FLORIDA v. THOMAS

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774 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
FLORIDA v. THOMAS
certiorari to the supreme court of florida
No. 00–391. Argued April 25, 2001—Decided June 4, 2001
While officers were investigating marijuana sales and making arrests at
a Florida home, respondent Thomas drove up, parked in the home’s
driveway, and walked toward the back of his car. An officer met him
there and asked his name and whether he had a driver’s license. After
a check of Thomas’ license revealed an outstanding warrant, the offi-
cer arrested him, handcuffed him, and took him inside the home. The
officer then went back outside, alone, and searched Thomas’ car, finding
several bags containing methamphetamine. Thomas was charged with
possession of that drug and related offenses. The trial court granted
his motion to suppress the evidence of narcotics and narcotic para-
phernalia. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, finding the
search valid under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, in which this Court
established a “bright-line” rule permitting an officer who has made a
lawful custodial arrest of a car’s occupant to search the car’s passen-
ger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. Holding
that Belton did not apply, the Florida Supreme Court reversed, but
remanded for the trial court to determine whether the vehicle search
was justified under Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752. This Court
granted certiorari to consider whether, as the State Supreme Court had
held, Belton’s bright-line rule is limited to situations where the officer
initiates contact with a vehicle’s occupant while that person remains
in the vehicle.
Held: The Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the question on which cer-
tiorari was granted. Although the parties did not raise the issue in
their briefs on the merits, this Court must first consider whether it has
jurisdiction to decide this case. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
488 U. S. 299, 306. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a) authorizes this Court to
review “[f]inal judgments . . . by the highest court of a State . . . where
any . . . right . . . is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution.”
In a criminal prosecution, finality generally is defined by a judgment
of conviction and the imposition of a sentence. Fort Wayne Books, Inc.
v. Indiana, 489 U. S. 46, 54. However, in certain circumstances, the
Court has treated state-court judgments as final for jurisdictional
purposes even though further proceedings were to take place in the
state court. Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U. S. 619, 620–621. In Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 479–483, the Court divided cases of this

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Syllabus
kind into four categories: (1) cases in which there are further pro-
ceedings, even entire trials, yet to occur in the state courts, but where
the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings
preordained; (2) cases in which the federal issue, finally decided by a
State’s highest court, will survive and require decision regardless of
the outcome of future state-court proceedings; (3) cases in which the
federal claim has been finally decided, with further proceedings on
the merits in the state courts to come, but in which later review of the
federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case;
and (4) cases in which the state courts have finally decided the federal
issue with further proceedings pending in which the party seeking re-
view in this Court might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds,
thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court,
and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be
preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action rather
than merely controlling the nature and character of, or determining
the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come.
Because none of those categories fits the Florida Supreme Court’s judg-
ment in this case, the judgment is not final. Pp. 777–781.
Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Reported below: 761 So.
2d 1010.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General of
Florida, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs were Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Car-
olyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General.
Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben.
Cynthia J. Dodge argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief was James Marion Moorman.*
*Tracey Maclin and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the National Associ-
ation of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

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776 FLORIDA v. THOMAS
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we established
a “bright-line” rule permitting a law enforcement officer who
has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of a car
to search the passenger compartment of that car as a con-
temporaneous incident of the arrest. We granted certiorari
to consider whether that rule is limited to situations in which
the officer initiates contact with the occupant of a vehicle
while that person remains inside the vehicle. 531 U. S. 1069
(2001). We find, however, that we lack jurisdiction to decide
the question.
On the evening at issue, officers were present at a home
in Polk County, Florida, investigating the sale of marijuana
and making arrests. Respondent Robert Thomas drove up
to the residence, parked in the driveway, and walked toward
the back of his vehicle. Officer J. D. Maney met Thomas
at the rear of Thomas’ vehicle, and asked him his name
and whether he had a driver’s license. After a check of
Thomas’ license revealed an outstanding warrant for his
arrest, Officer Maney arrested him, handcuffed him, and took
him inside the residence. The officer then went back out-
side, alone, and searched Thomas’ car. The search revealed
several small bags containing a white substance that tested
positive for methamphetamine.
Respondent was charged with possession of metham-
phetamine and related narcotics offenses. The trial court
granted his motion to suppress the evidence of narcotics
and narcotic paraphernalia. The Second District Court of
Appeal reversed, 711 So. 2d 1241 (1998), finding the search
valid under New York v. Belton, supra. The Supreme Court
of Florida in turn reversed, holding that Belton did not apply.
The court held that “Belton’s bright-line rule is limited
to situations where the law enforcement officer initiates
contact with the defendant” while the defendant remains in
the car. 761 So. 2d 1010, 1014 (2000). The court concluded

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Opinion of the Court
that Belton was inapplicable, and directed that the trial
court determine “whether the factors in Chimel [v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969),] justify the search of Thomas’
vehicle.” 761 So. 2d, at 1014. The court explained that
“[b]ased on the record . . . we are unable to ascertain whether
[the officer’s] safety was endangered or whether the pres-
ervation of the evidence was in jeopardy,” as necessary to
justify the search under Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752
(1969), and remanded for further proceedings.
Although the parties did not raise the issue in their briefs
on the merits, we must first consider whether we have ju-
risdiction to decide this case. See Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch, 488 U. S. 299, 306 (1989). Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a)
authorizes this Court to review “[f]inal judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had . . . where any title, right, privilege, or immu-
nity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution.”
In a criminal prosecution, finality generally “is defined by
a judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence.”
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U. S. 46, 54 (1989).
But we have not, in practice, interpreted the finality rule so
strictly. In certain circumstances, we have “treated state-
court judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes although
there were further proceedings to take place in the state
court.” Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U. S. 619, 620–621 (1981) (per
curiam). In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975), we divided cases of this kind into four categories.
None fits the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court, how-
ever, and we therefore conclude that its judgment is not final.
The first Cox category includes those cases in which “there
are further proceedings—even entire trials—yet to occur in
the state courts but where for one reason or another the
federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceed-
ings preordained.” Id., at 479. The prototypical example
of this category is Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966).
There the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a statute

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Opinion of the Court
which prohibited the publication of an editorial endorse-
ment on election day did not violate the First Amendment,
and remanded the case for trial. Id., at 216–217. Mills
conceded that his only defense to the state charge was his
constitutional claim; he admitted that he did publish the
editorial. We held that this was a “final judgment” and took
jurisdiction, saying that a trial “would be no more than a
few formal gestures leading inexorably towards a conviction,
and then another appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court for
it formally to repeat its rejection of Mills’ constitutional
contentions whereupon the case could then once more wind
its weary way back to us as a judgment unquestionably final
and appealable. Such a roundabout process would not only
be an inexcusable delay of the benefits Congress intended
to grant by providing for appeal to this Court, but it would
also result in a completely unnecessary waste of time and
energy in judicial systems already troubled by delays due
to congested dockets.” Id., at 217–218.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida here dif-
fers considerably from that of the state court in Mills. The
Florida Supreme Court remanded the case not only for appli-
cation of Chimel, but for further factfinding, and the State
has not conceded that the search is invalid under Chimel.
In Cox’s second category are those cases in which “the
federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the
State, will survive and require decision regardless of the out-
come of future state-court proceedings.” 420 U. S., at 480.
In Cox we used our decision in Radio Station WOW, Inc.
v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120 (1945), to illustrate the second
category. We said:
“In Radio Station WOW, the Nebraska Supreme Court
directed the transfer of the properties of a federally
licensed radio station and ordered an accounting, reject-
ing the claim that the transfer order would interfere
with the federal license. . . . Nothing that could happen

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Opinion of the Court
in the course of the accounting, short of settlement of
the case, would foreclose or make unnecessary decision
on the federal question.” Cox, supra, at 480.
In this case, however, were the Florida courts to find that
Chimel allows the search, a decision on the Belton issue
would no longer be necessary. We have also noted that we
treat state-court judgments in this category as final on the
assumption that “ ‘the federal questions that could come here
have been adjudicated by the State court,’ ” and the state
proceedings to take place on remand “ ‘could not remotely
give rise to a federal question . . . that may later come here.’ ”
Cox, 420 U. S., at 480. We cannot make that assumption in
this case.
Cases where “the federal claim has been finally decided,
with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot
be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case,” fall into
Cox’s third category. Id., at 481. New York v. Quarles, 467
U. S. 649 (1984), is such a case. Respondent was charged in
state court with criminal possession of a weapon, and certain
evidence was suppressed on federal constitutional grounds.
We granted the petition for certiorari and reversed, ex-
plaining that the suppression ruling was a “final judgment”
although respondent had yet to be tried. Id., at 651. We
said that this case fell within Cox’s third category because
“should the State convict respondent at trial, its claim that
certain evidence was wrongfully suppressed will be moot.
Should respondent be acquitted at trial, the State will be
precluded from pressing its federal claim again on appeal.”
467 U. S., at 651, and n. 1.
To deny review here would not necessarily cause Florida
to go to trial without the suppressed evidence, with further
appeal barred in the event of an acquittal or the federal claim
mooted in the event of a conviction. The state court has

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Opinion of the Court
yet to decide whether the evidence should be suppressed;
that will be resolved on remand. If the State prevails on
remand and the evidence is admitted under Chimel, then
the Belton issue will be moot, and the State cannot seek
review of it. But if the State loses, and the evidence is
suppressed, Florida law allows the State to appeal, as long
as it does so prior to trial. Fla. Stat. § 924.071(1) (1996)
(“The state may appeal from a pretrial order . . . suppressing
evidence”); Fla. Rule App. Proc. 9.140(c)(1)(B) (2001) (“The
state may appeal an order . . . suppressing before trial . . .
evidence obtained by search and seizure”). Should the Su-
preme Court of Florida rule against the State on the Chimel
issue, the question of suppression would be finally decided
by the Florida courts, and the State could then seek cer-
tiorari in this Court. At that time it could obtain review of
both the Belton issue and the Chimel issue. See Jefferson
v. City of Tarrant, 522 U. S. 75, 83 (1997).
The fourth Cox category includes those cases where “the
federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts
with further proceedings pending in which the party seek-
ing review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal
grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal
issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on
the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation
on the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling
the nature and character of, or determining the admissibility
of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come. In these
circumstances, if a refusal immediately to review the state-
court decision might seriously erode federal policy, the Court
has entertained and decided the federal issue, which itself
has been finally determined by the state courts for purposes
of the state litigation.” 420 U. S., at 482–483.
Here the State can make no claim of serious erosion of
federal policy that is not common to all run-of-the-mine de-
cisions suppressing evidence in criminal trials. The fourth
Cox exception does not apply here.

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Opinion of the Court
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the writ of certiorari
for want of jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.