Smith, Paula v. McNeilus Companies

FILED
Jun 24, 2026
11:06 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Paula Smith Docket Nos. 2025-50-5373
2025-50-5374
v.
State File Nos. 50279-2025
McNeilus Companies, et al. 51831-2025

Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Dale A. Tipps, Judge

Affirmed and Remanded

In this interlocutory appeal, the employee asserts the trial court erred in denying her request
for additional temporary disability and medical benefits. Specifically, she sought
temporary disability benefits from the date payments were terminated to the present,
compensation for underpayment due to an incorrect compensation rate, and an order for
continuing medical treatment. The employer argued it had provided all workers’
compensation benefits to which the employee is entitled. Following a hearing, the trial
court noted that the employer provided authorized medical treatment with a panel physician
and temporary disability benefits until she was released at maximum medical
improvement. The court also found the employee had presented no proof that her weekly
compensation rate was improperly calculated. The trial court declined to award any
additional benefits, and the employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record,
we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge
Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Paula Smith, employee-appellant, pro se

Neil McIntire, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, McNeilus Companies

Factual and Procedural Background

Paula Smith (“Employee”) alleges that, while working for McNeilus Companies
(“Employer”), she sustained a workplace injury to her left wrist on July 10, 2025, and a
subsequent injury to her right knee on July 28, 2025. Employee was seen at St. Thomas

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Ascension Urgent Care for initial treatment of both injuries. Regarding her left wrist, the
medical provider diagnosed Employee with “unspecified synovitis and tenosynovitis” of
the wrist and placed her on light-duty work restrictions. Employer accommodated work
restrictions by placing her in a different role at work. On July 23, Employee began
experiencing knee pain while performing her job duties and reported an injury to her right
knee. She returned to St. Thomas Urgent Care for this condition. Following that visit,
during which no new work restrictions were assigned, Employee did not return to work.

Thereafter, Employer provided a panel of orthopedic physicians from which
Employee selected Dr. Timothy Steinagle. Employee first saw Dr. Steinagle on October
23, 2025 for her right knee complaints. Dr. Steinagle ordered an MRI and returned
Employee to work with restrictions. The results of the MRI revealed “[m]ild edema of the
suprapatellar fat pad, suggestive of fat pad impingement syndrome” and “[n]o other
significant internal derangement of the knee.” Thereafter, on December 11, Dr. Steinagle
observed that the right knee MRI showed no evidence of internal derangement or other
abnormalities necessitating further medical treatment, and he placed Employee at
maximum medical improvement (“MMI”). A Worklink report noted “[n]o follow-up
required,” but Dr. Steinagle did not refuse to see Employee again. Following Employee’s
placement at MMI, Employer discontinued temporary disability benefits. 1

Thereafter, Employee sought an order for continuing medical treatment in the form
of physical therapy for her knee, as well as continuing temporary disability benefits.
Employee also contended that her compensation rate was incorrectly calculated and sought
a penalty for delayed payment of certain temporary disability benefits.

During the April 7, 2026 expedited hearing, Employee testified that she still had
pain in her right knee and that Employer had denied her request to see a different provider.
Employee testified she experienced problems receiving timely care, including having not
been provided a panel of physicians timely, and she asserted that she was still in need of
physical therapy for her knee. She further testified that her wrist injury was partially
denied, resulting in her receiving bills from medical providers for care she received for this
injury. Employee also testified that her temporary disability benefits were not paid timely,
resulting in financial hardship, and that her compensation rate had not been calculated
correctly.

In its April 13, 2026 order, the trial court noted that the records of Employee’s
disability payments reflect that the first check was issued to Employee on August 21 for
four weeks of benefits beginning on July 28, or the date she reported the knee injury. The
court observed that Employer missed another payment, which it made up one week later.
Once direct deposit was arranged, there were no more problems with the timely payment
of disability benefits. With respect to Employee’s contention that she is entitled to

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Employee indicated that her wrist symptoms have resolved.

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additional medical care, the court noted that Employee selected Dr. Steinagle from a panel
of physicians and that Employer authorized treatment with him until he placed her at MMI.
The court found that, in the absence of any contrary medical opinions submitted by
Employee, she was not likely to prevail at trial in establishing her entitlement to additional
medical benefits at this stage of the case. Similarly, the court determined that because
Employee offered no evidence of an additional period of disability that would entitle her
to additional temporary disability benefits or to payment of benefits at an adjusted
compensation rate, she was not entitled to additional disability payments. Employee has
appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s
factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2025). When the trial judge has had the opportunity
to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable
deference to credibility determinations made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp.
of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “when it comes to deposition
testimony, an appellate panel is in the same position as the trial court to make credibility
determinations.” Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, No. W2024-01034-SC-R3-WC, 2025 Tenn.
LEXIS 514, at *18 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2025). Thus, when medical proof is presented by
deposition, “the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and
credibility of the expert testimony.” Id. Moreover, the interpretation and application of
statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption
of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone
N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our
obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in
accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor
either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2025).

Analysis

In her notice of appeal, Employee contends the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard, selectively admitted evidence, failed to rule on pending motions, and erred in
according the authorized treating physician a presumption of correctness in light of
objective radiological evidence contradicting the MMI determination. In response,
Employer asserts the trial court correctly decided issues of admissibility, gave appropriate
weight to Dr. Steinagle’s opinion as the authorized treating physician, and correctly denied
Employee’s request for resumption of temporary disability benefits after she was placed at
MMI.

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Introduction of Evidence at Expedited Hearings

As an initial matter, it is a well-settled principle that the employee in a workers’
compensation case bears the burden of proving all essential elements of her claim, even at
an interlocutory stage of the case. See Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-05-
0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd.
Aug. 18, 2015). Although an employee need only prove a likelihood of prevailing at trial
to secure benefits at an interlocutory hearing, “this lesser evidentiary standard . . . does not
relieve an employee of the burden of [production] at an expedited hearing.” Buchanan v.
Carlex Glass Co., No. 2015-01-0012, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *6
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 29, 2015). Here, it was Employee’s burden to
come forward with sufficient evidence to convince the court she is likely to prevail at trial
in proving entitlement to additional temporary disability and/or medical benefits

In her brief on appeal, Employee argues that the court “changed the operative
evidentiary rules” during the hearing by admitting certain evidence and denying other
documents. Employee asserts this, in effect, resulted in her having to re-prove her case,
even though a record was already created, without fair advance notice. Employee further
argues that the trial court “refus[ed] to meaningfully consider the preserved record [she]
spent months building,” asserting that she followed the procedures set out in Tenn. Comp.
R. and Regs 0800-02-21-.15 for requesting a hearing and presenting certain documents and
evidence for the court’s consideration.

Specifically, the rule Employee cited establishes a time frame within which
documentary evidence must be filed with the court, and it cautions that “[e]vidence or
witnesses not disclosed in accordance with this rule, except for witnesses or evidence
intended for impeachment or rebuttal purposes, will not be considered unless good cause
is shown for why the evidence/witness was not timely disclosed.” In response to
Employee’s arguments, Employer asserts the burden is on the parties to review all prior
pleadings and other filings to identify which documents they want considered as
“evidence” for purposes of the expedited hearing. Here, the trial court considered the
opinions and medical records of Dr. Steinagle regarding diagnosis, causation, and MMI.
Employee offered no admissible evidence contrary to his opinions and the court sustained
Employer’s hearsay and foundational objections when she attempted to introduce certain
documents into evidence.

Employee also asserts Employer’s documents “had not been timely disclosed.”
However, our review of the record supports Employer’s contention that all documents
offered into evidence at the hearing were timely filed with the court on March 25, 2025,
thirteen days before the April 7 expedited hearing. In addition, we disagree with
Employee’s contention that Employer “was allowed broader latitude in framing the case
and cross-examining” Employee or that the court demonstrated an “asymetri[c]al”
approach to evidentiary decisions. In short, Employee claims she was treated unfairly. We

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respectfully disagree. As noted above, Employee had the burden of proving all essential
elements of her claim. She and she alone had the burden to offer admissible evidence that
established her entitlement to additional benefits. Employer had no such burden under the
circumstances of this case. We find no evidence in this record that the trial court departed
from established rules, improperly admitted or excluded evidence, or placed any unfair
burden on Employee.

Self-represented litigants must be held to the same standards as represented parties.
Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). As explained by
the Tennessee Court of Appeals:

The courts should take into account that many pro se litigants have no legal
training and little familiarity with the judicial system. However, the courts
must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant
and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. Thus, the courts must not
excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and
procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe. . . . Pro se
litigants should not be permitted to shift the burden of the litigation to the
courts or to their adversaries.

Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903-04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). Self-represented litigants, just like represented litigants, must present
admissible evidence to support their claims, and the trial court is tasked with considering
objections raised by the opposing party concerning the admissibility of evidence. Although
Employee may have filed what she considered a compelling record in her case, those
documents must still meet the evidentiary standards set out in the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence for the trial court to consider them. Filing the records with the court prior to the
hearing is not the same as having them admitted into evidence during the hearing, which
the trial court explained at the expedited hearing. In short, our review of the record reveals
no errors by the trial court in its evidentiary decisions. 2

Consideration of Medical Evidence

Employee next contends that Dr. Steinagle’s conclusions regarding the absence of
objective evidence of a work-related injury and his MMI determination are inconsistent
with the radiologist’s interpretation of diagnostic imaging. However, Employee has
offered no countervailing medical opinions in support of her argument. The trial court
correctly noted that, given his status as the authorized physician, Dr. Steinagle’s medical
opinion was entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(E), and it determined Employee had “presented no

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Given the interlocutory nature of the trial court’s order, Employee is not foreclosed from offering proof
in an admissible form at any subsequent hearing.

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medical opinions to challenge his conclusions or overcome that presumption.” As we have
previously observed, “parties and their lawyers cannot rely solely on their own medical
interpretations of the evidence to successfully support their arguments.” Lurz v. Int’l Paper
Co., No. 2015-02-0462, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 8, at *17 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2018). We agree with the trial court that, without countervailing
medical proof, the only medical evidence in the record addressing whether Employee
suffered a work-related injury or reached MMI is that of Dr. Steinagle. Temporary
disability benefits terminate upon, among other things, the occurrence of MMI. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Crencor Leasing and Sales, No. 2015-06-0332, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 48, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 11, 2015). Consequently,
Employee’s request for additional medical and temporary disability benefits must fail
because she provided no expert medical opinions in support of her claim for additional
benefits at this time. 3

Finally, Employee conceded at the expedited hearing that she had no evidence that
Employer had erroneously calculated her compensation rate. Thus, we consider this issue
to have been waived.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.
Costs on appeal are taxed to Employee.

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We emphasize, however, that Employee remains entitled to reasonable and necessary medical treatment
arising primarily from her alleged work accidents, and Dr. Steinagle remains her authorized treating
physician. We hold only that Employee has not come forward with sufficient evidence at this interlocutory
stage of the case to show that she is entitled to any specific medical treatment at this time in the absence of
an expert medical opinion supporting the medical necessity for any such treatment.

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