Yeoman, Damien v. Transwood Logistics, Inc.

FILED
Nov 13, 2025
11:57 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Damien Yeoman Docket No. 2024-30-2931

v. State File No. 81990-2023

Transwood Logistics, Inc., et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Brian K. Addington, Judge

Affirmed and Certified as Final

In this second appeal of this case, the employee challenges the trial court’s order granting
summary judgment to the employer on the basis that the employee failed to provide proper
notice of the workplace accident. Previously, in an interlocutory appeal, we concluded that
an employee’s lack of understanding of the extent of his or her injury does not constitute a
reasonable excuse for the failure to provide timely notice of a sudden, traumatic workplace
accident. As a result, following our remand of the case and the employer’s filing of a
motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the employee did not come
forward with sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage to prove he had a
reasonable excuse for his late notice. The employee has appealed. Having carefully
reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and certify it as final.

Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which
Judge Pele I. Godkin and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Andrew J. Roberto, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant, Damien Yeoman

W. Troy Hart and Allison P. King, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee,
Transwood Logistics, Inc.

Factual and Procedural Background

We previously summarized the facts of this case as follows:

Damien Yeoman (“Employee”), a thirty-one-year-old resident of Knox
County, worked as a delivery driver for Transwood Logistics, Inc.

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(“Employer”). On September 26, 2023, while making a delivery in
Hendersonville, North Carolina, Employee slipped on a wet step while
exiting his truck and, as a result, “all of his weight pulled on his right
shoulder/arm.” Employee stated he did not inform Employer of this accident
initially for two reasons: first, he believed he had suffered a minor muscle
pull that would resolve over time; and second, he had only been employed
by Employer for approximately one month and “wanted to be cautious to
make sure this was a work injury.”

On October 10, 2023, Employee went to his primary care provider at
Cherokee Health Systems and saw Nurse Practitioner Crystal Larrimore
(“NP Larrimore”). At that visit, he complained of right shoulder and left
thumb pain. According to NP Larrimore’s report, Employee stated that his
“shoulder hurts all the time, hurts when he moves it, hurts if he keeps it still.”
Importantly, NP Larrimore’s report also stated that Employee “believes he
may have injured this at his new job, pulling a hose.” Later in the same
report, the provider indicated he had experienced shoulder symptoms for “2-
3 weeks.” On physical examination, Employee had “moderate pain” during
range of motion testing and tenderness in his right shoulder. NP Larrimore
ordered a right shoulder x-ray.

On October 20, Employee informed his dispatcher that he needed time
off for a medical appointment. This discussion was overheard by the
terminal manager, Jerry Smith. During his subsequent conversation with
Employee, Mr. Smith learned about the work accident, although Employee
was unable at that time to recall the date it had occurred. . . .

....

Although Employer had initially authorized medical treatment after
receiving notice of Employee’s accident, it subsequently denied the claim
due to what it asserted was lack of timely notice. Specifically, Employer
asserted that Employee’s direct supervisor “had no knowledge of
Employee’s injury until October 20, 2023,” which was 24 days after the
accident.

During the expedited hearing, Employee testified that, after returning
home following the accident on September 26, he told his mother that he had
“slipped climbing out of the truck.” He further acknowledged that, within a
week of the accident, he decided his condition was bad enough that he needed
to seek medical attention. Yet, he admitted he did not inform his supervisor
of the incident until October 20. Finally, Employee acknowledged that he
knew he had suffered a work-related accident on the date it occurred.

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Yeoman v. Transwood Logistics, Inc., No. 2024-30-2931, 2025 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 11, at *2-5 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 19, 2025) (footnote omitted).

The trial court conducted an expedited hearing in December 2024 to determine
whether Employee was entitled to the initiation of certain workers’ compensation benefits.
In a December 20, 2024 order, the trial court determined that Employer was not likely to
prevail at trial on its notice defense because Employee is a poor historian who did not
understand the seriousness of his medical condition and because Employer was not
prejudiced by Employee’s late notice. Consequently, the court concluded Employee had a
reasonable excuse for his failure to provide timely notice, and it ordered Employer to
initiate certain benefits. On appeal, we reversed, first noting that Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-201(a)(1) requires written notice of a workplace accident “within
fifteen (15) days after the occurrence of the accident.” Id. at *8 (citing Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-201(a)(1) (emphasis added)). Second, we concluded there was no evidence
Employer had actual knowledge of the accident. Id. at *11. Finally, we held that an
employee’s lack of understanding of the seriousness of the resulting injury was not a
reasonable excuse for his failure to timely report a sudden, traumatic workplace accident.
Id. at *11-12. We observed that to hold otherwise would result in the addition of a
“discovery rule” to the notice requirement for sudden workplace accidents, which would
expand the language of the relevant statute. Id. at * 12.

Following our remand of the case, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning Employee’s failure to
give timely notice of the workplace accident, Employer’s lack of actual knowledge of the
accident, or Employee’s lack of a valid excuse for failure to give timely notice. In response,
Employee argued that because he believed he had suffered only a minor muscle strain that
would heal on its own, he had a reasonable excuse for not giving timely notice of the
accident. In addition, Employee argued that this Board erred in reversing the trial court’s
expedited hearing order because we failed to give proper deference to the trial court’s
findings of fact concerning the reasonable excuse element of the analysis. Following a
hearing, the trial court granted Employer’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed
Employee’s case, and Employee has appealed.

Standard of Review

The interpretation and application of statutes and regulations are questions of law
that we review de novo with no presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are correct.
See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn.
2013). The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment likewise is a question of
law that we review de novo with no presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are
correct. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn.
2015). As such, we “make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Id. We are also mindful

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of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and
in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not
favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2024).

Analysis

On appeal, Employee raises several issues, which we have combined and restated
as follows: (1) whether an employee’s lack of understanding of the extent and nature of his
or her medical condition can constitute a reasonable excuse for the failure to provide timely
notice of a sudden, traumatic work-related accident; (2) whether the trial court erred in
concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Employee
presented sufficient evidence of a reasonable excuse for the failure to provide timely notice;
and (3) whether Employer waived its notice defense by authorizing certain medical
treatment and paying certain benefits. We will address the first two issues together.

Reasonable Excuse

We have previously analyzed the structure and elements of a notice defense as set
out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201. See Ernstes v. Printpack, Inc., No.
2020-07-0617, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 25, at *34 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp.
App. Bd. June 6, 2023) (aff’d Ernstes v. Printpack, Inc., No. W2023-00863-SC-RS-WC,
2024 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 2, 2024)). In Ernstes, we
discussed a five-step process for the evaluation of notice, the third step of which states:

C. If no timely written notice was provided and no actual knowledge has
been proven, did the employee show a “reasonable excuse” for the
failure to give proper notice to the employer? In considering whether
the employee has shown by a preponderance of the evidence a
reasonable excuse, a court can consider, among other things: (1) the
employer’s actual knowledge of the employee’s injury, (2) lack of
prejudice to the employer by an excusal of the notice requirement, and
(3) the excuse or inability of the employee to timely notify the
employer. However, as previously stated by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, lack of prejudice alone would not be sufficient to excuse notice.

Ernstes, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 25, at *34 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). In affirming our decision, the Supreme Court’s Special Workers’
Compensation Appeals Panel made clear that the burden of proving reasonable excuse is
on the employee. Ernstes, 2024 Tenn. LEXIS 1, at *13.

In the present appeal, Employee asserts that a relevant factor to consider in
evaluating an employee’s reasonable excuse for the failure to give proper notice of a
sudden, traumatic workplace accident is his or her lack of understanding of the extent

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and/or nature of the medical condition the employee claims arose from the accident. We
also addressed this argument in our first opinion in this case, stating:

We conclude, however, that an employee’s understanding, or lack thereof, of
the seriousness of his injury does not excuse the notice requirement in
circumstances where [the employee] was involved in a sudden, traumatic
accident at work. Section 201(a)(1) expressly requires an employee to give
notice “within fifteen (15) days after the occurrence of the accident,” not
within fifteen days after the employee understands the seriousness of the
injury caused by that accident. The trial court’s rationale, taken to its logical
conclusion, would result in the addition of a “discovery rule” to the notice
requirement applicable to sudden, acute, and traumatic injuries described in
section 201(a)(1), which we conclude would expand the intended meaning
of that statute.

Yeoman, 2025 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 11, at *11-12 (emphasis in original). A
necessary corollary to this conclusion is that an employee’s lack of understanding of the
extent and/or nature of a medical condition arising from a sudden, traumatic workplace
accident is not pertinent to the assessment of timely notice. In other words, in cases
involving a sudden, traumatic accident, the notice requirement applies to the occurrence of
the accident, not to the discovery of an injury arising from that accident. Hence, in the
context of the present appeal, we conclude that the language of section 201(a) placed a
burden on Employee to give timely notice of the occurrence of the workplace accident
regardless of whether he understood the extent or nature of any medical condition he
believes arose from that accident. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-201(a). 1

We have also stressed that Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law treats the
employee’s notice requirement differently depending on the context of the case. For
example, in circumstances where an employee alleges he or she suffered a gradual or
cumulative trauma injury at work, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(b) requires
the employee to give notice to the employer within 15 days of the date the employee
“[k]nows or reasonably should know that the employee suffered a work-related injury that
has resulted in permanent physical impairment” or within 15 days after the employee “is
rendered unable to continue to perform the employee’s normal work activities as a result
of the work-related injury.” Furthermore, in circumstances where an employee alleged an
occupational disease, the employee is required to give notice within thirty days “after the
first distinct manifestation of” the disease. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-305(a) (2024). The

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Employee’s argument appears to conflate an employee’s knowledge of his or her injuries from an accident
with his or her knowledge of an accident. As we have stated previously, “Tennessee courts have
consistently held that the employee is required to give timely notice of the accident but need not understand
or appreciate the nature or extent of the injuries arising from the accident at the time notice is given.” Dyer
v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 2023-05-0917, 2024 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 5, at *21 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 1, 2024).
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Appeals Panel has interpreted this language to require courts to consider “when [the
employee] knew or should have known that he suffered from an occupational disease
caused by his workplace.” Mayton v. Wackenhut Servs., No. E2010-00907-WC-R3-WC,
2011 Tenn. LEXIS 620, at *11-12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel July 18, 2011).

Thus, both cumulative trauma cases and occupational disease cases include a
“discovery rule” that impacts the employee’s notice requirement in those circumstances.
Yet, there is no such language in section 201(a). If the General Assembly had intended to
include a “discovery rule” in the context of sudden, traumatic workplace accidents, it could
easily have stated such in section 201(a). In short, we have no authority to expand
unambiguous statutory language to add a discovery rule in the context of sudden, traumatic
workplace accidents. See Ernstes, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 25, at *18.
Consequently, we reiterate our previous holding that Employee’s lack of knowledge of the
nature or extent of his condition is insufficient to establish a reasonable excuse for the
failure to give timely notice of a sudden, traumatic accident. We also conclude the trial
court did not err in determining Employee did not come forward with sufficient evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding reasonable excuse.

Waiver of Notice Defense

Finally, Employee asserts that Employer waived its notice defense by authorizing
and paying for certain workers’ compensation benefits. We are unpersuaded by this
argument. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-205(d)(2) (2024) provides that in cases
where an employer pays certain benefits without an award, “the prior payment of
compensation shall not be considered a binding determination of the obligations of the
employer as to future compensation payments.” Further, the Tennessee Supreme Court
has stated that “an employer who voluntarily makes payments to an employee may
subsequently contest liability. An employee’s acceptance of any such payments does not
bind either side.” Catlett v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of N. Am., 914 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tenn.
1995) (internal citations omitted); see also Ward v. Federal Transp., No. 02S01-9304-CH-
00028, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 281, at *4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May 30, 1995) (noting
that section 50-6-205 makes no mention of waiver of defenses). Thus, we conclude that
Employer’s payment of benefits prior to contesting the compensability of the claim did not
lead to a waiver of its notice defense.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment and certify it as final. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employee.

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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Damien Yeoman Docket No. 2024-30-2931

v. State File No. 81990-2023

Transwood Logistics, Inc., et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Brian K. Addington, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced case
was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 13th day of
November, 2025.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Andrew J. Roberto X aroberto@brownandroberto.com
cwilliams@brownandroberto.com
W. Troy Hart X wth@mijs.com
Allison P. King apking@mijs.com
slmcculley@mijs.com
Brian K. Addington, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov