Airbnb, Inc. v. Soul BnB LLC

Mailed: February 3, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
———
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
———
Airbnb, Inc.
v.
Soul BnB LLC
______
Opposition No. 91288785
______
Christopher T. Varas and Jennifer Fairbairn Deal of Kilpatrick Townsend &
Stockton LLP, for Airbnb, Inc.
Soul BnB LLC, pro se (by Christopher D. Foreman, CEO).
———
Before Wellington, Pologeorgis, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lavache, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Soul BnB LLC filed an application seeking registration on the Principal
Register of the standard character mark SOUL BNB for “Health spa services for
health and wellness of the mind, body and spirit offered in or from a remote, mobile
or temporary on-site location,” in International Class 44.1
1 Application Serial No. 97637496, filed October 18, 2022, claiming a bona fide intention to
use the mark in commerce, under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Opposition No. 91288785
2
Opposer Airbnb, Inc. opposes registration of Applicant’s mark on the ground of
likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based
on its ownership of eight pleaded registrations for the standard character mark
AIRBNB,2 for various goods and services in International Classes 9, 35, 36, 39, 42,
43, and 45, as summarized below:
Reg. No. Reg. Date Goods/Services
3890025 12/14/2010
(renewed)
Providing online business directories featuring temporary lodging, in
International Class 35.
3890027 12/14/2010
(renewed)
Arranging temporary housing accommodations; Providing online
reservation services for temporary lodging; Travel agency services,
namely, . . . lodging; Providing temporary lodging information via the
Internet, in International Class 43.
3971784 5/31/2011
(renewed)
Computer services in the nature of customized web pages featuring user-
defined information, personal profiles and information, in International
Class 42.
4289397 2/12/2013
(renewed)
Providing an online interactive website featuring the listing and rental
of temporary lodging; Providing online computer database and online
searchable databases featuring information, listings and
announcements about housing, apartments, condominiums, townhouses,
real estate, and rental and leasing advertisements for the foregoing; Real
estate listing, rental and leasing services for residential housing,
apartments, rooms in homes, sublets, vacation homes, cabins and villas
on a global computer network; Providing reviews and feedback about
listers and renters of real estate, in International Class 36;
Computer services, namely, creating an on-line community for registered
users to participate in discussions, get feedback from their peers, form
virtual communities, and engage in social networking featuring the
rental and listing of real estate, in International Class 42;
2 See Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 1, 19-98; Opposer’s First Notice of Reliance, 10
TTABVUE 10-92. The Notice of Opposition also listed “Common Law Basis” and “Dilution by
blurring” as grounds for opposition. 1 TTABVUE 1. However, because Opposer’s brief
contains no arguments as to these claims, they are waived. See Monster Energy Co. v. Chun
Hua Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *3-4 (deeming opposer’s lack of bona fide
intent to use claim waived because it was not argued in opposer’s brief).
The “TTABVUE” citations in this opinion refer to entries in the Board’s electronic docket.
The number preceding “TTABVUE” is the docket entry number and any numbers following
indicate the relevant page numbers within the docket entry. See, e.g., Turdin v. Trilobite,
Ltd., No. 94002505, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *6 n.6.

Opposition No. 91288785
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On-line social networking services, in International Class 45.
4329542 4/30/2013
(renewed)
Online trip and travel recommendations and reservation services;
Providing travel information over global computer networks, namely,
providing search services for travel listings, travel information and
related topics and for making reservations and bookings for
transportation; Providing reviews and recommendations of local
attractions via a global computer network, in International Class 39;
Providing travel information over global computer networks, namely,
providing search services for travel listings, travel information and
related topics and for making reservations and bookings for lodging, in
International Class 43.
4385613 8/13/2013
(renewed)
Providing an online interactive website obtaining users comments
concerning business organizations, service providers, and travel and
social activities; Providing information, namely, compilations, rankings,
ratings, reviews, referrals and recommendations relating to business
organizations, service providers, and travel and social activities using a
global computer network; Advertising and promotion services and
related consulting; dissemination of advertising for others via a global
communications network; online advertising services for others, namely,
providing advertising space on internet web sites; Providing a searchable
online advertising guide featuring the goods and services of online
vendors; providing a searchable online evaluation database for buyers
and sellers; promoting the goods and services of others; advertising and
advertisement services; advertising and information distribution
services, namely, providing classified advertising space via the global
computer network; providing consumer product and service information
via the Internet; providing an online business information directory on
the Internet; providing on-line computer databases and on-line
searchable databases featuring classified listings; computer services,
namely, providing on-line computer databases and on-line searchable
databases featuring consumer information on a wide variety of topics of
general interest to the consuming public, in International Class 35.
4884815 1/12/2016
(maintained)
Vacation real estate listing services and providing such services via a
global computer network; Real estate listing services, namely, providing
an interactive website and online database of rental properties, rental
information, rental property descriptions and images, rental locations
and amenities, availability and rates for vacation rental homes,
condominiums, cabins, villa, apartments, and time-shares; Real estate
services, namely, arranging of rental agreements for real estate for
others by through a website where users can post and receive requests
to rent short-term houses, condos, and apartments, in International
Class 36;
Providing a website for the arrangement and booking of travel tours and
excursions; Providing a website featuring travel information and
commentary; Providing an online searchable computer database
featuring information on travel; Providing reviews of travel service
providers; Travel guide and travel information services; Travel agency

Opposition No. 91288785
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services, namely, making reservations and bookings for transportation,
excursions, travel tours and travel, in International Class 39;
Providing online reservation, booking and search services for temporary
lodging, temporary accommodations and temporary vacation rentals;
Providing an online interactive website featuring temporary lodging,
temporary accommodations, temporary vacation rentals and temporary
rental listings; Providing a website featuring information in the field of
temporary lodging, temporary accommodations and temporary vacation
rentals; Travel agency services, namely, making reservations and
bookings for temporary lodging, temporary accommodations and
temporary vacation rentals; Providing rental information for temporary
lodging, temporary accommodations and temporary vacation rentals,
namely, property descriptions and images, reviews, locations and
amenities, availability and rates for temporary lodging, temporary
accommodations and temporary vacation rentals, in International Class
43.
4983513 6/21/2016
(maintained)
Computer application messaging software for mobile phones, portable
media players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software that allows users to communicate with each other; computer
application software for mobile phones, portable media players,
handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely, software that
allows messaging among guests of lodging accommodations owned and
hosted by others and among the hosts who list lodging accommodations
for rent[;] computer application software for mobile phones, portable
media players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software that allows users to plan, announce, invite others to attend and
evaluate real world meetings and events; computer application software
for mobile phones, portable media players, handheld computers and
related mobile devices, namely, software that allows users to solicit each
other to perform a wide range of personal and customized services,
personalized travel, itinerary and private tour and activity services;
computer application software for mobile phones, portable media
players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software that allows users to arrange for the remote exchange of keys to
lodgings, homes and for locking and unlocking lodgings homes[;]
computer application software for mobile phones, portable media
players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software management tools to permit users to manage, organize,
calendar and share with others travel bookings, activity dates,
photographs, opinions and preferences; computer application software
for mobile phones, portable media players, handheld computers and
related mobile devices, namely, software management tools to permit
users to arrange for temporary lodging check-in help; computer
application software for mobile phones, portable media players,
handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely, software that
permits listers of goods, real property and services for rent or sale to
receive suggested improvements to their listing advertisements;
computer application software for mobile phones, portable media
players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software that permits listers of goods, real property and services for rent
or sale to arrange for professional photographs of the listed goods,

Opposition No. 91288785
5
property and services; computer application software for mobile phones,
portable media players, handheld computers and related mobile devices;
computer application software for mobile phones, portable media
players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software to facilitate the sale of goods and services by others via a
computer network and to provide evaluative feedback and ratings of
sellers' goods and services, the value and prices of sellers' goods and
services, buyers' and sellers' performance, delivery, and overall trading
experience in connection therewith; computer application software for
mobile phones, portable media players, handheld computers and related
mobile devices, namely, software that allows users to list and rent
temporary lodging, access information, listings and announcements
about housing, apartments, condominiums, townhouses, real estate, and
rental and leasing advertisements for the foregoing; computer
application software for mobile phones, portable media players,
handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely, software that
allows users to provide reviews and feedback about listers and renters of
real estate, temporary lodging, transportation, and temporary parking;
computer application software for mobile phones, portable media
players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software that allows users to make and receive payments for the rental,
purchase and sale of goods and services; computer application software
for mobile phones, portable media players, handheld computers and
related mobile devices, namely, software that allows users to search for
travel, transportation, temporary accommodation, and temporary
vehicle parking listings, travel information and related topics and for
making reservations and bookings for transportation, temporary
accommodations, and temporary parking; computer application software
for mobile phones, portable media players, handheld computers and
related mobile devices, namely, software that allows users to provide
travel reviews and recommendations for local attractions; computer
application software for mobile phones, portable media players,
handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely, software that
allows vehicle owners and users to list [sic] [;] computer application
software for mobile phones, portable media players, handheld computers
and related mobile devices, namely, software that allows users to list,
arrange and reserve temporary parking of vehicles at residences;
computer application software for mobile phones, portable media
players, handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely,
software that allows users to list temporary parking; computer
application software for mobile phones, portable media players,
handheld computers and related mobile devices, namely, software that
allows users to engage in social networking featuring travel,
transportation, temporary lodging, temporary parking and the rental
and listing of real estate, in International Class 9.
Applicant’s answer denies most of the allegations in the notice of opposition, but
admits, in relevant part, that Opposer is “a San Francisco-based company providing
an online marketplace for accommodations and experiences”; that “the term

Opposition No. 91288785
6
‘AIRBNB’ has no ordinary English language meaning”; that Opposer owns “numerous
U.S. registrations and applications for ‘AIRBNB’”; and that Applicant’s “application
contains no restrictions on trade channels.”3
Opposer filed a trial brief,4 but Applicant did not. Nor did Applicant submit any
evidence during its assigned trial period.5 For the reasons explained below, the
opposition is dismissed.
I. The Record
The record includes the pleadings, the submissions of the parties during their
respective trial periods, and, by rule, Applicant’s involved application file. See
Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1). Although we do not specifically
itemize the contents of the record, it has been reviewed and considered in its entirety.6
See Quiktrip W., Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“We
have held ‘on multiple occasions that failure to explicitly discuss every issue or every
3 Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 2-4. In response to Opposer’s first request for admission,
Applicant also admitted that it was aware of Opposer and Opposer’s marks when Applicant
adopted Applicant’s mark and when Applicant filed the application for Applicant’s mark. See
Opposer’s Fourth Notice of Reliance, 22 TTABVUE 49 (Applicant’s Response to the First
Request for Admissions). Applicant otherwise denied the allegations in the first and second
requests for admission. Id. at 42-51 (Response to First Request for Admission), 60-65
(Response to Second Request for Admission).
4 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE.
5 Because the burden of proof resides with Opposer, Applicant was not required to submit
any evidence or file a brief. See Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, No.
91263919, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *5 (citing Yazhong Investing Ltd. v. Multi-Media Tech.
Ventures, Ltd., 2018 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *12 n.13 (“Because Respondent, as defendant
herein, is under no obligation to submit evidence or a brief, we do not construe Respondent's
failure to do so as a concession of the case.”)
6 The record includes a stipulation of facts signed by both parties, which was filed by Opposer
on February 18, 2025. See 19 TTABVUE (public filing). The Board had not previously
approved this stipulation; we do so here. See generally TBMP § 501.

Opposition No. 91288785
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piece of evidence does not alone establish that the tribunal did not consider it.’”
(quoting Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017)));
In re Miracle Tuesday LLC, 695 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he mere fact
that the Board did not recite all of the evidence it considered does not mean the
evidence was not, in fact, reviewed.” (citing Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Dekalb
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).7
In our analysis below, we have cited any evidence we have credited, and we have
given no weight to factual assertions that are not supported by evidence properly
introduced into the record. See Pierce-Arrow Soc’y v. Spintek Filtration, Inc., No.
91224343, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 388, at *9.
II. Opposer’s Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Establishing an entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a threshold
requirement in every inter partes case. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d
1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM,
LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Thus, Opposer, as plaintiff in this
opposition proceeding, must prove its entitlement to a statutory cause of action by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC,
No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *8.
7 The record contains a document captioned “Notice of Civil Action filed in Cancellation No.
92083886.” 27 TTABVUE. As the name of the document suggests, it provides notice that
Opposer initiated a de novo appeal in district court concerning a prior decision of the Board
involving Opposer’s petition to cancel Registration No. 6421453 for the mark COMPLETE
BNB. See id. The relevance of the district court action to this proceeding is unclear and
Opposer has not provided any explanation on that point. Therefore, we do not take any
further action regarding the notice other than to acknowledge receipt of it.

Opposition No. 91288785
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To establish an entitlement to a statutory cause of action, Opposer must
demonstrate that it has: (1) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected
by the statute, and (2) a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the
registration of the mark. Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118, 129-134 (2014)); Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1304-07; see also Made in
Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *18.
Here, Opposer has submitted printouts from USPTO records showing the current
status and title of Opposer’s pleaded registrations.8 These registrations form the basis
of a likelihood-of-confusion claim that is not wholly without merit, demonstrating
both an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by the Trademark Act
and a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the registration of
Applicant’s mark. Therefore, Opposer has established its entitlement to oppose
Applicant’s application. N.Y. Yankees P’ship v. IET Prods. & Servs., Inc., No.
91189692, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 96, at *8 (“Opposer’s standing is established with
respect to its likelihood of confusion and dilution claims by its . . . registrations . . .
which the record shows to be valid and subsisting, and owned by Opposer.”) (citing
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also
Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1306.
8 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE 19-98; Opposer’s First Notice of Reliance, 10 TTABVUE
10-92.

Opposition No. 91288785
9
III. Priority
Because Opposer’s valid and subsisting registrations are properly of record and
Applicant has not counterclaimed to cancel them, priority is not an issue for Opposer’s
claimed mark and the goods and services identified in the registrations. Heil Co. v.
Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 494, at *44 (citing King Candy,
Inc. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (CCPA 1974));
Nkanginieme v. Appleton, No. 91256464, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 64, at *4 (“Opposer’s
registration removed priority as an issue.”).
IV. Likelihood of Confusion
We now turn to Opposer’s likelihood-of-confusion claim. Trademark Act Section
2(d), in relevant part, prohibits registration of a mark that “so resembles a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office . . . as to be likely, when used on or in
connection with the goods [or services] of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Opposer bears the burden of establishing
that there is a likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 951. To determine whether confusion is likely, we analyze
all probative evidence relevant to the factors set out in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See In re Majestic Distilling Co.,
315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key DuPont factors are the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks and the relatedness of the respective goods or services,
because the “fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect
of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences

Opposition No. 91288785
10
in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976). Here, we have considered these DuPont factors, as well as any other
factors that are relevant and for which there is evidence and argument of record. See
In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the
evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he
various evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular
determination.”). Ultimately, however, “each case must be decided on its own facts
and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d
1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
A. Focus on Certain Pleaded Registrations
Opposer pleaded ownership of eight prior registrations, all for the standard
character mark AIRBNB, but Opposer’s arguments rely mainly on the following
registrations and, in some instances, certain services listed within these
registrations:9
• Registration No. 3890025: Providing online business directories featuring
temporary lodging,” in International Class 35;10
• Registration No. 3890027: “Arranging temporary housing accommodations;
Providing online reservation services for temporary lodging; Travel agency
services, namely, . . . lodging; Providing temporary lodging information via the
Internet,” in International Class 43;11
9 See Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 24, 35.
10 Opposer’s First Notice of Reliance, 10 TTABVUE 11.
11 Id. at 13.

Opposition No. 91288785
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• Registration No. 4329542: “Online trip and travel recommendations and
reservation services; Providing travel information over global computer
networks, namely, providing search services for travel listings, travel
information and related topics and for making reservations and bookings for
transportation; Providing reviews and recommendations of local attractions
via a global computer network,” in International Class 39;12 and
• Registration No. 4884815: “Providing a website for the arrangement and
booking of travel tours and excursions; Providing a website featuring travel
information and commentary; Providing an online searchable computer
database featuring information on travel; Providing reviews of travel service
providers; Travel guide and travel information services; Travel agency
services, namely, making reservations and bookings for transportation,
excursions, travel tours and travel,” in International Class 39.13
Our opinion likewise focuses on these particular registrations and services, as we
agree that they are the most relevant to our Section 2(d) analysis.14 If we do not find
a likelihood of confusion with respect to the services in these registrations, then we
would not find a likelihood of confusion as to the remaining registrations. Cf., e.g.,
Sock It To Me, Inc. v. Fan, No. 91230554, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 201, at *20-21 (confining
Section 2(d) analysis to most similar pleaded mark) (citing N. Face Apparel Corp. v.
Sanyang Indus. Co., No. 91187593, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 328, at *20-21).
B. Relatedness of the Services
We begin our analysis with the second DuPont factor, which concerns the
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the respective services, i.e., the relatedness
of the services. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. When considering this factor, we look to
12 Id. at 19.
13 Id. at 21.
14 We also note that there is some overlap between the various registrations, as they include
some identical or similar services.

Opposition No. 91288785
12
the services as identified in Applicant’s application and the services listed in
Opposer’s registrations. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d
1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs. Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Here, Applicant’s services are “health spa services for health and wellness of the
mind, body and spirit offered in or from a remote, mobile or temporary on-site
location,” in International Class 44. Opposer’s services, as specified above, are various
services in Classes 35, 39, and 43, relating to temporary accommodations and
travel.15
According to Opposer, Applicant’s services are “subsumed by the broad scope of”
Opposer’s registrations and thus “are identical in part–or at a minimum highly
related” to Opposer’s services.16 To make this argument, Opposer recharacterizes
Applicant’s services as “providing temporary accommodations related to health and
wellness,”17 based, in part, on Applicant’s statements that its services have a
15 The classification of the respective services is not a factor in our likelihood-of-confusion
analysis. “The classification of goods and services by the USPTO is a purely administrative
determination that has no bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion.” In re Rum & Spirits
Corp., No. 86873768, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 4, at *11 n.8 (citing Trademark Act Section 30, 15
U.S.C. § 1112 (“The Director may establish a classification of goods and services, for
convenience of Patent and Trademark Office administration, but not to limit or extend the
applicant’s or registrant’s rights.”) and Jean Patou Inc. v. Theon Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (“[C]lassification is wholly irrelevant to the issue of registrability under section
1052(d), which makes no reference to classification.”)).
16 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 34-35.
17 Id. at 35.

Opposition No. 91288785
13
“temporary accommodation aspect” and Applicant’s “mission [is] to provide both
comfortable accommodations and opportunities for personal growth and healing.”18
Applicant, on the other hand, asserts that its services “are distinctly different from
those of [Opposer],”19 because Applicant “specializes in wellness and therapy retreats
with a clear focus on mental health, relationships, and trauma therapy, which are
markedly different from [Opposer’s] general travel and accommodation offerings.”20
We disagree with Opposer’s recharacterization of Applicant’s services as primarily
“providing temporary accommodations” and with Opposer’s related argument that
the respective services are identical in part, or “highly related,” simply because
Applicant’s health spa services may be provided in a temporary on-site location.
While Applicant’s own statements may refer to a “temporary accommodation aspect”
of its services, including “[t]emporary accommodation arrangements in connection
with wellness retreats,”21 we reiterate that our analysis must be based on Applicant’s
services as they are identified in the application. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323; Coach
Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012). And under a
plain reading of the identification here, Applicant’s services consist of “health spa
services for health and wellness of the mind, body, and spirit,” with the wording
18 Opposer’s Fourth Notice of Reliance, 22 TTABVUE 18-19 (Applicant’s Response to
Opposer’s First Set of Interrogatories).
19 Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 4.
20 Id. at 4-5.
21 Opposer’s Fourth Notice of Reliance, 22 TTABVUE 21 (Applicant’s Response to Opposer’s
First Set of Interrogatories).

Opposition No. 91288785
14
“offered in or from a remote, mobile or temporary on-site location” merely specifying
an ancillary aspect of the services, namely, how or where the services are to be
rendered. In other words, the identification indicates that Applicant offers health spa
services, which may be provided in a temporary location, or from a mobile location,
or even remotely. The identification does not indicate that Applicant is arranging
temporary lodging or accommodations, enabling reservations for that purpose, or
even providing information in that field. Thus, we concur with Applicant that the
respective services are different.
However, our inquiry into relatedness does not end there, as even different
services may be found related for purposes of the likelihood-of-confusion analysis. See
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“Even if the goods and services in question are not identical, the consuming public
may perceive them as related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of
the goods and services.”). Indeed, it is sufficient that the services are related in some
manner, or that the conditions and activities surrounding their marketing are such
that they would or could be encountered by the same persons under circumstances
that could, because of the similarity of the marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that
they originate from the same source. See Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1396 (Fed. Cir.
2012); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 58, at *28-29.
Thus, the issue is not whether consumers would confuse Applicant’s services with
Opposer’s services, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the

Opposition No. 91288785
15
source of these goods. See L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, No. 91184456, 2012 TTAB LEXIS
77, at *16; In re Rexel Inc., No. 73241423, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 57, at *2.
On that point, we consider Opposer’s argument that the respective services are
related because “through [Opposer’s] online marketplace, consumers can . . . search
for and find wellness-related accommodations, services, and experiences, including,
by way of example only, sunrise yoga experiences, cold plunge experiences, naturalist
hikes and native plant tea explorations, and spa or spa-like experiences.”22
Opposer’s evidence23 includes the following excerpt from its website:24
22 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 34.
23 See Opposer’s Third Notice of Reliance, 21 TTABVUE 10-113.
24 Id. at 81 (red arrows added).

Opposition No. 91288785
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This excerpt shows that users of Opposer’s online marketplace for temporary
accommodations may also search the marketplace for “Wellness activities in
California.” Although the excerpt indicates that the “wellness activities” are “led by
local experts,” they are explicitly branded as “AIRBNB EXPERIENCES.” Other
evidence shows listings for various “wellness-related” experiences that consumers
may book through Opposer’s AIRBNB-branded online marketplace, which are offered
and provided by apparent third parties identified as “Hosts.”25 But, regardless of
whether the advertised “wellness activity” services are ultimately provided by
Opposer or by third-party affiliates of Opposer, this evidence supports the conclusion
that consumers may view Opposer’s and Applicant’s respective services as related
because such services may be offered by the same source under the same mark. See
Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1396.
In addition, this evidence establishes that experiences, including wellness
activities, can be an integral part of travel and thus are relevant to the travel
planning and booking process. Thus, consumers may utilize both Opposer’s and
Applicant’s services in a complementary fashion. Cf., e.g., Venture Out Props. LLC.
V. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, No. 91167237, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *20-21
(finding hotel services and restaurant/bar services are “highly similar . . . in that hotel
guests often dine in restaurants and drink in bars and lounges during their travels,
as well as engage in recreational activities, such as gambling in casinos”); In re
25 See, e.g., id. at 59-62, 67-79. The online marketplace also allows users to apply a filter to
their searches to find specific activity types, including “wellness.” Id. at 21.

Opposition No. 91288785
17
Summit Hotel Corp., No. 73233333, 1983 TTAB LEXIS 68, at *4 (“Restaurants and
hotels offer complementary services to the same general class of consumers.”).
Accordingly, we find that consumers may perceive the respective services as related
based on their nature and how they are offered to, and used by, consumers in the
marketplace. Therefore, the second DuPont factor weighs in favor of a conclusion that
confusion is likely.
C. Similarity of Trade Channels and Classes of Consumers
Next, we consider established, likely-to-continue channels of trade, the
third DuPont factor. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Opposer argues that “neither the
Application nor the [Opposer’s] Registrations contain a restriction to particular
channels of trade and or a particular type of consumer.”26 And Applicant, for its part,
admits that its “application contains no restrictions on trade channels.”27 Thus, other
than taking into account the wording in Application’s identification indicating the
types of locations at which the services may be provided, we presume that the
respective identifications encompass all services of the type described, that the
identified services travel through all normal channels of trade for such services, and
that they are available to all classes of purchasers of such services. See Levi Strauss
& Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013); In
re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *15.
26 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 36.
27 Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 2-4.

Opposition No. 91288785
18
And, here, Opposer’s evidence of record, particularly the listings for third-party
services on Opposer’s online marketplace, supports a finding that the respective
services are encountered by the same classes of consumers in the same channels of
trade. Specifically, the evidence indicates that consumers seeking accommodations
and travel information may also seek to book experiences, including “wellness
activities” and “spa or spa-like” services, to complement their trip.28 In other words,
those making travel arrangements, including reservations for temporary
accommodations, may also seek health spa services for wellness, and they may do so
through the same channels of trade, including an online marketplace. We therefore
reject Applicant’s assertion that, because none of Opposer’s registrations cover
Applicant’s identified Class 44 services, the respective “services will [not] be
marketed to overlapping classes of consumers or through overlapping channels of
trade.”29
The third DuPont factor thus also weighs in favor of a conclusion that confusion
is likely.
D. Strength of Opposer’s AIRBNB Mark
Before we compare the marks, we consider the strength or weakness of Opposer’s
AIRBNB mark as used in connection with the relevant services because it affects the
mark’s scope of protection. See Made in Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *23-24
(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361); In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392, 2016
28 Opposer’s Third Notice of Reliance, 21 TTABVUE 10-113.
29 Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 4.

Opposition No. 91288785
19
TTAB LEXIS 448, at *17-18 (“[T]he strength of the cited mark is—as always—
relevant to assessing the likelihood of confusion under the du Pont framework.”). “A
well-known mark enjoys an appropriately wider latitude of legal protection, for
similar marks tend to be more readily confused with a mark that is already known to
the public.” Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 851
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
When evaluating the strength or weakness of a mark, we look at the mark’s
inherent conceptual strength based on the nature of the term itself and its
commercial strength in the marketplace. See Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Two of the DuPont factors (the fifth and sixth) consider
strength. The fifth DuPont factor, ‘[t]he fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising,
length of use),’ is a measure of the mark’s strength in the marketplace. . . . There are
two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth factor: conceptual
strength and commercial strength.” (internal citations omitted)); In re Chippendales
USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (measuring both conceptual and
marketplace strength); Made in Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *24.
The sixth DuPont factor allows an applicant to argue that confusion is less likely
by adducing evidence of conceptual and commercial weakness. Spireon, 71 F.4th at
1362. By contrast, the fifth DuPont factor enables an opposer to prove that its pleaded
mark is entitled to an expanded scope of protection by adducing evidence of the fame
of the prior mark (e.g., sales, advertising, length of use). Id.

Opposition No. 91288785
20
1. Sixth DuPont Factor
We first consider the conceptual strength of Opposer’s AIRBNB mark under the
sixth DuPont factor. Conceptual strength, or inherent strength, is a measure of a
mark’s distinctiveness and may be placed “in categories of generally increasing
distinctiveness: . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5)
fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Marks in the
latter three categories are considered inherently distinctive. See Chippendales, 622
F.3d at 1351.
Because Opposer’s AIRBNB mark issued on the Principal Register without a claim
of acquired distinctiveness, the mark is presumed to be inherently distinctive as to
the services listed in the pleaded registrations. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Tea Bd. of India
v. Republic of Tea, Inc., No. 9118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62 (“A mark that is
registered on the Principal Register is entitled to all Section 7(b) presumptions
including the presumption that the mark is distinctive and moreover, in the absence
of a Section 2(f) claim in the registration, that the mark is inherently distinctive for
the goods.”).
Further, Applicant admits that “the term ‘AIRBNB’ has no ordinary English
language meaning,”30 and we find no evidence of record to the contrary. As to the
term’s origin, Opposer explains that it “adopted the name and mark AIRBNB to
replace the original name ‘Airbed & Breakfast,’ which had referred to the fact that
the company’s founders had previously rented out a room with three airbeds in their
30 Id. at 3.

Opposition No. 91288785
21
apartment to make extra money, adding free breakfast as a perk.”31 Accordingly, we
find that, as applied to the services in the pleaded registrations, AIRBNB, as a whole,
is at least arbitrary and thus conceptually strong. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(indicating that an arbitrary term is “conceptually strong as a trademark”); Nautilus
Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]n
arbitrary mark is a known word used in an unexpected or uncommon way.”).
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that if there
is evidence that a mark, or an element of a mark, is commonly adopted by many
different registrants, that may indicate that the mark or common element has some
conceptual weakness as an indicator of a single source. See Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung
Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence of third-party registrations is relevant to ‘show the
sense in which a mark is used in ordinary parlance,’ . . . that is, some segment that
is common to both parties’ marks may have ‘a normally understood and well-
recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that segment
is relatively weak.’”) (quoting Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d
1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
In this case, Applicant has asserted that the “BNB” portion of Opposer’s AIRBNB
mark “is a generic term in the hospitality industry and does not exclusively relate to
31 Testimony Declaration of Rebecca Williams, 14 TTABVUE 2.

Opposition No. 91288785
22
[Opposer],” an issue we address later in this opinion.32 But Applicant has not
submitted any evidence to establish that AIRBNB, as a whole, should be considered
conceptually weak. As to the commercial strength of Opposer’s mark, there is likewise
no evidence of record to establish that the consuming public is exposed to widespread
third-party use of marks similar to AIRBNB in connection with similar services, such
that Opposer’s mark may be considered “relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow
scope of protection.” Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1373.
The sixth DuPont factor is therefore neutral.
2. Fifth DuPont Factor
Opposer argues that its AIRBNB mark “famous for the purposes of assessing
likelihood of confusion,”33 invoking the fifth DuPont factor concerning “[t]he fame of
the prior mark.” DuPont, 476 F.3d at 1361. The fame or commercial strength of a
mark is relevant to the likelihood-of-confusion analysis because, “[a] mark with
extensive public recognition and renown deserves and receives more legal protection
than an obscure or weak mark.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v Greater Omaha Packing
Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose
Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). In this context, the commercial
strength of a mark is not a binary factor, but instead “varies along a spectrum from
very strong to very weak.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards Holdings, LLC v. Fairmont
32 Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3.
33 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 11.

Opposition No. 91288785
23
Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at
1374-75).
Such strength rests on the extent to which “a significant portion of the relevant
consuming public . . . recognizes the mark as a source indicator.” Joseph Phelps
Vineyards, 857 F.3d at 1324-25 (citing Palm Bay 396 F.3d at 1374-75). Here, the
relevant consuming public consists of actual and prospective purchasers of the
services identified in Opposer’s relevant pleaded registrations, including the services
of “arranging temporary housing accommodations,” “providing online reservation
services for temporary lodging,” and “travel agency services, namely, making
reservations and bookings for transportation, excursions, travel tours and travel.” See
Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1374-75 (“[T]he proper legal standard for evaluating the fame
of a mark under the fifth DuPont factor is the class of customers and potential
customers of a product or service, and not the general public.”); see also Tripleye, 2024
TTAB LEXIS 494, at *51.
In assessing commercial strength or fame, we may consider not only direct
evidence, such as consumer surveys or declarations, but also indirect evidence,
including the volume of sales and advertising expenditures in connection with the
identified services sold under the mark; the length of time the mark has been in use;
widespread critical assessments; notice by independent sources of the services offered
under the marks; and the general reputation of the services. Weider Publ’ns, LLC v.
D & D Beauty Care Co., No. 91199352, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 2, at *18-19; see also Bose

Opposition No. 91288785
24
Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing
indirect evidence as appropriate proof of strength).
Opposer, as the party asserting that its mark is famous, must clearly prove it.
Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1367 (citing Leading Jewelers Guild Inc. v. LJOW Holdings
LLC, No. 91160856, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 35, at *12). To that end, Opposer relies, in
part, on a March 2021 report regarding an online survey “designed, supervised, and
implemented by Hal L. Poret,”34 which was intended “to measure ‘the extent to which
the AIRBNB mark is famous, if at all, in connection with rental property reservation
services.’”35
The survey involved 300 respondents from “among a representative sample of the
general consuming public of the U.S.,”36 who “were first asked to list all companies,
websites, or mobile apps that they are aware of that offer the relevant type of services
. . . without the survey showing or mentioning the [AIRBNB] mark.”37 This measured
the respondents’ “unaided awareness” of Opposer’s mark.38 Next, the “[r]espondents
were . . . shown a total of seven names [including the AIRBNB mark], one at a time,
34 Testimony Declaration of Hal Poret, 16 TTABVUE 8 (Poret Survey Report).
35 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 37.
36 Testimony Declaration of Hal Poret, 16 TTABVUE 9. While the relevant public here
consists of actual and prospective purchasers of the services identified in Opposer’s relevant
pleaded registrations, including accommodation and travel services, we presume that the
members of the general consuming public who participated in the survey would be actual and
potential purchasers of such services.
37 Id.
38 Id.

Opposition No. 91288785
25
and . . . asked whether . . . they have ever seen or heard of the name.”39 This measured
the respondents “aided awareness” of Opposer’s mark.40
According to Mr. Poret’s report, the survey showed that 32.7% of respondents had
an unaided awareness of AIRBNB in connection with the relevant services,41 while
90.3% had an aided awareness of the mark.42 The “next most frequently identified
brands” were ZILLOW, which had an unaided awareness rate of 12%,43 and VRBO,
which had an unaided awareness rate of 11% and an aided awareness rate of 40%.44
In comparison, the fictitious control mark, TROUBA,45 had an aided awareness rate
of 4.3%.46 Based on these results, the report concludes with Mr. Poret’s opinion that
“that the AIRBNB word mark is famous.”47 Applicant has not submitted any
arguments or evidence to rebut the survey or the findings in Mr. Poret’s report.
We agree that the survey indicates a relatively high brand awareness of Opposer’s
AIRBNB mark. But a couple issues weaken its probative value. First, the survey was
conducted in March 2021, and thus is now nearly five years old. Therefore, it may not
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 24.
42 See id. at 26.
43 Id. at 25-26. The ZILLOW mark was not included in the aided awareness portion of the
survey (see id. at 26) and thus there was no aided awareness rate.
44 Id. at 24-26.
45 See id. at 13 (“The purpose of including the control name [in the survey’s aided awareness
portion] was to measure survey noise – i.e., the extent to which respondents indicate false
awareness of a term that is not actually used in connection with the relevant category, such
as due to respondent error, assumption, guessing, or yea-saying.”).
46 Id. at 26.
47 Id. at 31.

Opposition No. 91288785
26
accurately reflect contemporary consumer awareness of the AIRBNB mark. Cf. Royal
Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A]s it cannot
disclose contemporary public perception, the probativeness of this survey [conducted
more than five years before the close of testimony], even merely to support other
evidence, is questionable.”); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (“[T]he factual situation may be different in 1982 than it was in May 1978
when appellant had the survey conducted.”); In re Audemars Piguet Holding SA, No.
90045780, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *54-55 (2025) (noting that the “results of a survey
conducted over a decade ago are a highly suspect basis on which to determine
consumer perception now”).
Second, “in general, the Board has discouraged heavy reliance on aided awareness
to prove fame.” ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., No. 91194974, 2015 TTAB
LEXIS 67, at *48 (finding that survey showing 82% aided awareness of opposers’
mark “lack[ed] significant evidentiary value on the question of fame.”) (citing
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc., No. 91116355, 2005 TTAB
LEXIS 406, at *49). While aided awareness relies on the prompting of survey
participants with a list of marks, including the mark being assessed, unaided
awareness does not. Thus, unaided awareness is entitled to more weight than aided
awareness on the question of fame. See Carefirst, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 406, at *49. And,
here, unaided awareness is significantly lower than aided awareness.
Aside from the survey report, the record contains a declaration from Opposer’s
Director of Business Affairs, Ms. Rebecca Williams, who states that the “AIRBNB

Opposition No. 91288785
27
brand [is] known worldwide as identifying a community marketplace in which people
can list, view, and book unique accommodations and experiences around the world
through its people-powered hospitality service offered on its website at
www.Airbnb.com and through its mobile app.”48 And Opposer has provided copies of
its SEC Form 10-K filings,49 which, inter alia, indicate that Opposer has spent billions
of dollars on “sales and marketing” and “product development” from 2020 to 2023,
and that its revenue ranged from over $3 billion to over $8 billion in those same
years.50 These figures are impressive on their face and suggest that Opposer has
enjoyed immense commercial success. But Opposer has pointed to no other evidence,
aside from the survey, showing its efforts to create or increase consumer awareness
of the AIRBNB mark in connection with the relevant services, or otherwise
demonstrating that Opposer’s mark enjoys wide recognition among the relevant
consumers, such as evidence of advertisements over the duration of the mark’s use,
promotional activities in various forms of media in connection with the mark, or
unsolicited media coverage of the services offered under the mark. See, e.g., Weider
Publ’ns, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 2, at *18-19; cf. Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1375-76 (finding
VEUVE CLICQUOT famous among purchasers of champagne and sparkling wine
based upon sale in 8,000 restaurants nationwide, and in liquor stores, wine shops and
other retail establishments; extensive promotional campaign consisting of print
48 Testimony Declaration of Rebecca Williams, 14 TTABVUE 2.
49 See id. at 18-411.
50 Id. at 128, 345.

Opposition No. 91288785
28
advertisements in general interest magazines and in wine specialty magazines, radio
ads, point-of-sale displays, wine tastings; and unsolicited media coverage in
publications including the New York Times, Boston Globe, and Money Magazine).
Opposer also points to its efforts to protect its AIRBNB mark through the filing of
opposition and cancellation proceedings against marks including SEABNB,
MAILBNB, BAGBNB, VR-BNB, SHARPBNB, THE ARTBNB, TREEBNB,
GRADBNB, CAREBNB, CARBNB, FURBNB, PETBNB, PINESBNB, and
TALLYBNB.51 But the majority of these oppositions and cancellations were sustained
by default judgment or otherwise upon the abandonment of the involved applications
or surrender of the respondent’s registration. Cf. In re Wella Corp., 565 F.2d 143, 144
n.2 (CCPA 1977) (“Appellant argues that various letters (of record) from competitors
indicating their discontinuance of use of its mark upon threat of legal action are
evidence of its distinctiveness, but we agree with the TTAB that such evidence shows
a desire of competitors to avoid litigation rather than distinctiveness of the mark.”).
While this evidence establishes that Opposer has been active and successful in its
enforcement efforts in connection with the AIRBNB mark, it is not particularly
probative of whether AIRBNB is famous. See Omaha Steaks, 908 F.3d at 1323 (“[T]he
mere fact that lawsuits were filed is not reasonably probative of the fame inquiry,
which is focused on whether the mark has achieved ‘extensive public recognition and
renown,’ not on enforcement efforts.”) (internal citation omitted); Monster Energy,
2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *64 n. 83 (“[W]e are not concerned with mere efforts at
51 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 40.

Opposition No. 91288785
29
enforcement, but rather with the context surrounding successful enforcement and
how that evidence bears on consumer recognition of any place applicant may have in
the market.”).
Accordingly, we find that, based on the record before us, Opposer has not proved
that its AIRBNB mark falls on the strongest end of the strength spectrum for
likelihood of confusion purposes. See Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1367. That said, it
does place at the higher end of the commercial strength spectrum, and is thus entitled
to a broader scope of protection against confusingly similar marks. See Joseph Phelps
Vineyards, 857 F.3d at 1325 The fifth DuPont factor therefore weighs in favor of a
conclusion that confusion is likely.
E. Comparison of the Marks
We turn now to the first DuPont factor, which focuses on the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation
and commercial impression. See Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1371 (quoting DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361). Similarity as to any one of these elements may be sufficient to support
a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. See Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form,
spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”); In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC,
No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13. But see Champagne Louis Roederer
S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[O]ne DuPont factor
may be dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis, especially when that single
factor is the dissimilarity of the marks.”).

Opposition No. 91288785
30
In assessing the similarity of the marks, all elements of the marks must be
considered. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985). “The proper
test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who
encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” In
re i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d
at 1368 (internal quotation marks omitted)). And “[t]he focus is on the recollection of
the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a specific
impression of trademarks.” In re Box Sols. Corp., No. 76267086, 2006 TTAB LEXIS
176, at *14.
Here, Applicant’s mark is SOUL BNB in standard characters and Opposer’s mark
is AIRBNB, also in standard characters. Thus, both marks consist of a term (SOUL
or AIR) combined with, or followed by, the term BNB.
Opposer argues that “[f]or purposes of comparison to [its] AIRBNB Marks, the
dominant and therefore most salient element of Applicant’s mark is the distinctive
term ‘BNB,’” because “the SOUL element is weak and descriptive”52 in that it
describes Applicant’s “‘primary focus . . . on offering wellness and therapy retreats.’”53
According to Opposer, the shared BNB element renders the respective marks “highly
52 Id. at 31.
53 Id. at 29-30 (quoting Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3).

Opposition No. 91288785
31
similar” and “reinforces the confusing and misleading message that Applicant’s Mark
is an extension of [Opposer’s] AIRBNB Marks.”54
For its part, Applicant asserts that the “term ‘BNB’ (bed and breakfast) is a
generic term in the hospitality industry and does not exclusively relate to Opposer,”
and that SOUL BNB “significantly differs from [Opposer’s AIRBNB] Mark in aspects
such as prefix, spacing of characters, sound, connotation, intended market, and
overall meaning.”55
We acknowledge that the appearance of BNB in both marks does create a point of
visual and aural similarity between the marks. But we must consider and compare
both marks as a whole; we may not dissect the marks by ignoring their other
elements. See Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058 (indicating that, when comparing
marks, “the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
entireties”). And, despite the shared BNB element, we are not convinced that the
marks create similar overall commercial impressions or are otherwise similar in
terms of sound, appearance, or connotation.
Regarding dominant elements in the marks, we disagree with Opposer that BNB
is the dominant element in Applicant’s mark or, for that matter, Opposer’s mark.
While “[t]here is no mechanical test to select the dominant element of a mark,”
Monster Energy, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *45, we find that AIR is the dominant
element of Opposer’s mark, while SOUL is the dominant one in Applicant’s mark.
54 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 33.
55 See Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3. We are unsure what Applicant means by “intended
market” in the context of the mark comparison.

Opposition No. 91288785
32
These terms appear first in the respective marks and are therefore likely to create
the strongest impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (noting that consumers “typically notice [initial] words first”); see also Palm
Bay, 396 F.3d at 1372 (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word
in the mark and the first word to appear on the label.”); Monster Energy, 2023 TTAB
LEXIS 14, at *29 (“[T]he first term generally is the one which creates the strongest
impression.”).
Further, we find that AIR and SOUL are the dominant elements in the respective
marks because they are each more distinctive than BNB. The term “air” may be
defined variously as “a light breeze,” “the mixture of invisible orderless tasteless
gases . . . that surrounds the earth,” “aviation,” “empty space,” or “nothingness.”56
And we have Opposer’s testimony that AIRBNB was selected because it “referred to
the fact that the company’s founders had previously rented out a room with three
airbeds in their apartment to make extra money, adding free breakfast as a perk.”57
Thus, as used in connection with Opposer’s services, AIR appears to be arbitrary. See
Nautilus, 372 F.3d at 1340 (“[A]n arbitrary mark is a known word used in an
unexpected or uncommon way.”). As to “soul,” the term may be defined as, inter alia,
“the immaterial essence, animating principle, or actuating cause of an individual
56 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/air
(accessed on January 27, 2026). The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions,
including online dictionaries that exist in printed form or regular fixed editions. Univ. of
Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., No. 91061847, 1982 TTAB LEXIS 146,
at *7, aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Red Bull GmbH, No. 75788830, 2006 TTAB
LEXIS 136, at *7; TBMP § 1208.04.
57 Testimony Declaration of Rebecca Williams, 14 TTABVUE 2.

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33
life,” “a person’s total self,” “spiritual or emotional nature of human beings,” or
“spiritual or moral force.”58 Thus, despite Opposer’s arguments to the contrary, we
find that SOUL is at least suggestive in connection with Applicant’s services, as, in
Applicant’s words, it may “indicate[] a commitment to wellness, healing, and
tranquility.”59
Regarding the term BNB, Opposer introduced an expert report by Dr. Philip M.
Carter, a professor of linguistics, expressing his opinion that “the sequence bnb does
not have longstanding use in American English,” “in contrast to the terms [‘]bed and
breakfast[’] and [‘]B&B[’].”60 According to Dr. Carter’s report, the sequence bnb is a
new term in American English,” which began to appear “with systematic regular
usage . . . after 2009.”61 Dr. Carter asserts that the data he collected “strongly suggest
that ordinary speakers of American English disambiguate the generic forms ‘B&B’
and ‘B and B,’ used as abbreviations for ‘bed and breakfast,’ from the new form
[‘]bnb[’], which is closely associated with a brand.”62 Specifically, the report indicates
that “search term data shows that the sequence bnb is by and large associated with
the brand Airbnb.”63 It also indicates that, while BNB does not appear in modern
58 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/soul
(accessed on January 27, 2026).
59 Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3.
60 Testimony Declaration of Philip M. Carter, 18 TTABVUE 7-8.
61 Id. at 8 (italics removed).
62 Id. at 9 (italics removed).
63 Id. at 45 (italics removed).

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dictionaries,64 the terms “B and B,” “B & B” and “b. & b.,” the abbreviated forms of
“bed and breakfast,” do.65
We find Dr. Carter’s report largely unpersuasive as to the distinctiveness of the
term BNB in Opposer’s mark. The fact that “BNB” may not have longstanding use in
American English does not preclude a finding that consumers are currently familiar
with the term. Nor does the existence and use of other terms to refer to “bed and
breakfast” services, such as “B and B” or “B&B,” necessarily render BNB distinctive.
See, e.g., In re Murphy Door Bed Co., No. 73271208, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 56, at *10-12
(rejecting applicant’s argument that MURPHY was a trademark and finding that the
term was instead generic for a type of bed despite evidence that there was a “number
of other terms” to identify such a bed); see also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004) (acknowledging “the
undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first”); cf. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC,
No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *10 (“Under the current standard [for
assessing mere descriptiveness], there is no requirement that the Examining
Attorney prove that others have used the mark at issue or that they need to use it,
although such proof would be highly relevant to an analysis under Section 2(e)(1).”).
And, while the report concludes that consumers associate BNB with Opposer’s mark
AIRBNB, that conclusion is based on a review of online search term data, rather than
64 Id. at 11.
65 Id. at 12.

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35
a true trademark inquiry into the perception of the relevant public who encounters
the term BNB in connection with Opposer’s services. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Holt, No. 91180119, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 599, at *24 (“[T]here is simply nothing that
persuades us that the lone opinion of opposer’s asserted linguistics expert should
substitute for evidence of the perception of the consuming public of the involved
marks.”).
Based on the record, including the dictionary evidence in Dr. Carter’s report, we
find that that BNB may be pronounced as the phonetic equivalent of “B & B,” and
would thus evoke an immediate association with the term “bed and breakfast.” See
In re Calphalon Corp., No. 86356713, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 98, at *29 (“We find that
SHARPIN evokes an immediate association with the phonetically-identical and
otherwise virtually-identical word ‘sharpen,’ and there is nothing incongruous about
the use of the word sharpen [or its phonetic equivalent SHARPIN] to describe the
function of goods . . . [with] ‘built-in sharpeners that automatically sharpen knives.’”);
In re White Swan Ltd., No. 73617169, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 37, at *3 (“The fact that the
registrant’s mark contains the letter ‘N’ surrounded by hyphens and applicant’s mark
contains an ampersand constitutes but a very minor difference. The letter ‘N’ and the
ampersand are pronounced either in identical fashion or in near identical fashion.”).
Thus, when used in connection with bed-and-breakfast services, BNB is likely to be
perceived as highly suggestive, if not descriptive.

Opposition No. 91288785
36
Opposer disputes this, asserting that “[n]one of the Airbnb registrations recite bed
and breakfast services,”66 which is true insofar as these services are not specifically
named in the registrations. However, at least one of the pleaded registrations
identifies services in the nature of “arranging temporary housing accommodations,”
“providing online reservation services for temporary lodging,” “travel agency services,
namely, . . . lodging,” and “providing temporary lodging information via the
Internet.”67 The wording “lodging,” “temporary lodging,” and “temporary housing
accommodations,” is broad enough to include bed-and-breakfast services, which
according to Opposer’s evidence, involve “an accommodation offered by an inn, hotel,
or [especially] a private home, consisting of a room for the night and breakfast the
next morning for one inclusive price.”68 Therefore, Opposer’s services do encompass
bed-and-breakfast accommodations, despite not being explicitly referenced in
Opposer’s registrations.
Regarding the significance of BNB in SOUL BNB, Applicant explains that it
“stands for ‘Bed And Breakthrough,’ the motto of the business as noted on the
[Applicant’s] public website.”69 However, we have no evidence showing that
consumers would perceive the mark in this manner. And, as discussed above,
Applicant’s identified services do not primarily involve the provision of temporary
66 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 23.
67 See Registration No. 3890027.
68 Testimony Declaration of Philip M. Carter, 18 TTABVUE 17 (quoting an excerpt from THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE).
69 Applicant’s Answer, 4 TTABVUE 3.

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37
accommodations or lodging, but are instead “health spa services for health and
wellness of the mind, body and spirit offered in or from a remote, mobile or temporary
on-site location.” That said, because the “temporary on-site location[s]” of Applicant’s
services could include temporary locations in the nature of bed-and-breakfast
establishments, consumers may view BNB as suggestive of that ancillary aspect of
Applicant’s services.
Having assessed the significance and distinctiveness of the individual elements of
the respective marks, we must now consider the marks overall. We find the marks
AIRBNB and SOUL BNB have first and dominant terms which differ significantly in
appearance, sound, and connotation. That is, AIRBNB might bring to mind light and
easy accommodations for travel, or allude to Opposer’s origins, while SOUL BNB
might connote services intended for a person’s spiritual or emotional health, which
may take place in comfortable, but temporary, locations.
Accordingly, while we must presume that the relevant consumers will retain a
general rather than specific recollection of trademarks, see Box Sols., 2006 TTAB
LEXIS 176, at *14, we conclude that the relevant consumers are likely to differentiate
between the two marks, regardless of the single point of similarity provided by the
shared term BNB, because the marks otherwise feature completely different
dominant terms, AIR and SOUL, resulting in significant overall differences in sound,
appearance, and commercial impression.
The first DuPont factor thus weighs heavily against a conclusion that confusion is
likely.

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38
F. Actual Confusion
The seventh DuPont factor relates to the nature and extent of any actual
confusion. See DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Opposer correctly notes that a showing of
actual confusion is not necessary to find that there is a likelihood of confusion.70 See
Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1309. Nonetheless, in the absence of any evidence
showing actual instances confusion in the marketplace, Opposer has submitted a
survey71 “design[ed] and conduct[ed] . . . to assess whether the SOUL BNB mark is
likely to cause confusion with respect to Airbnb and its AIRBNB marks.”72 While the
survey is not direct evidence of actual confusion, we may consider it as circumstantial
evidence from which we may infer whether there is a likelihood of confusion. ProMark
Brands, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 67, at *49.
Opposer provided the following description of the submitted survey, which was
conducted by Dr. David Neal, the managing partner of “a research consulting firm
specializing in the analysis of human decision making and consumer behavior”:73
Dr. Neal began by selecting a universe of respondents ultimately
consisting of “405 U.S. adults that have made a reservation, booking, or
purchase of health spa services for health or wellness in the past year,
or are likely to make a reservation, booking, or purchase of health spa
services for health or wellness in the next year.” He divided respondents
into two groups: a Test Group, which was shown Applicant’s SOUL BNB
Mark (as shown in Applicant’s application); and a Control Group, which
was shown the mark SOUL STAY, which served as a “close unaccused
alternative for the Test Cell.” Dr. Neal chose SOUL STAY because it
“has the same first word, ‘SOUL,’” “has not been accused of infringing”
70 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 40.
71 Testimony Declaration of David Neal, 17 TTABVUE.
72 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 40-41.
73 Testimony Declaration of David Neal, 17 TTABVUE 2.

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39
the AIRBNB Marks, and “eliminates the BNB lettering common to the
Applicant’s SOUL BNB Mark and the Opposer’s AIRBNB Marks.”
“Accordingly, it provides a fair, valid, and reliable measure of any
baseline confusion in the marketplace stemming from factors other than
trademark confusion (e.g., guessing, general beliefs that the relevant
services may all be put out by the same company or brand, etc.).”
Dr. Neal’s survey revealed that 18.0% of the Test Group respondents
expressed confusion with Airbnb when shown and asked about
Applicant’s SOUL BNB Mark, as compared to 1.0% of the Control Group
respondents who were shown and asked about the SOUL STAY mark.
Thus, “[t]he net confusion level between the Test Cell and the Control
Cell [was] 17%.” Based on this figure, Dr. Neal opined that the survey
“clearly supports a conclusion that there is a significant likelihood of
confusion with Opposer caused by Applicant’s SOUL BNB Mark, in
connection with health spa services for health and wellness of the mind,
body and spirit offered in or from a getaway at a remote location, a
mobile location, or at a temporary on-site location.”74
Opposer also asserts that “survey respondents’ verbatim responses to the
questions in Dr. Neal’s survey confirm that confusion is likely specifically because
Applicant’s SOUL BNB Mark includes Airbnb’s distinctive BNB suffix.”75 These
responses were prompted by a question asking respondents to describe, “[f]or each
company or brand you named (listed below), . . . what makes you think they are
affiliated with, or connected to, the company or brand that puts out the listed services
74 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 41-42 (quoting Testimony Declaration of David Neal, 17
TTABVUE). Dr. Neal’s testimony that “there is a significant likelihood of confusion” is a legal
conclusion, which is entitled to little weight. See Mennen Co. v. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co.,
1979 TTAB LEXIS 38, at *7 (“[T]he opinions of witnesses, including those qualified as expert
witnesses, on the question of likelihood of confusion are entitled to little if any weight and
should not be substituted for the opinion of the tribunal charged with the responsibility for
the ultimate opinion on the question.”) (no number in original); Edwards Lifesciences Corp.
v. VigiLanz Corp., No. 91154210, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 84, at *1 (“[W]e will not substitute the
opinion of a witness, even an expert witness, for our evaluation of the facts.”).
75 Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 43.

Opposition No. 91288785
40
using the name above.”76 For those respondents who mentioned AIRBNB as the
brand that offered services under SOUL BNB, the responses to the query included
the following:
• “They used the same bnb language”;77
• “They probably have a trademark on bnb”;78
• “This makes me think this because of the BNB in the name. Also because if
someone was looking to book a spa or something Air BNB would be the right
place”;79
• “The BNB portion of the brand”;80
• “The use of the moniker BnB, it's a hallmark of the brand”;81 and
• “[S]imilar name to AIRBNB.”82
Dr. Neal explains in his report that when formulating the survey questions, he
“included a reference to ‘getaways’ in the description of services to ensure [he] fairly
and accurately captured Applicant’s consumer-facing language concerning its
services.”83 In other words, based on advertising copy on Applicant’s website, Dr. Neal
determined that Applicant’s services included a “getaway” element. However, as
explained above, our assessment must be based on the services as they are identified
76 Testimony Declaration of David Neal, 17 TTABVUE 36-37.
77 Id. at 82.
78 Id. at 84.
79 Id. at 85.
80 Id. at 90.
81 Id. at 91.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 9.

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41
in Applicant’s application, and there is no mention of the services being provided “in
or from a getaway.” Again, the identification merely states that Applicant’s health
spa services may be “offered in a or from a remote, mobile or temporary on-site
location.”
Because the term “getaway,” refers to “a vacation especially of brief duration,”84
its inclusion in the description services does not, in fact, correctly characterize the
nature of Applicant’s identified services, despite Dr. Neal’s stated intentions.
Consequently, the inclusion of “getaway” may have predisposed survey respondents
to think of Opposer and its AIRBNB-branded services, which can be used to plan
short “getaway” trips, and thus skewed the responses. In fact, one of the survey
respondents who thought AIRBNB was associated with the services offered under
SOUL BNB stated that they thought so “[b]ecause it’s a get away [sic] were [sic] you
tend to stay.”85 And several other respondents, regardless of whether they identified
AIRBNB, mentioned the “getaway” aspect of the services when explaining their
answers.86 We therefore strongly suspect the survey results would have been
markedly different if Applicant’s services had been correctly characterized and, for
that reason, we find the survey is entitled to little probative weight.
84 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
getaway (accessed on January 28, 2026).
85 Testimony Declaration of David Neal, 17 TTABVUE 82.
86 See, e.g., id. at 81-82, 85, 87.

Opposition No. 91288785
42
Putting aside this flaw, we acknowledge that a number of respondents seem to
have assumed the AIRBNB brand “puts out”87 Applicant’s SOUL BNB-branded
services because of the marks’ shared BNB element. However, other respondents
were more ambiguous about their reasons for naming AIRBNB. For example, one
stated that AIRBNB was the “only[] company I can think of,”88 which could be
interpreted as indicating that they were focused on the described services and were
simply trying think of a company that could provide such services. Another states
that “I feel like the model is the same as Airbnb but the services are slightly
different,”89 which, again, focuses more on the services being offered than on the
marks at issue. A different respondent explains that “they are most associated,”90
which may indicate that the respondent believes the AIRBNB brand to be the most
associated with the named services, but not necessarily that AIRBNB identifies the
source of the services or that there would be confusion between AIRBNB and SOUL
BNB. Another response simply states “similar company [sic] bed and breakfast
company,”91 which, is unclear, but suggests that the respondent recognizes the
element BNB as referring to bed-and-breakfast services. Lastly, one respondent’s
explanation was “[b]ecause it says BNB, and they usually offer those services,”92
87 Id. at 37.
88 Id. at 82.
89 Id. at 89.
90 Id. at 83.
91 Id. at 86.
92 Id.

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43
which Opposer credits as referring to AIRBNB.93 However, that respondent actually
named “Bed and breakfast” as the provider of the services,94 not AIRBNB.
In addition, some of the respondents who named AIRBNB as the provider of the
services (survey question #4), also named other brands, including SOUL BNB,
Priceline, VRBO, and SOUL STAY (the survey’s control mark).95 One stated “[a]
hotel” in addition to AIRBNB.96 And we count 31 respondents who, in their first text
response to question #4, named SOUL BNB the provider of the services versus 32
respondents who named AIRBNB in their first text response.97 Based on Dr. Neal’s
explanation of the survey, most of the responses referencing either SOUL BNB or
AIRBNB in question #4 appear to be from respondents in the survey’s test group,
meaning that the number of respondents who identified SOUL BNB as the provider
of the services in response to the question was roughly equal to the number who
identified AIRBNB.
In sum, in view of the flawed survey question based on an inaccurate description
of Applicant’s services, as well as the ambiguity of some of the survey responses, we
find that the survey falls far short of Opposer’s claim that it shows a “significant
93 See Opposer’s Brief, 25 TTABVUE 33.
94 Testimony Declaration of David Neal, 17 TTABVUE 89.
95 See id. at 82, 85, 86,
96 Id. at 89.
97 Dr. Neal’s report indicates there were 36 total responses indicating “that Applicant’s SOUL
BNB Mark was put out by, had an affiliation or connection with, or needed to get permission
or approval from Opposer, Airbnb.” See id. at 14. We presume that the difference between
our count and Dr. Neal’s is explained by (1) our count being limited to those respondents who,
in response to question #4 in the survey, indicated AIRBNB in their first text response and
(2) Dr. Neal’s count reflecting responses to multiple questions in the survey.

Opposition No. 91288785
44
likelihood of confusion” between the marks. But the survey does provide some indirect
evidence of actual confusion on the part of some consumers. Thus, while Opposer
overstates the probative value of the survey, we find that the seventh DuPont factor
weighs slightly in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
V. Conclusion
Having reviewed all of the evidence and arguments as they apply to the relevant
DuPont factors, we find that the parties’ respective services, as identified in
Applicant’s application and Opposer’s registrations (particularly the services in
Registration Nos. 3890027 and 4884815), are related, and are sold through the same
trade channels and encountered by the same classes of consumers. We also find that,
despite significant flaws in the surveys submitted by Opposer, the record
demonstrates that the AIRBNB mark falls on the higher end of the commercial
strength spectrum and that there is at least some circumstantial evidence that a
portion of the relevant consumers could be confused by the respective marks.
However, this is a case where the first DuPont factor is dispositive, because the
differences between the marks in sound, appearance, and overall commercial
impression outweigh the minimal amount of similarity created by the shared term
BNB. See Boston Red Sox Baseball Club LP v. Sherman, No. 91172268, 2008 TTAB
LEXIS 67, at *29 (“In appropriate cases, a single du Pont factor may be dispositive of
the likelihood of confusion analysis.”) (citing Champagne Louis Roederer, 148 F.3d at
1375; Kellogg Co. v. Pack’Em Enters., No. 91080586, 1990 TTAB LEXIS 3, at *15,
aff’d, 951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). In short, despite the commercial strength of
AIRBNB as a whole, we find the element BNB will be recognized by consumers as

Opposition No. 91288785
45
equivalent to B&B (or variations thereof), a term that is highly suggestive, if not
descriptive, of Opposer’s services and thus has very little significance as a distinctive
feature of Opposer’s mark. Therefore, although BNB is common to the parties’ marks,
this shared element is unlikely to lead consumers to mistakenly believe that the
overall marks, AIRBNB and SOUL BNB, identify the same source when used in
connection with the parties’ respective services. Accordingly, Opposer has failed to
satisfy its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that confusion as to
source is likely.
Decision: The opposition to registration of Applicant’s SOUL BNB mark, based
on a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), is dismissed.