TFBC Group Inc.

Mailed: July 7, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re TFBC Group Inc.
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Serial No. 98243448
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Ruth Khalsa and Courtney Creasman of The Ideas Law Firm, PLLC,
for TFBC Group Inc.
Michala Blue, Trademark Examining Attorney,
Pamela Y. Willis, Managing Attorney, Law Office 129.
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Before Wellington, Cohen, and Stanley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
TFBC Group Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard mark TWISTED FORK BRUNCH COMPANY for “restaurant services,” in
International Class 43.1 Applicant disclaimed the words BRUNCH COMPANY.
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Trademark Act (“the Act”) Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of
1 Application Serial No. 98243448, filed October 27, 2023, based on Applicant’s statement of
a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce, under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b).
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Serial No. 98243448
2
likelihood of confusion based on the registered mark THE TWISTED FORK for
“restaurant and bar services,” in Class 43.2
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant requested
reconsideration and filed an appeal. The Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration and the appeal resumed. Both Applicant and the Examining Attorney
filed briefs, including Applicant’s reply brief. For the reasons explained below, we
affirm the refusal.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Act, in relevant part, prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the [services] of the applicant, to cause confusion.”
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). To determine whether confusion is likely, we analyze all
probative evidence relevant to the factors set out in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See In re Majestic Distilling Co.,
315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key DuPont factors are the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks and the relatedness of the respective goods or services,
because the “fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect
of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences
in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976). Here, we have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant and for
2 Registration No. 6356326 issued on the Principal Register on May 18, 2021.

Serial No. 98243448
3
which there is evidence and argument of record. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d
1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various
evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular
determination.”). Ultimately, however, “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts
and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d
1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
A. Identity of the Services and Channels of Trade
We first look to the second and third DuPont factors, which concern the
relatedness of the services and the channels of trade for the services. DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. In this analysis, we must consider the services as they are identified in
Applicant’s application and the cited registration. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P.
v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v.
Houston Comp. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Further, it is sufficient
for a finding of likelihood of confusion as to a class of services in the application if
relatedness is established for any one of the recited services within the application.
Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981).
Here, Applicant’s “restaurant services,” are encompassed by Registrant’s
“restaurant and bar services.” The services are thus identical in part as to these
restaurant services.

Serial No. 98243448
4
Because the application and cited registration include restaurant services
without any restriction or limitation, we must presume that these identical services
will be offered to the same classes of consumers in the same trade channels. Viterra
Inc. v. Gen. Mills Corp., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was
no evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was
entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); see
also Genesco Inc. v. Martz, No. 91121296, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 123, at *28 (“Given the
in-part identical and in-part related nature of the parties’ goods, and the lack of any
restrictions in the identifications thereof as to trade channels and purchasers, these
clothing items could be offered and sold to the same classes of purchasers through the
same channels of trade.”).
Accordingly, the second and third DuPont factors weigh strongly in favor of
finding confusion likely.
B. Alleged Weakness of the Cited Mark
Under the sixth DuPont factor, we consider “[t]he number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods [or services].” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Thus,
Applicant in this case may adduce such probative evidence and demonstrate that a
cited mark, or element thereof, has less source-identifying significance. “Evidence of
third-party use of similar marks on similar goods [or services] is relevant to show that
a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.” Apex
Bank v. CC Serve Corp., 156 F.4th 1230, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting Palm Bay
Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondée en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). “When a field is crowded with similar marks, the theory is that

Serial No. 98243448
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customers will be more adept at distinguishing marks from each other and are less
likely to be confused by similar marks.” Id. (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters.
LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). In other words, sufficient probative
evidence of third-party use may indicate that consumers are conditioned to
distinguish between marks based on otherwise less meaningful differences between
the marks. Third-party use evidence, as well as third-party registrations, may also
show that a term has a “normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or
suggestive meaning.” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
(citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) and thus ‘can bear on a mark’s
conceptual strength.” Id.
In its appeal brief, Applicant cites to various decisions holding that the scope of
protection accorded to a cited registered mark may be abbreviated based on a record
showing widespread third-party use of the same or similar mark for the same or re-
lated goods and services.3 Applicant points to twenty registrations it submitted for
marks containing the term TWISTED and argues that, based on “such widespread
use of the element TWISTED consumers are more likely to acknowledge slight vari-
ances among its uses.”4
3 6 TTABVUE 21-24 (section of Applicant’s brief captioned “The Weakness of the Cited Mark
Weighs Against Confusion”).
Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case docket refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding TTABVUE
corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the
page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear.
4 6 TTABVUE 22. Copies of the registrations were submitted with Applicant’s Request for
Reconsideration filed March 27, 2025, TSDR pp. 209-259. Applicant further asserted that

Serial No. 98243448
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As to Applicant’s third-party registration evidence, we note the following:
• Only one of these third-party registrations is for a mark incorporating the term
TWISTED FORK—(Reg. 3966922: for the mark TWISTED FORK RANCH,
stylized with design, for “horse and guest ranch club services, namely, dude
ranches”);
• Applicant identified 14 third-party registrations for marks containing the term
TWISTED that cover “restaurant” services, and 5 others involved in the field
of food or beverage services, e.g., catering, food truck, etc.; and
• The third-party registered marks contain additional terms with sufficiently
distinguishing them from Applicant’s mark and the cited mark.5
To be clear, the record does not include any third-party registrations for
a marks containing the wording TWISTED FORK for restaurant or related
services. Thus, the probative value of Applicant’s third-party registration evidence
is thus quite limited because the common or shared element between the cited mark
and Applicant’s mark is the combined wording TWISTED FORK, not simply
TWISTED. For purposes of demonstrating weakness, evidence of use or registration
of those combined words would be more fruitful and, as mentioned, we have no such
evidence. See, e.g., Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 TTAB
LEXIS 464, at *32 (third-party registration evidence discounted where they
“over 70 marks utilize a variation of the element TWISTED in International Class 043,” 6
TTABVUE 22; however, Applicant merely references a search result it submitted with the
Request for Reconsideration. Thus, any additional putative registrations are not of record.
Citations in this opinion to the application record are to pages in the downloadable .pdf
version of the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
5 We note that Reg. No. 6722376 for the mark TWISTED SPOON, for “coffee bars; coffee
shops,” shares some similarity with Applicant’s mark and the cited mark in that it combines
the word TWISTED with a common eating utensil. However, the other third-party marks
generally use the term TWISTED with either food items, e.g., TWISTED FAJITA, TWISTED
NOODLE, and THE TWISTED TUNA.

Serial No. 98243448
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contained “additional elements that cause many of them to be less similar to [the
involved] marks”).
Moreover, to the extent that Applicant seeks to rely on the third-party
registrations for purposes of showing marketplace weakness, we point out that
registrations are not actually “evidence of third-party use of the registered marks in
the marketplace, for purposes of the sixth du Pont factor.” In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd.,
No. 77029776, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *22 (citation omitted). Applicant has not
submitted evidence of third-party use of TWISTED- or TWISTED FORK- formative
marks.
Lastly, we are mindful that the cited mark is registered on the Principal Register
without a claim of acquired distinctiveness and thus it is presumed to be is inherently
distinctive. Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS
330, at *62 (a “mark that is registered on the Principal Register is entitled to all
Section 7(b) [of the Act] presumptions including the presumption that the mark is
distinctive and moreover, in the absence of a Section 2(f) claim in the registration,
that the mark is inherently distinctive for the goods”).
In sum, we are not persuaded by Applicant’s evidence and ultimately disagree
with Applicant’s contention that the cited mark, THE TWISTED FORK, or even the
term TWISTED is so weak in connection with restaurant services that its scope of
protection is abbreviated.
Accordingly, the sixth DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis.

Serial No. 98243448
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C. Comparison of the Marks
We turn now to the first DuPont factor, which focuses on the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation,
and commercial impression. See Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1371 (quoting DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361). Similarity as to any one of these elements may be sufficient to support
a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. See Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form,
spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”); accord In re Inn at St. John’s,
LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13, aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
Applicant’s mark, TWISTED FORK BRUNCH COMPANY, essentially
incorporates the cited mark, THE TWISTED FORK. Indeed, TWISTED FORK is the
dominant element of both marks given the additional words have less source-
identifying significance. That is, the definite article THE, in the cited mark, plays a
subordinate role and merely modifies the term TWISTED FORK. See, e.g., In re Thor
Tech Inc., No. 78634024, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 253, *3 (WAVE and THE WAVE are
virtually identical because “[t]he addition of the word ‘The’ at the beginning of the
registered mark does not have any trademark significance.”); In re Narwood Prods.
Inc., No. 329339, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 52, *2 (wording THE MUSIC MAKERS and
MUSICMAKERS are “virtually identical” marks; the inclusion of the definite article
“the” is “insignificant in determining likelihood of confusion”).

Serial No. 98243448
9
Likewise, the disclaimed wording, BRUNCH COMPANY, has less source-
identifying significance because it is descriptive of restaurant services. Despite the
descriptiveness of this wording, Applicant argues that:6
Even if descriptive portions of a mark are disregarded elsewhere in this
analysis, descriptive portions would still appear on all of the relevant
offerings and be seen and thus pronounced by consumers. Thus,
Applicant's mark with the wording BRUNCH COMPANY will still be
pronounced by consumers. The word THE appears nowhere in Applicant's
mark, and the words BRUNCH COMPANY appear nowhere in the Cited
mark. The pronunciation is dissimilar and no source confusion is likely.
To the extent Applicant is arguing that disclaimed matter is not entirely removed
from consideration of its mark when comparing it to the cited mark, we agree.
Nevertheless, certain elements of marks may play a less important role in
distinguishing them from others and disclaimers of merely descriptive terms
“constitute rational reasons for giving those terms less weight in the analysis.” In re
Detroit Ath. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc.,
105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding DELTA the dominant part of the mark
THE DELTA CAFE, in part because the generic word “café” was disclaimed)). See
also In re Binion, No. 76590702, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 701, at *7-8 (concluding that
confusion was likely between BINION’S for “hotel and bar services” and BINION’S
ROADHOUSE for “restaurant services” where descriptive word ROADHOUSE
received less weight than BINION’S when comparing the marks as a whole).
Here, we have no trouble determining that as the initial and only non-descriptive
(and non-disclaimed) term in Applicant’s mark, the wording TWISTED FORK is the
6 6 TTABVUE 11.

Serial No. 98243448
10
dominant source indicator in the mark. See Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc.,
No. 91074797, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 60, *8 (noting that “it is often the first part of a
mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and
remembered”); see also Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d 1372.
In terms of sound and appearance, the marks are also quite similar in that
Applicant’s mark begins with the near equivalent to the entirety of the cited mark.
We also keep in mind that when marks have clearly dominant elements, there is a
“penchant of consumers to shorten marks” and, when calling for the goods or services,
“it is reasonable that such a practice would lead many consumers to drop the highly
descriptive/generic term[s]” in marks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., No.
85826258, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *9 (holding consumers calling for TIME
TRAVELER BLONDE beer may drop the disclaimed term BLONDE). Thus, given
that many restaurants offer a brunch service, it would not be unreasonable for
consumers shorten any reference to Applicant as TWISTED FORK.
Finally, in terms of commercial impression and meaning, Applicant argues the
marks are “significantly different” because of the disclaimed wording BRUNCH
COMPANY and that its mark “can thus refer to an altered path for a brunch
company, or an unexpected path or type of cuisine served.”7 Applicant argues that,
“[b]y contrast, the Cited mark refers to a curved or winded utensil, or an emotionally
unsound or unstable utensil.”8 Applicant relies on the definition of “twisted” to mean
7 6 TTABVUE 12, 13.
8 6 TTABVUE 13.

Serial No. 98243448
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either “to unite by winding,” “to form into a spiral shape,” or “mentally or emotionally
unsound or disturbed.”9
We disagree with Applicant’s contention that the marks convey significantly
different meanings; rather, we find them to be extremely similar. That is, both marks
suggest a fork that has been turned or distorted, i.e., twisted. The addition of
BRUNCH COMPANY in Applicant’s mark does not alter this meaning. It is not
unusual for restaurants, such as Registrant, to offer a brunch meal. Thus, the
additional descriptive wording in Applicant’s mark only emphasizes this offering but
does not help convey a meaning that helps distinguish the mark.
In sum, we conclude that the marks are overall very similar. Accordingly, the first
DuPont factor weighs in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
D. Pairs of Registrations for Similar Marks Covering Restaurant
Services
Applicant also submitted twenty-five pairs of third-party registrations owned by
different entities for the same or very similar marks which are separately registered
for restaurant services, e.g., LIBERTY BAR and LIBERTY BURGER, both for
restaurant services, and registered to two different entities.10 Applicant argues that
“[e]ven assuming arguendo that Applicant’s mark is similar to the Cited mark, the
plethora of similar marks registered alongside each other for the services at issue
9 Copies of definitions were submitted with Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration filed on
March 27, 2025, TSDR pp. 57-71.
10 Applicant submitted copies of the registrations with its Request for Reconsideration filed
on March 27, 2025, TSDR pp. 72-177.

Serial No. 98243448
12
indicates that customer confusion is unlikely.”11 Applicant asserts that this shows
“the USPTO practice of allowing restaurant marks with shared terms to be registered
concurrently.”12
Generally, evidence comprising pairs of third-party registrations evidence is used
to support an argument that the goods or services of the applicant and cited
registration are sufficiently distinct for the marks to coexist. See, e.g., In re Thor Tech,
Inc., No. 85667188, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 18. Here, there can be no such argument as
the restaurant services at issue are identical. Instead, Applicant appears to be
arguing that it is not unusual for very similar marks to coexist even when used in
connection with restaurant services.
The paired registrations evidence may have some probative value to the extent
they show consumers are accustomed to encountering some marks that are similar
in connection with restaurant services. However, there is also a void of certain
information that detracts from the relevance of this evidence. That is, we are not
privy to the prosecution histories of these pairs of third-party registrations, including
whether there was evidence showing weakness of those marks in connection with
restaurants. As discussed above, that is not the case here as we find no demonstrated
weakness with respect to Registrant’s mark or the shared element, TWISTED FORK.
Also, we are not privy to whether any the paired registrations involved agreements
or consents to register between the different owners. Additionally, the coexistence of
11 6 TTABVUE 15.
12 6 TTABVUE 19.

Serial No. 98243448
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these pairs of registrations “does not prove that they coexisted during that time
without confusion in the marketplace.” In re Thomas, No. 78334625, 2006 TTAB
LEXIS 135, *22.
Accordingly, Applicant’s evidence of paired registrations does not persuade us that
confusion is not likely.
E. Consumer Sophistication
Under the fourth DuPont factor, we consider “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., 'impulse' vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. “[W]e must make our determination based on the least
sophisticated consumer.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020 TTAB LEXIS
17, at *17 (TTAB 2020) (citing Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325).
In this regard, Applicant argues:13
Consumers of restaurant services have many considerations when
choosing where to eat. Restaurant consumers must think about type of
cuisine, location, price point, online reviews, and other factors when
determining what restaurant to go to. … Reviews of restaurants and word
of mouth mean more to consumers in recent years, so they will do their
research before going to a place, so as to determine whether or not to eat
there. ... For example, consumers would not be confused between a 1-star
diner, and a 5-star steakhouse, because they will understand the
differences in reviews, price, and atmosphere.
Additionally, many Americans have dietary restrictions and thus choose
restaurants carefully because they do not want to get sick or have an
allergic reaction to the food that they eat. … Consumers with allergies are
recommended to reach out to restaurants prior to visiting, to ensure that
they can be accommodated. … For example, a person with celiac disease
would need to determine whether a restaurant has gluten free options on
their menu prior to going to that restaurant. Thus, consumers think
carefully about which restaurants to go to before actually going.
13 6 TTABVUE 20.

Serial No. 98243448
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While some of Applicant’s arguments may ring true, e.g., consumers relying on
reviews and dietary restrictions, and these factors may assist in their selection of
restaurants, other marketplace realities remain. Specifically, the relevant consumer
for restaurant services is essentially the general public, without any limitation as to
those with food allergies or those relying on reviews. In addition, because there is no
limitation in the restaurant services identified in the application and cited
registation, we must assume Applicant’s and Registrant’s restaurant services may
involve serving the same cuisine in an inexpensive environment and catering to con-
sumers who will not exercise a higher degree of care in their choice of restaurants.
Accordingly, we find the fourth DuPont factor to be neutral in our analysis.
II. Conclusion
The first DuPont factor favors a finding of a likelihood of confusion because
Applicant’s mark, TWISTED FORK BRUNCH COMPANY, viewed in its entirety, is
very similar to the cited mark, THE TWISTED FORK. In addition, the second and
third DuPont factors strongly support a finding that confusion is likely because the
involved restaurant services are identical and their channels of trade are also
presumed to be the same. Other factors for which there is argument and evidence are
neutral. There are no factors that weigh against a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
In view thereof, we conclude that Applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion with
the cited mark.
Decision: The refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) to register Applicant’s
mark is affirmed.