RALEIGH, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF STOECKER v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

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Syllabus
RALEIGH, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF
STOECKER v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 99–387. Argued April 17, 2000—Decided May 30, 2000
While debtor Stoecker was its president, a now-defunct Illinois company
purchased a plane out of State and moved it to Illinois. Respondent
claims that this purchase was subject to the State’s use tax. When
such tax is unpaid, respondent issues a Notice of Tax Liability to the
taxpayer and may issue a Notice of Penalty Liability against any cor-
porate officer responsible for paying the tax who willfully fails to file
the return or make the payment. By the time respondent discovered
that the tax was unpaid in this case, the company was defunct and
Stoecker was in bankruptcy, with petitioner as his trustee. Respond-
ent filed, inter alia, a Notice of Penalty Liability against Stoecker. The
fact that there was no affirmative proof that he was responsible for or
willfully evaded the payment was not dispositive, for Illinois law shifts
the burden of proof, both on production and persuasion, to the respon-
sible officer once a Notice of Penalty Liability is issued. The Seventh
Circuit ruled for respondent, holding that the burden of proof remained
with petitioner, just as it would have been on Stoecker had the proceed-
ings taken place outside of bankruptcy, and finding that petitioner had
not satisfied the burden of persuasion.
Held: When the substantive law creating a tax obligation puts the burden
of proof on a taxpayer, the burden of proof on the tax claim in bank-
ruptcy court remains where the substantive law put it (in this case, on
the trustee in bankruptcy). Pp. 20–26.
(a) Creditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy arise from the underlying
substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation, subject to any qualify-
ing or contrary Bankruptcy Code provisions. See Butner v. United
States, 440 U. S. 48, 55. The basic federal rule in bankruptcy is that
state law governs the substance of claims. Id., at 57. In this case,
Illinois tax law establishes the estate’s obligation to respondent, placing
the burden of proof on the responsible officer. That burden of proof is
a substantive aspect of such a claim, given its importance to the out-
come of cases. See, e. g., Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267, 271. Tax law is no
candidate for exception from the general rule, for the very fact that the

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16 RALEIGH v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF REVENUE
Syllabus
burden has often been shifted to the taxpayer indicates how critical it is.
Several compelling rationales for this shift—the government’s vital in-
terest in acquiring its revenue, the taxpayer’s readier access to the rele-
vant information, and the importance of encouraging voluntary com-
pliance—are powerful justifications not to be disregarded lightly. The
Bankruptcy Code makes no provision for altering the burden of proof
on a tax claim, and its silence indicates that no change was intended.
Pp. 20–22.
(b) The trustee’s appeals to Code silence are rejected. The state of
pre-Code law does not indicate that the Code is silent because it was
predicated on an alteration of the substantive law of obligations once
a taxpayer enters bankruptcy. And although Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, suggested that “allowance”
of claims is a federal matter, that case concerned distribution of assets,
not the validity of claims in the first instance, which, Vanston specifi-
cally states, is to be determined by reference to state law, id., at 161.
Nor is the trustee helped by the reference, in City of New York v. Saper,
336 U. S. 328, 332, to “prov[ing]” government claims in the same manner
as other debts, for that reference was to the procedure by which proof
of claim was submitted, not to the validity of the claim. Finally, the
trustee’s argument that the Code-mandated priority enjoyed by taxing
authorities over other creditors requires a compensating equality of
treatment when it comes to demonstrating validity of claims distorts a
bankruptcy court’s legitimate powers and begs the question about the
relevant principle of equality. Pp. 22–26.
179 F. 3d 546, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Robert Radasevich argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Phil C. Neal, David A. Eide, and
John W. Guarisco.
A. Benjamin Goldgar, Assistant Attorney General of Illi-
nois, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
brief were James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Joel D. Ber-
tocchi, Solicitor General, and James D. Newbold, Assistant
Attorney General.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Act-

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17 Cite as: 530 U. S. 15 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
ing Assistant Attorney General Junghans, Kent L. Jones,
Kenneth L. Greene, and Steven W. Parks.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question raised here is who bears the burden of proof
on a tax claim in bankruptcy court when the substantive
law creating the tax obligation puts the burden on the tax-
payer (in this case, the trustee in bankruptcy). We hold
that bankruptcy does not alter the burden imposed by the
substantive law.
I
The issue of state tax liability in question had its genesis
in the purchase of an airplane by Chandler Enterprises, Inc.,
a now-defunct Illinois company. William J. Stoecker, for
whom petitioner Raleigh is the trustee in bankruptcy, was
president of Chandler in 1988, when Chandler entered into a
lease-purchase agreement for the plane, moved it to Illinois,
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation by James J. Keightley, William G. Beyer,
Israel Goldowitz, Nathaniel Rayle, and Charles G. Cole; for the State of
New Mexico et al. by Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General of New Mex-
ico, Donald F. Harris, Special Assistant Attorney General, and James I.
Shepard, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Sal-
azar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of
Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa,
Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ket-
terer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of
Massachusetts, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Hatch of Minne-
sota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, John J.
Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D.
Montgomery of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Penn-
sylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South
Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Jan Graham of Utah, William
H. Sorrell of Vermont, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Gay
Woodhouse of Wyoming; and for the Council of State Governments et al.
by Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, and Steven H. Goldblatt.

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18 RALEIGH v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF REVENUE
Opinion of the Court
and ultimately took title under the agreement. See In re
Stoecker, 179 F. 3d 546, 548 (CA7 1999).
According to respondent State Department of Revenue,
the transaction was subject to the Illinois use tax, a sales-tax
substitute imposed on Illinois residents such as Chandler
who buy out of State. If the seller does not remit the tax,
the buyer must, and, when buying a plane, must file a return
and pay the tax within 30 days after the aircraft enters the
State. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, § 105/10 (1999). Chandler
failed to do this.
When the State discovers a failure to file and pay taxes,
its Department of Revenue (the respondent here) determines
the amount of tax due and issues a Notice of Tax Liability
to the taxpayer. §§ 105/12, 120/4. Unless the taxpayer pro-
tests within the time provided, the assessment becomes final,
though still subject to judicial review in the Illinois circuit
court. §§ 120/4, 12.
Illinois law also provides that any corporate officer “who
has the control, supervision or responsibility of filing returns
and making payment of the amount of any . . . tax . . . who
wilfully fails to file the return or make the payment . . .
shall be personally liable for a penalty equal to the total
amount of tax unpaid by the [corporation].” § 735/3–7. The
department determines the amount, and its determination
is “prima facie evidence of a penalty due,” ibid., though a
Notice of Penalty Liability issued under this provision is
open to challenge much like the antecedent Notice of Tax
Liability.
By the time the department discovered the unpaid tax
in this case, Chandler was defunct and Stoecker was in
bankruptcy. The department issued both a Notice of Tax
Liability against Chandler and a Notice of Penalty Liability
against Stoecker. See 179 F. 3d, at 549.
The record evidence about Chandler’s operations is mini-
mal. A person named Pluhar acted as its financial officer.

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There is no evidence directly addressing Stoecker’s role in
the filing of Chandler’s tax returns or the payment of any
taxes, and so no affirmative proof that he either was re-
sponsible for or willfully evaded the payment of the use tax,
see id., at 550. This evidentiary dearth is not necessarily
dispositive, however, due to the provision of Illinois law
shifting the burden of proof, on both production and per-
suasion, to the responsible officer once a Notice of Penalty
Liability is issued, see Branson v. Department of Revenue,
168 Ill. 2d 247, 256–261, 659 N. E. 2d 961, 966–968 (1995).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accordingly
ruled for the Department of Revenue. 179 F. 3d, at 550.
The Court of Appeals thought the trustee may have satis-
fied his burden of production by identifying Pluhar as the
financial officer but, in any event, had not satisfied his burden
of persuasion. Because Stoecker was the president and, as
far as the record showed, he and Pluhar were the only offi-
cers, each would have been involved in Chandler’s tax affairs.
Ibid. While it is true that failure to pay must be willful
(at least grossly negligent) to justify the penalty under Illi-
nois law, see Branson, supra, at 254–255, 659 N. E. 2d, at
965, and true that Chandler had an opinion letter from a
reputable lawyer that no tax was due because of certain de-
tails of the lease-purchase agreement, there was no evidence
that Stoecker ever saw the letter or relied on it, and nothing
else bearing on the issue of willfulness. See 179 F. 3d, at
550–551.
Obviously, the burden of proof was critical to the reso-
lution of the case, which the Department of Revenue won
because the Court of Appeals held that the burden remained
on the trustee, just as it would have been on the taxpayer
had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy. The
Courts of Appeals are divided on this point: the Seventh
Circuit joined the Third and Fourth Circuits in leaving the
burden on the taxpayer. See Resyn Corp. v. United States,

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20 RALEIGH v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF REVENUE
Opinion of the Court
851 F. 2d 660, 663 (CA3 1988); In re Landbank Equity Corp.,
973 F. 2d 265, 270–271 (CA4 1992). The Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have come
out the other way. See In re Placid Oil Co., 988 F. 2d 554,
557 (CA5 1993); In re Brown, 82 F. 3d 801, 804–805 (CA8
1996); In re Macfarlane, 83 F. 3d 1041, 1044–1045 (CA9 1996),
cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1115 (1997); In re Fullmer, 962 F. 2d
1463, 1466 (CA10 1992). We granted certiorari to resolve
the issue, 528 U. S. 1068 (2000), and now affirm.
II
Creditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first
instance from the underlying substantive law creating the
debtor’s obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See Butner v. United
States, 440 U. S. 48, 55 (1979); Vanston Bondholders Pro-
tective Comm. v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 161–162 (1946). The
“basic federal rule” in bankruptcy is that state law governs
the substance of claims, Butner, supra, at 57, Congress hav-
ing “generally left the determination of property rights in
the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law,” 440 U. S., at 54
(footnote omitted). “Unless some federal interest requires a
different result, there is no reason why [the state] interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.” Id., at 55.
In this case, the bankruptcy estate’s obligation to the Illi-
nois Department of Revenue is established by that State’s
tax code, which puts the burden of proof on the responsible
officer of the taxpayer, see Branson, supra, at 260–262, 659
N. E. 2d, at 968.
The scope of the obligation is the issue here. Do the
State’s right and the taxpayer’s obligation include the bur-
den of proof? Our cases point to an affirmative answer.
Given its importance to the outcome of cases, we have long
held the burden of proof to be a “substantive” aspect of a

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claim. See, e. g., Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267, 271 (1994);
Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 437, 446 (1959);
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 249 (1942).
That is, the burden of proof is an essential element of the
claim itself; one who asserts a claim is entitled to the burden
of proof that normally comes with it.
Tax law is no candidate for exception from this general
rule, for the very fact that the burden of proof has often
been placed on the taxpayer indicates how critical the bur-
den rule is, and reflects several compelling rationales: the
vital interest of the government in acquiring its lifeblood,
revenue, see Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central
Ark., 520 U. S. 821, 826 (1997); the taxpayer’s readier access
to the relevant information, see United States v. Rexach,
482 F. 2d 10, 16 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1039 (1973);
and the importance of encouraging voluntary compliance
by giving taxpayers incentives to self-report and to keep
adequate records in case of dispute, see United States v.
Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141, 145 (1975). These are powerful
justifications not to be disregarded lightly.1
Congress of course may do what it likes with entitlements
in bankruptcy, but there is no sign that Congress meant to
alter the burdens of production and persuasion on tax claims.
The Code in several places, to be sure, establishes particular
burdens of proof. See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 362(g) (relief from
automatic stay), § 363(o) (adequate protection for creditors),
1 It is true that a trustee may have less access to the facts than a tax-
payer with personal knowledge, but the trustee takes custody of the tax-
payer’s records, see 11 U. S. C. § 521(4), and may have greater access to
the taxpayer than a creditor. Even if the trustee’s advantage is some-
what less than the original taxpayer’s, the difference hardly overcomes
the compelling justifications for shifting the burden of proof. The gov-
ernment, of course, is in no better position than it ever was, and remains
without access to sources of proof when the taxpayer has not kept suffi-
cient documentation.

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§ 364(d)(2) (same), § 547(g) (avoidability of preferential trans-
fer), § 1129(d) (confirmation of plan for purpose of avoiding
taxes). But the Code makes no provision for altering the
burden on a tax claim, and its silence says that no change
was intended.2
III
The trustee looks for an advantage in the very silence of
the Code, however, first by arguing that actual, historical
practice favored trustees under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
and various pre-Code revisions up to the current Code’s en-
actment in 1978. He says that courts operating in the days
of the Bankruptcy Act, which was silent on the burden to
prove the validity of claims, almost uniformly placed the
burden on those seeking a share of the bankruptcy estate.
Because the Code generally incorporates pre-Code practice
in the absence of explicit revision, the argument goes, and
because the Code is silent here, we should follow the pre-
Code practice even when this would reverse the burden
imposed outside bankruptcy. This tradition makes sense,
petitioner urges, because in bankruptcy tax authorities are
no longer opposed to the original taxpayer, and the choice
is no longer merely whether the tax claim is paid but
whether other innocent creditors must share the bankruptcy
estate with the taxing government.
We, however, find history less availing to the trustee than
he says. While some pre-Code cases put the burden of proof
2 The legislative history indicates that the burden of proof on the issue
of establishing claims was left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
See S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 62 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95–595, p. 352 (1977).
The Bankruptcy Rules are silent on the burden of proof for claims; while
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(f) provides that a proof of
claim (the name for the proper form for filing a claim against a debtor) is
“prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim,” this rule
does not address the burden of proof when a trustee disputes a claim.
The Rules thus provide no additional guidance.

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on taxing authorities,3 others put it on the trustee,4 and still
others cannot be fathomed.5 This state of things is the end
of the argument, for without the weight of solid authority on
the trustee’s side, we cannot treat the Code as predicated
on an alteration of the substantive law of obligations once a
taxpayer enters bankruptcy. Cf. United Sav. Assn. of Tex.
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365,
381–382 (1988) (“The at best divided [pre-Code] authority . . .
removes all cause for wonder that the alleged departure
from it should not have been commented upon in the legisla-
tive history”).
The trustee makes a different appeal to Code silence in
pointing to language in Vanston Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Green, 329 U. S. 156 (1946), suggesting that “allow-
ance” of claims is a federal matter. But “allowance” re-
ferred to the ordering of valid claims when that case was
decided, see id., at 162–163, and Vanston, in fact, concerned
3 See, e. g., United States v. Sampsell, 224 F. 2d 721, 722–723 (CA9 1955);
In re Avien, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1335, 1341–1342 (EDNY 1975), aff ’d, 532
F. 2d 273 (CA2 1976); In re Gorgeous Blouse Co., 106 F. Supp. 465 (SDNY
1952); see also In re Highway Constr. Co., 105 F. 2d 863, 866 (CA6 1939)
(apparently accepting lower court’s placement of burden of proof on tax
authority).
4 See, e. g., In re Uneco, Inc., 532 F. 2d 1204, 1207 (CA8 1976); Paschal
v. Blieden, 127 F. 2d 398, 401–402 (CA8 1942); In re Lang Body Co., 92
F. 2d 338, 341 (CA6 1937), cert. denied sub nom. Hipp v. Boyle, 303 U. S.
637 (1938); United States v. Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 83 F. 2d 423, 425
(CA9), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 573 (1936). Some of these cases, such as
Paschal and Lang Body Co., appear to confuse the burden of production
(which ceases to be relevant upon presentation of a trustee’s case) with
the burden of persuasion, under tax statutes that shift the entire burden
of proof to the taxpayer. Whatever we make of their reasoning, these
cases do not follow the rule whose pedigree petitioner wishes to establish.
5 See, e. g., Fiori v. Rothensies, 99 F. 2d 922 (CA3 1938) (per curiam)
(discussing prima facie value of tax authority’s claim, but failing to discuss
burden of proof); Dickinson v. Riley, 86 F. 2d 385 (CA8 1936) (resolving
claim without reference to burden of proof); In re Clayton Magazines,
Inc., 77 F. 2d 852 (CA2 1935) (same).

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distribution of assets, not the validity of claims in the first
instance, see In re Highland Superstores, Inc., 154 F. 3d 573,
578 (CA6 1998); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F. 2d 387, 394–395 (CA5
1955). The burden of proof rule in question here bears only
on validity, and as to that the Vanston opinion specifically
states that “[w]hat claims of creditors are valid and sub-
sisting obligations . . . is to be determined by reference to
state law.” 329 U. S., at 161 (footnote omitted). Nor is the
trustee helped by City of New York v. Saper, 336 U. S. 328,
332 (1949), which mentions “prov[ing]” government claims
in the same manner as other debts; the reference was to
the procedure by which proof of claim was submitted and
not to the validity of the claim. While it is true that federal
law has generally evolved to impose the same procedural re-
quirements for claim submission on tax authorities as on
other creditors, ibid., nothing in that evolution has touched
the underlying laws on the elements sufficient to prove a
valid state claim.
Finally, the trustee argues that the Code-mandated pri-
ority enjoyed by taxing authorities over other creditors, see
11 U. S. C. §§ 507(a), 503(b)(1)(B), requires a compensating
equality of treatment when it comes to demonstrating va-
lidity of claims. But we think his argument distorts the
legitimate powers of a bankruptcy court and begs the ques-
tion about the relevant principle of equality.
Bankruptcy courts do indeed have some equitable powers
to adjust rights between creditors. See, e. g., § 510(c) (equi-
table subordination). That is, within the limits of the Code,
courts may reorder distributions from the bankruptcy es-
tate, in whole or in part, for the sake of treating legitimate
claimants to the estate equitably. But the scope of a bank-
ruptcy court’s equitable power must be understood in the
light of the principle of bankruptcy law discussed already,
that the validity of a claim is generally a function of under-
lying substantive law. Bankruptcy courts are not author-
ized in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution

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of underlying law controlling the validity of creditors’ enti-
tlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself
provides. See United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabrica-
tors of Utah, Inc., 518 U. S. 213, 228–229 (1996); United
States v. Noland, 517 U. S. 535, 543 (1996).
Moreover, even on the assumption that a bankruptcy court
were to have a free hand, the case for a rule placing the
burden of proof uniformly on all bankruptcy creditors is not
self-evidently justified by the trustee’s invocation of equality.
Certainly the trustee has not shown that equal treatment
of all bankruptcy creditors in proving debts is more com-
pelling than equal treatment of comparable creditors in and
out of bankruptcy. The latter sort of equality can be pro-
vided by a bankruptcy court as a matter of course, whereas
the trustee’s notion of equality could not be uniformly ob-
served consistently with other bankruptcy principles. Con-
sider the case when tax litigation is pending at the time
the taxpayer files for bankruptcy. The tax litigation will
be subject to an automatic stay, but the stay can be lifted by
the bankruptcy court for cause, see 11 U. S. C. § 362(d)(1),
which could well include, among other things, a lack of good
faith in attempting to avoid tax proceedings, or in attempt-
ing to favor private creditors who might escape the disad-
vantage of a priority tax claim under the trustee’s proposed
rule. See generally 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07[6][a],
pp. 362–101 to 362–102 (rev. 15th ed. 2000) (noting that bad
faith commencement of case justifies lifting stay); Internal
Revenue Service v. Bacha, 166 B. R. 611, 612 (Bkrtcy. Ct.
Md. 1993) (lifting automatic stay when bankruptcy filing was
attempt to avoid tax proceedings). If the bankruptcy court
exercises its discretion to lift the stay, the burden of proof
will be on the taxpayer in the pre-existing tax litigation, and
a tax liability determination will be final. See 11 U. S. C.
§ 505(a)(2)(A). We see no reason that Congress would have
intended the burden of proof (and consequent vindication
of this trustee’s vision of equality) to depend on whether

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26 RALEIGH v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF REVENUE
Opinion of the Court
tax authorities have initiated proceedings against a debtor
before a bankruptcy filing. Thus, the uncertainty and in-
creased complexity that would be generated by the trustee’s
position is another reason to stick with the simpler rule, that
in the absence of modification expressed in the Bankruptcy
Code the burden of proof on a tax claim in bankruptcy re-
mains where the substantive tax law puts it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.