TBK Operating Company, LLC

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: June 9, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re TBK Operating Company, LLC
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Serial No. 98551577
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Todd A. Fichtenberg, of Emerson, Thomson, Bennett, LLC,
for TBK Operating Company, LLC.
Joseph Greene, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 125,
Robin Mittler, Managing Attorney.
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Before Goodman, Lebow, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
TBK Operating Company, LLC (Applicant) appeals the refusal of its application
to register the proposed standard-character mark THE OHIO IPA (“OHIO”
disclaimed) on the Principal Register for goods identified as “Ale; Beer; Pale ale; Pale
beer,” in International Class 32.1
1 Application Serial No. 98551577 was filed on May 15, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce. Applicant entered a voluntary disclaimer of “OHIO” during
prosecution. See Feb. 20, 2025, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 9-10. Citations
in this opinion to the application record refer to the version of the documents as downloaded

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The Examining Attorney bases the refusal on two independent grounds. First, the
Examining Attorney refused registration based on Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with the mark OHIO PALE ALE
(“PALE ALE” disclaimed), which is registered on the Principal Register in standard-
character format for “Beer” in International Class 32.2 Second, the Examining
Attorney refused registration under Section 2(e)(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2),
finding that the proposed mark THE OHIO IPA is primarily geographically
descriptive of the identified goods.
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final,3 Applicant appealed.4
Applicant and the Examining Attorney each filed briefs,5 and Applicant filed a reply
brief.6 The case is now ready for decision. For the reasons explained below, we affirm
the refusal to register on both grounds.
ANALYSIS
We begin by addressing whether the proposed mark is primarily geographically
descriptive of the goods under Section 2(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2).
in .pdf format from the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
2 Reg. No. 4865768 issued on December 8, 2015, and is renewed.
3 See July 11, 2025, Final Office Action.
4 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and appeal record cite to the Board’s TTABVUE
electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents the docket number
assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE, and any number immediately following
“TTABVUE” identifies the specifically-cited page(s), if any.
5 See 4 TTABVUE (Applicant); 6 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney).
6 See 7 TTABVUE.

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A. Section 2(e)(2) refusal
Section 2(e)(2) of the Act prohibits registration of “mark which … when used on or
in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive
of them … .” To establish that a mark is primarily geographically descriptive of an
applicant’s goods or services, an examining attorney must show that: “(1) the mark
sought to be registered is the name of a place known generally to the public, and (2)
the public would make a goods/place association, i.e., believe that the goods for which
the mark is sought to be registered originate in that place. … [T]he PTO must also
show that (3) the source of the goods is the geographic region named in the mark.” In
re Newbridge Cutlery Co., 776 F.3d 854, 860-61 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted);
accord In re Princeton Equity Grp. LLC, No. 97397212, 2025 WL 1638891, at *3
(TTAB 2025).
“Under the first prong of the test—whether the mark’s primary significance is a
generally known geographic location—a composite mark such as the applicant’s
proposed mark must be evaluated as a whole.” In re Save Venice N.Y. Inc., 259 F.3d
1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also In re Sibony, No. 86293054, 2021 WL 4812119,
at *3 (TTAB 2021) (“while the USPTO may consider the significance of each element
separately, a mark comprising geographic wording coupled with additional wording
still must be considered as a whole”) (citation omitted).
The goods/place or services/place association (the second element above) generally
is presumed where the geographic location is generally known, the term’s geographic
significance is its primary significance, and the goods or services originate there. See,

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e.g., Princeton Equity, 2025 WL 1638891, at *3; In re Mankovitz, No. 77000589, 2009
WL 804139, at *4 (TTAB 2009).
We evaluate first whether the mark’s primary significance is a generally known
geographic location. Applicant does not argue that Ohio is not a well-known
geographic location. But it does argue that the primary significance of THE OHIO
IPA, evaluated as a whole, is not geographic.7 Specifically, Applicant asserts that
“[c]onsumers will see the wording ‘THE’ as a source identifying term that changes
the primary significance of the mark from the word ‘OHIO.’”8 Applicant gives an
analogy: “Consumers will understand that ‘THE OHIO IPA’ is different from ‘OHIO
PALE ALE’ in the same manner that they understand that ‘The Ohio State
University’ is different from ‘Ohio University.’”9
We see several problems with this argument. First, there’s no evidence to support
the argument that “THE” distracts from, or somehow changes, the geographic
significance of OHIO. This assertion is simply attorney argument. Attorney argument
is not evidence. See, e.g., Estée Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); In re Teledyne Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 968, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1982). Second, we
evaluate each mark offered for registration individually, based on the evidence before
us, not on analogies to different third-party marks for different goods and services,
7 4 TTABVUE 12.
8 Id. at 13.
9 Id. In the section of its brief addressing the Section 2(d) refusal, Applicant elaborates,
arguing that “THE” is defined as a term used “to emphasize” the noun that follows. See id. at
7. This undercuts Applicant’s argument because it shows that the article “the” only serves to
reinforce, not change, whatever terms follows (here, “OHIO IPA”). The Board has noted this
before. See, e.g., In re Thor Tech, Inc., No. 78634024, 2009 WL 1098997, at *2 (TTAB 2009).

Serial No. 98551577
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no matter how similar an applicant says they are. See, e.g., In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 753 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Quik-Print Copy Shops, Inc., 616 F.2d 523,
526 n.8 (CCPA 1980). Third, that consumers perceive Ohio University and The Ohio
State University as different sources of educational services or t-shirts says nothing
about whether the term “Ohio” in both of those marks has geographical significance.
Likelihood of confusion with another mark and whether a mark is primarily
geographically descriptive are two different issues.
Applicant also argues that young people perceive an alternate meaning of “Ohio.”
To them, says Applicant, it’s slang for “weird, bizarre, or foolish.”10 But there is no
evidence of this asserted slang meaning in the record. Second, many terms have one
meaning in one context and other meanings in other contexts. But we assess
consumer perception in the context relevant to the case before us, not in the abstract
or in other contexts. See, e.g., In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 963-64 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
In re Brouwerij Nacional Balashi NV, No. 78304942, 2006 WL 2223449, at *3 (TTAB
2006); In re MCO Props. Inc., No. 74438943, 1995 WL 838977, at *3 (TTAB 1995).
Here, we are concerned with how consumers of beer and ale perceive THE OHIO IPA,
and there’s no evidence that such consumers would view “Ohio” in that context as
anything other than geographic.
Applicant also says that the term IPA “carries weight and significance, changing
the overall meaning or connotation of the term ‘OHIO.’”11 But Applicant does not
10 Id.
11 See id. at 12.

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explain or provide evidence how. The record shows that “IPA” is the acronym for
“India pale ale,” which is a type of ale or beer.12 Generally, “the presence of generic
or highly descriptive terms in a mark which also contains a primarily geographically
descriptive term does not serve to detract from the primary geographical significance
of the mark as a whole.” In re Am. Furniture Warehouse Co., No. 86407531, 2018 WL
1942214, at *3 (TTAB 2018) (citation omitted); accord In re Spirits of New Merced,
LLC, No. 78710805, 2007 WL 4365811, at *6 (TTAB 2007) (“We find that the primary
significance of the term ‘Yosemite’ is geographic, and also that the primary
significance of YOSEMITE BEER, in its entirety, is geographic. The addition of a
generic word to a geographical term does not overcome the primary geographic
significance of the mark as a whole.”) (citation omitted). Nothing in the record
supports Applicant’s vague remark about how “IPA” changes the meaning of Ohio in
the proposed mark.
We find that the primary significance of the proposed mark THE OHIO IPA is
geographic.
We now turn to the second and third elements in Newbridge Cutlery, 776 F.3d at
860-61: whether “(2) the public would make a goods/place association, i.e., believe
12 See July 11, 2025, Final Office Action, at TSDR 15 (AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
entry defining “India pale ale” as “A golden ale with a strong flavor of hops and a relatively
high alcohol content”); id. at 17 (OXFORD REFERENCE entry describing “India pale ale” as
follows: “(IPA) is a beer style characterized by high levels of alcohol and hops … .”); id. at 22
(entry in Beer Advocate for “American IPA”). Applicant points to an entry in “Acronym
Finder” for IPA listing over 130 different terms for which IPA is an acronym (including India
pale ale). See Feb. 20, 2025, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 16-20. But the
evidence that it stands for “India pale ale” clearly is the relevant definition, given Applicant’s
identified goods (“beer” and “pale ale”) and the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY and
OXFORD REFERENCE entries.

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that the goods for which the mark is sought to be registered originate in that place …
[and] (3) the source of the goods is the geographic region named in the mark.” As
mentioned, we presume that the public will make a goods/place association (the
second element) where the geographic location is generally known, the term’s
geographic significance is its primary significance—both of which we’ve already
found—and the goods originate in the geographic location. See, e.g., Princeton Equity,
2025 WL 1638891, at *3; Mankovitz, 2009 WL 804139, at *4. Here, as to this last fact,
the record contains evidence from Applicant’s website that Applicant’s “production
facility” for its beers and ales is in Middleburg Heights, OH.13 Thus, we apply the
presumption that consumers will make a goods/place association. Applicant insists
otherwise,14 but offers no evidence in support. We therefore find that consumers will
make a goods/place association.
Because the record reflects that Applicant’s proposed mark is primarily
geographically descriptive, we affirm the Section 2(e)(2) refusal. Though this means
that the application must be refused, we will address next, in the interest of
completeness, the alternative refusal under Section 2(d).
B. Section 2(d) refusal
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
13 See July 11, 2025, Final Office Action, at TSDR 43-48.
14 See 4 TTABVUE 14.

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to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). As mentioned at the outset, the
Examining Attorney also refused registration under Section 2(d), finding that THE
OHIO IPA for “Ale; Beer; Pale ale; Pale beer” would cause a likelihood of confusion
with the registered mark OHIO PALE ALE for beer.
We determine whether confusion is likely by analyzing all probative facts in
evidence relevant to the likelihood-of-confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures
LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Though du Pont lists thirteen numbered
factors, we generally address only those that are relevant and material to the case
before us. See, e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed. Cir.
1990). Typically, those include comparisons of the marks and goods (the first two
factors listed in du Pont) and any other du Pont factors that the parties address and
on which there is relevant evidence in the record. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v.
Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). After making findings on the relevant
factors, we then weigh them together to determine if, on balance, they indicate that
confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
A. Comparison of the goods, channels of trade, and classes of
customers
We first compare the respective goods, channels or trade, and classes of customers.
See, e.g., du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. We’ll start with the goods. Here, the Examining

Serial No. 98551577
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Attorney argues that that goods are identical: both the application and the cited
registration list “beer.”15 Applicant does not contest that the goods are identical. We
agree with the Examining Attorney and find the goods to be identical. This favors a
conclusion that confusion is likely.
Two more relevant factors are the parties’ respective trade channels and classes
of customers. See id. (listing as factors “The similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels” and “buyers to whom sales are made”). The
Examining Attorney correctly points out that where, as here, the goods are identical
and there are no restrictions in the application or registration, there is a presumption
that the applicant’s and registrant’s goods will travel in the same trade channels to
the same classes of customers.16 See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2012). Applicant does not contest this principle or that it applies here. Nor does
Applicant address these factors at all. We find that the trade channels and classes of
customers are identical. These two factors, too, favor a conclusion that confusion is
likely.
B. Comparison of the marks
This brings us to the final factor that is relevant in this case and the only factor
that Applicant addresses: “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” du Pont,
476 F.2d at 1371. Similarity as to even one of these aspects may be enough, depending
15 The Examining Attorney also asserts that the other goods in the application (ale, pale ale,
and pale beer) are beers as well. See 6 TTABVUE 12; see also supra note 12.
16 See 6 TTABVUE 12.

Serial No. 98551577
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on the circumstances, to support a conclusion that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Krim-
Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968); Cecile Gagnon
Co. v. Bourjois, Inc., 223 F.2d 731, 733 (CCPA 1955); In re Jimenez, 2025 WL 3126703,
at *4 (TTAB 2025). “Those who comprise the purchasing public for [the] goods
ordinarily must depend upon their past recollection of marks to which they were
previously exposed.” Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007
(CCPA 1981) (citation omitted). Thus, “marks must be considered in light of the
fallibility of memory and not on the basis of side-by-side comparison.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up; citation omitted).
Here, THE OHIO IPA and OHIO PALE ALE look and sound alike only to the
extent they contain the term OHIO. But, as we discussed in the preceding section, in
the beer context, there is evidence that “IPA” signifies a sub-type of pale ale: India
pale ale. So the respective marks have very similar meanings.
Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney improperly “dissected” the marks
and put too much emphasis on OHIO. In this vein, Applicant argues that [the
Examining Attorney or he?] “should have examined Applicant’s Mark as a whole and
given more weight to the elements ‘THE’ and ‘IPA’ ….” 17 Applicant acknowledges
that we have held that the article “the” generally does little work in distinguishing a
mark.18 See, e.g., Thor Tech, 2009 WL 1098997, at *2; U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Midwest
Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 1977 WL 22507, at *5 (TTAB 1977). Applicant notes that what
17 See 4 TTABVUE 6.
18 See id. at 5.

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“the” typically does is to highlight the term or terms that follow it (here, OHIO IPA)
and to signify that Applicant’s “Ohio IPA” is “unique and the most outstanding or
prominent choice for beer.”19
We fail to see how this essentially laudatory use of “THE” in Applicant’s mark,
which points to the words that follow (Applicant’s “OHIO IPA” beer) distinguishes
source from the seller of “OHIO PALE ALE” beer, which is essentially the same thing
(an Ohio beer or pale ale20). Laudatory terms are considered descriptive, not
distinctive, see, e.g., DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d
1247, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and generally adding a descriptive term—especially one
that highlights the terms that follow—does little to distinguish source. See, e.g., In re
Detroit Athl. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (descriptive entity terms “Co.”
and Club” do not change the commercial impressions of otherwise identical marks);
Kristinus Gesellschaft v. Murray, Sons & Co., 370 F.2d 581, 582 (CCPA 1967) (“In
view of its obvious laudatory or descriptive connotation, the fact that the term ‘de
luxe’ appears in close proximity to ‘PEER’ is of little significance.”) (citation omitted);
cf. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 WL 3915986, at *9 (TTAB
2016) (“[W]e see little in Applicant’s mark to distinguish it from Registrant’s mark,
as Applicant’s mark merely adds a highly descriptive term to the registered mark, in
such a way as to indicate to customers a suitable purpose of the goods. And although
the registered mark includes the word ‘THE,’ which is absent from Applicant’s mark,
19 See id.
20 See supra note 12.

Serial No. 98551577
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the presence or absence of this word is unlikely to allow consumers to meaningfully
distinguish the marks, because we cannot find on the evidence of record that
consumers would associate the trademark THE BLOB, as used on these goods, with
the classic movie.”) (citation omitted).
Applicant’s last-ditch effort is to argue that ‘“IPA’ … has a distinctive impression
to [sic] PALE ALE” because there are many types of pale ale.21 But Applicant does
not grapple with the evidence we mentioned above that shows that an IPA is a type
of pale ale.22 Besides, the question is whether consumers will likely be confused as to
source, not whether they will confuse the marks, see, e.g., Kangol Ltd. v. Kangaroos
U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson
Pub. Co., 473 F.2d 901, 902 (CCPA 1973), or confuse the goods, see, e.g., Hydra Mac,
Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 507 F.2d 1399, 1400 (CCPA 1975); Nat’l Mineral Co. v.
Norwich Pharmacal Co., 183 F.2d 119, 120 (CCPA 1950).
In short, we find the marks, overall, to be similar, especially in meaning. This
factor will support a conclusion that confusion is likely.
C. Conclusion as to whether confusion is likely
Our final step is to assess the factor findings together to determine if, on balance,
they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384.
“[W]here, as here, the goods at issue are identical, the degree of similarity [of
marks] necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Viterra Inc.,
21 See 4 TTABVUE 11.
22 See supra note 12.

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671 F.3d at 1363 (cleaned up; citation omitted). The marks at issue are quite similar,
particularly in meaning. Even without the nudge provided by the identicality of the
goods, we would find that this strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely.
Further, the channels of trade and classes of customers are identical. With all the
relevant factors indicating that confusion is likely and nothing to counterbalance
them, we have no difficulty, on the record here, concluding that confusion is likely.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed both under Section
2(e)(2) and, independently, under Section 2(d).