Turnkey Storage, LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: January 8, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Turnkey Storage, LLC
_____
Serial No. 97796315
_____
Terrence J. Edwards of TechLaw Ventures, PLLC,
for Turnkey Storage, LLC.
Wade Speake, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 111,
Chris Doninger, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Greenbaum, Lebow, and Stanley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Stanley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Turnkey Storage, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the proposed standard-character mark TURNKEY STORAGE for the following
services, as amended, in International Class 39:
Providing self-storage facilities for others; Providing self-
storage facilities for storage of goods for others; Providing
self-storage facilities for Recreational Vehicles, Boats, and

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Automobiles for others; Providing climate controlled and
non-climate controlled self-storage facilities for others.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s proposed
mark under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), on the ground that
it is merely descriptive of Applicant’s identified services. Applicant argued against
the refusal and, in the alternative, claimed acquired distinctiveness under
Trademark Act Section 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). The Examining Attorney then issued
a final refusal, finding that the proposed mark is merely descriptive under Section
2(e)(1) and that it has not acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f).2
Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney
denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal resumed. The case is now fully
briefed.
1 Application Serial No. 97796315 was filed on February 15, 2023, based on alleged use of the
mark in commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
2 The Examining Attorney also issued a genericness advisory during prosecution. See March
24, 2024 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 4-5; July 27, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR at 6.
In its brief, Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney takes a “contradictory position”
that is “both procedurally improper and prejudicial” by “rely[ing] on the heightened
evidentiary standard applicable to generic marks to discount Applicant’s evidence while
refusing to formally raise a genericness refusal.” Applicant’s Br. 6 TTABVUE 21. The
Examining Attorney did not apply a “heightened evidentiary standard.” The Examining
Attorney considered, as do we, whether Applicant’s proposed mark is merely descriptive
under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) and whether it has acquired distinctiveness under
Trademark Act Section 2(f). “‘[A]dvisory statements are not refusals subject to appeal,’” In re
Sheet Pile, LLC, No. 90900931, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *5 n.12 (quoting In re Nat’l Ass’n
of Veterinary Technicians in Am., Inc., No. 87171093, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 259, at 4 n.11
(citations omitted)), and, as a result, “genericness is not at issue in this appeal.” Id.
Citations to the prosecution file are to the USPTO’s TRADEMARK STATUS & DOCUMENT
RETRIEVAL (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system.

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For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal under Section 2(e)(1) on
the ground that the phrase TURNKEY STORAGE is merely descriptive of the
identified services and lacks acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f).
I. Mere Descriptiveness
Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act excludes from registration any “mark which,
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods [or services] of the applicant is
merely descriptive … of them.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1). A mark is “merely descriptive”
within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) “if it immediately conveys information
concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of the goods or services for which
registration is sought.” In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see
also In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “A
mark need not immediately convey an idea of each and every specific feature of the
goods [or services] in order to be considered merely descriptive; it is enough if it
describes one significant attribute, function or property of the goods [or services].” In
re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *4 (citing In
re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Whether a mark is merely descriptive is “evaluated ‘in relation to the particular
goods [or services] for which registration is sought, the context in which it is being
used, and the possible significance that the term would have to the average purchaser
of the goods [or services] because of the manner of its use or intended use,”’ Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d at 1300 (quoting In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 963-
64 (Fed. Cir. 2007)), and “not in the abstract or on the basis of guesswork.” Fat Boys,

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2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *4 (citing In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 (CCPA
1978)). We ask “whether someone who knows what the goods and services are will
understand the mark to convey information about them.” Real Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-
Lay N. Am., Inc., 906 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting DuoProSS Meditech
Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation omitted)). A mark is suggestive, and not merely descriptive, if it requires
imagination, thought, and perception on the part of someone who knows what the
goods or services are to reach a conclusion about their nature from the mark. See, e.g.,
Fat Boys, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *11.
We must “‘consider the commercial impression of a mark as a whole[.]’” Real
Foods, 906 F.3d at 974 (quoting DuoProSS Meditech, 695 F.3d at 1253) (emphasis in
bold here, in italics in original). “‘Where a mark consists of multiple words, the mere
combination of descriptive words does not necessarily create a non-descriptive word
or phrase.’” In re Zuma Array Ltd., No. 79288888, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *8
(quoting In re Omniome, Inc., No. 87661190, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 414, at *12). “[I]f
each component retains its merely descriptive significance in relation to the goods or
services, the combination results in a composite that is itself merely descriptive.”
Omniome, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 414, at *12. Only where the combination of merely
descriptive terms creates a unitary mark, or a mark with a unique, incongruous, or
otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods or services is the mark
registrable as suggestive. Id.

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“The major reasons for not protecting [merely descriptive] marks are: (1) to
prevent the owner of a mark from inhibiting competition in the sale of particular
goods [or services]; and (2) to maintain freedom of the public to use the language
involved, thus avoiding the possibility of harassing infringement suits by the
registrant against others who use the mark when advertising or describing their own
products [or services].” Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d at 813 (citation omitted).
Refusals for mere descriptiveness, like other refusals, are based on evidence
bearing on public perception of the mark. See, e.g., Real Foods, 906 F.3d at 974
(descriptiveness inquiry “consider[s] the commercial impression of a mark as a whole,
viewed through the eyes of a consumer”) (cleaned up, citation and italics omitted);
In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The perception of the
relevant purchasing public sets the standard for determining descriptiveness.”).
Evidence that a term is merely descriptive to the relevant purchasing public may be
obtained from any competent source, Nett Designs, 236 F.3d at 1341, such as
dictionaries, newspapers, or surveys. Bayer, 488 F.3d at 964. It also may be obtained
from websites and publications, see N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d at 1368, including an
applicant’s own materials, website, or news articles. In re Promo Ink, No. 76541018,
2006 TTAB LEXIS 138, at *4-5 (examining attorney may introduce evidence that
applicant’s own literature supports descriptiveness of term even though application
was based on intent-to-use under Trademark Act Section 1(b)).
“It is the Examining Attorney’s burden to show, prima facie, that a mark is merely
descriptive of an applicant’s goods or services.” Fat Boys, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at

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*5 (citing Gyulay, 820 F.2d at 1217). If the Examining Attorney establishes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut that case. Id.
Relying on the dictionary definition of the word “turnkey,” the Examining
Attorney argues that TURNKEY STORAGE is merely descriptive because “turnkey”
means “‘[s]upplied, installed, or purchased in a condition ready for immediate use,
occupation, or operation[,]’” “the wording ‘STORAGE’ appears in applicant’s
identification of services and has been disclaimed[,]” and together the words retain
their ordinary meanings and immediately inform consumers that “applicant provides
facilities for storage that are provided in a condition ready for immediate use.”3
To further support his position, the Examining Attorney relies on multiple
third‑party uses of the term “turnkey” and the phrase “turnkey storage” that describe
ready‑to‑use storage offerings across self‑storage and other storage contexts in the
record (e.g., paddleboard/kayak storage, lab/biological storage, industrial
warehousing, etc.),4 including the following:
• Reconxx.com: “Turnkey Storage Solutions for Every Business”;
“Consider a turnkey storage provider if you want to grow your
product-based business”; “A turnkey storage provider plans and
installs your designed storage facility”;5
• FlexBuildSystems.com: “Our turnkey storage solutions provide
maximum flexibility for your individual design specifications”;6
3 Examining Attorney’s Br., 8 TTABVUE 3 (quoting November 17, 2023 Office Action, TSDR
at 7) (definition of “turnkey” from The American Heritage Dictionary).
4 Id. at 3-4.
5 March 24, 2024 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 7-9 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 14-16 (emphasis added).

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• RMHSystems.com: “Turnkey Storage Solution for a Global Logistics
Leader”;7
• TurnkeyStorageFacility.com: “Why Use Turn Key Storage”;8
• iPort.com: “Interport’s modified storage container units are a
turnkey solution for multiple storage needs”;9
• OmegaMorgan.com: “Omega Morgan Provides Turnkey Storage
Solution For General Contracting Company In Hillsboro, OR”;10
• DogPatchPaddle.com: “We offer turnkey storage solutions directly in
Crane Cove Park for paddle boards & kayaks”;11
• FertilityStorageSolutions.com: “Our turnkey storage services will
free up space and reduce liability on your lab, while providing your
patients with safe, reliable off-site storage and industry leading
customer support”;12
• SelfStorageCanyonLake.com: “Comprehensive, Turnkey Storage
Solutions for Any Occasion”;13
• Facebook page for Amanda McCauley-Thornberry, DMD, promoting
Home Storage Town in Cynthiana, KY: “We have storage units open up
for rent! Turn-key, clean, and ready for storage!”;14
• GuyMTurner.com: “Turnkey storage solutions for plant relocation or
any other need”;15
7 Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 26-28 (emphasis added).
10 July 27, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR at 8-10 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
13 May 8, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration, TSDR at 17-21 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).

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• WhyIPS.com: “Your facility needs propane bulk plant design and
turnkey storage solutions that fit the unique requirements and work
processes of your organization”;16
• MorrisonEnergy.com: “Providing cost-effective turnkey storage
services, the organization is poised to handle everything from
transportation to logistics to ensure the customer’s experience is hassle-
free”;17
• REBStorage.com: “REB specializes in the integration of turnkey
storage solutions”;18
• FilingAndStorageOfMS.com: “We specialize in providing turnkey
storage system solutions designed to optimize your business.”19
The Examining Attorney contends that these third-party uses show that
consumers encounter the term “turnkey” and the phrase “turnkey storage”
descriptively in commerce in a variety of storage-related contexts, with all of the uses
referring to storage that is “in a condition ready to be used by customers.”20 The
Examining Attorney also points to Applicant’s own materials as descriptive use,
namely its website stating it wants the customer’s “storage experience to be a
valuable, turnkey experience” and a quote from Applicant’s Marketing Director in a
news article explaining that “turnkey” means that “everything will be handled.”21
Applicant argues the Examining Attorney’s evidence is insufficient to show the
mark is merely descriptive. Relying on the expert testimony of Professor Michael
16 Id. at 28-32 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 33-36 (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 38-43 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
20 Examining Attorney’s Br., 8 TTABVUE 3-4. See also id. at 6-7.
21 Id. at 4-5 (quoting November 17, 2023 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 10 (screenshot of
Applicant’s website) and January 27, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 103 (article
from mrt.com titled “Indoor storage facility bringing old Kmart back to life”)).

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Bond,22 Applicant maintains that TURNKEY STORAGE is at least suggestive of its
services23 and contends the Examining Attorney: (1) failed to consider non‑descriptive
meanings of “turnkey” or to show that the term is commonly used descriptively for
Applicant’s specific services; 24 (2) ignored that the mark does not immediately convey
a particular quality, feature, function, or characteristic of the services with the
requisite specificity to be “merely descriptive”;25 (3) treated the separate words
“TURNKEY” and “STORAGE” as if their combination yields a precise meaning, when
in fact both words are broad and their combination does not instantly reveal the
precise nature of Applicant’s self‑storage offerings;26 (4) overlooked that the phrase
TURNKEY STORAGE leaves prospective customers uncertain what type of storage
is offered;27 (5) equates a general promise of convenience or readiness with a specific
descriptive feature, even though the phrase only suggests a benefit without
describing concrete attributes;28 (6) disregards that self‑storage transactions typically
involve multiple steps (e.g., unit selection, rental agreement, access setup, locks,
transport, etc.), so the services are not inherently “immediate” in the dictionary
sense;29 (7) ignores that “turnkey” is a context‑dependent marketing term whose
22 See Declaration of Michael Bond (“Bond Declaration”), attached to January 27, 2025
Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 23-52.
23 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 8.
24 Id. at 9.
25 Id. at 11.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 12.
29 Id.; see also Applicant’s Reply Br., 9 TTABVUE 3-4, 9.

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meaning varies by industry;30 and (8) failed to account for numerous third‑party
TURNKEY‑formative registrations showing the term commonly conveys a general
notion of readiness, convenience, or completeness rather than a uniform, immediately
understood descriptive feature of self‑storage services.31
Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive.32 The record establishes that
TURNKEY STORAGE is merely descriptive because it immediately conveys a quality
or feature of the services − namely, that Applicant’s self-storage facilities are ready
for immediate use − without requiring imagination or inference. See Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d at 1300. This conclusion is supported by dictionary
definitions of “turnkey” and by evidence showing both Applicant and multiple third
30 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 14-15; see also Applicant’s Reply Br., 9 TTABVUE 5-6, 8.
31 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 18; see also Applicant’s Reply Br., 9 TTABVUE 3.
32 We give little weight to the testimony of Applicant’s expert witness, Professor Bond, on
factual or legal grounds beyond general statements about marketing or branding, the
subjects of his purported expertise, to the extent they are relevant to the issues herein. “[T]he
Board … will not substitute the opinion of a witness, even an expert witness, for our
evaluation of the facts.” Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., No. 91154210, 2010
TTAB LEXIS 84, at *3. While Professor Bond may be an expert in marketing and branding,
it is apparent from a review of his testimonial declaration that he is not an expert in
trademark matters much less on the registrability of trademarks under the Trademark Act
and the problems and considerations related thereto. This is readily apparent from his
inability to appreciate the difference between the Examining Attorney’s refusal based on
mere descriptiveness and his genericness advisory, and his reference to “trademarking” as a
verb. January 27, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 29-30 (Bond Decl. at ¶ 18) (“If
a majority of consumers recognize the term as a generic descriptor, it fails the test and cannot
be trademarked.”). As such, his opinions are, for the most part, akin to that of a lay witness.
It is well established that the expressions of opinion by witnesses, including persons
considered to be experts in a particular field on any question before the Board, is not binding
upon the Board for “if such testimony were adopted without considering other aspects of the
case, the effect would be to substitute the opinion of the witnesses for the ultimate decision
to be reached by the Court and would therefore be improper.” Quaker Oats Co. v. St. Joe
Processing Co., Inc., 232 F.2d 653, 655 (CCPA 1956).

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parties in the self‑storage field using “turnkey” and “turnkey storage” in a plainly
descriptive manner for self‑storage facility services:
• TurnKeyStorage.com (Applicant’s website): “we want your storage
experience to be a valuable, turnkey experience”;33
• DogPatchPaddle.com: “We offer turnkey storage solutions directly in
Crane Cove Park for paddle boards & kayaks”;34
• SelfStorageCanyonLake.com: “Comprehensive, Turnkey Storage
Solutions for Any Occasion”;35
• Facebook page for Amanda McCauley-Thornberry, DMD, promoting
Home Storage Town in Cynthiana, KY: “We have storage units open up
for rent! Turn-key, clean, and ready for storage!”36
These uses of “turnkey” align with the ordinary dictionary meaning of the term.
And even if “turnkey” could be interpreted as having multiple meanings in the self-
storage context, “‘so long as any one of the meanings of a term is descriptive, the term
may be considered to be merely descriptive.’” In re Mueller Sports Med., Inc., No.
87209946, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 156, at *18 (quoting In re Chopper Indus., No. 273140,
1984 TTAB LEXIS 118, at *5-6).
33 November 17, 2023 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 10. The Examining Attorney notes
(Examining Attorney’s Br., 8 TTABVUE 5), and Applicant acknowledges (Applicant’s Reply
Br., 9 TTABVUE 7), that Applicant has removed this language from its website. Applicant,
citing In re Canine Cavier Pet Foods, Inc., No. 85710350, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 155, contends
the removed language is “not probative.” Applicant’s Reply Br., 9 TTABVUE 7. We disagree.
Canine Caviar involved a deceptiveness refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a), where the Board found screenshots of inactive, cached third‑party webpages to be
of limited probative value. Canine Cavier Pet Foods, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 155, at *10-11. That
situation is materially different from Applicant’s own prior, non‑source‑identifying use of
“turnkey” on its website. The fact that Applicant later deleted the wording does not erase its
evidentiary value in this appeal. We find Applicant’s prior use of “turnkey” probative of how
consumers would perceive the term in connection with the identified services.
34 July 27, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR at 11 (emphasis added).
35 May 8, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration, TSDR at 17-18 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).

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Applicant emphasizes that several third‑party examples cited by the Examining
Attorney come from the broader storage field rather than the self‑storage niche. But
those uses are consistent with the ordinary dictionary meaning of “turnkey,” i.e.,
ready for immediate use. In any event, as noted above, descriptiveness is assessed in
relation to the identified services and the likely perception of the average purchaser
who understands what those services are. Here, the record shows that consumers
encountering the term in the context of “providing self‑storage facilities for others”
would immediately understand “turnkey” to describe units that are ready for use
upon rental or purchase, without further preparation or modification.
Applicant stresses that consumers must complete certain steps before renting or
purchasing a unit (e.g., selecting a size, applying, identity or credit checks), but those
routine transactional steps do not diminish the descriptive meaning of “turnkey” in
the self‑storage context. Applicant’s expert identifies real estate as an industry where
“turnkey” is commonly used to mean “ready for immediate use” (i.e., move‑in ready),37
and real‑estate transactions likewise involve multiple pre‑occupancy steps − often
more extensive than in self‑storage. The presence of such preliminary steps does not
alter the ordinary meaning of “turnkey” in real estate, and it likewise does not change
its meaning in the self‑storage context: in both contexts, “turnkey” describes the
condition of the premises as immediately usable upon completion of the rental or
purchase.
37 January 27, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 30 (Bond Decl. at ¶ 21).

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Applicant’s reliance on third-party registrations for TURNKEY and TURNKEY-
formative marks is misplaced.38 None involve storage‑related services − let alone
“providing self‑storage facilities for others.” In any event, prior decisions and actions
of other examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value
and are not binding on the USPTO or the Board. Cf. In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t,
No. 85111552, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 55, at 5 n.3 (citing Nett Designs, 236 F.3d at 1342).
A term that is merely descriptive does not become registrable simply because other
seemingly similar marks appear on the register. See Nett Designs, 236 F.3d at 1342
(holding ULTIMATE BIKE RACK merely descriptive of “bicycle racks” despite the
presence of “ultimate” without a disclaimer in other marks on the Principal Register);
In re Sun Microsystems Inc., No. 75430946, 2001 TTAB LEXIS 258, at *12 (holding
AGENTBEANS merely descriptive of computer software for use in software
development and deployment where the Board found that changes in the vocabulary
of the field reduced the relevance of third-party registrations). Ultimately, we must
decide each case on its own facts. See In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171,
1174 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The third-party registrations identified by Applicant were
decided on their own records and have minimal probative value. Any effort to draw
an analogy between the third-party registrations and Applicant’s proposed mark is
far less meaningful than the detailed analysis we have given Applicant’s proposed
mark.
38 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 16-17; see also June 24, 2024 Response to Office Action, TSDR
at 19-48 (chart and TSDR screenshots of third-party registrations); January 27, 2025 Request
for Reconsideration, TSDR at 37-45 (Bond Decl. at ¶¶ 40-41) (chart of third-party
registrations).

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When we consider the proposed mark TURNKEY STORAGE as a whole, we find
that not only are “turnkey” and “storage” each merely descriptive of Applicant’s
services, but when those terms are combined into the proposed mark, the resulting
combination does not evoke a non-descriptive commercial impression. To the
contrary, the evidence shows that each component retains its merely descriptive
significance in relation to the identified services. We therefore find that the proposed
mark TURNKEY STORAGE is merely descriptive. See, e.g., In re Omaha Nat’l Corp.,
819 F.2d 1117, 1118-19 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (FIRSTIER merely descriptive of banking
services); Zuma Array, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *22 (SMART BEZEL merely
descriptive of electronic devices); Fat Boys, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *16
(HOUSEBOAT BLOB merely descriptive of inflatable float mattresses); In re
Petroglyph Games, Inc., Ser. No. 78806413, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 465, at *35-36
(BATTLECAM merely descriptive for computer game software because “the relevant
class of purchasers will immediately understand BATTLECAM to describe a feature
of computer game software”).
As to Applicant’s contention that any doubt as to the question of descriptiveness
should be resolved in Applicant’s favor,39 after carefully reviewing the entire record,
we have no such doubt. We are firmly of the opinion that Applicant’s proposed mark
TURNKEY STORAGE proposed for use in connection with the identified services –
including “providing self-storage facilities for others” − is merely descriptive.
39 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 10.

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II. Acquired Distinctiveness
Applicant argues, in the alternative, that if TURNKEY STORAGE is found to be
merely descriptive, it has nonetheless acquired distinctiveness. “Under Section 2(f) of
the Trademark Act, matter that is merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) may
nonetheless be registered on the Principal Register if it ‘has become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods [or services] in commerce.”’ In re Virtual Indep. Paralegals, LLC,
No. 86947786, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 74, at *30 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)). Section 2(f)
is not a ground for refusal; it is a pathway by which descriptive terms may become
registrable through proof of acquired distinctiveness (also known as “secondary
meaning”). Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1580 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
“An applicant seeking registration of a mark under Section 2(f) bears the ultimate
burden of establishing acquired distinctiveness.” Virtual Indep. Paralegals, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 74, at *31 (citing In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2015)). Applicant’s burden is to prove acquired distinctiveness by a
preponderance of the evidence. In re GJ & AM, LLC, No. 86858003, 2021 TTAB
LEXIS 203, at *42.
The Federal Circuit has “long held that ‘the applicant’s burden of showing
acquired distinctiveness increases with the level of descriptiveness; a more
descriptive term requires more evidence of secondary meaning.”’ Royal Crown Cola
Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re
Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). On this record, TURNKEY

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STORAGE is highly descriptive. The disclaimed word “STORAGE” is generic for
Applicant’s identified self-storage services, and the adjective “TURNKEY” conveys
exactly what dictionary definitions predict it would convey – storage units that are
ready for immediate use. See Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 892 F.2d
1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (degree of descriptiveness of an applied-for mark
determined in the context of its identified services). The third‑party uses, together
with Applicant’s own non‑source‑identifying use, reinforce that understanding. See,
e.g., See In re Guaranteed Rate, No. 87054820, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 265, *9-10 (third-
party uses of the terms “guaranteed rate,” “guaranteed mortgage rate,” and
“guaranteed interest rate,” established that claimed mark GUARANTEED RATE
was highly descriptive of mortgage-related services); In re Yarnell Ice Cream, LLC,
No. 86824279, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 208, at *28-29 (“dictionary definitions, third-party
uses and registrations, and webpages and articles” support finding that “SCOOP is
highly descriptive of ice cream and frozen confections”). Accordingly, while secondary
meaning is not impossible to prove, Applicant bears a heightened burden to establish
acquired distinctiveness. La. Fish Fry., 797 F.3d at 1336 (highly descriptive term
bears heavier burden).
“‘To show that a mark has acquired distinctiveness, an applicant must
demonstrate that the relevant public understands the primary significance of the
mark as identifying the source of a product or service rather than the product or
service itself.”’ Virtual Indep. Paralegals, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 74, at *35 (quoting In re
Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1297). In other words, the applicant must demonstrate

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that “consumers have come to associate the mark with a single source.” In re MK
Diamond Prods., Inc., No. 86813875, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 263, at *56.
The Federal Circuit has set forth the relevant factors for proving acquired
distinctiveness:
[T]he considerations to be assessed in determining whether
a mark has acquired secondary meaning can be described
by the following six factors: (1) association of the [mark]
with a particular source by actual purchasers (typically
measured by customer surveys); (2) length, degree, and
exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising;
(4) amount of sales and number of customers;
(5) intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media coverage
of the product [or service] embodying the mark.
Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “No single
factor is determinative and ‘[a]ll six factors are to be weighed together in determining
the existence of secondary meaning.’” In re Post Foods, LLC, No. 88857834, 2024
TTAB LEXIS 1, at *14 (quoting Guaranteed Rate, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 265, at *8).
Applicant contends that it has established acquired distinctiveness “under the
second, third, fourth, and sixth factors[.]”40 We consider each of these factors in turn.
Under the second factor − the length, degree, and exclusivity of use – Applicant
asserts substantially exclusive and continuous use of TURNKEY STORAGE since at
least June 1, 2015, i.e., more than ten years.41 Section 2(f) permits the Director to
accept “proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use … for the five years before
the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made” as prima facie evidence that
40 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 21.
41 Id. at 22.

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a mark has become distinctive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); see also Trademark Rule
2.41(a)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.41(a)(2). But this statutory language is permissive, not
mandatory, and the passage of time alone may not suffice to bestow on the applied-
for mark the mantle of distinctiveness. See, e.g., In re Ennco Display Sys., Inc., No.
74439206, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 235, at *23 (“Applicant’s length of use ranging from
approximately seven to seventeen years is simply insufficient, in itself, to bestow
acquired distinctiveness.”). This is especially true for highly descriptive matter, for
which even lengthy use may be inadequate. See Alcatraz Media, Inc. v. Chesapeake
Marine Tours Inc., No. 92050879, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 347, at *53, aff’d mem., 565 Fed.
Appx. 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Given the highly descriptive nature of registrant’s mark
continuous use alone since 1992 would not be sufficient to establish acquired
distinctiveness.”); In re Packaging Specialists, Inc., No. 250697, 1984 TTAB LEXIS
159, at *7 (deeming use of highly descriptive mark for sixteen years “a substantial
period but not necessarily conclusive or persuasive on the Section 2(f) showing”)
(collecting decisions).
As for exclusivity, the evidence of third-party use noted above shows that
Applicant’s use of “TURNKEY STORAGE” or variations thereof has not been
“substantially exclusive.” Racine Industries Inc. v. Bane-Clene Corp., No. 91086567,
1994 TTAB LEXIS 30, at *29. Indeed, given the highly descriptive nature of the
phrase, it is unsurprising that others in the self‑storage and broader storage
industries would employ the same language to describe their services. The
third‑party usage impedes Applicant’s ability to establish secondary meaning

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because it prevents the relevant public from perceiving the phrase as identifying a
single source. “When the record shows that purchasers are confronted with more than
one (let alone numerous) independent users of a term or device, an application for
registration under Section 2(f) cannot be successful, for distinctiveness on which
purchasers may rely is lacking under such circumstances.” Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Genesco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1401, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Under the third factor − the amount and manner of advertising − Applicant’s CEO
Tyrone Frazier attests that Applicant has spent over $1.8 million “in brand promotion
efforts,” of which more than $1.2 million was spent “in advertising and promoting the
TURNKEY STORAGE mark.”42 And under the fourth factor − the amount of sales
and number of customers − Mr. Frazier attests that Applicant has “served 11,266
customers purchasing goods and services generating $38,650,069.00 income.”43
Relying on both the Frazier Declaration and Bond Declaration, Applicant argues that
its “volume of customers, the long-term and continuous use of the mark, and the
substantial income generated all point to a well-established association in the minds
of consumers between the TURNKEY STORAGE mark and Applicant’s services.”44
There is no dispute that Applicant has invested in promoting its self‑storage
services and has generated millions in revenue under the TURNKEY STORAGE
designation. However, Applicant provides no industry context for its advertising and
42 January 27, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 95-96 (Declaration of Tyrone
Frazier (“Frazier Declaration”) at ¶¶ 8-11); see also Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 23.
43 January 27, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 95-96 (Frazier Decl. at ¶ 16); see
also Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 24-25.
44 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 25.

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sales figures, which diminishes their probative value. Without benchmarks − such as
market share, relative ranking, or comparative spend − it is unclear whether the cited
numbers are substantial, modest, or otherwise impactful within the industry. State
Permits, Inc. v. Fieldvine, Inc., No. 92075095, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 291, at *38-39
(citing Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2018)) (“In the absence of contextual evidence, we cannot ascertain whether
[Applicant’s] advertising ... [is] extraordinary or little more than commonplace.”). See
also Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, No. 91173963, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 151,
at *58 (“The probative value of [the sales revenue] is diminished by the fact that the
amount is just a raw number in the vast pharmaceutical industry, providing no
context showing Applicant’s market share and whether the stated amount of doses
sold is significant in the industry.”); Target Brands, Inc. v. Hughes, No. 91163556,
2007 TTAB LEXIS 94, at *14 (“It is difficult, however, to accurately gauge the level
of [sales] success … in the absence of additional information such as applicant’s
market share or how [applicant’s] product ranks in terms of sales in the trade.”).
Nevertheless, even assuming Applicant’s advertising and revenue are significant
in the self-storage industry, “‘compelling sales and advertising figures do not always
amount to a finding of acquired distinctiveness.’” Kohler Co. v. Honda Giken Kogyo
K.K., No. 91200146, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 450, at *162 (quoting Stuart Spector Designs
Ltd. v. Fender Musical Instruments Corp., No. 91161403, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 132, at
*65. “The ultimate test in determining whether a designation has acquired
distinctiveness is Applicant's success, rather than its efforts, in educating the public

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to associate the proposed mark with a single source.” Mini Melts, 2016 TTAB LEXIS
151, at *58.
Applicant relies on the Frazier and Bond Declarations to establish that the public
associates the proposed mark with a single source. However, neither declaration is
particularly persuasive on this point. Declarations from individuals with a
self‑interest in the outcome, such as Mr. Frazier (Applicant’s CEO), are entitled to
limited weight when assessing acquired distinctiveness. See In re Chem. Dynamics
Inc., 839 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding conclusionary declaration from
applicant’s vice-president insufficient without the factual basis for the declarant’s
belief that the design had become distinctive); In re Pennzoil Prods. Co., No.
73670049, 1991 TTAB LEXIS 27, at *21 (declarations from marketers of oil products
who have business relationships with the applicant “lack persuasiveness on the issue
of the primary significance of the [proposed mark] to the purchasing public.”). While
Professor Bond is a marketing professor and his testimony carries more weight than
Mr. Frazier’s, his declaration does not explain the basis for his opinion that
Applicant’s advertising and sales are sufficient to prove acquired distinctiveness for
a highly descriptive mark. There is no analysis of Applicant’s actual advertising
materials, nor any assessment of the self‑storage industry or relevant consumer
perception. The Bond Declaration offers only a single, unsupported opinion, with no
indication that it reflects the views of the relevant public. See, e.g., In re Meyer &
Wenthe, Inc., 267 F.2d 945, 949 (CCPA 1959) (“It is incumbent upon the applicant to

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submit proof that its mark is distinctive, not only to ‘experts’ in the field, but to the
purchasing public.”).
Finally, under the sixth factor − unsolicited media coverage − Applicant relies on
a single article from the Midland Reporter‑Telegram dated July 7, 2016, describing
Applicant’s renovation of a former Kmart building as “bringing [the building] back to
life.”45 This lone piece of coverage, from more than nine years ago, carries limited
weight. Applicant provides no circulation or readership data, making it impossible to
assess exposure to the relevant purchasing public. Moreover, the article quotes
Applicant’s marketing director using “turnkey” in a non-source-identifying manner −
“Essentially we’re going with the idea of ‘turnkey,’ which means everything will be
handled”46 − which undercuts the claim that the term functions as a source identifier
in the press.
In short, considering Applicant’s Section 2(f) showing as a whole, the evidence falls
short in establishing that “consumers have come to associate the [the phrase
TURNKEY STORAGE] with a single source.”47 MK Diamond Prods., 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 263, at *56.
45 Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 25 (quoting Ex. 1 to Frazier Decl., January 27, 2025 Request
for Reconsideration, TSDR at 99-105) (article from mrt.com).
46 Ex. 1 to Frazier Decl., January 27, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR at 103) (article
from mrt.com).
47 Applicant relies on a non-precedential decision, In re Watercraft Superstore, Inc., Serial No.
86369831, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 437, to equate its acquired-distinctiveness evidence with that
in cases where the Board found a mark distinctive. Applicant’s Br., 6 TTABVUE 20-21. The
Board discourages the citation of non-precedential decisions, which are not binding on the
Board. In re tapio GmbH, No. 87941532, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 483, at *28 n.30 (“Generally, the
practice of citing non-precedential opinions is not encouraged.”). In any event, Watercraft
Superstore is distinguishable. Applicant is correct that the applicant in Watercraft
Superstore, like here, submitted a declaration of an employee attesting to advertising and

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III. Conclusion
After carefully considering the record and applicable law, we conclude that:
(1) TURNKEY STORAGE is merely and highly descriptive of the identified services;
(2) Applicant therefore bears a heightened burden to prove acquired distinctiveness;
and (3) on this record, Applicant has not shown that the highly descriptive phrase
TURNKEY STORAGE has acquired distinctiveness for the identified services.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s proposed mark TURNKEY
STORAGE based on mere descriptiveness under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act
and lack of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) is affirmed.
sales figures. Watercraft Superstore, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 437, at *55. Unlike here, in that case,
the declarant also attested to the number of catalogs it distributed each year and the number
of “unique user impressions” that its website registered per year. Id. The applicant also
submitted more than fifty postings by consumers on an online forum recognizing
WATERCRAFT SUPERSTORE as a source identifier of the applicant. Id. at *7-10. In other
words, in that appeal, the applicant “demonstrated actual market recognition of its mark as
a source-indicator with evidence of spontaneous comments of relevant customers and
potential customers” (id. at *13); we have no consumer-level recognition evidence in this
appeal.