these IDs. Registrant identifies
“conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration services,”
i.e., services of neutral facilitators/decision-makers;
Applicant identifies “attorney services; attorney services,
namely, representation of clients in Family Law matters,”
i.e., advocacy for a client.
4 TTABVUE 3.
Applicant further argues that “[w]here categories are related only at a high level
of generality, the Federal Circuit requires ‘something more’ than mere field adjacency
to equate them,” id., and that “[t]he Federal Circuit requires ‘something more’ than
thematic overlap to treat such categories as related.” Id. at 5 (citing In re Coors

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Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345-47 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d
at 754–55). According to Applicant, “[t]he record here contains no evidence that
consumers would expect a single source to provide both neutral alternative-dispute-
resolution services and client advocacy in family-law representation.” Id. Applicant
concludes that “[o]n this sparse record, relatedness is not established.” Id.
The Examining Attorney responds as follows:
The applicant has argued that consumers will distinguish
these sources in commerce because the advocacy provided
by the applicant is sufficiently distinct from the counseling,
mediation and arbitration provided by the registrant. The
record shows that these are all legal dispute resolution
methods, and that alternative dispute resolution can be
court ordered. The evidence also shows that family law
attorneys are called “counsel”, can assist in finding a
mediator, and can serve as mediators. Finally, the evidence
shows that alternative dispute resolution practices are
common and increasing, in particular, in the field of family
law.
6 TTABVUE 4 (record citations and footnotes omitted).
As an initial matter, Applicant’s arguments that the Examining Attorney must
show “‘something more’ than mere field adjacency to equate them,” 4 TTABVUE 3,
and “‘something more’ than thematic overlap to treat such categories as related,” id.
at 5, are meritless, and Applicant’s reliance on Coors Brewing Co. and St. Helena
Hosp. misapprehends those cases. Those “opinions involved the question of
relatedness of goods and services, limiting the requirement for ‘something more’ to
circumstances where goods are used in the rendering of services and the relatedness
of the goods and services is not evident, well known, or generally recognized.” In re
Samsung Display Co., Ser. No. 90502617, 2024 WL 3451873, at *7 (TTAB 2024).

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Applicant’s argument improperly “seeks to extend the limited, ‘something more’
principle discussed in Coors Brewing Co. and St. Helena Hosp. to circumstances
involving a comparison of [services], which goes beyond its intended application.” Id.
(citation omitted).
“We ‘begin with the identifications of . . . services in the registration and
application under consideration.’” OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *5 (quoting
Country Oven, 2019 WL 6170483, at *3). The cited registration covers “conflict
counseling, mediation, and arbitration services,” while the application covers
“Attorney services; Attorney services, namely, representation of clients in Family
Law matters.”
Although both Applicant and the Examining Attorney focus on family law-related
attorney services, the services broadly identified in the application as “Attorney
services,” which are separated from the narrower “Attorney services, namely,
representation of clients in Family Law matters” by a semicolon, are distinct services
that are not limited to any legal practice specialty such as family law. See Monster
Energy, 2023 WL 417620, at *7 n.35; TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(“TMEP”) Section 1402.01(a) (Nov. 2025) (“Semicolons should generally be used to
separate distinct categories of goods or services within a single class”); In re Midwest
Gaming & Entm’t LLC, Ser. No. 85111552, 2013 WL 14422357, at *4 (TTAB 2013)
(because a semicolon separated the two relevant clauses in the registrant’s
identification of services, its “‘restaurant and bar services’ is a discrete category of
services that stands alone and independently as a basis for likelihood-of-confusion

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analysis, and is not connected to nor dependent on the services set out on the other
side of the semicolon.”). Because the services broadly identified in the application as
“Attorney services” are distinct from the narrower services identified in the
application as “Attorney services, namely, representation of clients in Family Law
matters,” the identified “attorney services” provide an independent “basis for
likelihood-of-confusion analysis.” Id.
Construing the “conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration services”
identified in the cited registration as broadly as reasonably possible, and resolving
any ambiguities in their coverage in favor of the registrant, OSF Healthcare, 2023
WL 6140427, at *5, and similarly giving the “attorney services” identified in the
application their “full scope,” id., we find that “conflict counseling,” “mediation,” and
“arbitration” are all services that could be and are provided by providers of “attorney
services.”
Attorneys are often identified as “counsel,” and an important part of “attorney
services” is counseling (advising) clients in resolving various legal conflicts.28 The
record shows that practicing attorneys participate as counsel, or as neutrals, in both
28 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including definitions from
online dictionaries that exist in printed format or have fixed regular editions. See, e.g., In re
Nursecon, LLC, Ser. No. 88052194, 2024 WL 5265079, at *10 n.64 (TTAB 2024) (citation
omitted). We take judicial notice that the verb “counsel” means “advise.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com, last accessed on January 27, 2026). Applicant’s
argument that the “attorney services” identified in her application pertain only to “advocacy
for a client,” 4 TTABVUE 3, ignores the critical role of attorneys, including Applicant herself,
in providing objective advice to their clients. As noted above, Applicant’s website states that
she and her colleagues “are committed to helping clients navigate the legal aspects of divorce
without the adversarial approach typical in traditional litigation.” March 15, 2025 Response
to Office Action at TSDR 9.

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mediation,29 and arbitration,30 the “process of resolving a dispute (as between labor
and management) or a grievance outside of the court system by presenting it to an
impartial third party or panel for a decision that may or may not be binding.”31 We
find that “attorney services” and “conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration
services” may all be provided by attorneys, and are inherently and actually “related
in some manner,” and that “the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such
that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [they] emanate from the same
source” when provided under similar marks. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at
*4 (quotation and quotation marks omitted). The second DuPont factor supports a
conclusion that confusion is likely.
C. The Fourth DuPont Factor
As noted above, Applicant invokes the fourth DuPont factor, the “conditions under
which and buyers to whom sales are made, i. e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, arguing, without citing any record evidence,
that “[e]ngaging a law firm for family-law representation is a deliberate, high-
involvement decision, distinct from selecting a neutral mediator or arbitrator.” 4
TTABVUE 4.32 Such “[a]ttorney argument is no substitute for evidence,” Ye Mystic
Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 WL 2953731, at *6 n.15 (citing Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc.,
29 December 18, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 28-30.
30 Id. at TSDR 23-26.
31 March 18, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 11 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).
32 As discussed below, the services broadly identified in the application as “Attorney services”
are distinct services that are not limited to any legal practice specialty such as family law.

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901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018)), but we can reasonably assume that purchasers
of both “attorney services” and “conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration
services” are likely to exercise at least some degree of care given the nature of the
services. The Board has recognized that “even in the case of the least sophisticated
purchaser, [important decisions] will be made with some thought and research, even
when made hastily,” Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC,
Opp. No. 91217095, 2016 WL 7655551, at *12 (TTAB 2016), but also that even
“careful or sophisticated consumers are not immune from source confusion.” In re
Rsch. & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“That the relevant class
of buyers may exercise care does not necessarily impose on that class the
responsibility of distinguishing between similar trademarks for similar goods.”). The
marks here are quite similar and the services are related, and we find that the fourth
DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis of the likelihood of confusion.
D. Summary
The key first and second DuPont factors support a conclusion that confusion is
likely, and the fourth DuPont factor is neutral. The PEACEMAKER and LEGAL
PEACEMAKERS marks are quite similar in all means of comparison, the involved
“attorney services” and “conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration services” are
inherently related and can both be provided by attorneys, and the record is devoid of
any evidence of the use of other PEACEMAKER-formative marks for the involved
services.

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We conclude, based on our findings under the key first two DuPont factors, that
consumers of the “conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration services” offered
under the PEACEMAKER mark who separately encounter the LEGAL
PEACEMAKERS mark for “attorney services,” and consumers of the “attorney
services” offered under the LEGAL PEACEMAKERS mark who separately encounter
the PEACEMAKER mark for “conflict counseling, mediation, and arbitration
services,” are likely to believe mistakenly that the respective services have a common
source.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.