NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION v. MORGAN

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101 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 00–1614. Argued January 9, 2002—Decided June 10, 2002
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff “shall” file an
employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days after an “alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).
Respondent Morgan, a black male, filed a charge of discrimination and
retaliation with the EEOC against petitioner National Railroad Passen-
ger Corporation (Amtrak), and cross-filed with the California Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing. He alleged that he had been
subjected to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts and had experi-
enced a racially hostile work environment throughout his employment.
The EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue,” and Morgan filed this
lawsuit. While some of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred
within 300 days of the time that Morgan filed his EEOC charge, many
took place prior to that time period. The District Court granted Am-
trak summary judgment in part, holding that the company could not be
liable for conduct occurring outside of the 300-day filing period. The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff may sue on claims that
would ordinarily be time barred so long as they either are “sufficiently
related” to incidents that fall within the statutory period or are part of
a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that took place, at least
in part, within the period.
Held: A Title VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or re-
taliatory acts must file his charge within the appropriate 180- or 300-day
period, but a charge alleging a hostile work environment will not be
time barred if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same unlaw-
ful practice and at least one act falls within the filing period; in neither
instance is a court precluded from applying equitable doctrines that may
toll or limit the time period. Pp. 108–122.
(a) Strict adherence to Title VII’s timely filing requirements is the
best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law. Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 826. In a State having an entity author-
ized to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice,
an employee who initially files a grievance with that agency must file
the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice;

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102 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN
Syllabus
in all other States, the charge must be filed within 180 days. § 2000e–
5(e)(1). The operative statutory terms of § 2000e–5(e)(1), the charge
filing provision, are “shall,” “after . . . occurred,” and “unlawful employ-
ment practice.” “[S]hall” makes the act of filing a charge within the
specified time period mandatory. “[O]ccurred” means that the practice
took place or happened in the past. The requirement, therefore, that
the charge be filed “after” the practice “occurred” means that a litigant
has up to 180 or 300 days after the unlawful practice happened to file
with the EEOC. The critical questions for both discrete discriminatory
acts and hostile work environment claims are: What constitutes an “un-
lawful employment practice” and when has that practice “occurred”?
The answer varies with the practice. Pp. 108–110.
(b) A party must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the
date that a discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act “occurred” or lose
the ability to recover for it. Morgan asserts that the term “practice”
provides a statutory basis for the Ninth Circuit’s continuing violation
doctrine because it connotes an ongoing violation that can endure or
recur over a period of time. This argument is unavailing, however,
given that § 2000e–2 explains in great detail the sorts of actions
that qualify as “[u]nlawful employment practices,” including among
them numerous discrete acts, without indicating in any way that the
term “practice” converts related discrete acts into a single unlawful
practice for timely filing purposes. And the Court has repeatedly inter-
preted the term “practice” to apply to a discrete act of single “occur-
ence,” even where it has a connection to other acts. Several principles
may be derived from Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,
429 U. S. 229, 234–235; United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553,
558; and Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250, 257. First,
discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when
they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Because each
discrete act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act, the
charge must be filed within the 180- or 300-day period after the act
occurred. The existence of past acts and the employee’s prior knowl-
edge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing
charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently
discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely
filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts
as background evidence to support a timely claim. In addition, the time
period for filing a charge remains subject to application of equitable
doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, and tolling. See Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393. While Morgan alleged that
he suffered from numerous discriminatory and retaliatory acts from the
date he was hired through the date he was fired, only those acts
that occurred within the applicable 300-day filing period are actionable.

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All prior discrete discriminatory acts are untimely filed and no longer
actionable. Pp. 110–115.
(c) Hostile work environment claims are different in kind from dis-
crete acts. Because their very nature involves repeated conduct, the
“unlawful employment practice,” § 2000e–5(e)(1), cannot be said to occur
on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years
and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may
not be actionable on its own. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U. S. 17, 21. Determining whether an actionable hostile environment
claim exists requires an examination of all the circumstances, including
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work perform-
ance. Id., at 23. The question whether a court may, for purposes of
determining liability, review all such conduct, including those acts that
occur outside the filing period, turns on the statutory requirement that
a charge be filed within a certain number of days “after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” Because such a claim is com-
posed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one “unlaw-
ful employment practice,” it does not matter that some of the component
acts fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an act con-
tributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time
period of the hostile environment may be considered for the purposes
of determining liability. That act need not be the last act. Subsequent
events may still be part of the one claim, and a charge may be filed at
a later date and still encompass the whole. Therefore, a court’s task is
to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are
part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so,
whether any act falls within the statutory time period. To support his
hostile environment claim, Morgan presented evidence that managers
made racial jokes, performed racially derogatory acts, and used various
racial epithets. Although many of these acts occurred outside the 300-
day filing period, it cannot be said that they are not part of the same
actionable hostile environment claim. Pp. 115–121.
(d) The Court’s holding does not leave employers defenseless when a
plaintiff unreasonably delays filing a charge. The filing period is sub-
ject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling when equity so requires,
Zipes, supra, at 398, and an employer may raise a laches defense if the
plaintiff unreasonably delays in filing and as a result harms the defend-
ant, see, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 424–425.
Pp. 121–122.
232 F. 3d 1008, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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104 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN
Opinion of the Court
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined as to Part II–A.
O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.,
joined as to all but Part I, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to Part I,
post, p. 123.
Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Melissa B. Rogers.
Pamela Y. Price argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Howard J. Moore, Jr., and William
McNeill III.
Austin C. Schlick argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Mar-
leigh D. Dover, and John C. Hoyle.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Abner Morgan, Jr., sued petitioner National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that he had been subjected
to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts and had ex-
perienced a racially hostile work environment throughout
his employment. Section 2000e–5(e)(1) requires that a Title
*Katherine Y. K. Cheung, Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Stephen A. Bokat,
and Robin S. Conrad filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory
Council et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Impact Fund
et al. by Ellen Lake, Brad Seligman, and Jocelyn D. Larkin; for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Robert H. Stroup,
Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, James L. Cott,
and Eric Schnapper; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law et al. by Thomas J. Henderson, John A. Payton, Gary T. Johnson,
Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Dennis Courtland Hayes, Marcia
D. Greenberger, Judith L. Lichtman, Marc Stern, and Paula A. Brantner.

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Opinion of the Court
VII plaintiff file a charge with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days “after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” We
consider whether, and under what circumstances, a Title VII
plaintiff may file suit on events that fall outside this statu-
tory time period.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a plaintiff may sue on claims that would ordinarily
be time barred so long as they either are “sufficiently re-
lated” to incidents that fall within the statutory period or
are part of a systematic policy or practice of discrimination
that took place, at least in part, within the limitations period.
We reverse in part and affirm in part. We hold that the
statute precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination
or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period.
We also hold that consideration of the entire scope of a hos-
tile work environment claim, including behavior alleged out-
side the statutory time period, is permissible for the pur-
poses of assessing liability, so long as an act contributing to
that hostile environment takes place within the statutory
time period. The application of equitable doctrines, how-
ever, may either limit or toll the time period within which
an employee must file a charge.
I
On February 27, 1995, Abner J. Morgan, Jr., a black male,
filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation against Am-
trak with the EEOC and cross-filed with the California De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing. Morgan al-
leged that during the time period that he worked for Amtrak
he was “consistently harassed and disciplined more harshly
than other employees on account of his race.” 1 App. to Pet.
1 Such discrimination, he alleges, began when the company hired him
in August 1990 as an electrician helper, rather than as an electrician.
Subsequent alleged racially motivated discriminatory acts included a ter-
mination for refusing to follow orders, Amtrak’s refusal to allow him to

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Opinion of the Court
for Cert. 25a. The EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue”
on July 3, 1996, and Morgan filed this lawsuit on October 2,
1996. While some of the allegedly discriminatory acts about
which Morgan complained occurred within 300 days of the
time that he filed his charge with the EEOC, many took
place prior to that time period. Amtrak filed a motion, ar-
guing, among other things, that it was entitled to summary
judgment on all incidents that occurred more than 300 days
before the filing of Morgan’s EEOC charge. The District
Court granted summary judgment in part to Amtrak, hold-
ing that the company could not be liable for conduct occur-
ring before May 3, 1994, because that conduct fell outside of
the 300-day filing period. The court employed a test estab-
lished by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Opera-
tions, 78 F. 3d 1164 (1996): A “plaintiff may not base [the]
suit on conduct that occurred outside the statute of limita-
tions unless it would have been unreasonable to expect the
plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on that conduct, as in
a case in which the conduct could constitute, or be recog-
nized, as actionable harassment only in the light of events
that occurred later, within the period of the statute of limita-
tions.” Id., at 1167. The District Court held that “[b]e-
cause Morgan believed that he was being discriminated
against at the time that all of these acts occurred, it would
not be unreasonable to expect that Morgan should have filed
an EEOC charge on these acts before the limitations period
on these claims ran.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a.2
Morgan appealed. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on its previous articu-
participate in an apprenticeship program, numerous “written counselings”
for absenteeism, as well as the use of racial epithets against him by his
managers.
2 The District Court denied summary judgment to Amtrak with respect
to those claims it held were timely filed. The remaining claims then pro-
ceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict in favor of Amtrak.

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Opinion of the Court
lation of the continuing violation doctrine, which “allows
courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time
barred ‘as long as the untimely incidents represent an ongo-
ing unlawful employment practice.’ ” 232 F. 3d 1008, 1014
(2000) (quoting Anderson v. Reno, 190 F. 3d 930, 936 (CA9
1999)). Contrary to both the Seventh Circuit’s test, used by
the District Court, and a similar test employed by the Fifth
Circuit,3 the Ninth Circuit held that its precedent “precludes
such a notice limitation on the continuing violation doctrine.”
232 F. 3d, at 1015.
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, a plaintiff can establish a con-
tinuing violation that allows recovery for claims filed outside
of the statutory period in one of two ways. First, a plaintiff
may show “a series of related acts one or more of which are
within the limitations period.” Ibid. Such a “serial viola-
tion is established if the evidence indicates that the alleged
acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations pe-
riod are sufficiently related to those occurring within the
limitations period.” Ibid. The alleged incidents, however,
“cannot be isolated, sporadic, or discrete.” Ibid. Second,
a plaintiff may establish a continuing violation if he shows
“a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that oper-
ated, in part, within the limitations period—a systemic viola-
tion.” Id., at 1015–1016.
To survive summary judgment under this test, Morgan
had to “raise a genuine issue of disputed fact as to (1) the
existence of a continuing violation—be it serial or systemic,”
and (2) the continuation of the violation into the limitations
period. Id., at 1016. Because Morgan alleged three types
3 The Fifth Circuit employs a multifactor test, which, among other
things, takes into account: (1) whether the alleged acts involve the same
type of discrimination; (2) whether the incidents are recurring or inde-
pendent and isolated events; and (3) whether the earlier acts have suffi-
cient permanency to trigger the employee’s awareness of and duty to chal-
lenge the alleged violation. See Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F. 2d
971, 981 (1983).

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Opinion of the Court
of Title VII claims, namely, discrimination, hostile environ-
ment, and retaliation, the Court of Appeals considered the
allegations with respect to each category of claim separately
and found that the prelimitations conduct was sufficiently
related to the postlimitations conduct to invoke the continu-
ing violation doctrine for all three. Therefore, “[i]n light of
the relatedness of the incidents, [the Court of Appeals found]
that Morgan ha[d] sufficiently presented a genuine issue of
disputed fact as to whether a continuing violation existed.”
Id., at 1017. Because the District Court should have al-
lowed events occurring in the prelimitations period to be
“presented to the jury not merely as background informa-
tion, but also for purposes of liability,” id., at 1017–1018, the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.
We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 927 (2001), and now re-
verse in part and affirm in part.
II
The Courts of Appeals have taken various approaches to
the question whether acts that fall outside of the statutory
time period for filing charges set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
5(e) are actionable under Title VII. See n. 3, supra. While
the lower courts have offered reasonable, albeit divergent,
solutions, none are compelled by the text of the statute. In
the context of a request to alter the timely filing require-
ments of Title VII, this Court has stated that “strict adher-
ence to the procedural requirements specified by the legisla-
ture is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of
the law.” Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 826 (1980).
In Mohasco, the Court rejected arguments that strict adher-
ence to a similar statutory time restriction 4 for filing a
4 The Court there considered both the 300-day time limit of 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e–5(e) and the requirement of § 2000e–5(c) that, in the case of an
unlawful employment practice that occurs in a State that prohibits such
practices, no charge may be filed with the EEOC before the expiration of
60 days after proceedings have been commenced in the appropriate state
agency unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.

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charge was “unfair” or that “a less literal reading of the Act
would adequately effectuate the policy of deferring to state
agencies.” Id., at 824–825. Instead, the Court noted that
“[b]y choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines, Con-
gress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing
of all charges of employment discrimination.” Id., at 825.
Similarly here, our most salient source for guidance is the
statutory text.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) is a charge filing provision
that “specifies with precision” the prerequisites that a plain-
tiff must satisfy before filing suit. Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 47 (1974). An individual must file
a charge within the statutory time period and serve notice
upon the person against whom the charge is made. In a
State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek
relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an em-
ployee who initially files a grievance with that agency must
file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the em-
ployment practice; in all other States, the charge must be
filed within 180 days. A claim is time barred if it is not filed
within these time limits.
For our purposes, the critical sentence of the charge filing
provision is: “A charge under this section shall be filed
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged un-
lawful employment practice occurred.” § 2000e–5(e)(1) (em-
phasis added). The operative terms are “shall,” “after . . .
occurred,” and “unlawful employment practice.” “[S]hall”
makes the act of filing a charge within the specified time
period mandatory. See, e. g., Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he
mandatory ‘shall,’ . . . normally creates an obligation imper-
vious to judicial discretion”). “[O]ccurred” means that the
practice took place or happened in the past.5 The require-
5 “In the absence of an indication to the contrary, words in a stat-
ute are assumed to bear their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
ing.’ ” Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S. 202, 207

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Opinion of the Court
ment, therefore, that the charge be filed “after” the practice
“occurred” tells us that a litigant has up to 180 or 300 days
after the unlawful practice happened to file a charge with
the EEOC.
The critical questions, then, are: What constitutes an “un-
lawful employment practice” and when has that practice
“occurred”? Our task is to answer these questions for both
discrete discriminatory acts and hostile work environment
claims. The answer varies with the practice.
A
We take the easier question first. A discrete retaliatory
or discriminatory act “occurred” on the day that it “hap-
pened.” A party, therefore, must file a charge within either
180 or 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to
recover for it.
Morgan argues that the statute does not require the filing
of a charge within 180 or 300 days of each discrete act, but
that the language requires the filing of a charge within the
specified number of days after an “unlawful employment
practice.” “Practice,” Morgan contends, connotes an ongo-
ing violation that can endure or recur over a period of time.
See Brief for Respondent 25–26. In Morgan’s view, the
term “practice” therefore provides a statutory basis for the
Ninth Circuit’s continuing violation doctrine.6 This argu-
(1997) (quoting Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates
Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380, 388 (1993) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1561
(1993) defines “occur” as “to present itself: come to pass: take place:
happen.” See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1080 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
“[o]ccur” as “[t]o happen; . . . to take place; to arise”).
6 Morgan also argues that the EEOC’s discussion of continuing violations
in its Compliance Manual, which provides that certain serial viola-
tions and systemic violations constitute continuing violations that allow
relief for untimely events, as well as the positions the EEOC has taken in
prior briefs, warrant deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural

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ment is unavailing, however, given that 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2
explains in great detail the sorts of actions that qualify as
“[u]nlawful employment practices” and includes among such
practices numerous discrete acts. See, e. g., § 2000e–2(a) (“It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin . . .”). There is simply no indication
that the term “practice” converts related discrete acts into
a single unlawful practice for the purposes of timely filing.
Cf. § 2000e–6(a) (providing that the Attorney General may
bring a civil action in “pattern or practice” cases).
We have repeatedly interpreted the term “practice” to
apply to a discrete act or single “occurrence,” even when it
has a connection to other acts. For example, in Electrical
Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229, 234 (1976),
an employee asserted that his complaint was timely filed be-
cause the date “the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred” was the date after the conclusion of a grievance
arbitration procedure, rather than the earlier date of his dis-
charge. The discharge, he contended, was “tentative” and
“nonfinal” until the grievance and arbitration procedure
ended. Not so, the Court concluded, because the discrimina-
tory act occurred on the date of discharge—the date that
the parties understood the termination to be final. Id., at
234–235. Similarly, in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Brief for Respond-
ent 26–32. But we have held that the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines do
not receive Chevron deference. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U. S. 244, 257 (1991). Such interpretations are “ ‘entitled to respect’
under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944),
but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to per-
suade.’ ” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000).

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(1986) (per curiam), a pattern-or-practice case, when consid-
ering a discriminatory salary structure, the Court noted that
although the salary discrimination began prior to the date
that the act was actionable under Title VII, “[e]ach week’s
paycheck that deliver[ed] less to a black than to a similarly
situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII . . . .”
Id., at 395.
This Court has also held that discrete acts that fall within
the statutory time period do not make timely acts that fall
outside the time period. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U. S. 553 (1977), United forced Evans to resign after she
married because of its policy against married female flight
attendants. Although Evans failed to file a timely charge
following her initial separation, she nonetheless claimed that
United was guilty of a present, continuing violation of Title
VII because its seniority system failed to give her credit for
her prior service once she was rehired. The Court dis-
agreed, concluding that “United was entitled to treat [Evans’
resignation] as lawful after [she] failed to file a charge of
discrimination within the” charge filing period then allowed
by the statute. Id., at 558. At the same time, however, the
Court noted that “[i]t may constitute relevant background
evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current
practice is at issue.” Ibid. The emphasis, however, “should
not be placed on mere continuity” but on “whether any pres-
ent violation exist[ed].” Ibid. (emphasis in original).
In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980),
the Court evaluated the timeliness of an EEOC complaint
filed by a professor who argued that he had been denied aca-
demic tenure because of his national origin. Following the
decision to deny tenure, the employer offered him a “ ‘ter-
minal’ ” contract to teach an additional year. Id., at 253.
Claiming, in effect, a “ ‘continuing violation,’ ” the professor
argued that the time period did not begin to run until his
actual termination. Id., at 257. The Court rejected this
argument: “Mere continuity of employment, without more,

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is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for
employment discrimination.” Ibid. In order for the time
period to commence with the discharge, “he should have
identified the alleged discriminatory acts that continued
until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of
his employment.” Ibid. He could not use a termination
that fell within the limitations period to pull in the time-
barred discriminatory act. Nor could a time-barred act jus-
tify filing a charge concerning a termination that was not
independently discriminatory.
We derive several principles from these cases. First, dis-
crete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred,
even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed
charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new
clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, there-
fore, must be filed within the 180- or 300-day time period
after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. The exist-
ence of past acts and the employee’s prior knowledge of their
occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing
charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are
independently discriminatory and charges addressing those
acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar
an employee from using the prior acts as background evi-
dence in support of a timely claim.
As we have held, however, this time period for filing
a charge is subject to equitable doctrines such as tolling
or estoppel. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U. S. 385, 393 (1982) (“We hold that filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like
a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and
equitable tolling”). Courts may evaluate whether it would
be proper to apply such doctrines, although they are to be
applied sparingly. See Baldwin County Welcome Center
v. Brown, 466 U. S. 147, 152 (1984) (per curiam) (“Procedural
requirements established by Congress for gaining access to

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the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of
a vague sympathy for particular litigants”).
The Court of Appeals applied the continuing violations
doctrine to what it termed “serial violations,” holding that
so long as one act falls within the charge filing period, dis-
criminatory and retaliatory acts that are plausibly or suffi-
ciently related to that act may also be considered for the
purposes of liability. See 232 F. 3d, at 1015. With respect
to this holding, therefore, we reverse.
Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, de-
nial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each
incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse em-
ployment decision constitutes a separate actionable “unlaw-
ful employment practice.” Morgan can only file a charge to
cover discrete acts that “occurred” within the appropriate
time period.7 While Morgan alleged that he suffered from
numerous discriminatory and retaliatory acts from the date
that he was hired through March 3, 1995, the date that he
was fired, only incidents that took place within the timely
filing period are actionable. Because Morgan first filed his
charge with an appropriate state agency, only those acts that
occurred 300 days before February 27, 1995, the day that
Morgan filed his charge, are actionable. During that time
period, Morgan contends that he was wrongfully suspended
and charged with a violation of Amtrak’s “Rule L” for insub-
ordination while failing to complete work assigned to him,
denied training, and falsely accused of threatening a man-
7 Because the Court of Appeals held that the “discrete acts” were action-
able as part of a continuing violation, there was no need for it to further
contemplate when the time period began to run for each act. The District
Court noted that “Morgan believed that he was being discriminated
against at the time that all of these acts occurred. . . .” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 40a. There may be circumstances where it will be difficult to
determine when the time period should begin to run. One issue that may
arise in such circumstances is whether the time begins to run when the
injury occurs as opposed to when the injury reasonably should have been
discovered. But this case presents no occasion to resolve that issue.

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ager.8 Id., at 1013. All prior discrete discriminatory acts
are untimely filed and no longer actionable.9
B
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from dis-
crete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct.
See 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimi-
nation Law 348–349 (3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter Lindemann)
(“The repeated nature of the harassment or its intensity con-
stitutes evidence that management knew or should have
known of its existence”). The “unlawful employment prac-
tice” therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day.
It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct
contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not
be actionable on its own. See Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (“As we pointed out in Meritor
[Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 67 (1986),] ‘mere
utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feel-
ings in a[n] employee,’ ibid. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted), does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment
to implicate Title VII”). Such claims are based on the cu-
mulative effect of individual acts.
“We have repeatedly made clear that although [Title VII]
mentions specific employment decisions with immediate con-
sequences, the scope of the prohibition ‘is not limited to “eco-
8 The final alleged discriminatory act, he contends, led to his termination
on March 3, 1995. Morgan alleges that after the manager reported that
Morgan had threatened him, he was ordered into a supervisor’s office.
Then, after he asked for union representation or the presence of a
co-worker as a witness, the supervisor denied both, ordered everyone out
of the office, and yelled at Morgan to get his “black ass” into the office.
Morgan refused and went home. He was subsequently suspended and
charged with violations of two company rules and, following an investiga-
tory hearing, terminated.
9 We have no occasion here to consider the timely filing question with
respect to “pattern-or-practice” claims brought by private litigants as
none are at issue here.

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nomic” or “tangible” discrimination,’ Harris, [510 U. S., at
21] (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, [477
U. S.,] at 64), and that it covers more than ‘terms’ and ‘condi-
tions’ in the narrow contractual sense.” Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 786 (1998) (quoting Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 78 (1998)). As
the Court stated in Harris, “[t]he phrase ‘terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment’ [of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)]
evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employ-
ment, which includes requiring people to work in a discrimi-
natorily hostile or abusive environment.” 510 U. S., at 21
(some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Meritor,
477 U. S., at 64, in turn quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978)).10
“Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation . . . .”
Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U. S. 268, 270
(2001) (per curiam). Thus, “[w]hen the workplace is perme-
ated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’
that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment,’ Title VII is violated.” Harris, 510 U. S., at
21 (citations omitted).
In determining whether an actionable hostile work envi-
ronment claim exists, we look to “all the circumstances,”
including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliat-
ing, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreason-
ably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id.,
at 23. To assess whether a court may, for the purposes of
determining liability, review all such conduct, including those
acts that occur outside the filing period, we again look to the
10 Hostile work environment claims based on racial harassment are re-
viewed under the same standard as those based on sexual harassment.
See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 786–787, and n. 1 (1998); Mer-
itor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 66–67 (1986).

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statute. It provides that a charge must be filed within 180
or 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.” A hostile work environment claim is composed
of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one
“unlawful employment practice.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).
The timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII
plaintiff file a charge within a certain number of days after
the unlawful practice happened. It does not matter, for pur-
poses of the statute, that some of the component acts of the
hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time pe-
riod. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs
within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile
environment may be considered by a court for the purposes
of determining liability.11
That act need not, however, be the last act. As long as
the employer has engaged in enough activity to make out an
actionable hostile environment claim, an unlawful employ-
ment practice has “occurred,” even if it is still occurring.
Subsequent events, however, may still be part of the one
hostile work environment claim and a charge may be filed at
a later date and still encompass the whole.
It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment
encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we
do not hold, as have some of the Circuits, that the plaintiff
may not base a suit on individual acts that occurred outside
the statute of limitations unless it would have been unrea-
sonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran
11 Amtrak argues that recovery for conduct taking place outside the time
period for filing a timely charge should be available only in hostile environ-
ment cases where the plaintiff reasonably did not know such conduct was
discriminatory or where the discriminatory nature of such conduct is rec-
ognized as discriminatory only in light of later events. See Brief for Peti-
tioner 38. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted this
approach in Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78
F. 3d 1164 (1996). See supra, at 106. Although we reject the test pro-
posed by petitioner, other avenues of relief are available to employers.
See infra, at 121–122.

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on such conduct. The statute does not separate individual
acts that are part of the hostile environment claim from the
whole for the purposes of timely filing and liability. And the
statute does not contain a requirement that the employee file
a charge prior to 180 or 300 days “after” the single unlawful
practice “occurred.” Given, therefore, that the incidents
constituting a hostile work environment are part of one un-
lawful employment practice, the employer may be liable for
all acts that are part of this single claim. In order for the
charge to be timely, the employee need only file a charge
within 180 or 300 days of any act that is part of the hostile
work environment.
The following scenarios illustrate our point: (1) Acts on
days 1–400 create a hostile work environment. The em-
ployee files the charge on day 401. Can the employee re-
cover for that part of the hostile work environment that oc-
curred in the first 100 days? (2) Acts contribute to a hostile
environment on days 1–100 and on day 401, but there are no
acts between days 101–400. Can the act occurring on day
401 pull the other acts in for the purposes of liability? In
truth, all other things being equal, there is little difference
between the two scenarios as a hostile environment consti-
tutes one “unlawful employment practice” and it does not
matter whether nothing occurred within the intervening 301
days so long as each act is part of the whole. Nor, if suffi-
cient activity occurred by day 100 to make out a claim, does
it matter that the employee knows on that day that an ac-
tionable claim happened; on day 401 all incidents are still
part of the same claim. On the other hand, if an act on day
401 had no relation to the acts between days 1–100, or for
some other reason, such as certain intervening action by the
employer, was no longer part of the same hostile environ-
ment claim, then the employee cannot recover for the previ-
ous acts, at least not by reference to the day 401 act.
Our conclusion with respect to the incidents that may be
considered for the purposes of liability is reinforced by the

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fact that the statute in no way bars a plaintiff from recover-
ing damages for that portion of the hostile environment that
falls outside the period for filing a timely charge. Morgan
correctly notes that the timeliness requirement does not dic-
tate the amount of recoverable damages. It is but one in a
series of provisions requiring that the parties take action
within specified time periods, see, e. g., §§ 2000e–5(b), (c), (d),
none of which function as specific limitations on damages.
Explicit limitations on damages are found elsewhere in
the statute. Section 1981a(b)(3), for example, details spe-
cific limitations on compensatory and punitive damages.
Likewise, § 2000e–5(g)(1) allows for recovery of backpay lia-
bility for up to two years prior to the filing of the charge.
If Congress intended to limit liability to conduct occurring
in the period within which the party must file the charge, it
seems unlikely that Congress would have allowed recovery
for two years of backpay. And the fact that Congress ex-
pressly limited the amount of recoverable damages else-
where to a particular time period indicates that the timely
filing provision was not meant to serve as a specific limita-
tion either on damages or the conduct that may be consid-
ered for the purposes of one actionable hostile work environ-
ment claim.
It also makes little sense to limit the assessment of liabil-
ity in a hostile work environment claim to the conduct that
falls within the 180- or 300-day period given that this time
period varies based on whether the violation occurs in a
State or political subdivision that has an agency with author-
ity to grant or seek relief. It is important to remember that
the statute requires that a Title VII plaintiff must wait 60
days after proceedings have commenced under state or local
law to file a charge with the EEOC, unless such proceedings
have earlier terminated. § 2000e–5(c). In such circum-
stances, however, the charge must still be filed within 300
days of the occurrence. See Mohasco, 447 U. S., at 825–826.
The extended time period for parties who first file such

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charges in a State or locality ensures that employees are
neither time barred from later filing their charges with the
EEOC nor dissuaded from first filing with a state agency.
See id., at 821 (“The history identifies only one reason for
treating workers in deferral States differently from workers
in other States: to give state agencies an opportunity to re-
dress the evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and
to avoid federal intervention unless its need was demon-
strated”). Surely, therefore, we cannot import such a limit-
ing principle into the provision where its effect would be to
make the reviewable time period for liability dependent upon
whether an employee lives in a State that has its own reme-
dial scheme.12
Simply put, § 2000e–5(e)(1) is a provision specifying when
a charge is timely filed and only has the consequence of limit-
ing liability because filing a timely charge is a prerequisite to
having an actionable claim. A court’s task is to determine
whether the acts about which an employee complains are
part of the same actionable hostile work environment prac-
tice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory
time period.
With respect to Morgan’s hostile environment claim, the
Court of Appeals concluded that “ the pre- and post-
limitations period incidents involve[d] the same type of
employment actions, occurred relatively frequently, and were
perpetrated by the same managers.” 232 F. 3d, at 1017. To
support his claims of a hostile environment, Morgan pre-
sented evidence from a number of other employees that
managers made racial jokes, performed racially derogatory
acts, made negative comments regarding the capacity of
blacks to be supervisors, and used various racial epithets.
Id., at 1013. Although many of the acts upon which his
claim depends occurred outside the 300 day filing period,
12 The same concern is not implicated with discrete acts given that, un-
like hostile work environment claims, liability there does not depend upon
proof of repeated conduct extending over a period of time.

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we cannot say that they are not part of the same actionable
hostile environment claim.13 On this point, we affirm.
C
Our holding does not leave employers defenseless against
employees who bring hostile work environment claims that
extend over long periods of time. Employers have recourse
when a plaintiff unreasonably delays filing a charge. As
noted in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385
(1982), the filing period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
filing a Title VII suit. Rather, it is a requirement subject
to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling “when equity so
requires.” Id., at 398. These equitable doctrines allow us
to honor Title VII’s remedial purpose “without negating the
particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt
notice to the employer.” Ibid.
This Court previously noted that despite the procedural
protections of the statute “a defendant in a Title VII enforce-
ment action might still be significantly handicapped in mak-
ing his defense because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing
the action after exhausting its conciliation efforts.” Occi-
dental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 373 (1977).
The same is true when the delay is caused by the employee,
rather than by the EEOC. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 424 (1975) (“[A] party may not be ‘enti-
tled’ to relief if its conduct of the cause has improperly and
substantially prejudiced the other party”). In such cases,
the federal courts have the discretionary power to “to locate
‘a just result’ in light of the circumstances peculiar to the
case.” Id., at 424–425.
In addition to other equitable defenses, therefore, an em-
ployer may raise a laches defense, which bars a plaintiff from
maintaining a suit if he unreasonably delays in filing a suit
and as a result harms the defendant. This defense “ ‘re-
13 We make no judgment, however, on the merits of Morgan’s claim.

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quires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against
whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party
asserting the defense.’ ” Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U. S. 673,
687 (1995) (quoting Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265,
282, (1961)). We do not address questions here such as
“how—and how much—prejudice must be shown” or “what
consequences follow if laches is established.” 2 Lindemann
1496–1500.14 We observe only that employers may raise
various defenses in the face of unreasonable and prejudicial
delay.
III
We conclude that a Title VII plaintiff raising claims of dis-
crete discriminatory or retaliatory acts must file his charge
within the appropriate time period—180 or 300 days—set
forth in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). A charge alleging a hos-
tile work environment claim, however, will not be time
barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part
of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one
act falls within the time period. Neither holding, however,
precludes a court from applying equitable doctrines that may
toll or limit the time period.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals’ judgment
is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
14 Nor do we have occasion to consider whether the laches defense may
be asserted against the EEOC, even though traditionally the doctrine may
not be applied against the sovereign. We note, however, that in Occiden-
tal there seemed to be general agreement that courts can provide relief
to defendants against inordinate delay by the EEOC. See Occidental
Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 373 (1977). Cf. id., at 383
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (“Since here the suit is to recover back-
pay for an individual that could have brought her own suit, it is impossible
to think that the EEOC was suing in the sovereign capacity of the
United States”).

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Opinion of O’Connor, J.
Justice O’Connor, with whom The Chief Justice joins,
with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join as
to all but Part I, and with whom Justice Breyer joins
as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Part II–A of the Court’s opinion because I agree
that Title VII suits based on discrete discriminatory acts are
time barred when the plaintiff fails to file a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within
the 180- or 300-day time period designated in the statute.
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). I dissent from the remainder of
the Court’s opinion, however, because I believe a similar re-
striction applies to all types of Title VII suits, including
those based on a claim that a plaintiff has been subjected to
a hostile work environment.
I
The Court today holds that, for discrete discriminatory
acts, § 2000e–5(e)(1) serves as a form of statute of limitations,
barring recovery for actions that take place outside the
charge-filing period. The Court acknowledges, however,
that this limitations period may be adjusted by equitable
doctrines. See ante, at 114, n. 7; see also Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982) (“We hold that
filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”). Like the Court,
I see no need to resolve fully the application of the discovery
rule to claims based on discrete discriminatory acts. See
ante, at 114, n. 7. I believe, however, that some version
of the discovery rule applies to discrete-act claims. See 2
B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination
Law 1349 (3d ed. 1996) (“Although [Supreme Court prece-
dents] seem to establish a relatively simple ‘notice’ rule as to
when discrimination ‘occurs’ (so as to start the running of
the charge-filing period), courts continue to disagree on what

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the notice must be of ” (emphasis in original)). In my view,
therefore, the charge-filing period precludes recovery based
on discrete actions that occurred more than 180 or 300 days
after the employee had, or should have had, notice of the
discriminatory act.
II
Unlike the Court, I would hold that § 2000e–5(e)(1) serves
as a limitations period for all actions brought under Title
VII, including those alleging discrimination by being sub-
jected to a hostile working environment. Section 2000e–
5(e)(1) provides that a plaintiff must file a charge with the
EEOC within 180 or 300 days “after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.”* It draws no distinction
between claims based on discrete acts and claims based on
hostile work environments. If a plaintiff fails to file a
charge within that time period, liability may not be assessed,
and damages must not be awarded, for that part of the
hostile environment that occurred outside the charge-filing
period.
The Court’s conclusion to the contrary is based on a char-
acterization of hostile environment discrimination as com-
posing a single claim based on conduct potentially spanning
several years. See ante, at 117. I agree with this charac-
terization. I disagree, however, with the Court’s conclusion
that, because of the cumulative nature of the violation, if
any conduct forming part of the violation occurs within the
charge-filing period, liability can be proved and damages can
be collected for the entire hostile environment. Although a
hostile environment claim is, by its nature, a general atmos-
phere of discrimination not completely reducible to particu-
lar discriminatory acts, each day the worker is exposed to
the hostile environment may still be treated as a separate
“occurrence,” and claims based on some of those occurrences
*This case provides no occasion to determine whether the discovery rule
operates in the context of hostile work environment claims.

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forfeited. In other words, a hostile environment is a form
of discrimination that occurs every day; some of those daily
occurrences may be time barred, while others are not.
The Court’s treatment of hostile environment claims as
constituting a single occurrence leads to results that contra-
dict the policies behind 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). Consider
an employee who has been subjected to a hostile work envi-
ronment for 10 years. Under the Court’s approach, such an
employee may, subject only to the uncertain restrictions of
equity, see ante, at 122, sleep on his or her rights for a dec-
ade, bringing suit only in year 11 based in part on actions
for which a charge could, and should, have been filed many
years previously in accordance with the statutory mandate.
§ 2000e–5(e)(1) (“A charge under this section shall be filed
[within 180 or 300 days] after the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice occurred”). Allowing suits based on such re-
mote actions raises all of the problems that statutes of limi-
tations and other similar time limitations are designed to
address:
“Statutes of limitation . . . promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memo-
ries have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The
theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust
not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the
period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prose-
cute them.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc., 321 U. S. 342, 348–349 (1944).
Although the statute’s 2-year limitation on backpay partially
addresses these concerns, § 2000e–5(g)(1), under the Court’s
view, liability may still be assessed and other sorts of dam-
ages (such as damages for pain and suffering) awarded based
on long-past occurrences. An employer asked to defend
such stale actions, when a suit challenging them could have

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been brought in a much more timely manner, may rightly
complain of precisely this sort of unjust treatment.
The Court is correct that nothing in § 2000e–5(e)(1) can be
read as imposing a cap on damages. But reading § 2000e–
5(e)(1) to require that a plaintiff bring an EEOC charge
within 180 or 300 days of the time individual incidents consti-
tuting a hostile work environment occur or lose the ability
to bring suit based on those incidents is not equivalent to
transforming it into a damages cap. The limitation is one
on liability. The restriction on damages for occurrences too
far in the past follows only as an obvious consequence.
Nor, as the Court claims, would reading § 2000e–5(e)(1) as
limiting hostile environment claims conflict with Title VII’s
allowance of backpay liability for a period of up to two years
prior to a charge’s filing. § 2000e–5(g)(1). Because of the
potential adjustments to the charge-filing period based on
equitable doctrines, two years of backpay will sometimes be
available even under my view. For example, two years of
backpay may be available where an employee failed to file a
timely charge with the EEOC because his employer deceived
him in order to conceal the existence of a discrimination
claim.
The Court also argues that it makes “little sense” to base
relief on the charge-filing period, since that period varies
depending on whether the State or political subdivision
where the violation occurs has designated an agency to deal
with such claims. See ante, at 119. The Court concludes
that “[s]urely . . . we cannot import such a limiting princi-
ple . . . where its effect would be to make the reviewable
time period for liability dependent upon whether an em-
ployee lives in a State that has its own remedial scheme.”
Ante, at 120. But this is precisely the principle the Court
has adopted for discrete discriminatory acts—depending on
where a plaintiff lives, the time period changes as to which
discrete discriminatory actions may be reviewed. The justi-
fication for the variation is the same for discrete discrimina-

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tory acts as it is for claims based on hostile work environ-
ments. The longer time period is intended to give States
and other political subdivisions time to review claims them-
selves, if they have a mechanism for doing so. The same
rationale applies to review of the daily occurrences that
make up a part of a hostile environment claim.
My approach is also consistent with that taken by the
Court in other contexts. When describing an ongoing anti-
trust violation, for instance, we have stated:
“[E]ach overt act that is part of the violation and that
injures the plaintiff . . . starts the statutory [limitations]
period running again, regardless of the plaintiff ’s knowl-
edge of the alleged illegality at much earlier times. . . .
But the commission of a separate new overt act gener-
ally does not permit the plaintiff to recover for the
injury caused by old overt acts outside the limitations
period.” Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, 189
(1997) (citations omitted).
Similarly, in actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., con-
cerning a pattern of racketeering activity, we rejected a rule
that would have allowed plaintiffs to recover for all of the
acts that made up the pattern so long as at least one occurred
within the limitations period. In doing so, we endorsed the
rule of several Circuits that, although “commission of a sepa-
rable, new predicate act within [the] limitations period per-
mits a plaintiff to recover for the additional damages caused
by that act . . . the plaintiff cannot use an independent, new
predicate act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused
by other earlier predicate acts that took place outside the
limitations period.” 521 U. S., at 190; but cf. Rotella v.
Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 554, n. 2, 557 (2000) (reserving the ques-
tion of whether the injury discovery rule applies in civil
RICO and, by extension, Clayton Act cases). The Court
today allows precisely this sort of bootstrapping in the Title

536US1 Unit: $U61 [12-22-03 07:32:48] PAGES PGT: OPIN
128 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
VII context; plaintiffs may recover for exposure to a hos-
tile environment whose time has long passed simply because
the hostile environment has continued into the charge-filing
period.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in its entirety.