University of Richmond v. Adam Barrington

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: January 16, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
University of Richmond
v.
Adam Barrington
_____
Consol. Opp. Nos. 91276323 (parent) & 91276329
_____
Amanda L. DeFord, Lucy Jewett Wheatley, George B. Davis, and Claire Hagan
Eller, of McGuire Woods LLP,
for University of Richmond.
Todd Wengrovsky, of Law Offices of Todd Wengrovsky, PLLC,
for Adam Barrington.
_____
On Applicant’s Motion for Reconsideration
_____
Before Lykos, Lebow, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Adam Barrington timely requested reconsideration of the Board’s June
24, 2025, final decision sustaining this opposition to registration of his three marks.1
1 See 54 TTABVUE. Applicant then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, see 56 TTABVUE, which divested us of authority to rule on any issues

Consol. Opp. Nos. 91276323 (parent) & 91276329
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Opposer opposes reconsideration.2 For the reasons set forth below, we deny the
motion.
Reconsideration is a procedural tool with a narrow purpose. A party may request
reconsideration when it believes that “based on the evidence of record and the
prevailing authorities, the Board erred in reaching the decision it issued.” In re
Berkeley Lights, Inc., No. 88895703, 2022 WL 15733123, at *2 (TTAB 2022) (citation
omitted). It thus “should be limited to a demonstration that based on the evidence
properly of record and the applicable law, the Board’s ruling is in error and requires
appropriate change.” Nkanginieme v. Appleton, No. 91256464, 2023 WL 2424119, at
*2 (TTAB 2023) (citation omitted). It may not “be devoted simply to a reargument of
the points presented in the requesting party’s brief on the case.” Id. Nor should it
raise new issues that could have been asserted earlier, because issues that were
available but not timely raised (i.e., raised in a party’s trial brief) are forfeited. Thus,
besides intervening changes in controlling law, generally the only new issues we will
entertain on reconsideration are those that arose only because of some error in the
Board’s decision that reasonably could not have been raised and addressed before the
Board ruled.
We have carefully considered Applicant’s arguments. We observe that they
comprise largely two types of arguments: arguments Applicant already raised in his
implicated by the appeal. So we have waited to rule on Applicant’s reconsideration request
until the Federal Circuit restored the case to us, which it now has done. See Order, ECF No.
14, No. 25-2040 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) (dismissing appeal).
2 See 55 TTABVUE.

Consol. Opp. Nos. 91276323 (parent) & 91276329
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trial brief; and quotes from the dissenting opinion issued with the final decision. The
former are inappropriate for a motion for reconsideration. And because the majority
opinion in final decision addressed the points made in the dissenting opinion, those
arguments, too, are an inappropriate basis for reconsideration. Nevertheless, we will
address them seriatim.
Specifically, Applicant argues that, as the dissenting opinion advocated, the final
decision should have used a “liberal approach” to Applicant’s request, in its trial brief,
to withdraw admissions, not the “manifest injustice” standard.3 Applicant cites no
decisional authority that the final decision overlooked that applied the more lenient
pre-trial standard for withdrawal of admissions to a withdrawal request made at or
after trial. The final decision directly addressed this issue and d ecided, in accordance
with Johnston Pump/Gen. Valve Inc. v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., No. 91076991, 1989
WL 274413, at *3 (TTAB 1989), that a “more restrictive” standard applies to
Applicant’s withdrawal request after the trial period. That more restrictive standard
is manifest injustice. Applicant does not suggest that there was a different “more
restrictive” standard, besides manifest injustice, that the Board should have applied.4
Applicant also argues that the final decision should have refused to accept
Applicant’s deemed admission that confusion is likely because, according to
Applicant, that is a “legal conclusion” outside the scope of Rule 36.5 This, too, is an
3 See 54 TTABVUE 4-5, 7-8.
4 See 53 TTABVUE 13-16.
5 See 54 TTABVUE 6.

Consol. Opp. Nos. 91276323 (parent) & 91276329
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issue the final decision fully considered, employing its discretion to address the issue
even though Applicant did not raise it in its trial brief. The final decision explained
that, as a conclusion of law based on underlying findings of fact, likelihood of
confusion is within the scope of Rule 36 in a case raising the issue of likelihood of
confusion.6 Rule 36 covers not just admissions of purely factual matters, but “the
application of law to fact.” Applicant’s motion concedes that likelihood of confusion is
a determination of law based on findings of relevant underlying facts.7 Applicant
nevertheless cites Brooks v. Creative Arts By Calloway, LLC, No. 91160266, 2010 WL
595585, at *4 (TTAB 2010), for the proposition that “opinions of law are not
admissions of fact.”8 In the cited passage, Brooks was addressing the admissibility of
a party’s prior statement in district court litigation “that a personal name must have
acquired distinctiveness before it can be exclusively appropriated as a trademark .”
Id. It was not addressing admissions under Rule 36. Rule 36 is not a rule of
evidentiary admissibility. As explained in the final decision, Rule 36 admissions are
akin to stipulations or admissions in pleadings and, as such, cover more than just
admissions of pure fact.9
Next, Applicant makes a belated objection to the fact that Opposer didn’t submit
Applicant’s deemed admission until its rebuttal period. The final decision addressed
that circumstance and found that Applicant forfeited any such objection by not
6 See 53 TTABVUE 22-
7 See 54 TTABVUE 6.
8 See id.
9 See 53 TTABVUE 25-25.

Consol. Opp. Nos. 91276323 (parent) & 91276329
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raising it in its trial brief.10 As we noted in the final decision,11 we routinely hold that
objections not timely raised at trial are forfeited. See, e.g., Optimal Chem. Inc. v. Srills
LLC, No. 92063200, 2019 WL 4316700, at *16 n. 90 (TTAB 2019); Hilson Rsch. Inc.
v. Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., No. 92019007, 1993 WL 290669, at *1 n.8 (TTAB
1993). Applicant does not argue that we overlooked a timely objection. An objection
after a final decision is too late.
Applicant next repeats his arguments in his trial brief that Opposer was not
prejudiced by Applicant’s failure to timely respond to the requests for admission.12
Motions for reconsideration may not simply reiterate arguments previously made.
Nkanginieme, 2023 WL 2424119, at *2.
Applicant again urges that he did not act in bad faith and that it would not be
“fair and equitable” to hold Applicant to his deemed admissions.13 As the final opinion
made clear, however, Applicant does not contest that he failed to respond to the Rule
36 requests within 30 days after service. Nor does Applicant contest that he did not
ask to be relieved of the effect of its deemed admissions until over two years after
Opposer brought Applicant’s failure to timely respond to Applicant’s attention.
Applicant mentions that his counsel is a solo practitioner and that Applicant
himself has a full-time job, and that they needed only a little bit more time to
10 See 53 TTABVUE 8 n.26.
11 See id. at 12 n.33.
12 See 54 TTABVUE 9-10 (reconsideration motion); 50 TTABVUE 25-26 (trial brief).
13 See 54 TTABVUE 4, 10 (reconsideration motion); 50 TTABVUE 26 (trial brief).

Consol. Opp. Nos. 91276323 (parent) & 91276329
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respond.14 Calendaring litigation deadlines is a basic task that is expected of all
counsel: in-house counsel; solo practitioners; lawyers at law firms small, medium, and
large. Further, Rule 36(a)(3) contemplates that contingencies may arise that prevent
timely responses, providing that “a longer time for responding may be stipulated to
under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.” Applicant did not request that the Board
allow additional time to respond, nor, apparently, did he obtain Opposer’s consent for
more time to respond. And, as detailed in the final decision, after Opposer informed
Applicant that his untimely responses had resulted in deemed admissions, at no time
in the ensuing twenty-two months before trial commenced did Applicant ask the
Board to withdraw the deemed admissions under the more permissive standard that
would have then applied.
The Federal Rules of Procedure are carefully drafted in precise terms to be fair
and equitable to all parties, both corporations and individuals, and their attorneys.
In laying out what is required in litigation in the federal district courts and before
the Board, the Rules foster predictability and efficiency. In the circumstances
presented in this case, what Applicant deems “fair and equitable” is tantamount to
asking the Board to ignore Rule 36 because Applicant ignored Rule 36. Applicant has
provided no meritorious basis we can discern for so doing. As we noted in the final
decision—and as this case has shown—not adhering to the deadlines and procedures
set forth in the applicable rules of procedure tends to result in additional proceedings
14 54 TTABVUE 3.

Consol. Opp. Nos. 91276323 (parent) & 91276329
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and, with that, the expenditure of unnecessary resources by parties and tribunals.15
Neutral enforcement of the Rules will help to avoid that in the long run.
Decision: We deny the motion for reconsideration.
15 See 53 TTABVUE 19 n.43.

Lykos, Administrative Trademark Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s denial of Applicant’s request for
reconsideration. For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of the final decision,1
I remain of the viewpoint that the majority’s opinion was legally erroneous.
1 53 TTABVUE 35-40.