Estate of Webb

#31017-a-JMK
2026 S.D. 2

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF MARTIN ALLEN WEBB,
Deceased.

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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
DEWEY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE HONORABLE MICHELLE K. COMER
Judge

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JEFFERY D. COLLINS of
Lynn Jackson Shultz & Lebrun, P.C.
Rapid City, South Dakota

MEGHANN M. JOYCE of
Lynn Jackson Shultz & LeBrun, P.C.
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellant
Stephanie Webb.

ERIC JOHN NIES of
Nies, Karras & Skjoldal, P.C.
Spearfish, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee Dee
Haugen.

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CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
OCTOBER 7, 2025
OPINION FILED 01/14/26
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KERN, Retired Justice

[¶1.] Martin Allen Webb (Butch), age 57, and Stephanie Eagleberger, age

29, planned to marry in 2013 after dating for nearly a year. Butch was a successful

businessman and rancher in South Dakota, and Stephanie co-owned and operated a

high-end horse breeding business in Colorado. At Butch’s request, his attorney,

Eric Bogue (Eric), drafted a prenuptial agreement for his review. The proposed

agreement, among other things, waived Stephanie’s right to claim any share of

Butch’s estate after his death. Butch presented Stephanie with the agreement the

day before their planned civil wedding ceremony, which was scheduled for the

following evening at Eric’s law office. The parties signed the agreement shortly

before the ceremony began, and the two were married on October 11, 2013.

[¶2.] Butch died approximately eight years later. Stephanie petitioned the

court for an elective share of Butch’s estate per SDCL 29A-2-201 and a family

allowance under SDCL 29A-2-403, arguing that her signature on the prenuptial

agreement was involuntarily made and that the agreement itself was

unconscionable. After a trial on the matter, the court granted Stephanie’s request

for a family allowance but denied her petition for an elective share. The court found

Stephanie voluntarily signed the agreement, and that the agreement was not

unconscionable. Stephanie appeals. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

[¶3.] Butch Webb died on December 9, 2021, at the age of 65. At the time,

he was married to Stephanie, who had been his wife since late 2013. Butch was

nearly 30 years older than Stephanie at the time of their marriage, and this was a

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second marriage for both parties. Throughout his life, Butch built a substantial

career in the financial industry. Butch was college-educated with a bachelor’s

degree from the University of Wyoming. He was the past president of a bank and a

very successful businessman, accumulating significant wealth through payday

lending businesses. In addition to his business ventures, he operated a sizeable

ranching operation near Isabel, South Dakota, where he raised cattle and valuable

horses.

[¶4.] Stephanie lives in Loveland, Colorado. She graduated from high

school in 2002 and has a bachelor’s degree in equine science with minors in

agricultural and racehorse economics from Colorado State University. While in

college, Stephanie started working for Royal Vista Equine, a high-end horse

breeding business. She began as an undergraduate intern and was later “hired on

to help sales prep racehorse yearlings” around 2006. The company employed 10 to

12 employees and was headquartered in Fort Collins, Colorado. She eventually

became the office manager in 2007 after graduating from college. Her duties

included oversight of client billing, entering into contracts with clients, and working

with CPAs to do the year-end taxes. She has been in charge of “the books since

[she] started working in the office in 2006.”

[¶5.] While working for Royal Vista in 2007, Stephanie married Chris

Kepplinger, her first husband. They separated in 2011 and divorced in 2012. The

divorce did not involve attorneys and was described as amicable. Also in 2011, the

owners of Royal Vista decided to retire and turned the business over to Stephanie

and her business partner, Jake Dahl. Through this process, Stephanie acquired a

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45% interest in Royal Vista Equine. She testified that the reason the previous

owners chose to turn the business over to her instead of selling it was because she

was good at what she did. After acquisition, Stephanie and Jake changed Royal

Vista’s name to Vista Equine LLC. Her interest remained at 45%, and she

continued in her role as office manager with a salary of $45,000 per year.

[¶6.] Stephanie and Butch’s romantic relationship began in January 2013.

Butch became a client of Vista Equine in 2007, but it was not until Stephanie began

texting Butch about acquiring a brood mare in early 2013 that their friendship

deepened. The two began texting and calling each other frequently, and their first

date was February 11, 2013, where they met at a bull sale in Nebraska, and Butch

asked Stephanie to join him for dinner.

[¶7.] Stephanie testified that the couple “had so many similarities” and

“looked at things the same way.” Their relationship “flowed” naturally despite the

nearly 30-year age difference. Butch and Stephanie traveled to South Dakota for

the first time together to visit Butch’s ranch and to meet his children and other

family members in the spring of 2013. Butch was previously married and had four

children from his first marriage and from another relationship: Dee, Deb, and two

minor children. Dee Haugen, the oldest of Butch’s children, was 46 years of age at

the time of trial.

[¶8.] After a few months of dating, Butch proposed to Stephanie on May 16,

2013. Because Stephanie was not ready to move to South Dakota, Butch purchased

a property in Loveland, Colorado, for her on May 20, 2013, titling it solely in her

name. The property covers nearly 70 acres and was valued at $1.3 million in 2013.

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Stephanie contributed nothing to the purchase price of the property. At the time of

purchase, Stephanie testified that Butch informed her he had multiple lawsuits

pending against him in several states stemming from his payday loan businesses.

It was Stephanie’s understanding that the Colorado property was titled solely in her

name in order to protect the property from a potential judgment arising from these

lawsuits. Over the next few years, Stephanie testified that Butch continued to live

in South Dakota but would visit Colorado one to two times per month, splitting his

time between the two locations.

[¶9.] Stephanie testified that she was unsure of the date when Butch first

brought up the idea of signing a prenuptial agreement, but that it was after he had

purchased the Colorado property and likely in the late summer of 2013. She

maintains that the first time Butch talked about the prenuptial agreement was in

the context of the document being “designed to protect [her].” Dee, however,

testified that Butch told her in May 2013 that he was engaged, and that Stephanie

had agreed to sign a prenuptial agreement.

[¶10.] After their engagement, the couple almost immediately began

discussing a date for their marriage. When deciding where they should marry, they

ultimately agreed on a destination wedding in Italy, because it was Stephanie’s

dream to be married there. Stephanie began working with a travel agent, and they

decided that they would be married in Sicily on November 12, 2013. They were

unaware, however, of restrictions in Italy which required the filing of certain

paperwork six months before the wedding, so they altered their plans. The couple

decided to be legally married in Faith, South Dakota, in a civil ceremony before

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traveling to Italy for their wedding. Neither Butch nor Stephanie wanted this civil

ceremony in Faith to look or feel like their real wedding because they wanted to

save that experience for their wedding in Italy in November.

[¶11.] The date of the civil ceremony was in flux, due primarily to Butch’s

busy fall schedule and the Atlas blizzard that began on October 3, 2013, which

devasted farms and ranches across western South Dakota.1 Eventually, the parties

decided to marry on October 11, 2013, in Faith, at the law office of Eric and Cheryl

Bogue, Butch’s long-time friends and attorneys. The Bogues had helped Butch with

various legal matters through the years, including lawsuits related to his payday

lending businesses and the formation of LLCs. Stephanie recalled that Butch had a

narrow window of availability during which the ceremony could be performed, and

that “Butch had it pretty well planned and set up for us, thankfully. He arranged

all of it. I mean, he knows the people; he knows the places.”

[¶12.] The day before the wedding, on October 10, 2013, Butch began the

drive from South Dakota to pick Stephanie up from her home in Loveland,

Colorado, to bring her back to Faith. Around 3:30 pm that day, Bogue sent a draft

of a prenuptial agreement to Butch. At 4:40 pm, Butch forwarded the email to

Stephanie. Exhibit B attached to the agreement contained a list and valuations of

the parties’ assets, valuing Stephanie’s property at $1.75 million and Butch’s assets

1. Winter storm Atlas or the “Cattleman’s Blizzard” lasted from October 3,
2013, through October 5, 2013, delivering inches of rain, up to five feet of
snow, and high winds resulting in the death of tens of thousands of cattle,
sheep, horses, and bison. National Weather Service, October 3-5, 2013,
Historic Blizzard, https://www.weather.gov/unr/2013-10-03_05 (last visited
Jan. 2, 2026).

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at around $26 million.2 Stephanie testified that this was the first time that she saw

the prenuptial agreement.

[¶13.] The agreement provided in relevant part:

WHEREAS, Butch and Stephanie consider it [in] their best
interests to settle between themselves, now and forever, their
respective rights and all other rights which may grow out of
their marriage relationship between them in which either of
them now has or may hereafter claim to have in any property of
every kind, nature and description, real, personal or mixed, now
owned or which hereafter may be acquired by either of them now
therefore,

***

8. Except as herein provided, both Butch and Stephanie do
hereby forever waive, release and quit claim to the other all of
the property rights, and claims which he or she now has or may
hereafter have as husband, wife, widower, widow, or otherwise
by the marital relations which may exist in the future between
the parties hereto[.]

9. It is further agreed that this agreement shall not be
construed or considered an agreement between the parties to
obtain a divorce, one from the other, but that the same is to be
considered strictly as an agreement settling rights respecting
property division of each of the parties hereto, and that each
person was urged to obtain legal advice [of] an attorney, and
that the same is a free and voluntary act of each of the parties
hereto.

10. The parties have entered into this agreement freely and
after adequate opportunity for independent counsel and
acknowledge that the provisions are fair. Neither party relies

2. Exhibit B contained valuations of each of Butch’s nine payday lending
businesses amounting to around $16 million, and a valuation of Butch’s 100%
ownership in Webb Ranch, LLC and DeKaKe Ranch, LLC, amounting to
around $9.8 million.

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upon any representations or statements of the other as to any
matters material to this agreement.3

[¶14.] At 8:20 pm, Stephanie replied to the email, in part: “Will you resend in

English?? Lawyer jargon is the quickest way for me to feel completely inept. I

really don’t understand most of these points.” After explaining her confusion, she

addressed the asset valuation in the exhibits attached to the draft agreement. She

corrected errors to her asset valuations and asked whether her 401(k) and personal

savings accounts should be included. Stephanie testified that although she was

confused about the legal wording in the document, she did not discuss the

agreement with an attorney of her own choosing. She further testified that she was

unsure whether she even read the entire agreement but acknowledged that she

attempted to read the draft.

[¶15.] Late on October 10, 2013, or in the early hours of October 11, Butch

arrived in Colorado and picked Stephanie up to bring her to South Dakota for their

marriage ceremony. Stephanie testified that they did not discuss the prenuptial

agreement on the drive to South Dakota. The parties stopped in Rapid City to buy

clothing and in Sturgis to purchase a marriage license, after which they drove to the

Bogues’ office in Faith, arriving mid-afternoon.

[¶16.] When Stephanie and Butch arrived at the law office, Stephanie

testified that she greeted the Bogues and then went to the restroom to change

3. Stephanie additionally claims that Paragraph 4 of the agreement, which
begins, “That in the event of divorce or separation,” contributed to her
understanding that the agreement only covered property distribution in the
event of divorce, not death. In the event of divorce, Paragraph 4 allowed
Stephanie to claim 2% of Butch’s estate for each year of marriage up to 20%
of his estate.

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clothes while Eric and Butch spoke in his office. She testified that when she came

out of the restroom, Butch was walking out of Eric’s office, and he asked Stephanie

to join him in his office. Eric’s recollection of the meeting was much different,

however, in that he testified that he spoke to the parties together and that both

Stephanie and Butch asked questions during the meeting.

[¶17.] Stephanie does not recall whether they went through each paragraph

of the agreement, but Eric testified that it was his normal practice to walk through

prenuptial agreements paragraph by paragraph with the parties, especially those

that related to post-death disposition of property as set forth in Paragraph 8. Eric

also recalled at least one conference call with Stephanie and Butch in which they

discussed the agreement before they arrived in the office. Eric testified that he did

not provide legal advice to Stephanie, and that he would have strongly

recommended that she consult with an attorney if she had any questions about the

agreement. Eric stated it was his general practice to tell parties to the transaction

that he could not represent them both because he could only represent the interests

of one party. He would then encourage the other party to seek their own legal

counsel, “which [he] would have done with Stephanie in this situation.” The circuit

court found credible Eric’s testimony about the events of October 11, 2013.

[¶18.] Stephanie testified she did not ask any questions during the meeting,

and that the encounter lasted less than five minutes. She maintains she did not

understand the agreement, but that she signed it regardless because she “was told

that it was designed to protect [her] should something happen in [the payday

lending lawsuits], and [she] trusted what [she] was being told and [she] trusted the

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Bogues.” She further testified that the premarital agreement was a “non-factor” in

her decision to marry Butch. Eric testified that Stephanie was not in any distress

and expressed “no reluctance” to him when she signed the prenuptial agreement.

When asked whether she could have rescheduled the ceremony to give her more

time to review the agreement to better understand it, she testified that she “[didn’t]

know that it could have been rescheduled very easily” because they had the

ceremony “shoved in such a tight time frame” before the scheduled trip to Italy for

their wedding nuptials in November.

[¶19.] After signing the agreement, the parties were legally married by

Pastor Harold Delbridge, and the Bogues served as witnesses for the ceremony. The

Bogues and Pastor Delbridge each testified that Stephanie generally appeared

happy during the event. After the ceremony, Stephanie and Butch had dinner with

the Bogues and then drove to Sturgis to stay the night. Butch drove Stephanie back

to Colorado the next day, and then returned to South Dakota where he remained

until the November wedding in Italy. A dozen family members and friends,

including the Bogues, joined them in Sicily for the wedding.

[¶20.] In 2014, Butch and Stephanie had a daughter, followed by a son in

2019. Their relationship continued through the years, with Stephanie living at the

Colorado property and Butch living in South Dakota on his ranch. Butch made an

effort to spend half of his time in Colorado, and Stephanie visited South Dakota on

multiple occasions. Stephanie testified that she visited the ranch in South Dakota

four to six times before they were married, but that her visits were less frequent

once their two children were born.

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[¶21.] Butch died on December 9, 2021. Stephanie filed her petition for

spousal elective share and family allowance under SDCL Chapter 29A-2 on May 31,

2022. In her petition, Stephanie asserted the agreement signed on October 11,

2013, was unenforceable and that she was therefore entitled to an elective share of

Butch’s estate. Dee Haugen, Butch’s daughter from his first marriage, objected.

The circuit court held a court trial on the petition on September 11, 2024, at the

conclusion of which the court took the matter under advisement, leaving the record

open for the submission of additional evidence.

[¶22.] On October 25, 2024, Stephanie submitted for the court’s consideration

an affidavit with attached exhibits alleging Butch failed to disclose a personal

retirement account and personal assets amounting to approximately $1.8 million.

The circuit court issued a memorandum decision on December 30, 2024, and

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 3, 2025. The court

found that Stephanie voluntarily signed the agreement and that the agreement was

not unconscionable. In upholding the agreement, the court found Stephanie’s

waiver of the elective share valid. Stephanie appeals, raising multiple issues which

we rephrase as follows:

1. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that Stephanie
voluntarily executed the prenuptial agreement.

2. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that the
prenuptial agreement waiving Stephanie’s spousal elective
share was not unconscionable.

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Analysis

1. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that
Stephanie voluntarily executed the prenuptial
agreement.

[¶23.] Stephanie first contends that the circuit court erred in finding that she

voluntarily signed the prenuptial agreement which waived her right to claim a

spousal elective share. In particular, she relies on the fact that she was first

presented with the prenuptial agreement the day before the wedding, did not

discuss the agreement with her own legal counsel, and signed the agreement just

minutes before the civil ceremony. Additionally, Stephanie claims that their

approaching November wedding in Italy and Butch’s tight schedule left no option to

reschedule the wedding, which further pressured her into signing the premarital

agreement on the night of October 11.

[¶24.] The circuit court’s factual findings, including its finding that Stephanie

voluntarily signed the premarital agreement, are reviewed for clear error. Estate of

Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78, ¶ 19, 983 N.W.2d 572, 580. Under the clearly erroneous

standard, “[t]his Court must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been made to overturn a circuit court’s findings.” Dunham v. Sabers,

2022 S.D. 65, ¶ 27, 981 N.W.2d 620, 633 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 2003 S.D. 75,

¶ 8, 666 N.W.2d 477, 480).

[¶25.] Under SDCL 29A-2-213(a), “[t]he right of election of a surviving spouse

. . . may be waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written

contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the surviving spouse.” “A surviving

spouse’s waiver is not enforceable if the surviving spouse proves that: . . . The

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waiver was not executed voluntarily[.]” SDCL 29A-2-213(b)(1).4 Similarly, under

SDCL 25-2-21(a)(1), “[a] premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party

against whom enforcement is sought proves that: . . . That party did not execute the

agreement voluntarily[.]”

[¶26.] Ultimately, the court’s duty is to determine whether the agreement

was executed voluntarily, not whether one party later finds the terms unfavorable.

The role of circuit courts in evaluating agreements between spouses is not to relieve

a party of his or her bad bargain. See Barton v. Barton, 2012 S.D. 44, ¶ 14, 815

N.W.2d 553, 557; Lodde v. Lodde, 420 N.W.2d 20, 22 (S.D. 1988) (“But courts are

not required to relieve parties from such bad bargains.”); Olson v. Olson, 1996 S.D.

90, ¶ 11, 552 N.W.2d 396, 399. “Voluntary” is not defined in SDCL 29A-2-213 or 25-

2-21, but we recently examined the meaning of the term as it relates to premarital

agreements in Estate of Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78, ¶ 26, 983 N.W.2d at 582–83, and

Estate of Smid, 2008 S.D. 82, ¶¶ 14–17, 756 N.W.2d 1, 7–8.

[¶27.] In Estate of Smid, we applied the general principle that “one who

accepts a contract is conclusively presumed to know its contents and to assent to

them, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or other wrongful act by another

contracting party.” 2008 S.D. 82, ¶ 17, 756 N.W.2d at 7 (citation omitted). In

4. A statutory elective share operates to protect surviving spouses from
unintentional disinheritance after being omitted from their deceased spouse’s
will. See Estate of Simon, 2024 S.D. 47, ¶¶ 40–42, 11 N.W.3d 36, 45–46
(Kern, J., dissenting). In South Dakota, elective shares range from a
supplemental amount up to 50% of the augmented estate depending upon the
length of the marriage. See SDCL 29A-2-202(a). Stephanie’s share, after
being married to Butch for eight years, would have amounted to 24% of
Butch’s augmented estate.

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Eichstadt, while closely examining this Court’s holding in Estate of Smid, we

emphasized that rather than focusing on whether a party was “forced” to execute

the premarital agreement, “a determination of voluntariness involves a more

comprehensive examination of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the

agreement.” Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78, ¶ 29, 983 N.W.2d at 583 (quoting Smid, 2008

S.D. 82, ¶ 23, 756 N.W.2d at 9). “[P]remarital and postnuptial contracts are unique

and require an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

execution of the agreement.” Id. ¶ 28.

[¶28.] The factual scenarios presented in both Eichstadt and Smid are

instructive here for purposes of comparison. In Eichstadt, wife was both unaware of

the fact that husband had hired an attorney to draft the premarital agreement and

that husband was taking her to sign the agreement on the day of execution. Id. ¶ 4,

983 N.W.2d at 577. Further, wife had a limited education, and she did not ask

questions nor review the agreement with an attorney. Id. ¶¶ 8, 25, 983 N.W.2d at

578, 582. Wife testified that during the meeting, husband was pacing, and she was

crying. Id. ¶ 9, 983 N.W.2d at 578. Upon her husband’s death, wife petitioned the

court for her elective share, arguing that her waiver of an elective share was

involuntary. Id. ¶ 13, 983 N.W.2d at 579. The circuit court found wife did not

voluntarily execute the agreement, rendering the agreement unenforceable. Id.

¶ 17, 983 N.W.2d at 580. Upon review of the totality of the circumstances, we

determined the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Id. ¶ 39, 983

N.W.2d at 587.

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[¶29.] In Smid, husband and wife had been married for almost four years at

the time of husband’s death. 2008 S.D. 82, ¶¶ 3, 8, 756 N.W.2d at 4–5. This was

husband’s second marriage after his first wife—with whom he had four children—

passed of cancer three years prior to his second marriage. Id. ¶ 2, 756 N.W.2d at 4.

Wife petitioned the circuit court for her elective share, claiming she did not

voluntarily waive her statutory rights in a prenuptial agreement that she signed

only to “avoid probate.” Id. ¶ 9, 756 N.W.2d at 5. At the hearing held on the

petition, wife testified she did not receive an explanation of the prenuptial

agreement before she signed it and that she lacked full knowledge of the facts and

law relevant to the agreement. Id. ¶¶ 8, 13–14, 983 N.W.2d at 5–7. The circuit

court found that any waiver was voluntary, and that the agreement was

enforceable. Id. ¶ 17, 983 N.W.2d at 8. We affirmed the circuit court’s holding,

reasoning that wife was emotionally stable at the time, knew and understood

husband’s testamentary wishes, and was present and involved in the entire estate

planning process. Id. ¶¶ 22–23, 756 N.W.2d at 9.

[¶30.] Here, after examination of the totality of the circumstances, the circuit

court found that Stephanie voluntarily signed the premarital agreement waiving

her elective share. We review this finding for clear error. Stephanie concedes she

was not deceived by Butch and did not feel tricked into signing the premarital

agreement. The circuit court further found that she was not afraid of Butch or how

he would react if she asked questions about the agreement, delayed, or would have

refused to sign. Indeed, the circuit court found no evidence that Butch bullied her

into signing the agreement or engaged in any form of wrongful conduct. Rather, the

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evidence reflects, and the court found, that Butch did everything he could to please

her, including purchasing a home and acreage for her, paying for the Italian

wedding, and transporting her back and forth to South Dakota so she would not

have to make the drive on her own.

[¶31.] Stephanie received the agreement on the afternoon of October 10.

Butch and Stephanie spent nearly eight hours in the car the day before the wedding

and did not discuss the premarital agreement. The circuit court found, “[d]espite

knowing that Butch and Stephanie intended to execute the Prenuptial Agreement

prior to the [legal] ceremony, Stephanie did not ask about the Prenuptial

Agreement on the drive from Colorado to Faith.” Additionally, the circuit court

found she had an opportunity to seek counsel, and the court found credible Eric’s

testimony that he would have encouraged her to seek independent counsel if she

had indicated she did not understand the agreement.

[¶32.] Yet, Stephanie testified that she felt pressured by the short window

available to schedule their civil ceremony. She contends that the wedding would

have been very difficult to reschedule due to the short timeline between the civil

ceremony and the Italian wedding in November, leaving her with no option to

reschedule. But this restraint was largely self-imposed. The Bogues and Pastor

Delbridge all testified that it would not have been an issue to reschedule the

ceremony had Stephanie requested more time. Stephanie and Butch had nearly a

month before they left for Italy to reschedule if she did not feel comfortable signing

the agreement that night.

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[¶33.] Finally, the evidence established that Stephanie was an independent,

capable person well able to make her own decisions at the time she signed the

agreement. She was a college-educated business owner and general manager of a

successful company, and she was not dependent on Butch for her income. The

Bogues and Pastor Delbridge testified that the atmosphere the night of the civil

ceremony was generally happy, and Stephanie denied feeling deceived or tricked

into signing. This was not the case before the Court in Eichstadt, where the wife

had an eighth-grade education and testified that her husband paced around the

office while she cried and attempted to skim the agreement without the ability to

consult with legal counsel. See Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78, ¶¶ 25, 37, 983 N.W.2d at

582, 586–87.

[¶34.] The circuit court found Eric’s testimony regarding the facts and

circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement to be credible, and we

afford great deference to a court’s credibility determinations. Estate of Gaaskjolen,

2020 S.D. 17, ¶ 18, 941 N.W.2d 808, 813–14. Based on our review of the record,

Stephanie has not established clear error, and we affirm the circuit court’s finding

that Stephanie voluntarily signed the premarital agreement waiving her elective

share.

2. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that
the prenuptial agreement waiving Stephanie’s
spousal elective share was not unconscionable.

[¶35.] Stephanie next asserts that the agreement and waiver were

unconscionable, primarily because she did not receive a fair and reasonable

disclosure of Butch’s financial condition when the agreement was presented to her.

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She also contends that the language in the agreement did not adequately inform

her that by signing, she would be waiving her spousal rights and any share of

Butch’s estate after his death. “An issue of unconscionability of a premarital

agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of law.” Eichstadt, 2022 S.D.

78, ¶ 19, 983 N.W.2d at 580 (quoting Smetana v. Smetana, 2007 S.D. 5, ¶ 7, 726

N.W.2d 887, 891); see also SDCL 29A-2-213(c) (“An issue of unconscionability of a

waiver is for decision by the court as a matter of law.”). Thus, we review a claim

regarding the unconscionability of a premarital agreement de novo.

[¶36.] Under SDCL 29A-2-213(b):

A surviving spouse’s waiver is not enforceable if the surviving
spouse proves that: . . . (2) The waiver was unconscionable when
it was executed and, before execution of the waiver, the
surviving spouse: (i) Was not provided a fair and reasonable
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the
decedent; (ii) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in
writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the decedent beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the
decedent.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶37.] Similarly, under SDCL 25-2-21(a)(2):

A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against
whom enforcement is sought proves that: . . . The agreement
was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution
of the agreement, that party: (i) Was not provided a fair and
reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of
the other party; (ii) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in
writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided;
and (iii) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an
adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of
the other party.

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(Emphasis added.)

[¶38.] To succeed on her claim of unconscionability, Stephanie must first

prove that the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed. In making

this determination, the circuit court may consider “the circumstances surrounding

the execution of the [a]greement, [and] the actual terms of the [a]greement.”

Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78, ¶ 42, 983 N.W.2d at 588. This includes whether the

agreement makes provision for the other spouse or whether the terms of the

agreement are disproportionate to the value of the drafting spouse’s total property

holdings. Id.

[¶39.] In Smid, where the marital home was the primary asset left over in

husband’s estate, we held the prenuptial agreement and elective share waiver were

not unconscionable where there was no “evidence that [wife] contributed to the

house during her marriage[.]” 2008 S.D. 82, ¶ 25, 756 N.W.2d at 9. In support of

our determination, we cited Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, 27 P.3d 433, 437 (Mont.

2001), where the Montana Supreme Court affirmed “the trial court’s finding that a

prenuptial agreement was not unconscionable in part because the disputed

residence was the home of his two children from a prior marriage and the new

spouse contributed nothing to the assets the decedent obtained prior to the

marriage.” Smid, 2008 S.D. 82, ¶ 25, 757 N.W.2d at 10.

[¶40.] Here, the circuit court found that the prenuptial agreement was not

unconscionable and that it “provided for Stephanie in the case of divorce.” This

finding was primarily based on provision 4 of the agreement, which reads in part:

In addition [to retaining her sole separate property listed on
Exhibit A], Stephanie shall be entitled to two percent (2%) of the

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value of Butch’[s] property for each year of their marriage.
However, the total such value shall not exceed twenty percent
(20%) of Butch’s property regardless of the length of their
marriage.

Exhibit A included both Stephanie’s individual businesses in Colorado and the

Colorado residence with all furniture, appliances, and personal effects. Butch’s

estate was valued at approximately $26 million, and 20% of his estate—the

maximum amount Stephanie could receive under the prenuptial agreement—would

have amounted to roughly $5.2 million. Based on the provisions in the agreement,

the circuit court did not err in finding that, at the time it was executed, the

agreement adequately provided for Stephanie in the event of divorce.

[¶41.] As to Stephanie’s spousal rights in the event of Butch’s death,

Stephanie argues that the premarital agreement is unconscionable because it does

not contain language clearly waiving these rights. However, paragraph 8 of the

agreement plainly states that both Stephanie and Butch “hereby forever waive,

release and quit claim to the other all of the property rights, and claims which he or

she now has or may hereafter have as husband, wife, widower, widow, or otherwise

by the marital relations which may exist in the future[.]” (Emphasis added.) This

provision further extends the parties’ agreement to “their heirs, executors,

administrators, and assigns for the purpose of enforcing any or either of the rights

specified in an[d] relinquished under this paragraph.” Importantly, the circuit court

noted Eric Bogue’s testimony that he reviewed each of the paragraphs in the

agreement, including this one, with the parties, and as noted above, we defer to the

court’s credibility finding as to Eric’s testimony.

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[¶42.] Moreover, the assets in Butch’s estate at the time of his death—which

were, in general, listed on Exhibit B of the prenuptial agreement—consisted

predominantly of his payday lending LLC holdings and his ranching business. All

these businesses were developed prior to Stephanie and Butch’s marriage, and

there is no indication in the record that Stephanie contributed substantially to

Butch’s businesses at the time the agreement was executed. As Stephanie

conceded, she did not financially depend on Butch for her wellbeing prior to the

marriage, and she maintained a successful career both before and during her

marriage to Butch. And despite her waiver of the spousal rights she would

otherwise have upon Butch’s death, Stephanie retained the valuable property Butch

purchased for her and titled solely in her name prior to their marriage. Given these

circumstances, Stephanie has not proven the prenuptial agreement was

unconscionable under SDCL 29A-2-213(b)(2) at the time of execution.

[¶43.] Not only was the agreement not unconscionable, but Stephanie was

also provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of Butch’s property holdings prior to

signing the prenuptial agreement.

An antenuptial agreement will be held valid if the prospective
spouse can be said to have had adequate knowledge of the
nature and extent of the other party’s property, either as a
result of disclosure by the other party or through the
independent knowledge, however acquired, of the prospective
spouse, or if the prospective spouse has been adequately
provided for by the agreement.

Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78, ¶ 45, 983 N.W.2d at 589 (citation modified). “It is sufficient

for a spouse to provide, within the best of his or her abilities, a list of assets and

liabilities with approximate valuations. The listing must be sufficiently precise to

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give the other spouse a reasonable approximation of the magnitude of the other

spouse’s net worth.” Sanford v. Sanford, 2005 S.D. 34, ¶ 44, 694 N.W.2d 283, 295.

[¶44.] Here, Exhibit B of the prenuptial agreement contained an itemized

valuation of Butch’s assets, approximating his total estate at around $26 million.

The easy-to-read list summarized his current property and holdings, including his

nine payday lending businesses. Stephanie testified she had a “general

understanding” of Butch’s business holdings, but that he “was private with

everybody” about these things, and that “[e]verybody was on a need-to-know basis.”

The list did not contain specific valuations of debt or liabilities, but it did contain a

disclaimer at the bottom which read: “As of 2013, all net income values for [Butch’s

payday lending LLCs] will be dramatically impacted by numerous lawsuits filed

against these various entities . . . which has resulted in a near total cessation of

business activity.” Considering Butch’s financial circumstances and the specificity

of the disclaimer, under the unique facts of this case, this statement was sufficient

to put Stephanie on notice that the valuations of Butch’s LLCs were subject to

change. At the time of the agreement, Butch was also uncertain about how these

lawsuits would impact the value of his estate. Considering the disclaimer, the lack

of specific values for liabilities which were yet to be determined did not render

Butch’s estate valuation unreasonable or insufficient.

[¶45.] With regard to Butch’s ranching operation, Stephanie visited Butch’s

ranch and properties in South Dakota on multiple occasions. She testified in her

deposition that she developed an understanding of the scope of Butch’s operation

during her visit in the spring of 2013. In fact, as noted above, Stephanie visited the

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ranch four to six times during their ten-month courtship. Butch was also a client of

her high-end horse breeding business, indicating he had sufficient assets to utilize

such a facility.

[¶46.] In support of her argument that Exhibit B was an unreasonable

approximation of Butch’s estate, Stephanie submitted an affidavit alleging Butch

failed to disclose on Exhibit B a commercial building, real property, and a

retirement account collectively valued at $1.8 million. The omitted property

amounted to approximately 8% of the value of Butch’s estate. The circuit court

found that Exhibit B, even with the omitted assets, was a fair and reasonable

financial disclosure of this approximate net worth. We agree. Stephanie presented

no evidence that these assets were intentionally omitted from the property list, and

$1.8 million in additional assets does not significantly impact the value of Butch’s

nearly $26 million estate.

[¶47.] Butch provided Stephanie with a “reasonable approximation” of his

assets in Exhibit B. Because Stephanie was provided a fair and reasonable

disclosure of Butch’s assets, we need not address the remaining factors under SDCL

29A-2-213(b)(2). Considering Stephanie’s working knowledge of Butch’s ranching

operation and the list provided to her, Stephanie had sufficient information to make

a reasonable assessment of Butch’s assets. Accordingly, the agreement was not

unconscionable at the time of execution.

Conclusion

[¶48.] We conclude the circuit court did not err in finding Stephanie

voluntarily signed the premarital agreement waiving her elective share. Further,

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the court committed no error in concluding that the agreement waiving Stephanie’s

elective share was not unconscionable. We affirm.

[¶49.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and DEVANEY and MYREN, Justices, concur.

[¶50.] SALTER, Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part.

[¶51.] GUSINSKY, Justice, not having been a member of the Court at the

time this action was considered by the Court, did not participate.

SALTER, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

[¶52.] I agree that we should affirm the circuit court’s decision to enforce the

Webbs’ premarital agreement, but I believe the voluntariness inquiry should be

guided by a rule explaining the definition of voluntariness, rather than a

comparison to the results in Smid and Eichstadt. Here, as in Eichstadt, the

majority opinion notes the absence of a rule for testing voluntariness in the context

of premarital agreements, but it does not provide one. Supra ¶ 25. Instead, it

simply begins an examination of the fact-bound circumstances of this case and

obtains an outcome by noting similarities or differences with Smid and Eichstadt.

Id. ¶¶ 26–28.

[¶53.] As I noted in my Eichstadt dissent, we should state what I believe to

be a clear and uncomplicated rule for voluntariness: “Voluntary means that the act

was taken intentionally and is a product of a person’s free will.” 2022 S.D. 78, ¶ 65,

983 N.W.2d 572, 593 (Salter, J., dissenting). Doing so would provide a durable rule

to guide courts and parties without relegating the voluntariness question to nothing

more than a comparison of individual scenarios falling somewhere along an

imprecise spectrum of results.

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