Revo Holdings, LLC v. RE Virtual Office Inc

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: June 16, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Revo Holdings, LLC
v.
Revo Real Estate Inc. and RE Virtual Office Inc.1
_____
Cancellation No. 92085621
_____
Dyan M. House, of Baker & McKenzie, LLP,
for Revo Holdings, LLC.
Revo Real Estate Inc., pro se (by Anthony J. Rutz).
_____
Before Larkin, Allard, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
On July 4, 2024, Revo Holdings, LLC (Petitioner) filed a petition to cancel
Registration No. 4066391 for the mark for services identified
as “real estate brokerage,” in International Class 36. The petition alleges that Revo
Real Estate Inc. (Respondent) owns the registration and that Respondent has
1 As explained infra, we are adding RE Virtual Office Inc. as an additional respondent.

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abandoned the mark.2 The petition attached a copy of the registration, along with its
status and title information from the USPTO public website.
I. Background
Registration No. 4066391 issued in 2011 to Anthony James Rutz. Since issuance,
three assignments of the registration have been recorded with the USPTO’s
Assignments Branch.3 On December 1, 2020, Mr. Rutz assigned it to Respondent.4
On February 14, 2024, Respondent assigned it back to Mr. Rutz.5 On February 24,
2025, while this proceeding was pending, Mr. Rutz assigned the registration to RE
Virtual Office Inc.6 All assignors and assignees share the same mailing address (PO
Box 14609, San Luis Obispo, CA 93406) and list Anthony Rutz as correspondent.
Mr. Rutz, who owned the registration when the petition was filed, answered the
petition.7 The answer is unclear whether Mr. Rutz answered for Respondent or
2 See 1 TTABVUE 4. References to the briefs, other filings in the case, and the record cite
the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” is the docket
number assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE and any number immediately following
“TTABVUE” identifies the specific page(s) to which we refer.
3 We can take judicial notice whether any assignments or security interests have been
recorded at the USPTO in a registration that is properly of record. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v.
WNBA Enters., LLC, No. 91160755, 2007 WL 763166, at *4 n.6 (TTAB 2007); Jim Dandy Co.
v. Siler City Mills, Inc., No. 91060588, 1981 WL 48120, at *1 n.2 (TTAB 1981).
4 Reel 007119, Frames 0949-50.
5 Reel 008542, Frames 0347-48. Thus, when the petition to cancel was filed on July 4, 2024,
Respondent was not the owner of the registration. Mr. Rutz was. However, this assignment
was not publicly recorded with the USPTO until August 14, 2024, i.e., about a month after
this cancellation proceeding was filed. Thus, as noted, the cancellation named as a defendant
the entity that USPTO records reflected as the owner at the time, i.e., Respondent.
6 Reel 008794, Frames 0506-07. On April 2, 2026, the Board acknowledged the recordation
of this assignment. See 9 TTABVUE.
7 See 4 TTABVUE.

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himself. The answer alleged that “Revo Real Estate Inc. [c]losed on 3/04/2024,” about
two weeks after it assigned the mark to Mr. Rutz. The answer further alleged that
“the mark is being used by Anthony James Rutz a licensed real estate agent.”8 We
thus view the answer as a denial of the claim of abandonment. See, e.g., Cummings
v. WSM, Inc., No. 92009591,1973 WL 19773, at *1 n.2 (TTAB 1973) (interpreting
unclear pleading “in the light most favorable” to pro se litigant “in order to do
substantial justice”); see generally Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A
document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’” under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure) (citation omitted).
Neither party submitted evidence during the trial period and only Petitioner filed
a trial brief. But we do not treat Respondent’s failure to file a trial brief as a
concession of the case, because our rules do not require a respondent in a cancellation
proceeding to file a trial brief. See Yazhong Investing Ltd. v. Multi-Media Tech.
Ventures, Ltd., No. 92056548, 2018 WL 2113778, at *4 n.13 (TTAB 2018). Nor is a
Respondent required to submit evidence. This is because, under Section 7(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), the registration is “prima facie evidence of the
validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s
ownership of the mark … .” As a consequence, Petitioner “must still prove its
[statutory entitlement to pursue a cancellation proceeding] and grounds for
cancellation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Yazhong Investing, 2018 WL
8 See id. at 2.

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2113778, at *4 n.13 (citation omitted); see also Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War
Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same).
The case is now ready for decision. For the reasons explained below, we deny the
petition to cancel.
II. Preliminary matter
As a preliminary matter, we add the current owner as reflected by the most recent
assignment recorded at the USPTO (RE Virtual Office Inc.) as an additional
respondent. See TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE
(TBMP) § 512.01 (“When there has been an assignment of a mark that is the subject
of … an inter partes proceeding before the Board, the assignee may be joined or
substituted, as may be appropriate, … upon the Board’s own initiative.”) (June 2025
rev.). This addition is reflected in the caption of this decision.
III. The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of Respondent’s registration. As mentioned, no other
evidence was presented by either party during the trial period.
Petitioner attached to its trial brief copies of a set of interrogatories and a set of
document requests. According to Petitioner’s brief, Petitioner served these on
Respondent during discovery but Respondent did not respond to them.9 We do not
consider these documents, for several reasons. First, “[a] brief may not be used as a
9 See 8 TTABVUE 5, 9-29.

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vehicle for the introduction of evidence. The Board will not consider evidence and
other evidentiary materials attached to the briefs unless they were properly made of
record during the time assigned for taking testimony.” Hole in 1 Drinks, Inc. v. Lajtay,
No. 92065860, 2020 WL 859853, at *2 (TTAB 2020) (citations omitted). Second, there
is no declaration authenticating these discovery requests. Third, there is no
declaration averring that Respondent did not respond to them: there is only
Petitioner’s statement in its trial brief, which is not evidence. See, e.g., Cai v.
Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“assertions of fact” in a
brief are “not evidence under any of the relevant rules”) (citation omitted); Peeler v.
Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 654 CCPA 1976).
IV. Analysis
Before we assess the merits of Petitioner’s claim of abandonment, we must
determine whether the relevant statute authorizing us to decide petitions to cancel
registrations entitles Petitioner to have instituted and prosecuted this proceeding.
Section 14 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064, authorizes petitions for
cancellation to be filed “by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged …
by the registration of a mark.” To be so entitled, a party petitioning for cancellation
of a registration must plausibly allege and demonstrate: (1) an interest within the
zone of interests protected by the cancellation statute, i.e., a direct and personal stake
in the outcome of a cancellation proceeding; and (2) a reasonable belief in damage
proximately caused by registration of the mark in violation of the statute. Curtin v.
United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359, 1364-65, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025)

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(citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 120-37
(2014)).
A plaintiff must both plead and prove its entitlement to proceed under the
opposition or cancellation statutes. See, e.g., Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
670 F.2d 1024, 1028 (CCPA 1982) (“standing,” i.e., statutory entitlement, must be
both properly pleaded and proved); Philanthropist.com, Inc. v. Gen. Conf. Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists, Nos. 92065178, 2021 WL 2472776, at *4 (TTAB 2021)
(same), aff’d mem., No. 21-2208, 2022 WL 3147202 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 2022); Hiraga
v. Arena, No. 92047976, 2009 WL 723334, at *5 (TTAB 2009) (“[a]s a threshold
matter, petitioner must plead and prove” statutory entitlement).
Petitioner’s brief does not address statutory entitlement. We therefore undertake
our own review of the record to determine whether statutory entitlement was
properly pleaded and proved at trial. As we explain below, it was not.
The Petition alleges, in conclusory terms, that Petitioner “believes it will be
damaged by the continued registration of US Registration No. 4,066,391,”10 but the
Petition alleges nothing else—such as, for example, Petitioner’s ownership of a
similar mark or a refused application to register a similar mark—that plausibly
allows us to infer that Petitioner has a real interest in the case. See, e.g.,
Saddlesprings, Inc. v. Mad Croc Brands, Inc., No. 92055493, 2012 WL 5196161, at *2
(TTAB 2012) (“petitioner must allege facts in the petition for cancellation which, if
ultimately proven, would establish that petitioner has a real interest in the
10 See 1 TTABVUE 3.

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cancellation proceeding”) (cleaned up; citation omitted); Doyle v. Al Johnson’s
Swedish Rest. & Butik, Inc., No. 92054059, 2012 WL 695211, at *2-3 (TTAB 2012)
(same).
Beyond the deficient pleading, the only evidence of record is Respondent’s
registration file and answer. Neither contains anything bearing on whether
Petitioner has a reasonable belief in damage by continued registration. Accordingly,
Petitioner has failed both to plead and to prove this necessary threshold element of
any cancellation claim. See, e.g., Melwani v. Allegiance Corp., No. 91190682, 2010 WL
5574281, at *5-7 (TTAB 2010) (“It is incumbent upon opposer to establish his
standing, in the absence of an admission or stipulation from applicant. … [O]pposer
does not have standing in this proceeding because there is neither an admission of
standing by applicant nor record evidence that otherwise establishes opposer’s
standing.”) (citation and paragraph break omitted); Boyds Collection Ltd. v.
Herrington & Co., No. 92032146, 2003 WL 152427, at *4 (TTAB 2003) (“Because
petitioner bears the burden of proof, it is axiomatic that without admissible evidence,
it cannot prevail.”) (citation omitted); id. at n.10 (“Without such evidence, petitioner
can prove neither its standing nor its substantive claims.”).
Though Petitioner’s failure to plead and prove it is statutorily entitled to seek
cancellation of Respondent’s registration by itself requires denial of the petition, we
note that the only admissible evidence in the case is the registration file and the
pleadings, in which Respondent denies abandonment. Thus, there is no evidence
supporting Petitioner’s sole claim that the mark has been abandoned. See, e.g.,

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Melwani, 2010 WL 5574281, at *6-7; Boyds Collection, 2003 WL 152427, at *4 n.10.
This independently requires denial of the petition.
Decision: We deny the petition for cancellation.